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Re´sume´
L’internet constitue aujourd’hui un milieu interactif ou` les communaute´s et les e´conomies virtuelles
gagnent de l’importance par rapport a` leurs contreparties traditionnelles. Tandis que ce de´calage cre´e
des occasions et avantages qui ont de´ja` ame´liore´s notre vie quotidienne, il apporte e´galement une toute
nouvelle se´rie de proble`mes. Par exemple, le manque d’interaction physique qui caracte´rise la majorite´
des transactions e´lectroniques rend les syste`mes beaucoup plus susceptibles a` la fraude et a` la tromperie.
Les me´canismes de re´putation offrent une manie`re nouvelle et efficace d’assurer la confiance qui est
essentielle au fonctionnement de chaque marche´. Ils rassemblent les informations sur l’histoire (c.-a`-d.
les transactions ante´rieures) des agents qui participent dans le marche´, et publient leur re´putation.
Les futurs associe´s guident leurs de´cisions en conside´rant l’information sur la re´putation, et sont ainsi
capable de faire les meilleurs choix. Les me´canismes de re´putation en ligne connaissent un succe`s
remarquable: ils sont pre´sents dans la plupart des syste`mes commerciaux de´ploye´s aujourd’hui, et sont
se´rieusement consulte´s par les utilisateurs humains.
La valeur e´conomique de la re´putation en ligne soule`ve des questions concernant la fiabilite´ des
me´canismes eux-meˆmes. Les syste`mes actuels ont e´te´ conc¸us en supposant que les utilisateurs partageront
honneˆtement leurs avis. Cependant, des e´tudes re´centes ont de´montre´ qu’il existe des utilisateurs qui
de´naturent la ve´rite´ pour manipuler la re´putation.
La pre´sente the`se de´crit diffe´rentes manie`res de rendre les me´canismes de re´putation en ligne plus
dignes de confiance, en encouragent les participants a` communiquer honneˆtement les informations qu’ils
de´tiennent. Diffe´rents types de me´canismes de re´putation sont e´tudie´s, et pour chacun, des me´canismes
pour re´compenser les agents qui rapportent la ve´rite´ sont pre´sente´s. Les proble`mes lie´s a` la complicite´
(c.-a`-d. la coordination de la strate´gie de plusieurs agents afin de manipuler le syste`me) et a` la ro-
bustesse sont e´galement e´tudie´s. De plus, cette the`se de´crit une nouvelle application des me´canismes
de re´putation pour surveiller la qualite´ livre´e par des fournisseurs de services, et e´tudie les facteurs qui
motivent et influencent des utilisateurs humains qui postent leurs avis dans des forums existants.
Mots cle´s: me´canismes de re´putation en ligne, feedback, incentive-compatibility, la collusion,
mechanism design, la the´orie des jeux
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vAbstract
The internet is moving rapidly towards an interactive milieu where online communities and economies
gain importance over their traditional counterparts. While this shift creates opportunities and benefits
that have already improved our day-to-day life, it also brings a whole new set of problems. For example,
the lack of physical interaction that characterizes most electronic transactions, leaves the systems much
more susceptible to fraud and deception.
Reputation mechanisms offer a novel and effective way of ensuring the necessary level of trust
which is essential to the functioning of any market. They collect information about the history (i.e.,
past transactions) of market participants and make public their reputation. Prospective partners guide
their decisions by considering reputation information, and thus make more informative choices. Online
reputation mechanisms enjoy huge success. They are present in most e-commerce sites available today,
and are seriously taken into consideration by human users.
The economical value of online reputation raises questions regarding the trustworthiness of mecha-
nisms themselves. Existing systems were conceived with the assumption that users will share feedback
honestly. However, we have recently seen increasing evidence that some users strategically manipulate
their reports.
This thesis describes ways of making online reputation mechanisms more trustworthy by providing
incentives to rational agents for reporting honest feedback. Different kinds of reputation mechanisms
are investigated, and for each, I present mechanisms for rewarding the agents that report truthfully.
Problems related to collusion (i.e., several agents coordinate their strategies in order to manipulate
reputation information) and robustness are also investigated. Moreover, this thesis describes a novel
application of incentive compatible reputation mechanisms to the area of quality of service monitoring,
and investigates factors that motivate and bias human users when reporting feedback in existing review
forums.
Keywords: Online reputation mechanisms, feedback, incentive-compatibility, collusion, reporting
behavior, mechanism design, game theory
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the beginning of the eleventh century, Khalluf ben Musa sends a letter from Palermo (Sicily) to
his business partner, Yeshua ben Ismail from Alexandria. The writer is a respectable jewish merchant,
deeply unsatisfied with his partner’s performance. The letter was written “on the eve of the New Year”1
just after Khalluf learned much to his surprise, that the partnership with Yeshua brought him no profit
in that year.
As it was customary in that period, the business partnership between Khalluf and Yeshua was based
on reciprocally handling each other’s goods: merchandise sent to Alexandria on Khalluf’s account was
to be handled (sold or rerouted to other destinations) by Yeshua, while Khalluf would provide the same
services for Yeshua in Palermo. We learn from the letter that Khalluf kept his part of the deal and
rigourously carried out Yeshua’s instructions. Khalluf’s goods, however, “remained unsold year after
year” because Yeshua didn’t take proper care of them. Khalluf is deeply disappointed with his partner’s
performance and concludes that: “Had I listen to what people say, I never would have entered into a
partnership with you”.
The same letter carries on with a detailed account of Khalluf’s services for Yeshua. Asarum2,
cinnamon, clove, aloe, flax and ginger were all sold without problems. Pepper, however was in very low
demand: “The price went down to 130, but still no one bought. [...] I held [the pepper] until the time
when the sailing of the ships approached, in the hope it would rise. However, the slump got worse.
Then I was afraid that suspicion might arise against me and sold your pepper to Spanish merchants for
133.”.
Trading conditions for pepper changed “the night before the sailing of the ships”. Boats with new
buyers arrived, which took the price of pepper up. Khalluf was able to sell his own pepper for 140-142.
He then surprisingly announces: “But brother, I would not like to take the profit [from selling pepper in
better circumstances] for myself. Therefore I transfer the entire sale to our partnership”.
The letter concludes with various details about transaction costs, current prices and settlement of
past payments, followed by Khalluf’s intention to end the partnership with Yeshua: “I ask you to settle
my account with yourself and give the balance to my brother-in-low, for you are a very busy man.”
I chose to start this introduction with a letter from one thousand years ago because it reveals
several important aspects that have dominated trading activities ever since the Middle Age. The first,
1The original letter is preserved by the Bodleian Library, Oxford; an english translation was published by Goitein
(1973, page 120)
2a medical plant imported from the Orient
1
2 Introduction
is the existence of Word-of-Mouth. Although geographically far apart, Khalluf had information about
Yeshua even prior to their partnership. Khalluf had apparently heard rumors that Yeshua was not a
reliable business partner; nevertheless, he chose to ignore them. Khalluf later discovered at his own
expense that the rumors were right: “Had I listen to what people say, I never would have entered into a
partnership with you”. Considering the delay and noise of communication channels at that time (letters
and messages were often lost, or took weeks, even months, to get delivered), the fact that a merchant
from Sicily had reliable information about another merchant from Egypt is remarkable.
The second aspect is a merchant’s strong incentive to carry out the instructions given to him by his
business partner. Khalluf knew that circumstances for selling pepper were not right, but rather than
breaking the implicit contract between him and Yeshua (a contract that required him to sell Yeshua’s
pepper), he chose to sell the pepper for a lower price, avoiding thus the “suspicions” that “might arise
against” him.
Third, and perhaps the most interesting, is Khalluf’s decision to act generously towards Yeshua,
by sharing with him profits that resulted from providential fortune. Khalluf had no way of knowing
that pepper prices would change within days, so his decision to sell Yeshua’s pepper for 133 dinars
(considered a low price) was perfectly justifiable. In fact, any other merchant would have done (and
apparently did) the same. “The night before the sailing of the ships” Khalluf was one of the few
merchants to still have pepper for sale, which allowed him to obtain a much better price. Nevertheless,
Khalluf generously split the profit with Yeshua, and compensated for the bad deal made a few days
ago. Khalluf’s action is even more surprising considering that he wanted to end his partnership with
Yeshua.
These three aspects provide strong evidence for the existence of an informal reputation mechanism
among the traders from the Mediterranean basin (Greif, 1989). Although located in different parts of
the Mediterranean coast, traders were part of the same community, sharing the same values and norms
regarding appropriate business conduct. In the case of Khalluf and Yeshua, they both belonged to
a group of Jewish traders mainly known as the Maghribi traders. One norm of the Maghribi was to
exchange information about the performance of previous partners, such that the community would be
informed about the past behavior of its members. Merchants anyway had to communicate frequently in
order to react to changing market conditions, so the overhead for transmitting reputation information
was insignificant. This is why Khalluf was able to learn that Yeshua is not a trustworthy partner prior
to establishing a partnership.
The main role of the reputation mechanism was to establish incentives for individual traders to
respect the implicit or explicit contracts with their business partners. Although local and religious
laws have long before condemned the breaking of business agreements, they had little power to enforce
contracts on an international level. Firstly, courts were hardly capable to verify claims about oversees
activities. A merchant from Sicily, for example, could understate sicilian market prices to his business
partner from Egypt, and thus pocket the difference for selling the latter’s goods for a higher price.
Any complaint filed by the merchant in Egypt would probably remain unresolved, since neither the
merchant, nor the court would be capable to exactly establish the prices obtained in Sicily. Secondly,
the procedure for tracking emigrating merchants, if at all possible, was costly and lengthy. A borrower,
for example, could set sail to a distant location and refuse to pay back his loan. International police
cooperation was unimaginable in those days, so the fugitive would probably enjoy a prosperous life. One
way or another, merchants could have easily cheated and remain unpunished, either because evidence
could not be gathered against them, or because they could evade judgement.
The reputation mechanism, however, works based on two main principles. First, it establishes a
merchant’s identity as a God fearing person, who would never deviate from the religious norms. These
norms, among others, condemned cheating in business relations, which meant that the merchant could
be safely trusted with business oversees. Second, the reputation mechanism creates a gap between the
3expected future revenue of a merchant with good reputation as opposed to one with bad reputation.
The Maghribi traders implicitly agreed to partner only with reputable peers, such that a person who lost
his reputation was effectively excluded from the community. Cheating was thus deterred by economic
sanctions rather than legal action: the momentary gain obtained from breaking a contract was largely
offset by the future loss caused by a lost reputation. The punishment was so effective that Maghribis
could strongly trust each other, and thus take full advantage of prosperous business opportunities arising
from international trade. All this, with extremely rare appeal to local courts.
Khalluf’s actions are suddenly easier to explain. When he sells Yeshua’s pepper for a low price
fearing the “suspicions that might arise against [him]”, he explicitly reacts in order to maintain his
reputation. Good reputation was a merchant’s greatest asset, and nobody in their right mind would
endanger it. The punishment for losing reputation was in fact so great, that Khalluf goes well beyond
his contractual obligations. He shares with Yeshua the profit made by selling his own paper, hoping
that his generosity will further strengthen his reputation. The fact that Khalluf wants to end his
partnership with Yeshua has little importance: other community members will learn about Khalluf’s
behavior and will reward him by increased trust. The reputation mechanism was therefore effective
even for short-time partnerships between the same two merchants, or towards the end of a merchant’s
life (the reputation would normally be inherited by ones offsprings).
By the late 13th century, however, the system based on inter and intra-community reputation ex-
perienced a harsh decline (Greif, 2002). As the number of communities increased and the communities
grew in size, it became easier for malicious traders to change their identity, falsify their community affil-
iation and avoid punishments for unappropriate conduct. The cost of reputation management became
simply too high (the larger the community, the longer and costlier was the propagation of negative
feedback), and as a consequence, the threat of losing reputation became less effective. Starting with
England and expanding all over Europe, the late Medieval period is associated with the development of
state-owned contract enforcement institutions that make every individual accountable for misconduct.
Slowly improving over the ages, the same system based in individual responsibility towards a central
authority regulates economic transactions today. Reputation continues to play an important informal
role for selecting capable business partners. Nevertheless, it is mostly lawyers and the threat of legal
action, not public defamation, that keeps all parties to stick to the contractual agreements.
Why, then, should you carry on reading this thesis on reputation? The concept is old as society
itself, and seems to have lost its importance over the years. The main reason is that we are looking
at reputation mechanisms in a new context: that of online systems. The widespread adoption of the
internet has created a global network that dramatically facilitates the communication between people
and computers around the world. This technological advancement created new business opportunities,
and changed the way people interact. Our day to day life has known numerous improvements ranging
from basically free communication, to an explosion of choice regarding products and services.
Nevertheless, online interactions raised a whole new set of problems regarding trust and security.
According to the US Federal Trade Commission approximately one half of all consumer fraud reports
in 2006 were related to the Internet3. This is an area where reputation mechanisms can be useful, for
the reasons I’ll describe below.
First, the effective contract enforcing institutions that regulate oﬄine trade have limited power in
online settings. From this perspective, online trade resembles that of the Middle Ages: litigation claims
are difficult and/or costly to verify, and legal punishments are difficult to impose on online users. Take
for example eBay4, the online auctioning site where buyers and sellers from all over the world meet to
exchange goods for money. Once a buyer wins an auction (by bidding the maximum amount) she pays
directly to the seller the price of the good. Upon receipt of payment, the seller is supposed to deliver
3The full report is available at http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/Top10Fraud2006.pdf
4www.ebay.com
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(usually by post) the promised good directly to the buyer. If, however, the buyer does not receive
the good (or receives a good of lesser quality), the legal resolution of the resulting conflict would be
extremely expensive: establishing with reasonable certainty whether or not the seller shipped the right
good would probably cost much more than the good itself. Moreover, even when the seller is clearly
guilty, (a) establishing a link between the seller’s online and physical identity is often not trivial, and
(b) obtaining the cooperation of the police authority in the country of residence of the seller may be
problematic (as, for example, the local legislation in that country does not recognize online fraud).
Second, a wide range of fraudulent online activities are not yet (or only starting to be) punishable
by law. Phishing5, for example, has only recently been accepted as a criminal offence (the US senate
voted anti-phishing laws in 2005; similar laws were introduced in UK in 20066). Spam7, another
example, is only partly punishable by law. On the other hand, many other activities are unlikely to be
ever mentioned in a law. Falsifying information on Wikipedia (the online collaborative encyclopedia),
deliberatively providing wrong answers to a question posed on Yahoo! Answers, or tweaking web sites
with commercial content in order to rank higher in search engines are just some of the examples.
Third, people like to think that online communities are natural extensions of their traditional,
oﬄine counterparts. They prefer to see the same kind of social control mechanisms functioning in
online environments, where status and reputation, rather than abstract law, inspire people to behave
cooperatively. Moreover, the underlying structure and philosophy behind the internet seem to disfavor a
centralized solution. The internet itself is not subject to the control of a single authority, and functions
in a distributed way. Self-organized, peer-to-peer applications designed explicitly to avoid any central
control have flourished in the last years.
Forth, the cost of reputation management in online systems can be considered negligible. The com-
munication cost for sending reputation information is significantly smaller online than oﬄine. Moreover,
information can get almost instantaneously to every corner of the world regardless the size of the commu-
nity: updating reputation information in an online community of one thousand or one million members
costs approximately the same.
In fact, online reputation mechanisms perform much better when they act in large communities.
Higher number of reputation reports allow a better estimation of reputation information, less prone to
errors in reporting and noise. For example, several Maghribi traders report having lost their reputation
as a consequence of one, wrongful report. Today on eBay, on the other hand, one erroneous negative
report amidst thousands of positive ones would hardly affect the business of an honest seller. Moreover,
feedback can be discussed (e.g., sellers on eBay have the right to reply to negative feedback posted by
clients) giving agents a powerful tool for defending themselves against mistaken or malicious reports.
Therefore, the very same factors that led to the decline of Medieval reputation mechanisms (information
delays and increased costs due to large communities) represent an opportunity for online reputation
mechanisms.
Last but not least, reputation mechanisms can be designed individually for every community or
market, in order to best take advantage of the particularities of that environment. For example, the
mechanism designer can decide what information to elicit from the participants, how to aggregate feed-
back into reputation, and how to disseminate reputation information. While it makes perfect sense to
have different reputation mechanisms acting on eBay or Amazon (governed by different rules, conceived
to maximize the utility of the mechanism in the targeted community), it would certainly be strange
to have different legal systems acting on the aforementioned markets. Locally designed reputation
mechanisms thus have the potential to become more efficient than centralized law enforcement.
5The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines phishing as a scam by which an online user is duped into revealing personal
or confidential information which the scammer can use illicitly.
6http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing
7Unsolicited usually commercial e-mail sent to a large number of addresses (the Merriam-Webster dictionary)
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For all these reasons, online reputation mechanisms have known important commercial success (e.g.,
the success of markets like eBay or Amazon is partly attributed to their reputation mechanism) and
have been the subject of intense research efforts in the last years. Today, they have been accepted
as standard components of any collaborative system involving some risky interactions. We use online
reputation mechanisms when searching for information, when booking trips, when purchasing electronic
equipment or for choosing our service providers. Our increasing reliance on reputation information, on
the other hand, creates “reputation premiums” so that products and providers with better reputation
are able to gain more.
The economical value of online reputation raises questions regarding the trustworthiness of mecha-
nisms themselves. Existing systems were conceived with the assumption that users will share feedback
honestly. However, we have recently seen increasing evidence that some users strategically manipulate
their reports. For some sites, the extent of spam feedback called for immediate solutions to eliminate
suspicious reports. Known approaches include ad-hoc semi-manual, semi-automatic filters that provide
satisfactory results only temporarily.
In this thesis I am concerned with a more systematic approach to making reputation mecha-
nisms trustworthy. First, I am addressing the design of reputation mechanisms that are incentive-
compatible, i.e., participants find it rational to share truthful feedback with the reputation mechanism.
In my approach users get rewarded when submitting feedback, and the rewards are designed such that
honest reporting is better than lying by at least some margin. Second, I address the problem of col-
lusion. I show that some incentive-compatible rewards can also make small lying coalitions unstable,
so that colluding agents find it more profitable to quit the coalition and report honestly. Third, I am
interested in making the mechanism robust to noise and private information.
Additionally, I identify novel applications for reputation mechanisms where a reward scheme brings
provable properties about the reliability of reputation information. One such example is quality of
service (QoS) monitoring in decentralized markets of (web-)services. By using the feedback reported
by the clients, the QoS monitoring process can be made more precise, reliable and cheaper.
Last but not least, I look at existing feedback and derive underlying factors that affect users when
submitting feedback. The detailed understanding of the human feedback reporting behavior is hoped to
generate new methods for aggregating reputation information that counterbalance the biases observed
today.
1.1 Summary of the Thesis
I will start by a brief review of the state of the art related to online reputation mechanisms. Chapter 2
reviews the notions of trust, reputation and reputation mechanism, and presents some of the definitions
that have been applied to these concepts in the context of online systems. For the scope of this thesis,
trust will be understood as an agent’s (i.e., the truster) subjective decision to rely on another agent (the
trustee) in a risky situation. The reputation of the trustee is one piece of information considered by the
truster when taking the decision. Reputation information is assumed objective, and disseminated by
a reputation mechanism. The role of reputation information is two-fold: first, to provide information
about the hidden characteristics of the trustee that are relevant for the given situation (i.e., a signaling
role) and second, to make future agents aware about any cheating that occurred in the past (i.e.,
a sanctioning role). The reputation mechanism, on the other hand, (i) provides the infrastructure
for gathering feedback and for disseminating reputation information, (ii) defines the algorithms for
aggregating feedback into reputation, and (iii) defines the interaction protocols and the incentives that
motivate users to participate.
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Truthful Signaling Reputation Mechanisms.
The main role of signaling reputation mechanisms is to disclose hidden quality attributes of products or
service providers based on the feedback of past users. Chapter 3 formally describes such mechanisms,
and is mainly focused on the reporting incentives of the participants. Two factors make obtaining
honest information difficult. First, feedback reporting is usually costly, and requires conscious effort
to formulate and submit feedback. Many agents report only because they have alternative motives, as
for example, extreme satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the service. This leads to a biased sample of
reports and inaccurate reputation information.
Second, truth-telling is not always in the best interest of the reporter. In some settings for instance,
false denigration decreases the reputation of a product and allows the reporter to make a future purchase
for a lower price. In other contexts, providers can offer monetary compensations in exchange for
favorable feedback. One way or another, external benefits can be obtained from lying and selfish agents
will exploit them.
Both problems can be addressed by a payment scheme that explicitly rewards honest feedback by
a sufficient amount to offset both the cost of reporting and the gains that could be obtained through
lying. Fundamental results in game theory show that side payments can be designed to create the
incentive for agents to report their private opinions truthfully. The best such payment schemes have
been previously constructed based on proper scoring rules (Savage, 1971), and reward reports based on
how well they update the current predictor about the observations of other agents (Miller et al., 2005).
Honest reporting thus becomes a Nash equilibrium of the reputation mechanism.
I take an alternative approach using the principle of automated mechanism design (Conitzer and
Sandholm, 2002). The mechanism is specified as an optimization problem where the payments minimize
the budget required to achieve a certain margin for reporting the truth. The simplicity of a closed-form
scoring rule is thus traded for a reduction of the required budget by approximately 50%. Furthermore,
I find that a filtering mechanism (i.e., some reports are filtered out by the mechanism) designed auto-
matically in conjunction with a payment mechanism can further reduce the cost of the mechanism by
up to an order of magnitude.
Unfortunately, incentive compatible payments do not usually have honest reporting as a unique
Nash equilibrium. Other lying equilibria exist, and bring forth the problem of collusion. Rational
agents have no reason to report truthfully if they can do better by coordinating on a lying equilibrium
with higher payoff.
One solution is to fully implement (Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2002) honest reporting, and have it as
the unique equilibrium of the mechanism. Any lying coalition must play a non-equilibrium of the
mechanism and is therefore unstable: i.e., individual colluders will find it rational to quit the coalition.
A second, less strict alternative is to design a mechanism where truth-telling is the “best” equilibrium.
In this case lying coalitions may be stable, but are not profitable. Assuming that rational agents will
not make the effort to collude on a worse-paying lying strategy, the mechanism is collusion-resistant.
I investigate different collusion scenarios where (i) some or all agents collude, (ii) colluders can coor-
dinate or not on asymmetric strategy profiles, and (iii) utilities are transferable or not. For each scenario
I apply the principle of automated mechanism design to specify the incentive-compatible collusion-
resistant payment mechanisms.
Novel Applications of Signaling Reputation Mechanisms.
An increasing fraction of a modern economy consists of services. Services are generally provided under
a contract (or Service Level Agreement) that fixes the type and quality of the service to be provided
as well as penalties if these are not met. An essential requirement for such service provisioning is to be
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able to monitor the quality of service that was actually delivered. As the monetary value of individual
services decreases, the cost of providing accurate monitoring takes up an increasing share of the cost
of providing the service itself. For example, with current technology, reliably monitoring the quality
of a communication service requires constant communication with a neutral third party and would be
almost as costly as providing the service itself. The cost of this monitoring remains a major obstacle
to the wider adoption of a service-oriented economy.
Chapter 4 presents an alternative Quality of Service (QoS) monitoring mechanisms based on feed-
back provided by the clients. Clients are monitoring the quality of the service provided to them, and
periodically report feedback to a reputation mechanism. The reputation mechanism aggregates the
reports and estimates the QoS delivered by a provider to a group of clients. In this way, (a) several
reports can be compressed into one message and communication overhead is reduced, (b) the monitoring
process is as precise as possible because the monitor does not need to sample the service requests, and
(c) the service provider cannot directly tamper with the monitoring process.
Accurate monitoring, however, requires clients to report the truth. The reward schemes for signaling
reputation mechanisms perfectly fit to this setting, and allow the construction of efficient and robust
QoS monitoring systems.
Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms.
A second important role of reputation mechanisms is to provide incentives to rational agents to be-
have cooperatively, even when direct benefits can be obtained from cheating. The main idea is that
present feedback determines the future reputation of an agent, and implicitly affects the future revenues
accessible to the agent. When carefully designed, reputation mechanisms can make it such that the
momentary gain obtained by cheating is offset by the future losses caused by a bad reputation. Cheating
is appropriately sanctioned by the reputation mechanism, and this encourages every participant in the
market to behave cooperatively.
Chapter 5 starts by addressing the design of efficient sanctioning reputation mechanism. The
internet gave us almost complete freedom over design parameters such as (i) the granularity of feedback
requested from the users, (ii) the algorithms for aggregating feedback into reputation information, or
(iii) the extent and form of reputation information dissemination. Dellarocas (2005) discusses binary
reputation mechanisms (where seller, for example, can cooperate or cheat, and buyers can receive high
or low quality) and investigates the effect these design decisions on the efficiency of the mechanism.
The contribution of this chapter is to extend Dellarocas’ results to general settings, where the seller can
choose between several effort levels, and buyers can observe several quality levels.
I find, for example, that a reputation mechanism where the reputation has a binary value (i.e., can
be either good or bad) can be equally efficient to other mechanisms where the reputation is infinitely
finer grained. Moreover, I show that efficient reputation mechanism can function by considering a finite
window of past reports, and finitely grained feedback values. All of these results agree with the findings
of Dellarocas for the binary case.
The second part of Chapter 5 discusses a mechanism (which I have named CONFESS) for encour-
aging the submission of honest feedback. CONFESS works by comparing the feedback submitted by the
buyer to the feedback implicitly submitted by the seller. After every transaction, the seller is allowed
to acknowledge failures and reimburse the affected buyer. If, however, the seller does not reimburse the
buyer, and the buyer submits negatived feedback, the reputation mechanism concludes that one of the
agents is lying, and punishes them both. This simple mechanism supports and equilibrium where all
sellers cooperate, and all buyers report the truth. Moreover, it allows the buyers to build a reputation
for always reporting the truth, which in the end, can be proven to limit the amount of false information
received by the reputation mechanism in any pareto-optimal equilibrium.
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Understanding the Human Feedback Reporting Behavior.
New reputation mechanisms could greatly benefit from the results obtained in the previous chapters.
However, we will still see a great number of commercial implementations that (i) provide little or no
reporting incentives, and (ii) aggregate feedback into reputation information in trivial ways. Since
these naive mechanisms will continue to be important channels for Word-of-mouth, and users will
continue using them for taking purchasing decisions, it is important to better understand the factors
and interaction that drive users to participate and report feedback.
Chapter 6 extends a recent line of research by investigating the factors that (i) drive a user to
submit feedback, and (ii) bias a user in the rating she provides to the reputation mechanism. For that,
I consider two additional sources of information besides the numerical ratings provided by the user:
first the textual comments that accompany the reviews, and second, the timely sequence of reviews
submitted by previous users. All hypotheses were validated by statistical evidence from hotel reviews
on the TripAdvisor website.
The first conclusion is that groups of users who amply discuss a certain feature are more likely to
agree on a common rating for that feature. Moreover, the users who write lengthy textual comments
are not outliers, and their reviews are generally regarded as more helpful by the other users. This
observation can be used to construct feature by feature estimates of quality, where for each feature, the
mechanism averages only the ratings corresponding to lengthy discussion of that feature.
The second result reveals a correlation between the effort spent in writing a review, and the risk
(in terms of making a bad choice) associated to a hotel. Booking a room in a high-end hotel is argued
to be a riskier transaction than booking a low-end hotel, as the traveler pays more without having the
guarantee that she gets the service she wants. Human raters apparently feel motivated to decrease the
decision risk of future users, hence they spend more effort rating the high-end hotels.
Third, the rating expressed by a reviewer appears to be biased by the reviews submitted by previous
users. The information already available in the forum creates a prior expectation of quality, and changes
the user’s subjective perception of quality. The gap between the expectation and the actual quality is
reflected in the rating submitted to the site.
Last but not least, the timely sequence of reviews also reveals another motivation for reporting
feedback. A great proportion of users submit ratings that are significantly different from the average of
previous ratings. This leads to the conclusion that human users are more likely to voice their opinion
when they can bring something different to the discussion, and can contribute with new information.
Chapter 2
Trust, Reputation and Reputation
Mechanisms
In 1970 Akerloff published an article (Akerlof, 1970) that warned about the possible collapse of markets
with asymmetric information. He gives as an example a market of second-hand cars, where buyers
cannot tell before the purchase if the quality of a second-hand car is good or bad. The sellers, who
of course know the real quality of the car they are selling, have the incentive to exploit the lack of
information of buyers, and exaggerate the quality of their cars in order to obtain higher prices. Buyers,
nevertheless, anticipate such strategic incentives, and discount the price they are willing to pay such
that it reflects the average quality on the market. This makes it uninteresting for sellers with good
quality to stay in the market. They don’t have any means to signal that their cars are better than
the average, and therefore, the amount they would receive from the buyers does not make the sale
worthwhile. The fact that good quality sellers will be driven away from the market further decreases
the average quality expected by the buyers, and therefore the price they would be willing to pay. This,
consequently drives sellers with medium quality away from the market. By induction, we end up with a
“Market of Lemons” where only the worst-quality (i.e., the “lemons”) is available in the market. Such
a market will clearly collapse.
You might consider the above example slightly exaggerated. Some of you may have already bought
a second-hand car, and never had any problems with it. You have probably test-driven the car, looked
at the service history, or had it inspected by a workshop in order to verify that the actual product is as
advertised. Second-hand car markets have devised mechanisms to ensure that buyers trust the quality
description offered by the seller, and as a consequence, such markets continue to flourish.
Electronic markets, on the other hand, are much closer to the assumptions set forth by Akerloff.
Take eBay, for example, the auctioning site where sellers post item descriptions and wait for buyers
to bid online. Although side-communication between the seller and the buyers is possible (through
e-mail), the same trust-enabling mechanisms that function in markets for second-hand cars are no
longer available. A buyer from California would never fly over to the East coast in order to inspect an
interesting bicycle posted by a seller from Boston. Even if the buyer and the seller were from the same
region, eBay sellers can rarely accommodate visits. They often operate from the comfort of their living
room, and sell thousands of items. The increased cost of having proper premisses where prospective
buyers can inspect the items makes the whole business unprofitable.
Electronic markets should therefore have a serious trust problem. Sellers have clear incentives to
overestimate the quality of their goods, and buyers should not trust the descriptions they see online.
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According to Akerloff these conditions lead to a market of lemons, and eventually, to the disappearance
of trade.
Nevertheless, eBay cleared auctions worth more than 14 billion dollars in the first quarter of 20071.
There seems to be significant trust between the the bidders and the seller, which encourages profitable
trade. The success of eBay is mostly attributed to the feedback mechanisms that allows bidders to
check the previous history of a particular seller. Following every transaction, eBay encourages both
participants to give feedback about their partner. Feedback is positive, negative or neutral, but may
also contains a textual comment. The history of past feedback received by a seller determines his
reputation, which strongly influences buyers when deciding which seller to trust.
Successful transactions on eBay, like in most electronic markets, seem to involve three important
concepts. First, the trust of the buyers who decide to bid for the item offered by a seller. Second, the
reputation of the seller, which inferred from the history of previous transactions of that seller, allows
buyers to decide whether and whom to trust. Third, the reputation mechanism which collects the
information (feedback) about previous interactions and makes it available to future users.
This chapter attempts to clarify the notions of trust, reputation and reputation mechanisms. I will
start with trust, and review the many definitions that have been applied to this concept. Trust has
been defined as “both a noun and a verb, as both a personality trait and a belief, and as both a social
structure and a behavioral intention” (McKnight and Chervany, 2001). The definition of trust and its
corresponding meaning is a much disputed issue among the computer science community. Since the
human understanding of the notion of trust is much too complex to be modelled within an artificial
system, authors usually consider just facets of the notion of trust, and define it corresponding to their
needs. I will do the same in this thesis, and regard trust as a subjective decision made by an agent
regarding another agent, in a specific context.
I will continue with reputation, and consider it to be one important piece of information agents
consider when taking trust decisions. While trust is subjective (e.g., the fact that agent A trusts agent
B in a certain context, does not mean that another agent C will also trust B in exactly the same context)
reputation is mainly assumed objective, so that all agents view it the same: e.g., the reputation of B
is the same when viewed by A or C. I will also investigate the role of past information in building a
reputation, and the influence of reputation on future decisions.
The last part of this chapter is reserved for an overview of existing (both commercial and academic)
reputation mechanisms.
2.1 Modelling Trust
The Oxford English Dictionary defines trust as “confidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute
of a person or thing”. Deutsch (1962) also identifies a notion of risk associated to trusting somebody
and therefore, “one trusts when one has much to lose and little to gain”. The same notion of risk is
mentioned by Gambetta (1988): “Trust is the subjective probability by which an individual A expects
that another individual B performs a given action on which its welfare depends”.
In psychology, trust occurs when an individual (Alice) is confronted with an ambiguous path, a
path that can lead to an event perceived to be beneficial, or to an event perceived to be harmful. Alice
perceives that the occurrence of the beneficial, respectively harmful event is contingent on the behavior
of another person, Bob. Moreover, Alice perceives that the negative impact of the harmful event is
stronger than the positive impact of the beneficial event. If Alice chooses to take such an ambiguous
1Information released by eBay in its first quarter 2007 financial information report (http://investor.ebay.com)
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path, she makes a trusting choice; otherwise she makes a distrustful choice (Marsh, 1994; Lamsal, 2001).
Marsh (1994) provides an extensive formalization of this concept of trust.
Note that trust, primarily, is the belief that a person (the trustee) will act in the best interest of
another (the truster) in a given situation, even when controls are unavailable and it may not be in the
trustee’s best interest to do so (Marsh and Dibben, 2005). However, trust also involves a decision or
commitment of the truster to rely on the trustee (Sztompka, 1999).
McKnight et al. (2002) and McKnight and Chervany (2001) develop a conceptual topology of the
factors that contribute towards trust and distrust decisions and define as subsets of the high level
concepts measurable constructs for empirical research (see Figure 2.1). In their model, the trust-related
behavior refers to a person’s voluntary reliance on another person with a feeling of relative security,
even though negative consequences are possible. The truster thus gives the trustee some measure of
power over himself/herself.
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Figure 2.1: The McKnight et al. interdisciplinary model of trust.
Trusting behavior is influenced by trusting intentions and trusting beliefs. Trusting intentions refer
to one’s subjective willingness to depend on the other party with a feeling of relative security, in spite
of lack of control over that party, and even though negative consequences are possible. Intentions may
depend on the general state of mind of the truster, but also on the specific context and behavior in
mind: e.g., the intention to trust somebody with keeping information private is generally more likely
than the intention to trust somebody with ones life.
Trusting beliefs, on the other hand, refer to the extent to which one believes, with feeling of relative
security, that the trustee has characteristics beneficial to one. Qualities of interest are: competence (the
truster securely believes that the trustee has the necessary abilities to successfully do what the truster
asked it to do), benevolence (the trustor securely believes that the trustee cares about and is motivated
to act in the truster’s interest), integrity (one securely believes that the other party makes good faith
agreements) and predictability (one securely believes that the other person’s actions, good or bad, are
consistent enough that one can foresee them).
Institutions can also encourage trusting behavior. For example, one may believe that proper laws
and authorities are in place in order to increase the probability of successful outcomes in risky situations.
Such structures and institutions encourage trusting behavior generally, across all trustees and contexts.
Last, but not least, trusting behavior also depends on one’s general disposition to trust : i.e., the extent
to which one displays a consistent tendency to be willing to depend on general others across a broad
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spectrum of situations and persons. Since disposition to trust is a generalized tendency across situations
and persons, it has a major influence on the trust-related behavior only in novel, unfamiliar situations
when we cannot relay on the other components. Parts of disposition to trust are faith in humanity
(assumption that people in general are usually honest, benevolent, competent and predictable) and
trusting stance (belief that regardless of what one assumes about other people generally, one assumes
that one will achieve better outcomes by dealing with people as they were well-meaning and reliable).
Several works extend the model of McKnight, Choudhury, Kacmar and Chervany by explicitly
modeling the risk involved by trusting decisions. Povey (1999), Dimitrakos (2003), Manchala (1998),
and Jøsang and Lo Presti (2004) all argue in favor of trust policies, or algorithms, that based on the
available information quantifying risk and opportunities (i.e., transaction value, probability of failure,
contingency outcomes, etc.) output the decision to trust or not.
Kramer (2001) focuses on explaining how humans decide whether to trust or not. He proposes the
Social Auditor Model (SAM) where the decision process is characterized by a set of rules. These rules
can be classified as:
• interpretation rules, i.e., rules that help us categorize a given trust dilemma and prescribe the sort
of evidence we should look for when trying to assess the another decision maker’s trustworthiness,
and
• action rules, i.e., rules about what behaviors we should engage in when responding to those
interpretations.
Rules are applied based on direct, momentary perceptions from the environment, but also using a
personal mental model of the world. The Social Auditor Model also includes a post-decision auditing
process, when the decision maker evaluates the results of his application of the rules, and updates
accordingly both the set of rules, and their mental model of the world. Kramer also studies the
efficiency of different rules and strategies that can be used within an artificial society.
Bacharach (2002), Falcone and Castelfranchi (2001) and Castelfranchi and Falcone (2000) look at
the dynamics associated with the notion of trust. Trust and distrust responsiveness (trust from the
trustee increases the probability of cooperative behavior from the trustor, while distrust from the trustee
increases the probability of defective behavior) are presented as facts of human behavior. They also
address the dialectic link between trust and degree of control.
From all facets of trust briefly described above, the one I’ll be using most in this thesis refers to the
interpersonal trust between the truster and the trustee. I will abstract away both subjective (e.g., dis-
position or intention to trust) and contextual (e.g., institutions, situations, etc) considerations involved
in trusting decisions, and assume that decisions rely entirely on the beliefs of the truster regarding the
trustee. Moreover, I will generally unite competence, benevolence, integrity and predictability under
one single measure, referred to as reputation.
2.2 Reputation
Similar disputes exist around the notion or reputation. In economics (and game theory) reputation
measures an agent’s ability to commit for a certain strategy. In computer science, reputation is usually
an ad-hoc measure of trustworthiness. Sociologists, anthropologists and biologists also use reputation
to characterize the position of an individual within the society.
Nevertheless, all these different aspects of reputation have two things in common. First, reputation
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Figure 2.2: Reputation Topology (presented by Mui et al.)
is distilled about information available from an agents past behavior. Second, reputation information
seems to be important when taking trust decisions.
2.2.1 The nature of reputation information
Mui, Halberstadt, and Mohtashemi (2002a), Mui, Mohtashemi, and Halberstadt (2002b) and Mui
(2003) provide an extensive classification of reputation (Figure 2.2) by the means of collecting it. At
the topmost level, reputation is derived from the individual characteristics of the agent, or inherited
from the group the agent belongs to. The group component of reputation is usually important in our
society: for example, the quality of job applicants is often judged by the prestige of the companies
they previously worked for. Most online systems, however, only consider the individual component
of reputation. Notable exceptions are the work of Sabater and Sierra (2001) and Halberstadt and
Mui (2002). The former studied the social dimension of reputation which is inherited from a group
reputation; the latter proposed a hierarchical group model and have studied group reputation based on
simulations.
Individual reputation can be further split as direct or indirect reputation. Direct reputation comes
from the first-hand information (either from direct encounters or from direct observations of others’
encounters) one has about the agent whose reputation is in question. Indirect reputation, on the other
hand, is based on second-hand information provided by others. Prior-derived reputation refers to the
prior beliefs (prejudices) agents bring with them about strangers, group-derived indirect reputation
refers to the prior beliefs agents have about groups, while propagated reputation is formed based on
the feedback from other agents.
Of all reputation categories above, online reputation mainly consists of direct, interaction derived
individual reputation, and indirect individual reputation propagated from other agents (shaded in Figure
2.2). The two categories naturally correspond to:
• information an agent directly obtains from her interactions with other agents, and,
• feedback reported to a reputation mechanism that can be used by other agents.
Two more aspects worth mentioning are that reputation is context-dependent (Mui et al., 2002a),
and usually has a personal scope (Conte and Paolucci, 2002). For example, someone’s reputation as a
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cook, should be separated from that person’s reputation as a singer. Most online reputation mechanisms,
however, maintain only one value of reputation, which characterizes all activities of an agent within
the system. As online reputation mechanisms are usually used in a narrow context (e.g., on eBay,
reputation characterizes the trading behavior of a seller, on Slashdot reputation refers to the quality
of the articles submitted by a user) this simplification is not over-restrictive. There are, however, cases
where finer-grained reputation would improve the overall performance of the system (e.g., empirical
studies of eBay reputation show that human users take into account different dimensions of reputation
(Pavlou and Dimoka, 2006), like speed of delivery, accuracy of item description, etc.).
Likewise, agent A may perceive agent B’s reputation differently from agent C. Nevertheless, since
most online reputation mechanisms are centralized, the probability that individual agents will have
private information that greatly differs from the information maintained by the reputation mechanism
is insignificant. Therefore, the assumption that reputation information is global (viewed uniformly by
all agents in the system) is usually correct. One notable exception are reputation mechanisms in peer-
to-peer systems (Despotovic, 2005). Here, different agents may judge reputation differently because
the underlying P2P network gives them different views on the set of feedback reports recorded by the
reputation mechanism.
2.2.2 The role of reputation information
If reputation is entirely constructed from information from the past, why and how is it helpful in future
decisions? Intuitively, there are two answers to this question. First, by looking at the history of an
agent’s behavior, one can hope to discover qualities and habits that are likely to remain valid in the
near future. On eBay, for example, a seller with thousands of positive feedback reports on his record
is probably committed to behave honestly. There is no guarantee whatsoever that the seller will also
honor the next transaction with the same honesty and care as the previous ones. Nevertheless, given
that the seller behaved honestly so many times in the past, a buyer is likely to believe that honesty is
an inherent characteristic of the seller, unlikely to change from one day to the next.
As another example, consider a hotel who has been subject to a number of reviews from travellers
who used to spend a night there. The fact that the hotel has a good reputation for having offered
great service in the past, creates a belief that a traveller going there next week will also be satisfied.
The management of the hotel might, of course, have radically changed the quality of service (e.g., by
cutting costs and firing some of the staff); nevertheless, the probability of this happening under normal
circumstances is so small, that as long as further reviews do not say otherwise, one continues to believe
the hotel will offer great service in the immediate future.
Therefore, the first role of reputation information is to signal lasting attributes (or types) charac-
terizing the behavior of an agent (Kuwabara, 2003). This role is mostly descriptive; reputation provides
information to decision makers, without really specifying what the decision should be.
The second role of reputation is normative in nature, and encourages decision makers to punish
agents with a bad reputation. This sanctioning role of reputation has as a main objective to encourage
long-term honest behavior by eliminating momentary incentives to cheat. The whole idea is simple:
when trusting decisions are contingent on reputation information, the present actions reflect on future
reputation and therefore on future revenues. Cheating may be profitable for the moment, but when
rational agents factor the future losses provoked by the resulting bad reputation, honest behavior
becomes the optimal strategy. An eBay seller, for example, may refuse to ship the product to the buyer
after receiving the payment. This gives the seller the momentary gain of not losing the good, but also
decreases his future reputation. Future buyers may account for the risk of being cheated and bid less
for the goods auctioned by the seller. The overall future loss may be greater than the momentary gain
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Figure 2.3: The Prisoners’ Dilemma.
obtained from cheating, and therefore, shipping the good in the first place becomes the optimal strategy.
The two roles of reputation are complementary, and solve the two important problems associated
with online markets (Dellarocas, 2006a). The signaling role acts against information asymmetries, and
allows agents to accurately identify capable partners. The sanctioning role, on the other hand, acts
against cheating incentives and encourages honest behavior.
There are settings, however, where one role of reputation is predominant. Online reviews such as
those posted by Amazon, ePinions or BizRate act primarily as signaling devices, and convey information
about products whose quality remains unchanged over a period of time. Buyers who read the reviews
are mainly interested in assessing the overall quality of the product, and do not generally worry that
someone out there will explicitly decide to ship them a product of significantly lower quality. Defective
items may of course reach end customers, but this unfortunate event is the result of chance (a random
process independently distributed across all buyers), not malice.
On eBay, on the other hand, reputation can be viewed primarily as a sanctioning mechanism.
Ratings reflect a seller’s ability to deliver the product as described in the auction, and do not reflect
the quality of the product itself. Assuming that all eBay sellers are equally capable of honest behavior,
the role of the reputation mechanism is to promote honest trade, without trying to identify the sellers
that auction better quality products.
The distinction between the two roles of reputation is crucial for the design of effective markets.
Before going into more details for each of these roles, I will briefly introduce some basic notions of game
theory.
Basic notions of Game Theory
Game Theory provides a set of tools that allow us to analyze and predict how self-interested decision
makers interact. Game Theory works on simplified, abstract models of reality (also known as games)
that define the actions that may be taken by the agents (or the players), the information available
to them, and the possible outcomes of the interaction, contingent on the actions (or the play) of the
agents. One important assumption is that players are rational in the sense that they wish to maximize
their welfare (or utility) and therefore reason strategically about their actions and about the actions of
their opponents.
One famous example of a game is the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and corresponds to the following situ-
ation. Two suspects in a crime are arrested in placed in separate cells. If they both confess, enough
evidence can be gathered against both of them and they will be sentenced to 3 years in prison. If only
one confesses, he will be freed and used as a witness against the other. The prisoner who didn’t confess
will be sentenced to 4 years in prison. Nevertheless, if neither of the prisoners confesses, they will both
be convicted for minor offenses and get sentenced to one year.
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A schematic representation of the game is shown in Figure 2.3. Player 1 (the first prisoner) has a
choice between two actions (Confess or Don’t Confess) which label the rows of the table. The actions
of Player 2 (the second prisoner) are in this case the same, and label the columns of the table. Every
cell in the table contains the outcome of the game when the players choose the corresponding actions.
The first number in every cell is the payoff (values are negative because spending time in jail is usually
associated to a loss, not a gain) to player 1, the second number is the payoff to player 2.
In the Prisoners’ Dilemma both players choose their actions once and for all, independently from
each other. Such games are called strategic games, and formally consist of:
• a finite set N of players; e.g., N = {Player 1, Player 2};
• for each player i ∈ N , a nonempty set Ai (the set of actions available to player i); e.g., A1 = A2 =
{Confess, Don’t Confess};
• for each player i ∈ N a preference relation %i on A = ×j∈NAj (the preference relation of player
i).
A pure strategy si of player i is an action ai ∈ Ai. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, a pure strategy of
the first player is, for example, to confess. A mixed strategy of player i is a probabilistic combination
of actions, si =
∑
ak∈Ai αk ·ak, where the action ak of player i is chosen with probability αk. Of course,∑
ak∈Ai αk = 1. A mixed strategy in the Prisoners’ Dilemma is to randomly choose whether to confess
(with some probability α) or not (with the remaining probability 1− α).
An action (or a pure strategy) profile is a collection of action values a = (aj)j∈N , specifying one
action aj ∈ Aj for every player j. (Confess, Don’t Confess), for example, is an action profile of the
Prisoners’ Dilemma, where the first player confesses and the second doesn’t. I will also use the notation
a−i to define an action profile for all players except i: i.e., a−i = (aj)j∈N\{i}, and a = (a−i, ai) = (ai)i∈N
for any player i. The set A−i = ×j∈N\{i}Aj contains all possible action profiles a−i of players other
than i. When there are only two players, as in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, a−1 for example is the action
taken by player 2.
An action profile a = (aj)j∈N is also an outcome of the game. The preference relation %i provides
an ordering (as viewed by player i) of the possible outcomes of the game. For example, player 1 orders
the outcomes of the Prisoners’ Dilemma in the following way: (Confess, Don’t Confess) %1 (Don’t
Confess, Don’t Confess) %1 (Confess, Confess) %1 (Don’t Confess, Confess). Under a wide range of
circumstances the preference relation %i of player i can be represented by a payoff function ui : A→ R
(also called utility function), in the sense that ui(a) ≥ ui(b) whenever outcome a is preferred to outcome
b (i.e., a %i b). Values of such a function are called payoffs (or utilities), and they are the ones we have
put in the cells of the table in Figure 2.3. We will denote a game by 〈N, (Ai), (%i)〉 or by 〈N, (Ai), (ui)〉.
Game theory predicts the class of “reasonable” outcomes that may occur in a game. Let us reex-
amine the payoff and the actions of the players in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is immediately obvious
that for player 1, the best thing to do is to confess:
• if player 2 confesses, confession gives −3 while not confessing give −4;
• if player 2 doesn’t confess, confession gives 0 while not confessing gives −1.
The game being symmetric, player 2 can make exactly the same reasoning, and therefore, both will end
up confessing. The dilemma in this game is that rational reasoning determines both players to confess,
while both would benefit if neither confesses. The outcome where neither of the players confesses is,
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Figure 2.4: The Product-choice game.
pareto-optimal2, but unfortunately not “stable”, since neither of the players can trust the other not
to confess.
Confessing is a dominant strategy in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, since no matter what the other
player does, confessing gives the highest payoff. A profile of dominant strategies, one for each player,
defines a dominant equilibrium of the game. Formally, a dominant equilibrium is defined as a strategy
profile s = (si)i∈N , where every player i plays a dominant strategy si: i.e. ui(si, s∗−i) > ui(s
′
i, s
∗
−i) for
all strategies s′i ∈ Ai, s′i 6= si of player i, and all strategies s∗−i ∈ A−i of the other players.
While dominant equilibrium is a very convenient (and strong) equilibrium concept, it does not exist
in all games. Consider the product-choice game in Figure 2.4, where a provider can exert high effort
(H) or low effort (L) to produce a good. The consumer on the other hand (player 2) can choose to
buy either a high priced (h) or a low priced (l) product from the provider. Player 1, for example, can
be considered a financial investor who offers two investment products, one requiring a high upfront
investment, the second requiring only a small investment. Another example is a restaurant who offers
on its menu both fast-food and fancy cuisine (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006).
The client most prefers the expensive product if the provider exerts high effort; nevertheless, if
the provider exerts low effort, the buyer is better off with the cheap product. One can gain more by
entrusting a high sum of money to a diligent financial investor, and one gets more pleasure from eating
a fine dinner prepared by a careful chef. The same person, however, would prefer the low investment or
the fast food if the investor, respectively the restaurant chef is doing a hasty job. The optimal action
of the client therefore depends on the action chosen by the provider, and there is no strategy for the
client that dominates all others.
The provider, however, does have a dominant strategy which prescribes low effort. The client an-
ticipates this, and will therefore choose the low priced product. The resulting outcome is a Nash
Equilibrium, one of the most commonly used equilibrium notions in game theory. The Nash Equi-
librium defines a “stable state”, where unilateral deviations are not profitable: no player can gain by
choosing another strategy, as long as all other players continue playing the equilibrium. Formally, the
strategy profile s = (si)i∈N is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i) for all players
i and all strategies s′i 6= si. A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium always exists (Nash, 1950).
Not all situations can be modeled through games where players simultaneously choose their actions.
In online auctions, for example, the seller ships the good only after the buyer has paid the required
amount. In chess, another example, black and white alternate their moves, and each player is informed
about the move made by the opponent before taking the next action. Games where players move in
turns are called extensive form game, and are usually represented as in Figure 2.5.
Here, a chain-store (player CS) has branches in several cities. In each city there is a single potential
competitor, player k. The potential competitor decides first whether or not she wants to compete with
2A payoff profile is pareto-optimal when none of the players can obtain a better payoff without decreasing the payoff
of at least one of the other players.
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Figure 2.5: The Chain-Store Game.
CS by opening another store. If the competitor decides to enter the market (action In), the chain store
can either fight (action F ), or cooperate with (action C) the competitor. If the competitor chooses not
to compete (action Out) the chain-store does not have to take a decision.
The payoffs of the players are represented as numbers associated to terminal nodes: the first number
is the payoff of the chain-store, the second number is the payoff to the competitor. When challenged, the
chain-store prefers to cooperate rather than fight (i.e., fighting is expensive). However, the chain-store
best prefers not to have the competition in the first place. The competitor is better off staying out,
rather than enter and being fought by the chain-store; nevertheless, the competitor obtains the highest
payoff when she enters and the chain-store cooperates.
Formally, an extensive form game is defined by the following components:
• a set N of players, e.g., N = {CS, k} for the Chain-Store game above;
• a set H of all possible histories of the game. A history is a sequence of actions taken by the
players that correspond to a valid path of moves in the game. For the Chain-Store game the set of
possible histories is H = {∅, In, (In, F ), (In,C), Out}, where ∅ is the initial history (no move has
occurred yet) and the subset Z = {(In, F ), (In,C), Out} contains all terminal histories (the
game ends after any of these histories). Note that (Out,C) is not a history, since the chain-store
cannot cooperate once player k chooses Out.
• a function P (called the player function) that assigns to any nonterminal history a subset of N .
If h ∈ H \Z is a non-terminal history, P (h) is the player who takes an action after the history h;
e.g. P (In) = CS
• for each player i ∈ N a preference relation %i on Z (the preference relation of player i). As we
have seen for the strategic games, the preference relation is often expressed as a utility function
over the set of terminal histories.
Extensive form games are said to have perfect information when all players perfectly see all the
actions taken by the previous players. If there is uncertainty about the actions previously taken, the
game has imperfect information. A strategy in an extensive form game is a sequence of mappings,
one for every node where the player has to take an action, describing the action to be taken by the
player for every possible history that precedes that node.
In the Chain-Store game, both players have two strategies: player k moves only once (after the
empty history, ∅), and can choose between In or Out, player CS also moves only once (after the history
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In) and can choose between F and C. The game has two Nash equilibria: (Out, F ) and (In,C). It is
easy to verify that none of the players can gain by changing their strategy as long as the opponent plays
the equilibrium. While you probably regard the second equilibrium as natural, the first one, (Out, F )
may look strange. The chain-store is supposed to fight the competitor who never enters the market,
something clearly forbidden by the rules of the game. The strategy (Out, F ) is nevertheless a Nash
equilibrium. The strategy F of the chain-store can be regarded as a commitment (or threat): given
that CS will ever be allowed to move, it will fight. This makes it optimal for the competitor to stay
out of the market.
There is, however, something wrong with the equilibrium (Out, F ): if the chain-store is actually
allowed to move, fighting is not rational. With the competitor already on the market, the chain-store
is clearly better by cooperating. The commitment of the chain-store to play F is not rational, and
anticipating this, the competitor will enter the market.
The above intuition is captured by the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium, a refinement of
the Nash equilibrium that requires strategies to be in equilibrium in every subgame of the original exten-
sive form game. This requirement applies even for subgames that are never reached by the equilibrium
strategy. Thus, (Out, F ) is not a Nash equilibrium in the subgame that starts with the chain-store mov-
ing, so the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the Chain-Store game is (In,C). Intuitively, subgame
perfect equilibrium strategies do not contain threats that are not credible.
Extensive form games are important because they allow the representation of repeated games:
i.e., players repeatedly engaging in a game G, called the constituent game or the stage game. There
may be no limit to the number of times G is played, in which case, we have an infinitely repeated
game. The players play the game G sequentially, such that the tth repetition of the game (or the tth
round) starts after the end of the repetition t − 1. Players carry information from the outcome of the
previous rounds, and can condition their strategy on such information.
The Chain-Store game can easily be viewed as a repeated game. Consider that there are K branches
(in K different cities) of the chain-store, and that competitors decide sequentially whether or not to
compete the local branch of the chain-store. Competitor k is assumed to see the outcome of the games
played between all previous competitors and the chain-store. Although individual competitors play
only once, the fact that there is information transmitted from previous competitors makes the whole
interaction a K time repetition of the game in Figure 2.5, where the same chain-store (the long-run
player) plays against a sequence of competitors (the one-shot players).
As we will see in the next sections, the transmission of information to the later rounds of a repeated
game will have a major impact on the equilibrium strategies the players can adopt. Players may
condition their strategies on the outcome of earlier games (and consequently on the past behavior of
their opponent) which leads to new equilibria. What I have intuitively described in the beginning of this
chapter as the influence of reputation information, will be formalized and characterized in the remaining
of this section.
The sanctioning role of reputation
As we have seen in the beginning of the section, reputation information can foster cooperation by
allowing agents to effectively punish their partners who have cheated in the past. This mechanism
works when agents care enough about the future, such that punishments inflicted at a later time can
cause a big enough loss to offset the momentary gain one can obtain from cheating.
To give an example, let us first give a new interpretation of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game from
Figure 2.3. Instead of two prisoners, we have two agents facing a business opportunity. If both partners
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Figure 2.6: The Prisoners’ Dilemma game, without prisoners.
cooperate (denoted as C) each receives a return of 3. However, if one agent cheats (or defects, denoted
as D) on his partner the cheater gets 4, while the cheated agent doesn’t receive anything. When both
agents cheat, each gets a default payment of 1. The outcome preferred by both agents is when they both
cooperate (the prisoners similarly obtain the best deal when they cooperate with each other and do
not confess). Nevertheless, agents are always better off by defecting, which makes (D,D) the (unique)
dominant strategy of this game. The modified game is represented in Figure 2.6
Assume now that the same two agents repeatedly play this version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma. In
fact, they intend to play this game forever, although death, or other unforseen events will eventually
force them to stop playing. The interaction between them can be best modeled as an infinitely repeated
game. The game, of course, will not be played an infinite number of times; however, as none of the
agents deliberatively foresees the end of the interaction, from their perspective, the game could go on
forever.
The uncertainty about the future (which eventually will lead to the termination of the game) can be
modeled in an infinitely repeated game by a discount factor applied to future revenues. The decisions
made now by an agents takes into account the future revenues, but gains from the near future count
more than gains from the distant future (exactly because gains from the distant future are less certain).
Formally, assume that both players expect with probability (1− δ) that the current game they are
playing is the last one. For example, 1− δ is the probability that one of the players will suffer a serious
accident before the time the next game is scheduled, which prevents her from ever playing the game
again. Therefore, following round t, the repeated game carries on to round t + 1 with probability δ,
and stops with probability 1− δ. If ui(st) is the payoff to player i from the game in round t (where the
strategy profile played by the players is st), the lifetime revenue of player i is:
Vi =
∞∑
t=0
δtui(st);
The revenue from the current game (t = 0) is certain, therefore is not discounted (δ0 = 1); the next
game will happen with probability δ, so the revenue of the next game counts towards the current time
estimation of life-time revenues with a discount (δ1); The tenth repetition of the game will happen with
probability δ9, and therefore, the corresponding revenue is discounted by δ9.
If every game gives player i the same payoff ui(st) = u, the player’s life time revenue is:
Vi =
∞∑
t=0
δtu =
u
1− δ ;
For convenience, we will normalize life time revenues by multiplying them with (1− δ); in this way the
life-time revenue is expressed in the same units as the stage-game payoffs, and can be easily compared
to the latter.
Putting this background notation and formalism aside, we can now see how repeated games support
new kind of equilibrium strategies, and new outcomes. Assume for example the following strategy: the
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agent cooperates in the first round. In every subsequent game, the agent cooperates as long as the
opponent cooperated in all previous games. Following a game where the opponent defected, the agent
defects forever. This strategy is commonly referred to as the Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategy because it
involves immediate and definitive retaliation: once the opponent defects, a player retaliates by defecting
in every subsequent round.
When both agents play TFT, the outcome of the repeated game consists of a sequence of cooperative
outcomes, and both agents obtain the pareto-optimal payoff. Moreover, the pair of strategies (TFT,
TFT) is an equilibrium, since none of the agents has an interest to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
To see this, imagine that one of the players, (player 1) considers deviating from TFT, by defecting in
the current round. Player 1 can make the following reasoning: by defecting in the current round he
gains 4 (because player 2 unsuspectingly cooperates), but switches the strategy of the opponent for the
rest of the games. Following deviation, player 1 will obtain a payoff equal to 1 for every game starting
with the next one. His life-time revenue is therefore:
V1(D) = (1− δ)
(
4 +
∞∑
t=1
1 · δt
)
= 4(1− δ) + δ;
If player 1, on the other hand, sticks to TFT and cooperates, he obtains a payoff equal to 3 in the
current round, and for every other round that follows. His life-time revenue is thus:
V1(C) = (1− δ)
(
3 +
∞∑
t=1
3 · δt
)
= 3;
TFT is an equilibrium strategy only when the deviation is not profitable: i.e., V1(D) < V1(C).
Simple arithmetics shows that as long as δ > 1/3, the payoff obtained for cooperation is always greater
than the payoff obtained by defecting. In other words, as long as player 1 cares enough about future
earnings (the discount factor is high enough) the momentary gain obtained by cheating is offset by the
future losses.
Viewed from the perspective of reputation information, the Tit-For-Tat strategy uses binary rep-
utation: good or bad. An agent has good reputation only if she had always cooperated in the past;
otherwise the agent has bad reputation. The equilibrium rewards good reputation with cooperative
play, and sanctions bad reputation with the uncooperative, lower payoff. When the future is important
enough agents care to maintain their good reputation, and the equilibrium outcome is efficient. The
TFT strategy is not the only one that leads to an efficient equilibrium of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
Axelrod (1984) analyses a series of strategies and evaluates them both empirically (based on simulation
tournaments) and analytically.
More generally, the intuition that infinitely repeated games support equilibrium outcomes that are
not possible in the stage game is formally characterized by the Folk Theorems. The good news is that
when future payoffs are important enough (the discount factor δ is close enough to 1), efficient outcomes
can be sustained in an equilibrium of infinitely repeated games. The bad news, on the other hand, is
that the set of equilibrium outcomes supported by equilibria of the repeated games is huge. As a matter
of fact, almost all feasible, individually-rational outcomes3 can be the result of an equilibrium strategy
profile.
The core idea behind equilibrium strategies of the repeated game are future punishments triggered
by present deviations from the equilibrium. As we have seen with Tit-For-Tat, players change their
behavior when they detect deviations in the past behavior of their opponents. The sanctions for past
3An outcome is feasible if there is a pair of strategies (non necessarily equilibrium strategies) that generate it in
the stage game. An outcome is individually rational if all players receive higher payoffs than what they can secure for
themselves in the stage game. The minimum payoff a player can secure in the stage game is called the minimax payoff
and corresponds to the worst-case payoff the other players can inflict on player i.
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deviations is scheduled such that it offsets any gains an agent can obtain from deviating. Notable folk
theorems for different settings have been proven by Fudenberg and Maskin (1989), Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1990) or Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994). For a detailed overview of the various
Folk Theorems the reader is redirected to the work of Osborne and Rubinstein (1997) or Mailath and
Samuelson (2006).
The signaling role of reputation
While the infinite repetition of the Prisoners’ Dilemma supports an equilibrium strategy profile that
gives the players the efficient payoff, the same is not true for a finite repetition of the Prisoners’
Dilemma. Assume two agents know they will be playing the Prisoners’ Dilemma T times, where T is a
finite number, no matter how large. At time t = 0, when the agents evaluate what strategy they should
adopt, they will realize that at some point, they will end up playing the last game, at time t = T .
Regardless of what has happened in the past, the best strategy in the last game is to defect: nothing
follows after the last game, so agents maximize their payoff in the one-shot game. Since the outcome
of the last round is fixed (both agents defect), the round before the last round will also be regarded as
an isolated game: both agents defect in the last round anyway, so the outcome of the game T − 1 does
not have any influence on the future play. The only equilibrium, therefore, asks both agents to defect
in round T − 1 as well. The same reasoning would apply to rounds T − 2, T − 3, etc., so by backward
induction the only equilibrium asks both agents to defect in every round of the finitely repeated game
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1994).
Although repeated defection is the only rational equilibrium, when T is large we would intuitively
expect some cooperation to take place. Not surprisingly, controlled experiments actually demonstrate
that humans do cooperate in finite repetitions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game (Lave, 1962; Roth, 1988;
Wedekind and Milinski, 1996).
Another example where theoretical equilibrium predictions contradict intuitive considerations is the
finitely repeated Chain-Store game (Figure 2.5). Here, again, the last repetition of the game must be
played as an isolated game and generates the outcome (In,C) ( i.e., to competitor enters the market and
the chain-store cooperates), the only subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game. By backward
induction all competitors will enter the market, and the chain-store cooperates with every one of them.
The only subgame equilibrium of the finitely repeated Chain-Store games prescribes the outcome (In,C)
in every game. This outcome, however, is not at all what you would expect from real chain-stores. In
real markets, monopolists fight strongly with all competitors. They hope in this way to develop a
reputation for being aggressive, and thus scare away future competition.
The apparent failure of game-theoretic equilibrium predictions have been elegantly solved by the
three seminal papers of Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps et al. (1982).
They explain the apparent irrational behavior as a signal intended to alter the beliefs of the opponents.
In particular, a player, let’s call her Alice, would like her opponents to believe that she is a crazy type
who does not play according to the equilibrium. When such beliefs become strong enough, opponents
might as well give up playing the equilibrium, and start responding to what they believe Alice will play
in the future. This change in the opponents’ strategy might be beneficial for Alice, which justifies the
signaling effort.
But why would such a change in beliefs be rational for the opponents? In the end, always cooperating
with competitors is the only rational action a chain-store can take. The chain-store that does otherwise,
is clearly intending to modify the beliefs of the competitors in order to deter their entry. Rational
competitors should therefore refuse to modify their beliefs, knowing that it is just a trick of the chain-
store.
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Figure 2.7: The Chain-Store Game (modified).
Well, not necessarily. In reality, competitors might have real uncertainty regarding the game that
is being played. Imagine, for example, that competitors are not exactly sure about the payoffs obtained
by the chain-store. It is almost certain that fighting is costly, but maybe the cost is so small that it is
largely compensated by the manager’s thrill to engage the competitors. Competitors, therefore, might
be in one of two possible situations:
1. they are playing against a normal chain-store that loses by fighting and obtains payoffs as described
in Figure 2.5 (apriorily most likely), or,
2. they are playing against a chain-store headed by a strange manager who enjoys fighting and who
obtains the payoffs as described in Figure 2.7 (unlikely, but possible).
In the former case, a chain-store fights competitors because it wants to alter the beliefs of future
players, deter their entry, and thus gain more. In the latter case, however, the chain-store fights
competitors because it is the optimal strategy following entrance, regardless of what happens in the
future. Clearly competitors should commit to always enter the market when playing against the first
type (the normal type) of chain-store, in order to determine the chain-store to cooperate with every
entrant. Against the second type (the crazy type), however, competitors are better off by staying out.
Such a game where players are not perfectly informed about the structure of the payoffs is said to
have incomplete information. Competitors do not know exactly against which type they are playing,
so they form beliefs. The initial belief would normally assign high probability to the normal type, but
following a series of fights, future competitors will update their beliefs in favor of the crazy type. When
the probability of the crazy type becomes high enough, competitors cannot risk entering the market
anymore, and they change their behavior.
It is exactly this uncertainty about the real type that allows chain-stores to obtain another equi-
librium even in the finitely repeated Chain-Store game. Normal chain-stores (the ones that really lose
by fighting) can start by fighting competitors, and thus falsely signal their belonging to the crazy type.
They build a reputation for being crazy, in the hope that future competitors, at some point, will stop
entering the market. Building this reputation is expensive, but if the repeated game is long enough
(though still finite) the future revenues accessible when the reputation becomes credible compensates
the cost of building the reputation.
This reputation effect can be extended to all games where a player (A) could benefit from committing
to a certain strategy σ that is not credible in a complete information game. In an incomplete information
game where the commitment type has positive probability, A’s opponent (B) can at some point become
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convinced that A is playing as if she were the commitment type. At that point, B will play a best
response against σ, which gives A the desired payoff. Establishing a reputation for the commitment
strategy requires time and cost. When the higher future payoffs offset the cost of building reputation,
the reputation effect prescribes minimum payoffs any equilibrium strategy should give to player A
(otherwise, A can profitably deviate by playing as if she were a commitment type).
Fudenberg and Levine (1989) study the class of all repeated games in which a long-run player
faces a sequence of single-shot opponents who can observe all previous games. If the long-run player is
sufficiently patient and the single-shot players have a positive prior belief that the long-run player might
be a commitment type, the authors derive a lower bound on the payoff received by the long-run player
in any Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. This result holds for both finitely and infinitely repeated
games, and is robust against further perturbations of the information structure (i.e., it is independent
of what other types have positive probability).
Schmidt (1993) provides a generalization of the above result for the two long-run player case in
a special class of games called of “conflicting interests”, when one of the players is sufficiently more
patient than the opponent. A game is of conflicting interests when the commitment strategy of one
player (A) holds the opponent (B) to his minimax payoff. The author derives an upper limit on the
number of rounds B will not play a best response to A’s commitment type, which in turn generates
a lower bound on A’s equilibrium payoff. This result holds even when players can observe only noisy
signals of each other’s actions (Fudenberg and Levine, 1992).
Chan (2000), however, points out that reputation effects cannot appear when the two long-run
players are equally (or approximately equally) patient. Unless the commitment strategy of player one
gives player two her best feasible and individually rational payoff in the stage game4 (i.e., player two
likes the commitment strategy of player one), player one can build a reputation only too slowly to make
it worth it.
Online settings, however, are often described by games of common interest, where the cooperation of
the two players brings benefits to both of them. For such games, however, the reputation effect cannot
be generalized. Schmidt (1993) and Cripps and Thomas (1997) show that in general, it is impossible
to eliminate strategies that enforce smaller payoffs than the cooperative one. Nevertheless, Aumann
and Sorin (1989) show that by restricting the set of possible types to those of bounded recall5, all pure
strategy equilibria will be close to the cooperative outcome.
One last result we would like to mention in this section addresses the stability of reputation in
settings with imperfect observations (i.e., the perception of players regarding the actions of their oppo-
nents are noisy). Cripps et al. (2004) surprisingly prove that in such noisy environments reputations
are not permanent: in the long run, the players will learn each other’s type and play will revert to a
static equilibrium.
The Sanctioning vs. the Signaling Role
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, there is a fundamental difference between the two roles
of reputation information. The sanctioning role allows agents and markets to specify strategies and
behavior norms that threaten present misbehavior by future punishments. These threats make a priory
commitments on cooperative behavior possible (even in settings where otherwise, cooperation is a
dominated action) and thus contribute to efficient exchanges. As there are numerous ways of specifying
4Such games are called of strictly conflicting interest and are also treated by Cripps et al. (2005)
5A type is of bounded recall when the corresponding strategy prescribes actions that depend on the outcome of a finite
number of past games. The strategy requires bounded memory since it does not need to store infinite information about
the past.
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punishments contingent of past behavior (or reputation), the set of possible equilibrium outcomes is
large, as proven by the Folk Theorems.
The signaling role, on the other hand, allows agents to “learn” from past feedback the characteristics
(or type) of other agents. Types can be innate, or acquired: e.g., the normal type chain-store has the
incentive to play as if it were committed to fight all competitors. Every single report about an agent’s
behavior triggers an update of beliefs regarding the agent’s type, and consequently an update of beliefs
regarding how that agent will play in the future. The updated beliefs are later used to make more
informative decisions or choices about future interactions.
2.3 Reputation Mechanisms for Online Systems
We define the reputation mechanism as the information system that allows to create and dissemi-
nate reputation information. Its main role is to gather feedback from the agents, to aggregate it into
reputation information, and to disseminate this information afterwards.
Existing reputation mechanisms differ on several dimensions. The first is the format of solicited
feedback. Some mechanism require binary feedback, and agents may “vote” positively or negatively a
product, a service, or the behavior of another agent. Other mechanisms allow agents to submit one out
of a finite number of possible feedback values. Hotels, for example, are rated with stars (one star for the
worst hotel, five stars for the best one), and movies are rated with points (one point is the minimum
rating, ten points is the maximum one). Yet other mechanisms allow (almost) an infinity of possible
feedback values, usually expressed as free textual comments6. Combinations of the above are also quite
common: e.g., users may give both numerical ratings, and textual comments.
The second dimension which differentiates reputation mechanisms is the way they aggregate feed-
back reports into reputation information. Some mechanisms accumulate all reports into a reputation
“score” that may potentially grow forever. Other mechanisms use a Bayesian approach where every
report is used to update a belief regarding the reputation of an agent. Yet other mechanisms use discrete
values for reputation information (e.g., an agent may be very trustworthy, trustworthy, untrustworthy or
very untrustworthy) with clear rules describing how sets of feedback are mapped to reputation values.
Finally, the third dimension relates to how reputation information is disseminated in the community.
Some mechanisms rely on a central entity to gather all reports and compute reputation information.
The central component is later responsible for disseminating reputation information (e.g., by publishing
on a web site). Other mechanisms rely on decentralized solutions where every peer stores information
about the other agents with which he interacted. Reputation information is disseminated on demand,
through the social network capturing the trust relations between peers.
In the rest of this section I will review existing reputation mechanisms and explain what is the
context they are used in, what kind of feedback they collect, how they aggregate reputation information,
and how that information is later disseminate to the other agents. I will first review commercial
mechanisms that are in use by real communities, followed by a discussion of the mechanisms proposed
by the academic community.
6Strictly speaking, the set of possible feedback values is not infinite. Most mechanisms restrict the length of the textual
comment, which limits the number of possible feedback values.
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2.3.1 Online Implementations
Perhaps the most famous implementation of a reputation mechanism is the Feedback Forum of eBay.
The main goal of the reputation mechanism is to promote trust between sellers and buyers that are
geographically far apart, and to encourage trading in the market. The reputation mechanism is often
cited as one of the important factors that contributed to the incredible growth of the eBay market.
For every transaction, eBay encourages both participants (the seller and the buyer) to rate each
other. Feedback can be positive (1), negative (-1) or neutral (0), followed by a comment that contains
free text. As of May 2007 buyers may also rate:
• the degree to which the description offered by the seller matched the item;
• the quality of the communication with the seller;
• the shipping time;
• the shipping and handling charges offered by the seller.
For these supplementary dimensions feedback is from one to five stars, one star being the lowest, and
five stars being the highest rating. Both users may reply with a comment to the feedback they received,
and may also add a follow-up note (free text) to the feedback they have previously submitted.
eBay aggregates all feedback reports into a Feedback Score. A positive rating increases the Feedback
Score by one point, a negative rating decreases the Feedback Score by one point, while a neutral rating
leaves the Feedback Score unmodified. Each member, however, can only affect another member’s
Feedback Score by no more than one point. The Feedback Score is displayed as part of a Feedback
Profile, together with (Figure 2.8):
• the percentage of positive feedback received by the user,
• the number of unique users who left positive feedback,
• the number of unique users who left negative feedback,
• the total number of positive feedback received for all transactions,
• a profile of most recent reports (summarized for the last month, the last six months and for the
last year),
• the average of the ratings for the additional dimensions,
• a list of the textual comments accompanying every feedback received by the user. The list can be
sorted to display the comments received as a seller and the ones received as a buyer,
• a list of the feedback left by that user.
Similar mechanisms are used by most of the marketplaces where complete strangers can interact.
In Amazon’s secondary market, users may rate other users who sell second-hand books. Ratings are
from 1 to 5, (where 4 and 5 are considered positive ratings, 3 is a neutral rating, 1 and 2 are negative
ratings) followed by one line of comments. The “reputation” of a seller is displayed as the percentage
of positive, neutral and negative ratings, followed by the number of raters, and the list of comments.
eLance.com is a marketplace for professional services. Contractors rate their satisfaction with
subcontractors by a rating from 1 to 5, and a short comment. The reputation of a user is displayed as
2.3. Reputation Mechanisms for Online Systems 27
Figure 2.8: The eBay Feedback Profile.
the percentage of positive reviews, the total earnings made by the user, followed by the project history
of the user. RentACoder.com, a marketplace for software programming services employs a similar
mechanism.
A second family of reputation mechanisms control the quality of content (mostly information)
contributed by a community of users. Slashdot is an online discussion board where postings (short
news articles) are prioritized or filtered according to ratings received from the readers. The site uses a
2-layer semi-automatic moderation scheme. Level 1 moderators rate posts, while level 2 moderators (or
the meta-moderators) moderate the level 1 moderators. Moderators are selected randomly according
to their “karma”. Karma may be terrible, bad, neutral, positive, good, and excellent depending on
how well the contribution of a user has been moderated in the past. Moderators are given a number
of points (proportional to their karma) which limits the number of comments they may rate. Every
comment may be rated on a scale from -1 to 5 by choosing labels that best fit the content. Example of
labels are insightful, funny, troll. Meta-moderators judge the fairness of the level 1 moderators, which
influences the karma of level 1 moderators and hence the ability to become moderators in the future.
One particularity of Slashdot is that karma is not explicitly visible. Nevertheless, users with better
karma get more power in the system and receive higher visibility for the content they submit.
Digg.com is a news site where the best articles are promoted on the top of the list by the community
of readers. Unlike in Slashdot, any reader can vote for an article and thus “digg it” up. Users may also
“burry” (i.e. remove spam) and comment on stories. All activities made by a user are recorded in a
profile visible to the user’s friends.
Yahoo! Answers, and Live QnA allow users to post questions and receive answers from other users.
The entire community my vote for the answers already posted, and thus contributes to selecting the
best answer to a specific question. Users are rewarded for their effort (answering questions or voting)
by points that can later be used to ask more questions. The number of points gained by a user measures
the user’s reputation within the community. However, this reputation is not visible to the outside world,
and is only used internally by the site owners.
A third family of mechanisms keeps reputation information about products or services. ePinions.com
allows users to rate goods products and services on a scale from 1 to 5 for various product-dependant
28 Trust, Reputation and Reputation Mechanisms
aspects (e.g., ease of use, reliability, durability, etc). Ratings are also accompanied by a detailed textual
review. The reputation of a product is displayed by aggregating the numerical ratings across the quality
dimensions for that product. Moreover, readers have easy access to the list of detailed textual reviews,
ordered by the date of submission.
Interesting enough, Epinions also keeps an internal reputation mechanism for the reviewers. Mem-
bers can rate the reviews as helpful or not. Reviewers with a lot of activity over a period of time may
become advisors, top reviewers, or category leads. Advisors and Top Reviewers are automatically cho-
sen. Category leads are chosen by the company based on member nominations. Epinions also creates a
web of trust where members can decide to “trust” or “block” other members. The fact of being trusted
or blocked by other members impacts a member’s qualification to become a Top Reviewer.
Similar product review systems may be seen on Bizrate.com, Amazon.com, IMDB.com or TripAd-
visor.com. As a matter of fact, all major retail e-commerce sites allow users to post reviews about
the products they have bought. The reputation of a product is usually displayed as the average of all
numerical ratings, plus a list of the textual comments submitted by the reviewers.
Most reputation mechanisms implemented today support with preponderance the signaling role of
reputation. Feedback from the past is aggregated into “different scores” that are displayed as such, and
called reputation. Users are not offered any support for interpreting reputation information, and they
generally regard it as estimates about future behavior.
Empirical studies, nevertheless, have shown the existence of reputation premiums, where users (or
products) with higher reputation obtain higher revenues. This suggests an implicit sanctioning role of
reputation information, as human users naturally discount the price (or the amount of business) offered
to peers with lesser reputation. This sanctioning, however, is mostly ad-hoc, without any support from
the mechanism. The absence of clear guidelines for interpreting reputation information, is, I believe,
one of the major drawbacks of existing reputation mechanisms.
2.3.2 Academic Models
The reputation mechanisms modeled in research papers are also mostly ad-hoc in the way they interpret
reputation information. They differ, nevertheless, from the existing commercial implementations in the
fact that most of them do not rely on the existence of a central place to gather feedback and aggregate
reputation information.
The view these works assume is that of a social network, where two agents that have interacted
in the past share an edge in the network. Every edges (A,B) is assigned a weight representing the
“trust” of agent A towards agent B aggregated across all interactions between them in which agent A
happened to have relied on agent B. Having the local interactions among the agents encoded this way,
the challenge is how to merge these local information to enable the agents to compute the reputation
of non-neighboring agents, whom they never met before. The main distinguishing points among the
numerous works belonging to this class are:
1. the strategy to aggregate individual experiences to give the mentioned weights: i.e., the trust an
agent A has in agent B;
2. the strategy to aggregate the weights along a path of an arbitrary length to give a path wide
gossip between two non-connected agents;
3. the strategy to aggregate this gossip across multiple paths between two non-connected agents.
2.3. Reputation Mechanisms for Online Systems 29
Beth et al. (1994) presents an early example in which a clear distinction between direct experiences
and recommendations has been made, which is reflected in the strategy for path wide gossip aggregation.
However, this separation of the two contexts led to an exponential complexity of the trust derivation
algorithm. Clearly, this is unacceptable for large scale networks.
Yu and Singh (2000) do not treat recommendations and direct service provisions separately. The
authors use a variation of the delta learning method to aggregate “positive” and “negative” experiences
of the agents into the weights assigned to the corresponding branches and simple multiplication as the
strategy to compute the path wide gossips. As for the strategy to aggregate the gossips of different
paths the authors use a variation of the simple maximum function. All this results in a polynomial time
algorithm for the overall trust aggregation.
Richardson et al. (2003) offers important theoretical insights on how the computational complexity
of the trust derivation algorithms relates to the mentioned aggregation strategies by characterizing the
combinations of path and across-path aggregation strategies that may lead to a non-exponential trust
computation algorithm (we note that many other works use such combinations: e.g., (Page et al., 1998)
and (Kamvar et al., 2003)). The authors also offer such an algorithm which is, however, based on a
synchronous participation of all agents in the network. As such it is not quite appropriate for usage in
P2P networks due to their inherent high dynamicity. With respect to this problem Xiong and Liu (2004)
offer a considerable improvement in terms of an appropriate caching scheme that enables asynchronous
computation while retaining good performance.
Srivatsa et al. (2005) describe techniques for minimizing the impact of malicious nodes on the
reputation mechanism. The framework guards against strategic oscillation of behavior, detects fake
transaction reports, and filters out dishonest reports.
A common denominator of all these works is that the computed values have unclear semantics and
are hard to interpret on an absolute scale, without ranking them. In many applications this imposes
certain problems. On the other hand, as shown by many simulations, they are very robust to a wide
range of misbehavior.
Probabilistic estimation techniques present certain improvement with respect to the meaningfulness
of the computed values. Namely, they output probability distributions (or at least the most likely
outcome) over the set of possible behaviors of the trusted agents enabling thus the trusting agents to
evaluate explicitly their utilities from the decision to trust or not. Mui et al. (2002b) present the well-
known method of Bayesian estimation as the right probabilistic tool for assessing the future trusting
performance based on past interactions. Only direct interactions were studied - the question of including
recommendations was not considered. Buchegger and Le Boudec (2003) go a step further by taking
into account the “second-hand” opinions also. However, the strategy for merging own experiences with
those of other witnesses is intuitive (giving more weight to own experiences, though plausible, is still
intuitive) rather than theoretically founded. Aberer and Despotovic (2001) and Despotovic and Aberer
(2004) is another work belonging to this group.
As we said previously, many works can be regarded as belonging to the class of “social networks” and
using different strategies to aggregate the gossip available. Thus Dellarocas (2000), Dellarocas (2004),
Zacharia et al. (1999) and Abdul-Rahman and Hailes (2000) use collaborative filtering techniques to
calculate personalized reputation estimates of as weighted averages of past ratings in which weights are
proportional to the similarity between the agent who computes the estimate and the raters. Birk (2000),
Birk (2001), Biswas et al. (2000) and Witkowski et al. (2001) use either well-known machine learning
techniques or heuristic methods to increase the global performance of the system by recognizing and
isolating defective agents. Common to these works is that they consider only direct reputation. Similar
techniques, extended to take into account indirect reputation, are used by Barber and Kim (2001),
Schillo et al. (2000), Jurca and Faltings (2003), Yu and Singh (2002) and Sen and Sajja (2002).
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2.3.3 Empirical studies of Reputation Mechanisms
Empirical studies on reputation were conducted both in labs and in real settings. The effects of reputa-
tion can better be isolated in lab experiments. Keser (2003) studies the investment game where player
one may entrust the opponent with an investment that brings sure returns (e.g., player two receives
three times the amount invested by player one). Player two then decides how much to return to player
one. Trust increases the total revenues (the higher the investment, the higher the returns) but leaves
player one vulnerable to player two taking all the profit. When players receive information about each
other’s play both trust (investment) and trustworthiness (return of profits to the trustor) were higher.
Similar studies of the investment game have been conducted by Berg et al. (1995), McCabe et al. (2003),
Cox and Deck (2005) Fehr and Go¨chter (2000) and Buskens and Barrera (2005).
Bolton et al. (2004) investigate a similar two-stage game where buyers decide whether to pay, and
sellers then decide whether to ship the item. They also consider two settings: one where players are
matched randomly and have information regarding the history of play of their partners, one where
players are matched randomly without reputation information, and one where the same two partners
interact repeatedly. Availability of reputation information (history of past play) increases both trust
and trustworthiness with respect to the no reputation setting. Nevertheless, the repetition of the game
between the same players yields the best results.
Chen et al. (2004) investigate the same setting for a wider set of choices. For example, buyers
can choose the sellers they want to trade with, both buyers and sellers may choose to cheat on their
partners, and players may choose to misreport feedback. Despite a more general setting, the results are
consistent with those of Bolton et al. (2004): reputation information significantly increases the efficiency
of the market. Interestingly, the fact that players may misreport feedback did not have a major impact
on the performance of the market.
An impressive body of lab experiments conducted on the Prisoners Dilemma are discussed by
Rapoport and Chammah (1965). The authors asked pairs of students to play the Prisoners Dilemma
several hundred times. The statistics yielded by the experiments give valuable insights to how human
users act and reason in conflict scenarios.
With few notable exceptions (e.g., Diekmann and Wyder, 2002), the vast majority of field exper-
iments on trust and reputation were conducted on eBay’s reputation mechanism. An overview of the
different studies is described by Dellarocas (2005), Resnick et al. (2006) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2004)
with the following main conclusions:
• reputable sellers seem to have their items purchased with higher probability and for higher prices.
The precise effects are, however, ambiguous and studies on different categories of products often
lead to contradictory results;
• reputation is more important for riskier (high value) transactions;
• from all the information displayed in the feedback profile, buyers mostly look the total number of
positive (respectively negative) reports, followed by the number of most recent negative comments.
Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) identify main patterns of human behavior with respect to trust.
The authors argue that, despite clear incentives to free ride (not leave feedback) and leave only positive
feedback, trust among eBay traders emerges due to its reputation system.
Resnick et al. (2006) conducted the first randomized controlled field experiment of the eBay repu-
tation mechanism. The same goods (vintage postcards) were sold under two identities: that of a new
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seller and that of a highly reputable seller. As predicted, the seller with a good reputation did signifi-
cantly better, and obtained, on the average, 8.1% higher prices than the new seller. The same authors
conducted another experiment and conclude that few negative ratings do not drive away buyers.
The same effect of reputation on eBay prices was observed by:
• Houser and Wooders (2006) for the sale of Pentium processors,
• Ba and Pavlou (2002) for the sale of music, software and electronics,
• Kalyanam and McIntyre (2001) for the sale of Palm Pilot PDAs,
• McDonald and Slawson Jr. (2002) for the sale of dolls,
• Melnik and Alm (2002) for the sale of circulated coins,
• Dewan and Hsu (2004) for the sale of collectible stamps,
• Dewally and Ederington (2006) for the sale of collectible comic books.
Other studies only find a correlation between reputation and the probability of sale. Livingston
(2002), for example, studies the auction of golf clubs and concludes that more positive feedback increases
the probability of sale. Jin and Kato (2004) reach the same conclusion for the sale of sports trading
cards. Similar conclusions hold for the german eBay market, as pointed out by Wehrli (2005).
Yet other studies (Lucking-Reiley et al., 2000; Kauffman, R. J. and Wood, C., 2000; Eaton, 2002)
don’t find an influence of positive feedback on the price or probability of sale, however, do acknowledge
that negative feedback drives away buyers and consequently reduces the probability of sale.
One surprising fact about eBay’s reputation mechanism is the overwhelming percentage of positive
reports: only 1% of all reports submitted to eBay are negative. This might lead to the naive inter-
pretation that 99% of the transactions on eBay result in satisfactory outcomes. Dellarocas and Wood
(2006) argue that this interpretation is biased and does not reflect the reality. They propose a method
to account for the sound of silence and factor in the transactions on which no feedback was submitted.
The results are surprising as they suggest that approximately 20% of the eBay users are not entirely
satisfied with the outcome of the transactions. Deriving information from missing feedback enables
buyers to more accurately assess the risks involved by a transaction. The bias of eBay feedback (mainly
due to retaliation effects) was also mentioned by Reichling (2004) and Klein, Lambertz, Spagnolo, and
Stahl (2006).
Several recent results investigate the role of reputation in the context of product review forums.
Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) examine the impact of reviews on the sale of books on Amazon and
BarnesandNoble.com. They find a positive correlation between an improvement in a book’s review
and volume of sales of that book. They also note that book reviews are overwhelmingly positive, and
therefore, the few negative reviews have a larger impact.
Hennig-Thurau et al. (2004) conduct a survey to determine what motivates users to submit online
reviews. They identify four motives: social benefits (fun and pleasure resulting from the participation
in an online forum), economic incentives (rewards offered in exchange of the review), concern for other
consumers (help others take more informative decisions) and extraversion (pleasure for sharing one’s
opinion with the rest of the community).
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2.3.4 Other Aspects related to Reputation Mechanisms
Economic theory predicts that voluntary feedback will be underprovisioned. Since feedback constitutes
a public good, users might be tempted to free-ride. Avery, Resnick, and Zeckhauser (1999) analyze
mechanisms where early evaluators are paid to provide information, and later clients pay in order to
balance the budget. They conclude that voluntary participation, no price discrimination and budget
balance cannot be simultaneously achieved; however, any combination of two such properties is feasible.
Another problem associated to online reputation mechanism comes from the ease with which partic-
ipants can change their identity. Friedman and Resnick (2001) discuss the risks associated with cheap
online pseudonyms, where users can exploit their initial reputation and then start new under a new
identity. Using a game theoretic model, the authors conclude that newcomers must start with the lowest
possible reputation. The cost of building reputation exceeds the benefits obtained from “milking” it
afterwards, which gives incentives to the users to keep their identity. This property is later used by
Dellarocas (2005) to design moral hazard reputation mechanisms that are robust to identity changes.
Dellarocas (2000) identifies a number of possible attacks on reputation reporting systems: e.g., ballot
stuffing (i.e., artificially inflating someone’s reputation), bad mouthing (i.e., artificially denigrating an
agent), negative discrimination (i.e., providers deliver good service to all except a few clients) and
positive discrimination (i.e., providers deliver good service only to a few selected agents). Dellarocas
discusses several solutions to reduce the effects of those attacks.
The strategic manipulation of opinion forums has been more formally studies by Dellarocas (2006b).
Firms whose products are being discussed in such forums can try to manipulate consumer perceptions
by posting costly anonymous messages that praise their products. The striking result of this result is
that manipulation can both increase and decrease the information value of online forums. A theoretical
analysis backed up by examples describes the settings in which such phenomena occur.
Reputation mechanisms would not be needed in the first place if the transactions in the electronic
market can be designed to be safe. Sandholm and Lesser (1995) propose the idea of safe exchanges
where the contract between the buyer and the seller is fulfilled without enforcement. The exchange is
managed such that at any point in time, the future gains from carrying out the rest of the exchange are
larger than the gains from cheating for both the seller and the buyer. The underlying principle is to
split the exchange into smaller chunks that are intelligently managed to avoid defection. Sandholm and
Ferrandon (2000) operationalize this idea into a safe exchange planner that can automatically carry
out the transaction on behalf of a player. Buttyan and Hubaux (1999) theoretically model the safe
exchange by a dynamic game, and Sandholm and Wang (2002) characterize what is inherently possible
and impossible to achieve in safe exchange. Safe exchanges, however, can only be designed for divisible
goods.
Chapter 3
Truthful Signaling Reputation
Mechanisms
As discussed in Section 2.2, one of the two important roles of reputation information is to bridge the
asymmetry of information that usually exists in online trading situations, by allowing the buyers to
differentiate between good and bad providers. The reputation mechanisms that primarily support this
role of reputation information are called signaling reputation mechanisms, as they signal to the buyers
some a priory unknown characteristics of the seller.
Most online feedback mechanisms available today on the internet are primarily signaling reputation
mechanisms. For example, product review sites like, Amazon.com, ePinions.com or BizRate.com fit into
this category; their main goal is to disclose to future buyers hidden, experience-related (Parasuraman
et al., 1985) product attributes (e.g., quality, reliability, ease of use, etc.) gathered from the testimonies
of previous buyers. Having access to this previously unavailable information allows buyers to take better
decisions and buy the products that best satisfy their needs.
From this perspective, signaling reputation mechanisms do not just place white or black tags on
the products in a certain market. Rather they help buyers identify product “types”, where every type
is characterized by a set or properties relevant to the market. Note that most of the times there is no
complete order relation on the set of possible types a product could have: Type A is not necessarily
better than type B, it is just different. It is therefore up to the buyer to select the product type that
is best in a particular context.
As a very simple example, assume that the relevant properties defining the product type are (1)
a one dimensional measure of quality, and (2) the speed of delivery. A good quality product that is
delivered fast is definitely better than a bad quality product delivered after a long time. Nevertheless,
the choice between a very good product with slow delivery (type A), and another slightly worse product
with fast delivery (type B) is harder to make. Depending on the context and the subjective preferences,
one buyer will choose the product type A, while another buyer will chose the product type B. When
more attributes are taken into account for defining a type, it becomes more likely that different types
will offer different tradeoffs to the buyers.
Signaling reputation mechanisms are therefore valuable for the sellers as well. First, they allow
the existence of specialized products in the market that will be recognized by the corresponding niche.
This can greatly increase the value of the market, as niche products cover the long tail distribution
of preferences and account for a significant volume of trading (Anderson, 2006). Second, sellers can
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optimally plan the investment in their products, knowing that buyers will be able to differentiate the
tradeoffs between different product attributes. The reputation mechanism thus contributes to the overall
efficiency of the market.
From a technical point of view, the reputation of a product indicates the product’s type, as inferred
by the reputation mechanism from the feedback reported by previous users. In most cases, however,
the reputation mechanism can only make an approximate prediction of a product’s type, and therefore,
reputation information is represented through a probability distribution over the possible types. As more
and more information is gathered about the product, the probability distribution (i.e., the reputation
information) will concentrate on the real type.
The signaling reputation mechanism therefore implements a learning algorithm. Given a description
of all possible types, the problem of the reputation mechanism becomes to continuously update reputa-
tion information (i.e., the probability distribution over the types) such that the feedback submitted by
the users is optimally taken into account. As we will see in the next section, one of the most natural
solutions to this problem is given by the Bayesian learning theory.
Before proceeding to a more formal treatment of signaling reputation mechanisms, let us make the
following remark. So far, I have mainly talked about the reputation and the type of a product. The
same discussion can be easily extended to sellers, service providers, algorithms, information or other
entities on which reputation information may be useful. Nevertheless, signaling reputation mechanisms
work under several important assumptions. First, the set of possible types, and their exact description,
is assumed known. Second, entities are assumed to have only one type, which does not change in time.
Finally, the entity is assumed to act consistently according to its type, such that all agents interacting
with that entity see (a noisy representation) of exactly the same type.
3.1 A Formal Model
I model the market and a signaling reputation mechanism in the following way. From all products
and buyers, I isolate all buyers (or “agents”, assumed rational) who buy and experience one particular
product. The quality of the product remains fixed, and defines the product’s unknown type. As discussed
in the previous section, types may be characterized by different quality attributes, and every type is
defined by a specific value for each quality attribute. Θ is the finite set of possible types, assumed
known by all agents, and θ denotes a member of this set.
A central reputation mechanism publishes the reputation of the product as a probability distribution
over the set of types. I denote by Pr[θ] the probability that the product has the type θ, hence the repu-
tation information published by the reputation mechanism is a vector (P [θ])θ∈Θ, where
∑
θ∈Θ Pr[θ] = 1.
All buyers are assumed to know the reputation of the product, so they share a common belief regarding
the prior probability Pr[θ].
After the purchase, the buyer inspects the product and forms an opinion about its quality and true
type. I model the opinion of the buyer i as a noisy random signal Oi; the value of signal Oi is denoted
oi, belonging to the set Q = {q0, q1, . . . qM−1} of possible signal values. Every signal qj may actually
represent a set of different attribute values characterizing the quality of the product. For example, the
signal q0 could mean that the product is unreliable and has a long delivery time. The set Q and the
semantics of the signals qj is assumed known by all agents.
Different buyers may perceive different signals about the same product, either because they have
different preferences, or because of the inherent noise in the assessment process. However, I assume
that the observations of different buyers are conditionally independent, given the type of the product.
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Let Pr[qj |θ] = Pr[Oi = qj |θ] be the probability that a buyer observes the signal qj when the true type
of the product is θ. Pr[·|·] is assumed common knowledge, and ∑qj∈Q Pr[qj |θ] = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. A
summary of the formal notation is given in the Appendix 3.A.
For the sake of simplicity, some results in this chapter are obtained on a binary setting where
there are only two possible quality signals. Here, buyers are assume to form and express a binary
opinion about the quality of the product, so that they will regard the product as either good or bad.
The resulting feedback they can submit to the reputation mechanism is binary, where q1 (or simply
1) stands the good quality signal, while q0 (or simply 0) stands for bad quality. When referring to
the submitted report, I will also call the two feedback values as the positive, respectively the negative
report. To distinguish between the general and the binary feedback set, I will also use the notation
Q2 = {q0, q1} = {0, 1}.
The reputation mechanism asks every buyer to submit feedback. Assuming that buyers report
truthfully, every feedback report can be used to update the reputation of the product, such that the
updated reputation becomes the posterior distribution over the possible types, given the prior distri-
bution and the observed signal. Therefore, the updated reputation can be computed by Bayes’s Law,
where the posterior probability that the product is of type θ given the feedback qj ∈ Q is:
Pr[θ|qj ] = Pr[qj |θ]Pr[θ]
Pr[qj ]
(3.1)
where Pr[qj ] is the overall probability that a buyer observes the signal qj ∈ Q:
Pr[qj ] =
∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]Pr[qj |θ];
Note that a signaling reputation mechanism represents a very simple instance of an online mecha-
nism 1. Feedback is received sequentially, and after every submitted report, the mechanism updates the
probability distribution over the possible types. However, since all buyers are assumed to experience a
signal from the same product (whose type remains fixed) the optimal solution to this online process is
governed by Bayes’ Law (expressed in Eq. 3.1).
The assumption that the type does not change in time can be relaxed such that the type changes
sufficiently slowly. If the model of type changes is known (e.g., after every interaction, the type of the
product changes randomly to some other type with a very small probability) it can be factored into
the Bayesian updating process to reflect the true posterior beliefs. If, on the other hand, the model of
change is unknown, we can have a mechanism that works on batches of reports: the type is assumed
to change only once every T transactions. During every window of T feedback reports, the mechanism
functions as described by Eq. 3.1. Nevertheless, from one batch to the next, the mechanism assumes
that the type may have changed, and relaxes the prior beliefs in order to reflect this possible change.
The computation of reputation information is therefore extremely simple as long as the mechanism
receives truthful feedback. The remaining of this chapter will therefore be dedicated to this problem:
how can the reputation mechanism provide incentives for rational agents to report honestly? Section
3.2.1 reviews the work of Miller et al. (2005) and explains that payment mechanisms (i.e., the reputation
mechanism pays agents for reporting feedback) can in general create an equilibrium where rational
agents find it optimal to report the truth, a property called incentive-compatibility. The key idea is to
score a report against the report submitted by another agent, called the reference report. The payment
to the first reporter depends on this score, and maximizes the expected revenue of the reporter when
submitting true feedback. Section 3.3 uses the idea of automated mechanism design (Conitzer and
1Online mechanisms function in dynamic environments where agents may arrive and depart dynamically, and infor-
mation can change over time. Online mechanism design (Friedman and Parkes, 2003) addresses the design of mechanisms
for such dynamic environments. A survey of the main results is offered by Parkes (2007).
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Sandholm, 2002; Sandholm, 2003) to construct incentive-compatible payment schemes that are also
optimal: i.e., the expected cost to the reputation mechanism is minimized, while offsetting both the
cost of reporting and the external gains an agent could obtain from lying. The average saving to the
reputation mechanism is around 50% when compared to the traditional payments based on proper
scoring rules (Miller et al., 2005).
Section 3.4 investigates two methods that can further decrease the incentive-compatible feedback
payments. The first requires the use of several reference reports and guarantees that the cost to the
reputation mechanism decreases as payments are computed by considering and increasing number of
reference reports. The second method involves probabilistic filtering mechanisms that discard some feed-
back reports. If the payments and the filtering mechanism are designed together, significant reductions
of cost can be achieved without affecting the quality of reputation information.
Section 3.5 extends the design of inventive-compatible payments to settings with uncertain infor-
mation. The improved payments make honesty the optimal strategy even for agents who poses private
information unknown to the reputation mechanism.
Finally, 3.6 addresses the collusion between reporters. First, I show that general incentive-compatible
payments have several equilibria besides the truthful one. Some of the lying equilibria generate higher
payoffs than the honest equilibrium, which might motivate selfish agents to coordinate their reports and
game the mechanism. Fortunately, supplementary constraints can be added to the design problem such
that honest reporting becomes the unique, or the pareto-optimal equilibrium. For different collusion
scenarios, I describe algorithms for computing such incentive-compatible, collusion-resistant payments.
3.2 Incentives for Honestly Reporting Feedback
Recent studies raise important questions regarding the quality of reputation information as reflected
by contemporary online feedback mechanisms. First, the absence of clear incentives drives only some
of the users to voice their opinions and report feedback. For example, Hu, Pavlou, and Zhang (2006)
and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) show that Amazon2 ratings of books or CDs follow with great
probability bi-modal, U-shaped distributions where most of the ratings are either very good, or very
bad. As controlled experiments on the same items reveal normally distributed opinions, the authors
conclude that users with a moderate outlook are unlikely to report. Talwar, Jurca, and Faltings (2007)
identify another factor that promotes rating, namely the desire to contribute with something new to
the previously submitted reports. In both cases, the reputation mechanism collects an unrepresentative
sample of reviews, that is not necessarily informative for the average user.
Second, and even more distressful, some users intentionally lie in order to gain external benefits
from the distorted reputation. Harmon (2004) reports that some authors write fake reviews on Amazon
in order to boost the sale of their own books, or to trash the reputation of competing titles. White
(1999) describes manipulation techniques for pushing songs up the charts, and Elliott (2006) and Keates
(2007) identify problems associated to fake hotel reviews on the travel reputation site TripAdvisor.com.
Although we still see high levels of altruistic (i.e., honest) reporting, the increasing awareness that gains
can be made by manipulating online reputation will likely attract more strategic reporting in the future.
Both problems can be solved by explicitly rewarding users for reporting feedback. These payments3
made by the reputation mechanism to the reporters have two roles. First, they must cover the cost of
reporting feedback so that more users report, and give the reputation mechanism a more representative
2http://www.amazon.com
3Using the term payments does not exclude non-monetary rewards such as preferential access to resources, social status
or bonus “points”.
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collection of feedback. Second, the payments must be designed such that self-interested agents find it
in their best interest to report the truth.
Fundamental results in the mechanism design literature (d’Aspremont and Grard-Varet, 1979;
Cre´mer and McLean, 1985) show that side payments can be designed to create the incentive for agents
to reveal their private opinions truthfully. Such payment schemes have been constructed based on
proper scoring rules (Kandori and Matsushima, 1998; Johnson et al., 1990; Clemen, 2002), and exploit
the correlation between the observations of different buyers about the same good. The first adaptation
of these results to online feedback mechanisms is due to Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser (2005), and is
described below.
3.2.1 Incentive-compatible Payment Mechanisms
The model used by Miller et al. (2005) is similar to the one presented in Section 3.1: a set of users
experience the same product or service, and later report the privately perceived quality signal to a
central reputation mechanism.
The reputation mechanism scores every submitted feedback by comparing it with another report
(called the reference report) submitted by a different user about the same good. The payment received
by a reporter is then directly proportional to the computed score. Let ri ∈ Q be the report submitted
by the buyer i, let ref (i) be the reference reporter of i, and let rref (i) ∈ Q be the report submitted
by the reference reporter of buyer i. The payment received by the buyer i is denoted by τ(ri, rref (i)),
computed in the following way:
τ(ri, rref (i)) = ScR(rref (i)|ri); (3.2)
where ScR(·|·) is a proper scoring rule. The three best studied proper scoring rules are:
• the logarithmic scoring rule:
ScRlog(qk|qj) = ln
(
Pr[qk|qj ]
)
; (3.3)
• the spherical scoring rule:
ScRsph(qk|qj) = Pr[qk|qj ]√∑
qh∈Q Pr[qh|qj ]2
; (3.4)
• the quadratic scoring rule:
ScRquad(qk|qj) = 2Pr[qk|qj ]−
∑
qh∈Q
Pr[qh|qj ]2; (3.5)
and depend on the conditional probability of the reference report given the report of buyer i. Pr[qk|qj ]
is the probability that the reference reporter observes the signal Oref (i) = qk given that buyer i observed
the signal Oi = qj :
Pr[qk|qj ] =
∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[qk|θ]Pr[θ|qj ]; (3.6)
where Pr[θ|qj ] is the posterior probability of the type θ given the observation qj , computed from Bayes’
Law as in Eq. (3.1).
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Assume that the true signal observed by the buyer i is oi ∈ Q. If the reference report is truthful,
the payment expected by buyer i from the reputation mechanism is the weighted sum of the payments
received for all possible values of the reference report:∑
rref (i)∈Q
Pr[rref (i)|oi]τ(ri, rref (i));
Miller et al. prove that for any proper scoring rule ScR(rref (i)|ri), the expected payment of a
reporter is maximized by reporting the truth: i.e.,∑
rref (i)∈Q
Pr[rref (i)|oi]
(
τ(oi, rref (i))− τ(ri, rref (i))
)
> 0;
for all signals oi ∈ Q, ri 6= oi ∈ Q. This makes honest reporting a Nash equilibrium of the mechanisms.
Moreover, they show that by scaling the payments appropriately, i.e.,
τ(ri, rref (i)) = aScR(rref (i)|ri) + b; (3.7)
where a and b are constants, the expected reward when reporting truthfully is large enough to cover
the effort of reporting.
Intuitively, incentive-compatible payments exploit the correlation between the private signal ob-
served by an agent, and the agent’s beliefs regarding the reference report. Every quality signal privately
observed by the agent will generate a different posterior belief regarding the true type of the product4,
and consequently a different expected distribution for the value of the reference report. By paying re-
porters according to how well the public posterior belief (updated with the submitted report) predicts
the actual reference report (assumed honest), agents have the incentive to “align” the public belief to
their private beliefs, and thus report the truth.
3.3 Automated Design of Incentive-compatible Payment Mecha-
nisms
The payments based on scoring rules proposed by Miller et al. (Equations (3.2) and (3.7)) make
honest reporting optimal for all possible signals privately observed by a buyer. Practical mechanisms,
however, require certain margins for truth-telling. Honest reporting must be better than lying by at
least some margin Λ, chosen by the mechanism designer to offset the external benefits an agent might
obtain by lying. The payments based on proper scoring rules can be scaled to account for this margin.
Nevertheless, this scaling can lead to arbitrarily high feedback payments. This can be a problem because
the payments cause a loss to the reputation mechanism that must be made up in some way, either by
sponsorship or by charges levied on the users of the reputation information.
In this section I will investigate incentive compatible payments derived by automated mechanism
design (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002; Sandholm, 2003). The basic idea is to define the payments
through an optimization problem that, for example, minimizes the budget required by the reputation
mechanism to achieve a certain truth-telling margin Λ. We thus lose the simplicity of a closed-form
scoring rule, but gain in efficiency of the mechanism by having the guarantee that the resulting payments
are the lowest we can have in a particular context.
Formally, let si =
(
si(0), . . . , si(M − 1)
)
be the reporting strategy of buyer i, such that the buyer
announces si(j) ∈ Q whenever she observes the signal qj . The honest reporting strategy is s¯, such that
4The fact that different observations trigger different posterior beliefs is grounded in Bayesian theory, but was also
experimentally proven in psychological studies (Prelec, 2004)
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Figure 3.1: Reporting feedback. Choices and Payoffs.
the buyer always reports the truth: s¯(j) = qj for all signals qj ∈ Q. A summary of the notation is
presented in Appendix 3.A.
Assuming that buyer i actually observed the quality signal qj , her report ri = si(j) is determined
by the reporting strategy, si. Likewise, when the reference reporter actually observes the signal qk,
the report she submits to the reputation mechanism is rref (i) = sref (i)(k), according to the reporting
strategy sref (i). The payment expected by i is therefore:
V (si, sref (i)|qj) = Eqk∈Q
[
τ
(
si(j), sref (i)(k)
)]
=
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[Oref (i) = qk|Oi = qj ]τ
(
si(j), sref (i)(k)
)
;
(3.8)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the signal qk ∈ Q that is observed by the reference re-
porter, and Pr[qk|qj ], computed according to Eq. (3.6), is the conditional probability that the reference
reporter observes qk given that buyer i observed qj .
Reporting feedback is usually costly, and buyers may obtain external benefits from lying. Let Cr ≥ 0
be an upper bound for the feedback reporting cost of one buyer, and let Λ(qj , qh) be an upper bound
on the external benefit a buyer can obtain from falsely reporting the signal qh instead of qj . The cost
of reporting Cr is assumed independent of the beliefs and observations of the buyer; moreover, for all
signals qj 6= qk ∈ Q, Λ(qj , qj) = 0 and Λ(qj , qk) ≥ 0.
Let us now consider the buyer i who purchases the product and observes the quality signal Oi = qj .
When asked by the reputation mechanism to submit feedback, the buyer can choose: (a) to honestly
report qj , (b) to report another signal si(j) 6= qj ∈ Q or (c) not to report at all. Figure 3.1 presents
the buyer’s expected payoff for each of these cases, given the payment scheme τ(·, ·) and the reporting
strategy sref (i) of the reference reporter.
Truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if the buyer finds it optimal to announce the true
signal, whenever the reference reporter also reports the truth. Formally, the honest reporting strategy
s¯ is a NE if and only if for all signals qj ∈ Q, and all reporting strategies s∗ 6= s¯:
V (s¯, s¯|qj) ≥ V (s∗, s¯|qj) + Λ(qj , s∗(j));
V (s¯, s¯|qj) ≥ Cr;
When the inequalities are strict, honest reporting is a strict NE, and the corresponding payment mech-
anism τ(·, ·) is incentive-compatible.
For any observed signal Oi = qj ∈ Q, there areM −1 different dishonest reporting strategies s∗ 6= s¯
the buyer can use: i.e., report s∗(j) = qh ∈ Q \ {qj} instead of qj . Using Eq. (3.8) to expand the
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expected payment of a buyer, the NE conditions become:∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
)
> Λ(qj , qh);
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]τ(qj , qk) > Cr;
(3.9)
for all qj , qh ∈ Q, qj 6= qh.
Given the incentive-compatible payment scheme τ(·, ·), the expected amount paid by the reputation
mechanism to an honest buyer is:
Eqj∈Q
[
V (s¯, s¯|qj)
]
=
∑
qj∈Q
Pr[qj ]
( ∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]τ(qj , qk)
)
;
The optimal payment scheme minimizes the budget required by the reputation mechanism, and
therefore solves the following linear program (i.e., linear optimization problem):
LP 3.3.1
min Eqj∈Q
[
V (s¯, s¯|qj)
]
=
∑
qj∈Q
Pr[qj ]
( ∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]τ(qj , qk)
)
s.t.
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
)
≥ Λ(qj , qh); ∀qj , qh ∈ Q, qj 6= qh;
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]τ(qj , qk) ≥ Cr; ∀qj ∈ Q
τ(qj , qk) ≥ 0; ∀qj , qk ∈ Q
The payment scheme τ(·, ·) solving LP 3.3.1 depends on the cost of reporting, on the external
benefits from lying, and on the prior belief about the type of the product. To illustrate these payments
the next subsection introduce a very simple example.
3.3.1 Example
Alice, the owner of a new house, needs some plumbing work done. She knows there are good (type
θG) and bad (type θB) plumbers, i.e., Θ = {θG, θB}. Alice picks the plumber from the Yellow Pages,
and given the reputation of the source, she believes that the plumber, Bob, is likely to be good:
e.g., Pr[θG] = 0.8 and Pr[θB ] = 0.2. However, even a good plumber can sometimes make mistakes
and provide low quality service. Similarly, a bad plumber gets lucky from time to time and provides
satisfactory service. Alice does not have the necessary expertise to judge the particular problem she is
facing; she therefore perceives the result of the plumber’s work as a random signal conditioned on Bob’s
true type. Let us assume that the probability of a successful service (i.e., high quality, q1) is 0.9 if the
plumber is good, and 0.15 if the plumber is bad (the probabilities of a low quality service, q0, are 0.1
and 0.85 respectively). Following the notation in Section 3.1, we have: Pr[q1|θG] = 1−Pr[q0|θG] = 0.9
and Pr[q1|θB ] = 1− Pr[q0|θB ] = 0.15.
Considering the prior belief, and the conditional distribution of quality signals, Alice expects to
receive high quality with probability: Pr[q1] = 1−Pr[q0] = Pr[q1|θG]Pr[θG]+Pr[q1|θB ]Pr[θB ] = 0.75.
Once Bob gets the work done, Alice observes the result and learns something new about Bob’s
type. If Alice sees good work, her posterior belief regarding the type of Bob will be Pr[θG|q1] =
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τ(q1, q1) τ(q1, q0) τ(q0, q1) τ(q0, q0)
min 0.6525 0.0976 0.0975 0.1525
s.t. 0.87 0.13 -0.87 -0.13 ≥ 0.06
0.87 0.13 ≥ 0.01
-0.39 -0.61 0.39 0.61 ≥ 0.02
0.39 0.61 ≥ 0.01
≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Table 3.1: The optimization problem LP 3.3.1 for the example in Section 3.3.1.
1−Pr[θB |q1] = 0.96 (computed by Bayes’ Law), and therefore, Alice will believe that some other client
will get good service from Bob with probability: Pr[q1|q1] = Pr[q1|θG]Pr[θG|q1]+Pr[q1|θB ]Pr[θB |q1] =
0.87. On the other hand, if Alice is not happy with the work done by Bob, her posterior belief will be:
Pr[θG|q0] = 1− Pr[θB |q0] = 0.32, and she will expect another client to receive good service from Bob
with probability: Pr[q1|q0] = Pr[q1|θG]Pr[θG|q0] + Pr[q1|θB ]Pr[θB |q0] = 0.39.
Alice can submit one binary feedback (i.e., q0 or q1) to an online reputation mechanism. Let the
price of the plumber’s work be fixed and normalized to 1, and the cost of formatting and submitting
feedback be Cr = 0.01. Alice has clear incentives to misreport:
• by reporting low quality when she actually received high quality, Alice can hope to both decrease
the price and increase the future availability of this (good) plumber. Assume that the external
benefits of lying can be approximated as Λ(q1, q0) = 0.06
• by reporting high quality when she actually received low quality, Alice can hope to decrease the
relative reputation of other plumbers and thus obtain a faster (or cheaper) service from a better
plumber in the future. Assume the lying incentive can be approximated as Λ(q0, q1) = 0.02
The optimal feedback payments solve the optimization problem presented in Table 3.1, and have
the following structure:
τ(·, ·) q0 q1
q0 0.082 0
q1 0 0.085
The expected payment to an honest buyer is 0.066, i.e., 6.6% of the price of the service.
Note that the payment mechanism described in Table 3.1 can only be used for the first report sub-
mitted by Alice after the prior distribution Pr[θG] = 1−Pr[θB ] = 0.8. Once the reputation mechanism
recorded the feedback reported by Alice and updated the reputation of the Bob, new payments must
be computed to provide honest reporting incentives for the next client employing Bob’s services. In an
online setting where feedback reports arrive sequentially, the payment mechanism must be computed
anew after every report. It is therefore essential that the payments be computed efficiently (further
details in Section 3.3.3).
Another remark is that the design process relies heavily on the prior distribution over types. The
reputation mechanism may collect these priors by considering all information available in the environ-
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ment about a specific product. From a practical perspective, the priors need not be precise: as long
as agents believe in the same priors as the reputation mechanism (this will typically be the case as
individual agents believe that they posses less information than the mechanism) they will subjectively
regard honest reporting as the optimal strategy. Moreover, Section 3.5 shows how to design robust
incentive compatible payments even when the beliefs of the agents differ slightly from the beliefs of the
reputation mechanism.
3.3.2 Unknown Lying Incentives
LP 3.3.1 reveals a strong correlation between the minimum expected cost and the external benefits
obtained from lying: low lying incentives generate lower expected payments. When finding accurate
approximations for the lying incentives is difficult, the mechanism designer might want to compute the
payment scheme that satisfies certain budget constraints, and maximizes the tolerated misreporting
incentives. The algorithm for computing these payments follows directly from LP 3.3.1: the objective
function becomes a constraint (e.g., expected budget is bounded by some amount, B) and the new
objective is to maximize the worst case (i.e., minimum) expected payment loss caused by misreporting:
LP 3.3.2
max Λ
s.t.
∑
qj∈Q
Pr[qj ]
( ∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]τ(qj , qk)
)
≤ B;
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
)
≥ Λ; ∀qj , qh ∈ Q, qj 6= qh;
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]τ(qj , qk) ≥ Λ; ∀qj ∈ Q
τ(qj , qk) ≥ 0; ∀qj , qk ∈ Q
The resulting scheme guarantees that any buyer will report honestly when the reporting costs and
external lying benefits are smaller than Λ.
Coming back to the example in Section 3.3.1, let us assume that the benefits obtained from lying
cannot be estimated accurately. Given the same limit on the expected budget (i.e., B = 0.066), we
want to compute the payment scheme that maximizes the tolerance to lying. Solving LP 3.3.2 gives
Λ = 0.047 and the payments:
τ(·, ·) q0 q1
q0 0.073 0
q1 0 0.124
3.3.3 Computational Complexity and Possible Approximations
The linear optimization problems LP 3.3.1 and LP 3.3.2 are similar in terms of size and complexity:
LP 3.3.1 has M2 variables and M2 inequality constraints, LP 3.3.2 has M2 + 1 variables and M2 + 1
inequality constraints. This section will therefore analyze the complexity (and runtime) of LP 3.3.1,
knowing that the same conclusions extend to LP 3.3.2 as well.
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M CPU time [ms] M CPU time [ms]
2 11.16 (std = 3.5) 10 92.79 (std = 7.5)
4 19.24 (std = 3.7) 12 174.81 (std = 11.1)
6 29.22 (std = 4.4) 14 316.63 (std = 18.4)
8 55.62 (std = 6.7) 16 521.47 (std = 25.4)
Table 3.2: Average CPU time (and standard deviation) for computing the optimal payment
scheme, depending on the number M of quality signals.
The worst case complexity of linear optimization problems is O(n4L), where n =M2 is the number
of variables, and L is the size of the problem (approximatively equal to the total number of bits
required to represent the problem). The average time required to solve LP 3.3.1 has been experimentally
evaluated using the standard linear solver in the Optimization Toolbox of Matlab 7.0.4. For different
sizes of the feedback set (i.e., different values ofM) 2000 problems were randomly generated as described
in Appendix 3.B. Table 3.2 presents the average CPU time required to find the optimal payment scheme
on an average laptop: e.g., 1.6 GHz Centrino processor, 1Gb RAM, WinXP operating system. Up to
M = 16 possible quality signals, general purpose hardware and software can find the optimal payment
scheme in less than half a second.
The optimal payment scheme depends on the prior belief regarding the type of the product, and
therefore, must be recomputed after every submitted feedback. Although linear optimization algorithms
are generally fast, frequent feedback reports could place unacceptable workloads on the reputation
mechanism. Two solutions can be envisaged to ease the computational burden:
• publish batches of reports instead of individual ones. The beliefs of the buyers thus change only
once for every batch, and new payments must be computed less frequently. The right size for the
batch should be determined by considering the frequency of submitted reports and the tradeoff
between computational cost, and the efficiency losses due to delayed information.
• approximate the optimal payments, either by closed form functions (e.g., scoring rules) or by
partial solutions of the optimization problem. The rest of this section develops on these latter
techniques.
The first approximation for the optimal incentive compatible payment scheme is provided Miller
et al. (2005), where τ(qj , qk) = ScR(qk|qj) is defined by a proper scoring rule. The three best known
proper scoring rules are the logarithmic, the spherical and the quadratic scoring rules defined by Eq.
(3.3), (3.5) and (3.4) respectively.
The constraints from LP 3.3.1 can be satisfied by: (a) adding a constant to all payments such that
they become positive: i.e., τ(qj , qk) = τ(qj , qk)−minqh,ql∈Q τ(qh, ql), and (b) multiplying all payments
with a constant such that the expected payment loss when lying outweighs external benefits: i.e.,
τ(qj , qk) = const · τ(qj , qk ) where:
const = max
s∗(j),qj∈Q
s∗(j) 6=qj
Λ(qj , s
∗(j ))(
V (¯s, s¯|qj )−V (s∗, s¯|qj )
) ; (3.10)
For the example in Section 3.3.1, the payments computed based on scoring rules (properly scaled
according to Eq. (3.10)) are the following:
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Figure 3.2: Incentive-compatible payments based on proper scoring rules.
• τlog(q1, q1) = 0.27, τlog(q1, q0) = 0, τlog(q0, q1) = 0.17, τlog(q0, q0) = 0.21 and an expected cost of
0.22 for the logarithmic scoring rule;
• τsph(q1, q1) = 0.2, τsph(q1, q0) = 0, τsph(q0, q1) = 0.11, τsph(q0, q0) = 0.15 and an expected cost of
0.17 for the spherical scoring rule;
• τquad(q1, q1) = 0.23, τquad(q1, q0) = 0, τquad(q0, q1) = 0.13, τquad(q0, q0) = 0.18 and an expected
cost of 0.19 for the quadratical scoring rule;
The payments based on scoring rules are two to three times more expensive than the optimal ones.
The same ratio remains valid for more general settings. For 2000 randomly generated settings (see
Appendix 3.B) and different number of quality signals, Figure 3.2 plots the average expected payment
to one buyer when payments are computed using scoring rules.
Computational methods can also be used to obtain faster approximations of the optimal payment
scheme. Most linear programming algorithms find the optimal solution by iterating through a set of
feasible points that monotonically converge to the optimal one. Such algorithms are anytime algorithms
as they can be stopped at any time, and provide a feasible solution (i.e., a payment scheme that
is incentive-compatible, but maybe not optimal). The more time available, the better the feasible
solution. The reputation mechanism can thus set a deadline for the optimization algorithm, and the
resulting payment scheme makes it optimal for the buyers to report the truth.
Figure 3.3 plots the convergence of the Matlab linear programming algorithm for large problems
(i.e., large number of possible quality signals) where approximations are likely to be needed. For 500
randomly generated settings, we plot (on a logarithmic scale) the average relative cost (relative to the
optimal one) of the partial solution available after t iteration steps of the algorithm. As it can be seen,
most of the computation time is spent making marginal improvements to the partial solution. For
M = 50 possible quality signals, the full optimization takes 20 steps on average. However, the partial
solution after 6 steps generates expected costs that are only 40% higher on the average than the optimal
ones.
Finally, the two techniques can be combined to obtain fast accurate approximations. As many linear
programming algorithms accept initial solutions, one could use an approximation computed using the
scoring rules to specify a starting point for an iterative optimization algorithm.
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Figure 3.3: Incentive-compatible payments based on partial solutions.
3.4 Further Decreasing the Feedback Payments
The payment scheme computed through LP 3.3.1 generate, by definition, the lowest expected budget
required by an incentive-compatible reputation mechanism, for a given setting. In this section I inves-
tigate two modifications of the mechanism itself, in order to lower the cost of reputation management
even further. The first, proposes the use of several reference reporters for scoring one feedback. I
formally prove that the higher the number of reference raters, the lower becomes the expected cost of
reputation management.
The second idea is to reduce the potential lying incentives by filtering out false reports. Intuitively,
the false feedback reports that bring important external benefits must significantly differ from the
average reports submitted by honest reporters. Using a probabilistic filter that detects and ignores
abnormal reports, lying benefits can be substantially reduced. The constraints on the optimal payments
thus become more relaxed, and the optimal expected cost decreases.
3.4.1 Using Several Reference Reports
The setting described in Section 3.1 is modified in the following way: we consider Nref (instead of only
one) reference reports when computing the feedback payment due to an agent. By an abuse of notation
we use the same ref (i) to denote the set of Nref reference reporters of agent i. The signals observed
and reported by the reference reporters are now sets containing Nref elements.
The order in which reference reports are submitted to the reputation mechanism is not important.
We therefore represent a set of Nref reports or observed signals by a vector (n0, n1, . . . , nM−1) where nj
is the number of times the signal qj ∈ Q is present in the set. The set containing all possible unordered
sets of Nref signals is Q(Nref ), formally defined as:
Q(Nref ) =
{
(n0, . . . , nM−1) ∈ NM |
M−1∑
j=0
nj = Nref
}
;
Let q¯k ∈ Q(Nref ) be a set of signals observed by the reference reporters ref (i). If they report
honestly, (i.e., every reference reporter reports according to the truthful strategy s¯), the expected
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payment received by buyer i, given that she observed the signal qj and reports according to the strategy
si is:
V (si, s¯|qj) =
∑
q¯k∈Q(Nref )
Pr[q¯k|qj ]τ
(
si(j), q¯k
)
;
where the payment function τ(·, ·) now depends on the report of buyer i, and the set of reports submitted
by the reference reporters. The optimal payment function solves the following optimization problem:
LP 3.4.1
min Eqj∈Q
[
V (s¯, s¯|qj)
]
=
∑
qj∈Q
Pr[qj ]
( ∑
q¯k∈Q(Nref )
Pr[q¯k|qj ]τ(qj , q¯k)
)
;
s.t.
∑
q¯k∈Q(Nref )
Pr[q¯k|qj ]
(
τ(qj , q¯k)− τ(qh, q¯k)
)
≥ Λ(qj , qh); ∀qj , qh ∈ Q, qj 6= qh;
∑
q¯k∈Q(Nref )
Pr[q¯k|qj ]τ(qj , q¯k) ≥ Cr; ∀qj ∈ Q
τ(qj , q¯k) ≥ 0; ∀qj ∈ Q, q¯k ∈ Q(Nref )
The optimization problem LP 3.4.1 hasM2 constraints andM ·|Q(Nref )| variables, where |Q(Nref )| =( Nref +M − 1
M − 1
)
is the cardinality of Q(Nref ) (proof in Appendix 3.C).
Proposition 3.4.1 The minimum expected budget required by an incentive compatible reputation mech-
anism decreases as the number of reference reporters increases.
Proof. I will prove that any incentive-compatible payment scheme designed for a N reference reports
can generate an incentive-compatible payment scheme for N + 1 reference reports, for any value of N .
Moreover, the expected payment to an honest reporter is equal under the two payment schemes. It
follows that the minimum budget required by a reputation mechanism that uses N+1 reference reports
is less or equal to the minimum budget required by a reputation mechanism that uses only N reference
reports. Hence the conclusion of the proposition.
Formally, let τN (·, ·) be the payment scheme that solves the linear program LP 3.4.1 for N reference
reports. Let q¯Nk ∈ Q(N) be a set of N reference reports, and let seqNk ∈ QN be an ordered sequence
of N reference reports. The notation seqNk ∼ q¯Nk means that the unordered set of reports present in
the sequence seqNk is equal to q¯
N
k . Let seq
N
k ⊕ qj also denote the sequence of N + 1 signals obtained by
appending the signal qj at the end of the sequence seqNk .
Slightly abusing the notation, I will also use τN (qj , seqNk ) = τN (qj , q¯
N
k ) to denote the payment
when the reference reports are ordered according to the sequences seqNk ∼ q¯Nk . The payment scheme
τN+1(·, ·) corresponding to a setting with N + 1 reference reports, can now be defined as follows: Take
all possible orderings of the signals in the set q¯N+1k . For each sequence seq
N+1
k ∼ q¯N+1k , discard the
last signal (e.g., if seqN+1k = seq
N
k ⊕ qh then discard qh) and consider the payment τ(qj , seqNk ) based
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on the remaining N reference reports. These payments are then averaged:
τN+1(qj , q¯
N+1
k ) =
∑
seqN+1
k
=seqNk ⊕qh
seqN+1
k
∼q¯N+1
k
τN (qj , seq
N
k )
∑
seqN+1
k
∼q¯N+1
k
1
;
Let us now prove that the payment scheme τN+1(·, ·) satisfies the constraints of the optimization
problem LP 3.4.1 corresponding to N + 1 reference reports:
∑
q¯k∈Q(N+1)
Pr[q¯k|qj ]
(
τN+1(qj , q¯k)− τN+1(qh, q¯k)
)
=
=
∑
q¯k∈Q(N+1)
∑
seq′k∼q¯k
Pr[seq ′k |qj ]
∑
seqN+1
k
=seqNk ⊕ql
seqN+1
k
∼q¯N+1
k
τN (qj , seq
N
k )− τN (qh , seqNk )
∑
seqN+1
k
∼q¯N+1
k
1
=
∑
q¯k∈Q(N+1)
∑
seqN+1
k
=seqNk ⊕ql
seqN+1
k
∼q¯N+1
k
Pr[seq ′k |qj ]
(
τN (qj , seq
N
k )− τN (qh , seqNk )
)
=
∑
seqN+1
k
=seqNk ⊕ql
seqN+1
k
∈QN+1
Pr[seqN+1k |qj ]
(
τN (qj , seq
N
k )− τN (qh , seqNk )
)
=
∑
seqNk ∈QN
Pr[seqNk |qj ]
(
τN (qj , seq
N
k )− τN (qh , seqNk )
)
=
∑
q¯k∈Q(N)
Pr[q¯k|qj ]
(
τN (qj , q¯k)− τN (qh, q¯k)
)
> Λ(qj , qh); ∀qj , qh ∈ Q, qj 6= qh;
The first transformation was obtained because Pr[seq ′k |qj ] takes the same value for all sequences
seq ′k ∼ q¯k . The second transformation is possible because a nested iteration over all q¯k ∈ Q(N) and all
seqk ∼ q¯k is equivalent to one iteration over all possible sequences seqk ∈ QN+1 . The third transfor-
mation takes into account that Pr[seqNk ⊕ ql |qj ] = Pr [seqNk |qj ] ·Pr [ql |qj ] and that
∑
ql∈Q Pr[ql|qj ] = 1.
Finally, the last transformation is possible because τN (·, seqNk ) = τN (·, q¯k ) for all sequences seqNk ∼ q¯k .
Similarly, it is easy to prove that:∑
q¯k∈Q(N+1)
Pr[q¯k|qj ]τN+1(qj , q¯k) =
∑
q¯k∈Q(N)
Pr[q¯k|qj ]τN (qj , q¯k) > Cr; ∀qj ∈ Q;
and that the expected payment made to an honest reporter is the same under the payment schemes
τN (·, ·) and τN+1(·, ·). ¥
Using several reference reports decreases the cost of reputation management, but also increases the
complexity of the algorithm defining the optimal payment scheme. To visualize the tradeoff between
the two, I generated 2000 random settings (details available in Appendix 3.B) and plotted in Figure
3.4 the average cost of the incentive-compatible payment mechanism as the number of reference reports
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Figure 3.4: Average expected payment to one agent when several reference reports are used.
increases from 1 to 5. Significant savings (approx. 25% for a setting with M = 2 quality signals, and
4% for a setting with M = 8 quality signals) are mainly obtained from the second and third reference
reports. Practical systems can therefore function in this sweetspot where 2 to 4 reference reports are
used to decrease the budget required by the reputation mechanism without increasing too much the
complexity of the design problem.
For the example in Section 3.3.1, using 2 reference reports reduces the expected payment to one
reporter from 0.066 to 0.054, and generates the following payment mechanism:
τ(·, ·) (2× q0) (q0, q1) (2× q1)
q0 0.087 0 0
q1 0 0 0.081
Using 3 reference reports further reduces the expected cost of the reputation mechanism to 0.051
and generates the following payments:
τ(·, ·) (3× q0) (2× q0, q1) (q0, 2× q1) (3× q1)
q0 0.112 0 0 0
q1 0 0 0 0.091
3.4.2 Filtering out False Reports
The feedback payments naturally decrease when the reporting and honesty costs become smaller. The
cost of reporting can be decreased by software tools that help automate as much as possible the process
of formatting and submitting feedback. On the other hand, the external incentives for lying can be
reduced by filtering out the reports that are likely to be false.
Truth filters can be constructed based on statistical analysis. When all agents report truthfully,
their reports follow a common distribution given by the product’s true type. Reports that stand out
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from the common distribution are either particularly unlikely, or dishonest. Either way, by filtering them
out with high probability, the reputation information does not usually suffer significant degradation.
Probabilistic filters of false reports have been widely used in decentralized and multi-agent systems.
Vu, Hauswirth, and Aberer (2005) use clustering techniques to isolate lying agents in a market of web-
services. Their mechanism is based on a small number of “trusted” reports that provide the baseline
for truthful information. The technique shows very good experimental results when lying agents use
probabilistic strategies and submit several reports. Buchegger and Le Boudec (2005) use Bayesian
methods to detect free riders in a wireless ad-hoc network. Nodes consider both direct and second-hand
information, however, second-hand information is taken into account only when it does not conflict with
direct observations (i.e., second hand reports do not trigger significant deviations in the agent’s beliefs).
In peer-to-peer reputation mechanisms (e.g., TRAVOS (Teacy et al., 2005), CREDENCE (Walsh and
Sirer, 2005) and (Yu and Singh, 2003; Ismail and Jøsang, 2002; Whitby et al., 2004)) agents weigh the
evidence from peers by the distance from the agent’s direct experience.
However, all of the results cited above rely on two important assumptions: a) every agent submits
several reports, b) according to some probabilistic lying strategy. Self-interested agents can strategically
manipulate their reports to circumvent the filtering mechanisms and take profit from dishonest report-
ing5. When all buyers are self-interested and submit only one feedback report, filtering methods based
entirely on similarity metrics can never be accurate enough to filter out effectively all lying strategies
without important losses of information.
In this section, I present an alternative filtering method that also exploits the information available
to the agents. The intuition behind this method is simple: the probability of filtering out the report ri
submitted by agent i should not only depend on how well ri fits the distribution of peer reports, but
also on the benefits that ri could bring to the reporter if it were false. When Λ(qj , ri) is big (i.e. the
agent has strong incentives to report ri whenever her true observation was qj), the filtering mechanism
should be more strict in accepting ri given that peer reports make the observation of qj probable. On
the other hand, when Λ(qj , ri) is small, filtering rules can be more relaxed, such that the mechanism
does not lose too much information. In this way, the filter adapts to the particular context and allows
an optimal tradeoff between diminished costs and loss of information.
Concretely, let Pr[θ], θ ∈ Θ describe the current common belief regarding the true type of the
product, let oi, ri ∈ Q denote the signals observed, respectively reported by agent i, and let q¯k ∈ Q(Nref )
describe the set of Nref reference reports. The publishing of the report submitted by agent i is delayed
until the next Nftr reports (i.e., the filtering reports) are also available. A filtering mechanism is formally
defined by the table of probabilities pi(ri, qˆk) of accepting the report ri ∈ Q when the filtering reports
take the value qˆk ∈ Q(Nftr ). With probability 1 − pi(ri, qˆk) the report ri will not be published by the
reputation mechanism, and therefore will not be reflected in the reputation information. Note, however,
that all reports (including the dropped ones) are paid for as described in the previous sections.
The payment scheme τ(·, ·) and the filtering mechanism pi(·, ·) are incentive compatible if and only
if for all signals qj , qh ∈ Q, qj 6= qh, the expected payment loss offsets the expected gain obtained from
lying: ∑
q¯k∈Q(Nref )
Pr[q¯k|qj ]
(
τ(qj , q¯k)− τ(qh, q¯k)
)
> Λˆ(qj , qh)
Λˆ(qj , qh) =
∑
qˆk∈Q(Nftr )
Pr[qˆk|qj ] · pi(qh, qˆk) · Λ(qj , qh);
(3.11)
where Λˆ(·, ·) is obtained by discounting Λ(·, ·) with the expected probability that a false report is
5It is true, however, that some mechanisms exhibit high degrees of robustness towards such lying strategies: individual
agents can profit from lying, but as long as the big majority of agents reports honestly, the liars do not break the properties
of the reputation mechanism
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recorded by the reputation mechanism.
Naturally, the feedback payments decrease with decreasing probabilities of accepting reports. How-
ever, a useful reputation mechanism must also limit the information lost by discarding feedback reports.
As a metric for information loss I chose the number (or percentage) of useful reports that are dropped
by the mechanism. A feedback report is useful, when given the true type of the product and a prior
belief on the set of possible types, the posterior belief updated with the report is closer to the true type
than the prior belief.
For the example in Section 3.3.1, when the plumber is actually good, recording a high quality report
is useful (because the posterior belief is closer to reality than the prior belief), while recording a low
quality report is not. Conversely, when the plumber is bad, recording a low quality report is useful,
while recording a high quality report is not. The notion of usefulness captures the intuition that some
reports can be filtered out in some contexts without any loss of information for the buyers (on the
contrary, the community has more accurate information without the report).
Formally, information loss can be quantified in the following way. Given the true type θ∗ ∈ Θ and
the prior belief Pr[·] on the set of possible types, the report qj is useful if and only if Pr[θ∗] < Pr[θ∗|qj ]:
i.e. the posterior belief updated with the signal qj is closer to the true type than the prior belief. Given
the filtering mechanism pi(·, ·), and the true type θ∗, the expected probability of dropping qj is:
Pr[drop qj |θ∗] = 1−
∑
qˆk∈Q(Nftr )
Pr[qˆk|θ∗]pi(qj , qˆk); (3.12)
where Pr[qˆk|θ∗] is the probability that the filtering reports take the value qˆk, when the true type of the
product is θ∗. To limit the loss of information, the reputation mechanism must insure that given the
current belief, whatever the true type of the product, no useful report is dropped with a probability
greater than a given threshold, γinfLoss :
∀qj ∈ Q, θ ∈ Θ, P r[θ] < Pr[θ|qj ]⇒ Pr[drop qj |θ] < γinfLoss ; (3.13)
I can now define the incentive-compatible payment mechanism (using Nref reference reports) and
the filtering mechanism (using Nftr filtering reports) that minimize the expected payment to an honest
reporter:
LP 3.4.2
min Eqj∈Q
[
V (s¯, s¯|qj)
]
=
∑
qj∈Q
Pr[qj ]
( ∑
q¯k∈Q(Nref )
Pr[q¯k|qj ]τ(qj , q¯k)
)
;
s.t.
∑
q¯k∈Q(Nref )
Pr[q¯k|qj ]
(
τ(qj , q¯k)− τ(qh, q¯k)
)
≥ Λˆ(qj , qh); ∀qj , qh ∈ Q, qj 6= qh,
Λˆ(qj , qh) is defined in (3.11);∑
q¯k∈Q(Nref )
Pr[q¯k|qj ]τ(qj , q¯k) ≥ Cr; ∀qj ∈ Q
Pr[θ] < Pr[θ|qj ]⇒ Pr[drop qj |θ] ≤ γinfLoss ; ∀θ ∈ Θ,∀qj ∈ Q
τ(qj , q¯k) ≥ 0, pi(qj , qˆk) ∈ [0, 1] ∀qj ∈ Q, ∀q¯k ∈ Q(Nref ), ∀qˆk ∈ Q(Nftr );
The effect of using probabilistic filtering of reports was experimentally studied on 500 randomly
generated settings, for different number of filtering reports (i.e., Nftr ), different number of quality
signals (i.e., M) and different values of the parameter γinfLoss . Figure 3.5 plots the tradeoff between
the reduction of cost (i.e. the ratio between the optimal cost without probabilistic filtering and the
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(a) M = 3, using N filtering reports;
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(b) M = 5, using N filtering reports;
Figure 3.5: Tradeoff between cost decrease and information loss.
optimal cost with probabilistic filtering) and the information loss for M = 3 and M = 5 quality signals.
When M = 3, and we accept losing 2% of the useful reports, the cost decreases 6 times by using
Nftr = 2 filtering reports, and 12 times by using Nftr = 8 filtering reports. As intuitively expected, the
cost decreases when we can use more filtering reports, and accept higher probabilities of losing useful
feedback.
As a next experiment, I studied the accuracy of the reputation information published by a mech-
anism that filters out reports. For each of the random settings generated above, I also generate 200
random sequences of 20 feedback reports corresponding to a randomly chosen type. For different param-
eters (i.e., number of signals, M , number of filtering reports, Nftr , and threshold probability γinfLoss),
Figure 3.6 plots the mean square error of the reputation information6 published by a mechanism that
filters, respectively doesn’t filter submitted reports. As expected, filtering out reports does not signif-
icantly alter the convergence of beliefs; on the contrary, filtering out reports may sometimes help to
focus the beliefs on the true type of the product.
Finally, for the example in Section 3.3.1 using one reference report and 3 filtering reports with
a threshold for dropping useful reports of 2%, the expected payment to one agent is 0.02, and the
payments τ(·, ·), respectively the filtering probabilities pi(·, ·) are the following:
τ(·, ·) q0 q1
q0 0.033 0
q1 0 0.023
pi(·, ·) (3× q0) (2× q0, q1) (q0, 2× q1) (3× q1)
q0 1 1 0.718 0
q1 0.04 0.42 0.995 1
6The mean square error after i submitted reports is defined as: msei =
∑
θ∈Θ (Pr [θ|i ]− I (θ))2 , where Pr[·|i] describes
the belief of the agents regarding the type of the product after i submitted reports, I(θ) = 1 for θ = θ∗ (the true type of
the product), and I(θ) = 0 for θ 6= θ∗.
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Figure 3.6: Convergence of reputation information.
3.5 Robust Incentive-Compatible Payment Mechanisms
One key assumption behind the payment mechanisms described in the previous section is that the
reputation mechanism and the reporters share the same prior information regarding the reputation of
the rated product. Only in this case the honest report aligns the posterior reputation (as computed
by the reputation mechanism) with the private posterior beliefs of the agent. When reporters have
private prior information unknown to the reputation mechanism, it may be possible that some lying
report is better than truth telling. In this section, I investigate feedback payment mechanisms that
are incentive compatible even when reporters have some private information that is unknown to the
reputation mechanism.
3.5.1 Dishonest Reporting with Unknown Beliefs
The optimal incentive-compatible payments computed in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3 rely on the posterior
beliefs (i.e., the probabilities Pr[qk|qj ]) of the reporters regarding the value of the reference reports.
These can be computed by the reputation mechanism from:
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• the prior belief, Pr[θ], that the product is of type θ,
• the conditional probabilities, Pr[qj |θ], that a product of type θ generates the signal qj ,
using Bayes’ Law as shown in the Eq. (3.6).
However, when the reporters have different beliefs regarding the values of the reference reports, the
constraints in LP 3.3.1 do not accurately reflect the decision problem of the agents, and therefore, do
not always guarantee an honest equilibrium.
Let us reconsider the example from Section 3.3.1, and the corresponding payments from Table 3.1.
Assume that the prior belief of Alice differs only slightly from that of the reputation mechanism. For
example, Alice might have talked on the phone with the plumber Bob, so she’s slightly more likely to
believe that Bob is a good plumber: e.g., for Alice, Pr∗[θG] = 0.83, while for the reputation mechanism,
Pr[θG] = 0.8. All other values remain the same. If Alice is dissatisfied with Bob’s work, her private
posterior belief regarding Bob’s type becomes Pr∗[θG|q0] = 0.365 instead of Pr[θG|q0] = 0.32, so Alice
expects another client to get good service from Bob with the probability: Pr∗[q1|q0] = 1−Pr∗[q0|q0] =
0.424 (instead of Pr[q1|q1] = 0.39 considered by the reputation mechanism). Simple arithmetics reveals
that Alice is better off by reporting a positive instead of the truthful negative report:
• the expected gain from falsely submitting positive feedback is: 0.424 ·0.085+0.576 ·0+Λ(q0, q1) =
0.056,
• while honest reporting brings only: 0.424 · 0 + 0.576 · 0.082 = 0.047.
3.5.2 Declaration of Private Information
To eliminate lying incentives, Miller et al. (2005) suggest that reporters should also declare their prior
beliefs before submitting feedback. The reputation mechanism could then use the extra information to
compute the payments that makes truth-telling rational for every agent.
Unfortunately, such a mechanism can be exploited by self-interested agents when external benefits
from lying are positive. Consider the same example as above: Alice has a prior belief which assigns
probability 0.83 to the plumber being good.
If Alice truthfully declares her prior belief, the reputation mechanism computes the optimal pay-
ments by solving LP 3.3.1:
τ(·, ·) q0 q1
q0 0.095 0
q1 0 0.082
so that by truthfully reporting negative feedback, Alice expects a payment equal to: 0.424 · 0 + 0.576 ·
0.095 = 0.055.
Alice can, however, declare the prior belief: Pr[θG] = 1− Pr[θB ] = 0.1. In this case, the payment
scheme computed by the reputation mechanism will be:
τ(·, ·) q0 q1
q0 0.064 0
q1 0 0.212
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and the optimal strategy for Alice following the negative experience is to submit a positive report. Her
expected payment is: 0.424 · 0.212 + 0.55 · 0 + Λ(q0, q1) = 0.11 > 0.055, where Λ(q0, q1) = 0.02 is the
external benefit Alice can obtain by falsely declaring q1 instead of q0.
The example provided above is, unfortunately, not unique. Profitable lying is possible because agents
can find false prior beliefs that determine the reputation mechanism to compute feedback payments
that make lying optimal. Thus, the agent obtains both the optimal feedback payment, and the external
benefit from lying.
The false prior beliefs that make lying profitable can be easily computed based on the following
intuition. The payment scheme defined by LP 3.3.1 makes it optimal for the agents to reveal their
true posterior belief regarding the type of the product. When the prior belief is known, only the truly
observed quality signal “aligns” the posterior belief of the reputation mechanism with that of the agent.
However, when the prior belief must also be revealed, several combinations of prior belief and reported
signal, can lead to the same posterior belief. Hence, the agent is free to chose the combination that
brings the best external reward.
The false prior belief (Pr[θ])θ∈Θ and the false signal qh that lead to the same posterior belief
(Pr[θ|qj ])θ∈Θ, can be computed by solving the following system of linear equations:
Pr[θ|qh] = Pr[qh|θ]Pr[θ]∑
θ′∈Θ Pr[qh|θ′]Pr[θ′]
=
Pr[qj |θ]Pr[θ]∑
θ′∈Θ Pr[qj |θ′]Pr[θ′]
= Pr[θ|qj ]; ∀θ ∈ Θ; (3.14)
The system has |Θ| equations and |Θ|+ 1 variables (i.e., the probabilities Pr[θ] and the signal qh);
therefore, there will generally be several solutions that make lying profitable. The agent may choose
the one that maximizes her expected payment by solving the following nested linear problem:
max Λ(qj , qh) +
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]τ(qh, qk)
s.t. Pr[θ|qh] = Pr[θ|qj ]; ∀θ ∈ Θ;
τ(·, ·) solves LP 3.3.1 for the prior beliefs Pr[θ]
To enforce truth-telling, Prelec (2004) suggests payments that also depend on the declared priors.
Agents are required to declare both the observed signal, and a prediction of the signals observed by the
other agents (which indirectly reflects the agent’s private information). The proposed “truth serum”
consists of two additive payments: an information payment that rewards the submitted report, and
a prediction payment that rewards the declared private information. Prelec shows that honesty is the
highest paying Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, his results rely on the assumption that a prior probability
distribution over all possible private beliefs (not the belief itself) is common knowledge.
Another solution has been suggested by Miller et al. (2005). Misreporting incentives can be elim-
inated if agents declare their prior beliefs before the actual interaction takes place. As posteriors are
not available yet, the agent cannot manipulate the declared prior belief in order to avoid the penalty
from lying. However, such a process has several practical limitations. First, the enforcement of prior
belief declaration before the interaction can only be done if a central authority acts as an intermediary
between the buyer and the seller. The central proxy may become a bottleneck and adds to the trans-
action cost. Second, the declaration of prior beliefs could significantly delay the access to the desired
good. Finally, the reporting of priors adds to the reporting cost (reporting probability distributions
is much more costly than reporting observed signals) and greatly increases the budget required by an
incentive-compatible mechanism.
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3.5.3 Computing Robust Incentive-Compatible Payments
In this section I pursue an alternative solution for dealing with unknown beliefs. I start from the
assumption that the private beliefs of most rational agents will not differ significantly from those of the
reputation mechanism. The beliefs of the reputation mechanism, as reflected in the publicly available
reputation information, have been constructed by aggregating all feedback reports submitted by all
previous users. Assuming that agents trust the reputation mechanism to publish truthful information,
their private information will trigger only marginal changes to the beliefs. Thus, rather than build a
system that can accommodate all private beliefs, I focus on mechanisms that are incentive-compatible
for most priors, i.e., the priors within certain bounds from those of the reputation mechanism.
Let (Pr[θ])θ∈Θ characterize the prior belief of the reputation mechanism and let (Pr∗[θ] = Pr[θ] +
εθ)θ∈Θ be the range of private beliefs the clients might have, where:
∑
θ∈Θ εθ = 0, and
max(−γmaxPI ,−Pr[θ]) ≤ εθ ≤ min(γmaxPI , 1− Pr[θ]), γmaxPI > 0.
Replacing the private beliefs in Eq. (3.6) , the conditional probabilities for the reference reporter’s
observed signals become:
Pr∗[qk|qj ] =
∑
θ∈Θ Pr[qk|θ]Pr[qj |θ](Pr[θ] + εθ)∑
θ∈Θ Pr[qj |θ](Pr[θ] + εθ)
;
Let Pr∗m[qk|qj ] and Pr∗M [qk|qj ] be the minimum, respectively the maximum values of Pr∗[qk|qj ]
as the variables (εθ)θ∈Θ take values within the acceptable bounds. If the constraints of LP 3.3.1 are
modified such that honest reporting is optimal for all possible values of the probabilities Pr∗[qk|qj ], the
resulting payment mechanism is incentive compatible for all private beliefs that are not too far from
the belief of the reputation mechanism.
Representing linear constraints for a continuous range of parameters is not accepted by linear solvers.
The constraint: ∑
qk∈Q
Pr∗[qk|qj ]
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
)
> Λ(qj , qh); (3.15)
is satisfied for all possible values of Pr∗[qk|qj ] ∈
[
Pr∗m[qk|qj ], P r∗M [qk|qj ]
]
, only when:
min
Pr∗[qk|qj ]
( ∑
qk∈Q
Pr∗[qk|qj ]
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
))
> Λ(qj , qh); (3.16)
If the probabilities Pr∗[qk|qj ] were independent7, the minimum would be given by one of the com-
binations of extreme values: i.e., Pr∗[qk|qj ] = Pr∗m[qk|qj ] or Pr∗[qk|qj ] = Pr∗M [qk|qj ]. Therefore, by
replacing every constraint (3.15), with 2M linear constraints, one for every combination of extreme
values of Pr∗[qk|qj ], we impose stricter condition than in (3.16). The optimization problem defining
the payment scheme is similar to LP 3.3.1, where every constraint has been replaced by 2M linear
constraints, one for every combination of extreme values of Pr∗[qk|qj ].
The effect of private beliefs on the expected cost of the incentive-compatible mechanism has been
experimentally evaluated by generating 2000 random problems as described in Appendix 3.B. For each
problem, I considered different tolerance levels to private beliefs (i.e., γmaxPI = {0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.07, 0.1})
and solved the linear optimization problem that defines the robust, incentive compatible payments. I
used average hardware (e.g., Pentium Centrino 1.6MHz, 1Gb RAM, WinXP) and the CPLEX8 linear
7The probabilities Pr∗[qk|qj ] are not independent because they depend on the same variables (εθ)
8www.ilog.com
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Figure 3.7: Average expected payment
to one agent for different tolerance levels
of private beliefs.
M CPU time [ms] Std. dev. [ms]
2 14.117 4.9307
3 38.386 4.1765
4 485.33 50.546
5 798.28 722.5
Table 3.3: Average CPU time (and
standard deviation) for computing the
optimal payment scheme with private
beliefs.
solver. Table 3.3 presents the average CPU time required for computing the payments. Due to the
exponential number of constraints, the time required to compute the optimal payments increases expo-
nentially with the number of signals, M . For M = 6 signals, the computation already takes more than
one second.
Figure 3.7 presents the average cost of an incentive-compatible payment scheme that tolerates
private beliefs. It plots the average expected payment to one agent for different number of signals, and
different tolerance levels for private beliefs. The cost of the mechanism increases quickly with γmaxPI ,
the tolerated range of beliefs. For beliefs within ±10% of those of the reputation mechanism, the cost
of the mechanism increases one order of magnitude. Note, however, that the constraints defining the
payment scheme are stricter than necessary. As future research, one can define non-linear algorithms
that can approach the truly optimal payments.
3.5.4 General Tolerance Intervals for Private Information
Instead of modeling private information as small perturbations to the prior belief regarding the true
type of the product, we consider in this section a more general case, where the conditional probabilities
Pr[qk|qj ] that parameterize LP 3.3.1 are allowed to vary within certain limits. Such variations can
account for various sources of private information: e.g., private beliefs regarding the true type of the
product, private information regarding the conditional distribution of signals, or even small changes to
the true type of the product. This approach is similar to the work of Zohar and Rosenschein (2006).
Without modeling the real source of private information, I assume that the conditional probability
distributions Pr∗[·|qj ] (for all qj) are not too far from the probability distributions Pr[·|qj ] computed
by the reputation mechanism. I will use the L2 norm for computing the distance, and assume that:
∑
qk∈Q
(
Pr∗[qk|qj ]− Pr[qk|qj ]
)2
≤ ε2; ∀qj ∈ Q; (3.17)
for some positive bound ε. The incentive-compatibility constraints must enforce that for any value of
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the probabilities Pr∗[·|·], honesty gives the highest payoff. Formally,
min
Pr∗[·|·]
( ∑
qk∈Q
Pr∗[qk|qj ]
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
))
> Λ(qj , qh); ∀qj 6= qh ∈ Q;
s.t.
∑
qk∈Q
(
Pr∗[qk|qj ]− Pr[qk|qj ]
)2
≤ ε2;
This optimization problem can be solved analytically by writing the Lagrangian and enforcing the first
order optimality conditions. Therefore:
min
( ∑
qk∈Q
Pr∗[qk|qj ]
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
))
=
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
)
− ε
√∑
qk∈Q
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
)2
;
and the best (i.e., cheapest) incentive compatible payments that are robust to private information (i.e.,
have robustness level ε2) are obtained by solving the conic optimization problem:
CP 3.5.1
min E
[
V (s¯, s¯|qj)
]
=
∑
qj∈Q
Pr[qj ]
( ∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]τ(qj , qk)
)
s.t.
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
)
− ε
√∑
qk∈Q
(
τ(qj , qk)− τ(qh, qk)
)2
≥ Λ(qj , qh);
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|qj ]τ(qj , qk)− ε
√∑
qk∈Q
τ(qj , qk)2 ≥ Cr;
∀qj 6= qh ∈ Q; τ(qj , qk) ≥ 0; ∀qj , qk ∈ Q
where Pr[·|·] are the probabilities computed by the reputation mechanism. Such problems can be solved
by polynomial time algorithms.
I evaluated experimentally the cost of general private information as reflected on the expected
payment to one reporter. For 2000 randomly generated problems (details in Appendix 3.B) and for
different levels of robustness, I solved CP 3.5.1 to obtain the robust incentive compatible payments.
Table 3.4 presents the average CPU time required to compute the payments. As expected, the values
are much smaller than those of Table 3.3.
Figure 3.8 plots the average expected payment to one agent for different number of signals, and
different tolerance levels to private information. Like in Figure 3.7, the cost of the mechanism increases
exponentially with the robustness level, ε2.
One important remark about the results of this section is that agents trust the reputation mechanism
to publish truthful information. Only in this case agents are likely to adopt (with marginal changes)
the beliefs of the reputation mechanism, and have incentives to report honestly. While the trustworthy
of the reputation mechanism is an interesting topic on its own, let us note that agents can verify9
whether or not the payments advertised by the reputation mechanism actually “match” the beliefs and
the robustness bound published by the reputation mechanism. On the other hand, the payments that
9by checking that the payments τ(·, ·) solve the optimization problems LP 3.3.1 or CP 3.5.1
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Figure 3.8: Average expected payment
to one agent for different levels of robust-
ness to general private information.
M CPU time [ms] Std. dev. [ms]
2 3.46 24.40
3 7.31 9.04
4 16.05 8.07
5 44.89 15.74
Table 3.4: Average CPU time (and
standard deviation) for computing the
optimal payment scheme with general
private information.
match the true beliefs of the reputation mechanism are the smallest possible, as guaranteed by the
corresponding optimization problems.
However, understanding exactly what the reputation mechanism can do in order to manipulate
reputation information without being detected, while still providing decent honest reporting incentives
requires further work.
3.6 Collusion-resistant, Incentive-compatible Rewards
Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3 describe several ways of designing incentive-compatible payment mechanisms
where honest reporting is a Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, honest reporting is not the only Nash
Equilibrium (NE) of the mechanism. Consider the plumber example from Section 3.3.1 and the pay-
ments computed by solving the optimization problem LP 3.3.1:
τ(·, ·) q0 q1
q0 0.082 0
q1 0 0.085
Besides the honest reporting equilibrium, this payment mechanism has two other equilibria where
all agents report the same thing: either q0 or q1. Moreover, if the expected payment in the honest
equilibrium is 0.066 (computed in Section 3.3.1), the payment given by the equilibrium where all agents
report positively, respectively negatively, is 0.085, respectively 0.082. While the multiplicity of equilibria
is generally seen a problem for other reasons (e.g., equilibrium selection), in this context it also brings
forth the problem of collusion: rational agents could potentially coordinate on a lying equilibrium to
extract the maximum payments from the reputation mechanism.
In this section, I will address the design of incentive-compatible reputation mechanisms that are
also resistant to collusion. First, I will motivate the need for collusion-resistance measures, and show
that all binary reputation mechanisms have multiple equilibria and are thus vulnerable to lying coali-
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tions. Second, I will describe a method for designing incentive-compatible, collusion-resistant payment
mechanisms by using several reference reports.
The basic idea behind deterring lying coalitions is to design incentive compatible rewards that make
honest reporting the unique, or at least the “best” equilibrium. Ideally, honest reporting would be the
dominant strategy for the colluders, such that no matter what other colluders do, honest reporting
is optimal for every individual colluder. Clearly no rational agent should be expected to join a lying
coalition under such circumstances.
When dominant truth-telling is not possible, the second most preferable option is to have honest
reporting as the unique NE. Any lying coalition would imply a non-equilibrium situation, where in-
dividual colluders would rather report differently than specified by the colluding strategy. Assuming
non transferable utilities and the absence of effective punishments that a coalition can enforce on its
members, any lying coalition would be unstable, and therefore, unlikely to form.
Finally, when honest reporting is neither the dominant strategy, nor the unique NE, collusion
resistance can emerge if honesty is the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium. The intuition here is that
any stable (i.e., equilibrium) lying coalition would make at least one of the colluders worse off than in
the honest equilibrium, which hopefully prevents that agent for joining the coalition in the first place
(assuming, again, non-transferable utilities).
An interesting scenario is when a single strategic entity controls a number of fake online identities,
or sybils (Cheng and Friedman, 2005). As colluders can now transfer payments among themselves, the
reward mechanism must ensure that the cumulative revenue of the coalition is maximized by the honest
reports. The different options discussed above are not relevant for this case, as individual reporting
incentives are not important. Instead, the appropriate payments must elicit truthful information from
the coalition as a whole.
The results I will describe in this section relate to the literature on (computational) mechanism de-
sign, implementation theory, and incentive contracts for principal-(multi)agent settings. The literature
on mechanism design (see Jackson, 2003, for a survey) and implementation theory (see Jackson, 2001,
for a survey) addresses the design of mechanisms and institutions that satisfy certain properties, given
that the agents using the mechanism behave strategically. The main difference between mechanism
design and implementation theory is that of multiple equilibria. In the mechanism design literature,
the goal of the designer is to find the mechanism that has the desired outcome as an equilibrium. In
the implementation literature, on the other hand, the mechanism is required to have only the desired
equilibria. From this perspective, our results are closer to the implementation theory. More details on
the relation between the results of this section and the related work are given in Section 3.7.
For the simplicity of the presentation, I will limit my results from this section to binary feedback
mechanisms where the set of signals privately observed by the buyers, and the set of feedback values
submitted to the reputation mechanism contains only two elements: q0 and q1, or simply 0 and 1.
The extension to general mechanisms where the feedback set contains M > 2 elements is conceptually
simple, but technically non-trivial. Whenever possible I will give directions for extending the binary
results to the general case.
3.6.1 Collusion Opportunities in Binary Payment Mechanisms
The proposition below shows that all binary incentive-compatible payment mechanisms using a single
reference report have several Nash equilibria (NE). Moreover, at least one lying equilibrium gives the
agents higher expected payoffs than the truthful NE.
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Proposition 3.6.1 Always reporting positive feedback or always reporting negative feedback are both
Nash equilibria of any binary incentive-compatible payment mechanisms using a single reference report.
One of these equilibria generates a higher payoff than the truthful equilibrium.
Proof. The proof follows two steps. First, I prove that in all settings, Pr[1|1] ≥ Pr[1|0], and
Pr[0|0] ≥ Pr[0|1]. Second, I derive the results of the proposition using the definition of payoffs and the
incentive-compatibility constraints.
Pr[1|1]− Pr[1|0] =
∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[1|θ]Pr[θ|1]−
∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[1|θ]Pr[θ|0]
=
∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[1|θ]2Pr[θ]
Pr[1]
−
∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[1|θ]Pr[0|θ]Pr[θ]
1− Pr[1]
=
∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[1|θ]Pr[θ] Pr[1|θ]− Pr[1]
Pr[1](1− Pr[1])
=
∑
θ∈Θ Pr[1|θ]Pr[θ]
(
Pr[1|θ]−∑t∈Θ Pr[1|t]Pr[t])
Pr[1](1− Pr[1]) ;
However, ∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[1|θ]Pr[θ]
(
Pr[1|θ]−
∑
t∈Θ
Pr[1|t]Pr[t]
)
=
=
∑
θ,t∈Θ,θ 6=t
(
Pr[1|θ]− Pr[1|t])Pr[θ]Pr[t](Pr[1|θ]− Pr[1|t])
=
∑
θ,t∈Θ,θ 6=t
(
Pr[1|θ]− Pr[1|t])2Pr[θ]Pr[t] ≥ 0
Similarly, Pr[0|0]− Pr[0|1] ≥ 0.
From the incentive-compatibility constraints:
Pr[0|0]
(
τ(0, 0)− τ(1, 0)
)
+ Pr[1|0]
(
τ(0, 1)− τ(1, 1)
)
> Λ(0, 1) > 0
Pr[0|1]
(
τ(1, 0)− τ(0, 0)
)
+ Pr[1|1]
(
τ(1, 1)− τ(0, 1)
)
> Λ(1, 0) > 0
Because Pr[1|1] ≥ Pr[1|0] and Pr[0|0] ≥ Pr[0|1], we have τ(0, 0) − τ(1, 0) > Λ(0, 1) and τ(1, 1) −
τ(0, 1) > Λ(1, 0). Let sneg = (0, 0) and spos = (1, 1) be the constant reporting strategies where an
agent always reports 0, respectively 1. It is easy to verify that V (sneg, sneq|·) > V (apos, sneg|·) and
V (spos, spos|·) > V (sneg, spos|·), which makes both sneg and spos be Nash equilibria.
Moreover,
V (s¯, s¯|·) = Pr[0|·]τ(·, 0) + Pr[1|·]τ(·, 1)
< max
(
τ(0, 0), τ(1, 1)
)
< max
(
V (spos, spos|·), V (sneg, sneg|·));
so at least one of the constant reporting NE strategies generates a higher expected payoff than the
truthful equilibrium. ¥
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Using several reference reports does not, by default, eliminate the conformity rating lying equilibria,
where every agent reports the same thing. In the following result I will show that the optimal binary
payment mechanisms based on the feedback submitted by N agents (i.e., Nref = N−1 reference reports)
also supports the lying equilibria mentioned in Proposition 3.6.1. However, before doing that, let us
introduce some simplifying notation (a summary of the notation in this chapter is presented in the
Appendix 3.A).
First, as mentioned above, I assume the reputation mechanism can dispose of N feedback reports
(besides the prior belief Pr[θ] and the conditional probabilities Pr[1|θ] when designing the payment
mechanism. This means that any report can be compared against Nref = N − 1 others for being paid.
Second, as the order of reports is not important, the set of Nref reports can be accurately described by
the integer n ∈ {0, . . . , N−1} denoting the number of positive reports the other N−1 agents submitted
to the reputation mechanism. This leads to a simplified representation of the payment mechanism by the
function τ : Q2×{0, . . . , N−1} → R+, where τ(ri, n) is the payment to agent i when she reports ri ∈ Q2
and n out of the other N − 1 agents report positively. Third, let S = {(s(0), s(1))|s(0), s(1) ∈ Q2}, be
the set of pure reporting strategies of one agent, where s =
(
s(0), s(1)
)
denotes the strategy according
to which the buyer announces s(0) ∈ Q2 when she observes low quality (i.e, 0), and s(1) ∈ Q2 when
she observes high quality (i.e., 1). To ease the notation, we name the four members of the set S as:
• the honest strategy, s¯ = (0, 1),
• the lying strategy, slie = (1, 0),
• the always reporting positive feedback strategy, spos = (1, 1), and
• the always reporting negative feedback strategy, sneg = (0, 0).
Forth, a strategy profile s is a vector (si)i=1,...,N , prescribing the reporting strategy si ∈ S for each
of the N agents. We will sometimes use the notation s = (si, s−i), where s−i is the strategy profile for
all agents except i; i.e., s−i = (sj), for j = 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , N .
Fifth, given the profile of reporting strategies (si, s−i), let µ[n, s−i] describe the belief of agent i
regarding the distribution of the reference reports, when:
• n out of the other N − 1 agents observe the high quality signal, 1
• the other N − 1 agents are reporting according to the strategy profile s−i;
Given n and s−i, agent i believes with probability µ[n, s−i](x) that x reference reports are positive.
Finally, I will assume that reporting feedback does not cost anything (Cr = 0) and that Λ is an
upper bound an all external benefits an agent may obtain by lying. Under these new assumptions the
incentive-compatibility constraints become:
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|1]
(
τ(1, n)− τ(0, n)
)
≥ Λ;
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|0]
(
τ(0, n)− τ(1, n)
)
≥ Λ;
(3.18)
and the expected payment to an honest reporter is:
E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
= Pr[1]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|1]τ(1, n) + Pr[0]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|0]τ(0, n); (3.19)
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The optimization problem defining the payment mechanism that minimizes the expected payment
to an honest reporter is given by LP 3.4.1 and has the following simplified form:
LP 3.6.1
min E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
= Pr[1]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|1]τ(1, n) + Pr[0]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|0]τ(0, n);
s.t.
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|1]
(
τ(1, n)− τ(0, n)
)
≥ Λ;
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|0]
(
τ(0, n)− τ(1, n)
)
≥ Λ;
τ(0, n), τ(1, n) ≥ 0; ∀n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1};
The proposition below characterizes the solution of LP 3.6.1, and reveals the vulnerability of the
resulting payment mechanism to lying coalitions:
Proposition 3.6.2 The incentive-compatible payment scheme that minimizes the expected payment to
an honest reporter (defined by LP 3.6.1) is:
τ(0, n) = 0, ∀n 6= 0; τ(1, n) = 0, ∀n 6= N − 1
τ(0, 0) = Λ
Pr[N − 1|0] + Pr[N − 1|1]
Pr[N − 1|1]Pr[0|0]− Pr[N − 1|0]Pr[0|1] ;
τ(1, N − 1) = Λ Pr[0|0] + Pr[0|1]
Pr[N − 1|1]Pr[0|0]− Pr[N − 1|0]Pr[0|1] ;
Before starting the proof, I will use the following lemma:
Lemma 3.6.1 Given any set of types Θ, probability distributions Pr[1|θ], prior belief over types Pr[θ]
and number of agents N , we have Pr[n|1]Pr[n|0] <
Pr[n+1|1]
Pr[n+1|0] for all n = 0 . . . N − 1.
Proof. see Appendix 3.D ¥
Proof.(Proposition 3.6.2)
Let us write the corresponding dual problem:
max Λy0 + Λy1;
s.t. Pr[n|0]y0 − Pr[n|1]y1 ≤ Pr[0]Pr[n|0]
Pr[n|1]y1 − Pr[n|0]y0 ≤ Pr[1]Pr[n|1]
∀n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1};
where y0 (respectively y1) is the dual variable corresponding to the constraint where the agent observes
0 (respectively 1). By dividing the first set of constraints by Pr[n|0] and the second set of constraints
by Pr[n|1], we have:
y0 − y1Pr[n|1]/Pr[n|0] ≤ Pr[0],∀n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1};
y1 − y0Pr[n|0]/Pr[n|1] ≤ Pr[1],∀n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1};
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Clearly, among the 2(N − 1) constraints of the dual problem, only two are active, corresponding to:
n1 = argminn
Pr[n|1]
Pr[n|0] , and n2 = argminn
Pr[n|0]
Pr[n|1] . By Lemma 3.6.1 we know that n1 = 0 and n2 = N−1.
Therefore, the only two variables of LP 3.6.1 that have non-zero values are τ(0, 0) and τ(1, N−1), which
satisfy the linear equations:
Pr[0|0]τ(0, 0)− Pr[N − 1|0]τ(1, N − 1) = Λ;
−Pr[0|1]τ(0, 0) + Pr[N − 1|1]τ(1, N − 1) = Λ;
hence the result of the proposition. ¥
Intuitively, the optimal payment mechanism rewards the consensus between all reporters, and it
is exactly this property that makes it vulnerable to collusion. Adding supplementary constraints to
the design problem (an idea I will investigate in the following subsections) or changing the objective
function10 may prevent lying equilibria where every agent reports the same signal. Nevertheless, all
payments that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints have the following property: there must
be at least two values of the reference reports, n1 < n2, such that:
τ(0, n1) > τ(1, n2)
τ(1, n2) > τ(0, n2);
This property will prove essential in Section 3.6.4 where I will prove that all incentive-compatible
payment mechanisms also accept lying equilibria.
3.6.2 Automated Design of Collusion-resistant Payments
Using several reference reports does not make incentive compatible payments, by default, collusion-
resistant. The result of Proposition 3.6.2 shows that the incentive-compatible constraints alone, also
generate reward schemes that are vulnerable to conformity rating (i.e, everybody reports the same
thing). In most cases, nevertheless, payment schemes based on several reference reports are not con-
strained to reward agreement, so one could specify further conditions, which added to the design problem
generate collusion-resistant mechanisms.
On the other hand, N agents have more colluding strategies than just 2 agents. Deterring all possible
coalitions requires a careful analysis of the options available to the reporters, and the consequent choice
of constraints added to the design problem. Once the constraints have been specified, my approach for
designing the actual payments is mostly numerical, and based on automated mechanism design (Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2002): I define the appropriate mechanism by an optimization problem that minimizes
the expected budget of the reputation mechanism under the constraints of incentive-compatibility and
collusion resistance. Nevertheless, I also consider the complexity of the design problem, and whenever
necessary, I give alternatives that trade performance for computational efficiency. Since the payment
mechanism must be (re)computed every time the information in the system changes, I believe it is a
strong practical requirement to have fast design algorithms.
The ideal reward mechanism deters any coalition, no matter how big, even when every colluder may
use a different strategy and side-payments are possible. Such a mechanism, unfortunately, is trivially
impossible: given that all agents may collude and use side-payments to subsidize the agents that might
otherwise quit the coalition, the payment mechanism doesn’t have any leverage to encourage honest
reporting. Whatever the payment scheme, the coalition will adopt the strategy that maximizes the
total revenue, regardless of the truth.
10 One might wish, for example, to design a mechanism that minimizes the expected budget paid to all N buyers. In
this case, the objective function of the problem LP 3.6.1 is: B =
∑N
n=0 Pr[n]
(
n · τ(1, n − 1) + (N − n) · τ(0, n)), where
Pr[n] is the prior probability that n out of N buyers observe high quality;
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Positive results may be obtained only by imposing further restrictions on possible lying coalitions.
The first restriction is that not all agents can collude. Some agents are altruistic in nature and report
honestly for moral or social reasons. Other agents are not aware of collusion opportunities, or cannot
be contacted by a forming coalition. Social or legal norms against collusion may furthermore create
prejudices that deter some agents from entering the coalition.
The second restriction addresses the complexity of the coordination among colluders. Symmetric
collusion strategies prescribe that all colluders are reporting according to the same strategy. The co-
ordination on symmetric strategies is very simple, and requires one anonymous access to a publicly
available source of information that specifies the colluding strategy. Intuitively, the role of the coor-
dination device may be played by a public blog which analyzes the mechanisms and informs potential
colluders on the most profitable symmetric colluding strategy. Asymmetric collusion strategies, on the
other hand, require significantly more complex coordination. Since every colluder may use a different
reporting strategy, the coordination device must know the identity of the colluder before instructing on
a collusion strategy. This is often unfeasible, either because colluders might not want to reveal their
identity and thus create a trace of their misbehavior, or because identity of the colluders cannot be
known at all before the actual reporting takes place.
The third restriction addresses the availability of side-payments between colluders (or transferable
utilities). Even when the rewards offered by the reputation mechanism are monetary, the kind of
micro-payments that would be required among the colluders are difficult and expensive to implement.
Side-payments are even less feasible when the rewards offered by the reputation mechanism are in kind,
or in some currency under the control of the reputation mechanism (e.g., Yahoo points or Slashdot
karma cannot be transferred even if users wanted to). The conversion of such subjective resources to
real money that can afterwards be transferred is even more difficult than the transfer itself.
One notable exception where side-payments are feasible is when the same strategic entity controls
a number of online identities, or “sybils” (Cheng and Friedman, 2005). Here, the controlling agent is
interested in maximizing his overall revenue (i.e., the sum of the revenues obtained by the sybils), so
side-payments do not have to physically occur11.
To summarize, we address collusion scenarios where:
• all or only some of the agents can become part of a lying coalition,
• colluders can coordinate or not on using different strategies,
• colluders can make or not side-payments to other colluders.
From the remaining seven restricted collusion scenarios (see Table 3.5) I am only addressing five. I will
not consider the settings where all or some of the agents may make side-payments among themselves,
but can only collude on symmetric strategies. As discussed in the previous paragraph, transferable
utilities should mostly be assumed for a group of online identities controlled by the same strategic agent.
Restricting the agent from coordinating its sybils on asymmetric strategies seems to us unreasonable.
For all scenarios involving non-transferable utilities, collusion resistance can emerge as a consequence
of having honest reporting as the only (or the most attractive) equilibrium. When all agents may collude,
an honest reporting dominant equilibrium is impossible. Therefore, I will resort to designing reward
schemes where honest reporting is a unique Nash equilibrium, or the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium.
11Whenever rewards are non-monetary, the overall utility of the controlling agent is usually less than the sum of utilities
of the sybils. On Slashdot, for example, ten users with bad karma are not worth as one user with good karma. Nevertheless,
we will keep for simplicity the assumption of additive utilities for the controlling agent.
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Non-Transferable Utilities Transferable Utilities
symmetric
strategies
asymmetric
strategies
symmetric
strategies
asymmetric
strategies
all agents
collude
Section 3.6.3 Section 3.6.4 unreasonableassumption impossible
some agents
collude
Section 3.6.5 Section 3.6.6 unreasonableassumption Section 3.6.7
Table 3.5: Different collusion scenarios.
When only a fraction of the agents may collude (non-colluders are assumed to report honestly) I also
consider designing rewards that make honest reporting the dominant strategy for the colluders.
I will restrict the analysis to pure reporting strategies and pure strategy equilibria. The reason
behind this choice is grounded in practical considerations: mixed strategies and mixed strategy equi-
libria are more complex and difficult to understand, and therefore unlikely to be observed in practical
applications. Acknowledging the limitations brought in by this assumption, I still believe these results
are valuable for a number of practical scenarios. The following subsections address each one collusion
scenario, and describe possible methods for designing collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible reward
mechanisms.
3.6.3 Full Coalitions on Symmetric Strategies, Non-Transferable Utilities
I assume that agents (i) can only coordinate once (before any of them purchases the product) on the
same (pure) reporting strategy, and (ii) cannot make side-payments from one to another. This simple
form of coordination between colluders considerably simplifies the problem of the mechanism designer;
the only supplementary constraint on the incentive-compatible payment mechanism is to ensure that
none of the pure symmetric strategy profiles is a NE.
The set of pure strategies is finite (and contains 3 lying strategies) therefore we can exhaustively
enumerate the constraints that prevent the corresponding symmetric lying strategy profiles to be NE:
• spos (always reporting 1) is not NE when a rational agent would rather report 0 instead of 1 given
that all other agents follow spos:
τ(0, N − 1) > τ(1, N − 1); (3.20)
• sneg (always reporting 0) is not NE when a rational agent would rather report 1 instead of 0 given
that all other agents follow sneg;
τ(1, 0) > τ(0, 0); (3.21)
• slie is not NE when at least one agent (either observing 1 or 0) would rather report the truth.
Given that other agents always lie, N − 1− n reference reports will be positive whenever n high
quality signals were actually observed:
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either
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|0](τ(0, N − 1− n)− τ(1, N − 1− n)) > 0;
or
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|1](τ(1, N − 1− n)− τ(0, N − 1− n)) > 0; (3.22)
The objective function from Eq. (3.19), and the constraints (3.18), (3.20), (3.21) and (3.22) de-
fine the optimal incentive-compatible payment mechanism that is also collusion-resistant in the sense
explained in the beginning of this section (i.e., honest reporting is the unique pure-strategy symmetric
NE). To compute the payments, the mechanism designer must solve two linear optimization problems,
one corresponding to each branch of the constraint (3.22).
Proposition 3.6.3 Collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible rewards require minimum N = 4 agents.
Proof. From (3.21), (3.20) and (3.18) we know that there must be n1 ∈ {1, . . . N − 1} and n2 ∈
{0, . . . N − 2} such that n1 < n2, τ(0, n1) > τ(1, n1) = 0 and τ(1, n2) > τ(0, n2) = 0. Clearly, this may
happen only when N ≥ 4. ¥
Taking the plumber example described in Section 3.3.1 and N = 4 agents, the conditional dis-
tribution of the reference reports and the optimal collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible payment
mechanism are the following:
Pr[·|·] 0 1 2 3
0 0.4179 0.2297 0.1168 0.2356
1 0.0255 0.0389 0.2356 0.7
τ(·, ·) 0 1 2 3
0 0 12.37 0 ε
1 ε 0 6.29 0
where ε is a small positive value, and the guaranteed margin for truth-telling is Λ = 1. For any N > 4
the payment mechanism looks the same and rewards a report if all but one of the other agents agree
with the submitted report. In the same time, opposing consensus is rewarded by a small amount ε.
Payments with exactly the same structure represent a general solution of the design problem in this
context. Moreover, the payments always exist:
Proposition 3.6.4 Given any set of types Θ, probability distributions Pr[1|θ], prior belief over types
Pr[θ], and number of agents N ≥ 4, the following payment system has honest reporting as the unique
symmetric NE:
τ(0, n) = 0,∀n 6= 1, N − 1; τ(1, n) = 0, ∀n 6= 0, N − 2; τ(0, N − 1) = τ(1, 0) = ε
τ(0, 1) =

Λ Pr[1|1]
Pr[1|0]Pr[1|1]−Pr[N−2|0]Pr[N−2|1] if condition A
Λ Pr[1|0]
Pr[N−2|0]Pr[N−2|1]−Pr[1|0]Pr[1|1] if condition B
Λ Pr[N−2|1]+Pr[N−2|0]
Pr[1|0]Pr[N−2|1]−Pr[N−2|0]Pr[1|1] otherwise
τ(1, N − 2) =

Λ Pr[N−2|1]
Pr[1|0]Pr[1|1]−Pr[N−2|0]Pr[N−2|1] if condition A
Λ Pr[N−2|0]
Pr[N−2|0]Pr[N−2|1]−Pr[1|0]Pr[1|1] if condition B
Λ Pr[1|1]+Pr[1|0]
Pr[1|0]Pr[N−2|1]−Pr[N−2|0]Pr[1|1] otherwise
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A =
∧ Pr[1|0]Pr[1|1] > Pr[N − 2|0]Pr[N − 2|1]Pr[N − 2|1] > Pr[1|1]
Pr[N − 2|1]2 − Pr[1|1]2 > Pr[1|0]Pr[1|1]− Pr[N − 2|0]Pr[N − 2|1]

B =
∧ Pr[N − 2|0]Pr[N − 2|1] > Pr[1|0]Pr[1|1]Pr[1|0] > Pr[N − 2|0]
Pr[1|0]2 − Pr[N − 2|0]2 > Pr[N − 2|0]Pr[N − 2|1]− Pr[1|0]Pr[1|1]

Proof. It is straight-forward to check that for ε small enough, the payments described in the proposi-
tion verify the constraints (3.18), (3.20) and (3.21). Moreover, these payments minimize the expected
payment to an honest reporter. ¥
A less strict notion of collusion resistance requires honest reporting to be the Pareto-optimal NE.
The intuition is that any stable (i.e., equilibrium) coalition will necessarily make some colluders worse
off than in the honest equilibrium. Assuming non-transferable utilities, colluders that benefit from the
coalition cannot subsidize the ones that make a loss, and hopefully, the latter will refuse to join the
coalition in the first place.
The payment mechanism that has honest reporting as the Pareto-optimal equilibrium solves the
following optimization problem:
LP 3.6.2
min E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
= Pr[1]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|1]τ(1, n) + Pr[0]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|0]τ(0, n);
s.t.
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|1]
(
τ(1, n)− τ(0, n)
)
≥ Λ;
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|0]
(
τ(0, n)− τ(1, n)
)
≥ Λ;
τ(1, N − 1) < E[V (s¯i, s¯−i)];
τ(0, 0) < E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
;
∨
∑N−1
n=0 Pr[n|0]
(
τ(0, N − 1− n)− τ(1, N − 1− n)) > 0∑N−1
n=0 Pr[n|1]
(
τ(1, N − 1− n)− τ(0, N − 1− n)) > 0
E
[
V (sliei , s
lie
−i)
]
< E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
;

τ(0, n), τ(1, n) ≥ 0; ∀n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1};
The first two constraints make honest reporting a Nash equilibrium. The next two constraints
prevent lying colluders on spos or sneg to get higher rewards than in the honest equilibrium. These
constraints are always easier to satisfy than the constraints (3.20), (3.21) which prevent equilibria on
spos and sneg. The last constraint requires that the symmetric profile where every agent lies is either
not a NE, or that it generates an expected payoff lower than the honest equilibrium. The expected
payoff to an agent reporting according to slie when everybody else reports according to slie is:
E
[
V (sliei , s
lie
−i)
]
=
N−1∑
n=0
(
Pr[n|0]Pr[0]τ(1, N − 1− n) + Pr[n|1]Pr[1]τ(0, N − 1− n)
)
;
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Note that for coalitions on slie it is not sufficient to limit the payoff to a colluder below the expected
payoff in the honest equilibrium (the third inequality of the last disjunctive constraint of LP 3.6.2).
Numerical simulations performed on randomly generated problems (Appendix 3.E describes the details
on how the problems were generated) show that for 40- 50% of the problems the collusion-resistant
payments are cheaper by eliminating altogether the symmetric lying equilibrium on slie: i.e., either the
first, or the second inequality from the last constraint of LP 3.6.2 are easier to satisfy than the third
inequality.
In either case, the resulting optimal payments have the following structure:
• τ(0, 0) = τ(1, N − 1) = E[V (s¯i, s¯−i)] − ε. These values prevent the lying coalitions on spos or
sneg to Pareto-dominate the honest reporting equilibrium;
• τ(0, 1) > 0 and τ(1, N − 2) > 0 are scaled to satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraints, and
the “easiest” of the three inequalities that prevent a coalition on slie;
• the other payments are 0.
For the plumber example in Section 3.3.1 the payments are the following:
τ(·, ·) 0 1 2 3
0 1.30 4.52 0 0
1 0 0 1.26 1.30
3.6.4 Full Coalitions on Asymmetric Strategies, Non-Transferable Utilities
In the next collusion scenario all N agents can coordinate on asymmetric collusion strategies, without
being able to make side-payments from one to another. Each of the N agents can have a different
reporting strategy, and the collusion strategy profile is denoted by s = (si), i = 1, . . . , N , where si ∈ S
is the reporting strategy of agent i.
I distinguish between two cases, when the communication (and therefore the coordination on the col-
lusion strategy profile) happens before or after the agents perceive the quality signals from the product
they purchase. In the former case, no payment scheme can satisfy the incentive-compatibility con-
straints. In the latter case, honest reporting can never be a unique Nash equilibrium of the mechanism;
however, honest reporting can be the Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6.5 When agents communicate and coordinate their reports after perceiving the quality
signals, strict incentive-compatible payment mechanisms do not exist.
Proof. Consider two settings, that are identical except for the observation of agent i. In setting I,
agent i observes oi = 0, in setting II, agent i observes oi = 1; in both settings the other agents observe
n high quality signals. An incentive-compatible mechanism requires i to report 0 in setting I, and 1
in setting II. Assume all other agents report truthfully; during the communication phase (happening
after signals have been perceived) agent i learns in both settings that the reference reports contain n
positive reports. An incentive-compatible payment mechanism requires that:
• τ(0, n) > τ(1, n) - honest reporting is strictly better for i in setting I ;
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• τ(1, n) > τ(0, n) - honest reporting is strictly better for i in setting II;
Clearly this is impossible. ¥
The previous proposition formalizes the intuition that truth-telling may only be an ex-ante Nash
equilibrium. The reference reports must be unknown to the agent in order to allow the design of
incentive-compatible payments.
When the communication takes place before the agents observe the signals, incentive-compatible
payments do exist, but always accept other Nash equilibria where agents lie:
Proposition 3.6.6 When agents communicate and coordinate their reports before perceiving the quality
signals, no payment mechanism has a unique honest reporting Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof shows that a full coalition can always find a profile of constant reporting strategies,
s = (si), i = 1, . . . , N , si ∈ {sneg, spos} that is a NE.
Let s(n) = (si) be the family of reporting strategy profiles where n out of N agents always report
1, and the other N − n agents always report 0: i.e.,
si = s
pos, ∀i ∈ A1; si = sneg, ∀i ∈ A0;
|A1| = n, |A2| = N − n;
A1 ∩A0 = ∅; A1 ∪A0 = {1, 2, . . . , N};
(3.23)
Assume that the payment mechanism defined by τ(·, ·) accepts honest reporting as the unique NE.
We have seen in Section 3.6.1 that the incentive-compatible constraints (3.18) imply the existence of
n1 < n2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} such that τ(0, n1) > τ(1, n1), and τ(1, n2) > τ(0, n2).
With non-transferable utilities, the strategy profile s(n2 + 1) is not a NE if and only if one of the
n2 + 1 agents that should report 1 would rather report 0:
τ(0, n2) > τ(1, n2);
or one of the N − n2 − 1 agents that should report 0 would rather report 1:
τ(1, n2 + 1) > τ(0, n2 + 1);
The first inequality cannot be true by the choice of n2; therefore, it must be that τ(1, n2 + 1) >
τ(0, n2 + 1).
Similarly, s(n2 + 2) is not a NE iff either τ(0, n2 + 1) > τ(1, n2 + 1) (impossible), or τ(1, n2 + 2) >
τ(0, n2 + 2). Continuing this argument we find that τ(1, N − 1) > τ(0, N − 1) which makes s(N) (i.e.,
all agents report 1) a Nash equilibrium. Hence the result of the proposition. ¥
Proposition 3.6.6 holds regardless the number of reports, N , available to the reputation mechanism.
The proof shows that all incentive-compatible reward schemes have the property that for some n ∈
{0, . . . , N − 1}, either τ(1, n) > 0 and τ(1, n+1) < τ(0, n+1), or τ(1, N − 1) > 0. In the first case, the
coalition can adopt the lying strategy where n+1 agents always report 1, and N −n− 1 agents always
report 0. The structure of the payments makes such a coalition stable, as no agent finds it profitable to
deviate from the coalition. In the second case the payment scheme is vulnerable to everybody always
reporting 1.
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While lying equilibria always exist in this scenario, they do not necessarily Pareto-dominate the
honest reporting NE. Take for example the incentive-compatible payments that solve LP 3.6.1, with
the additional constraints that τ(0, 0) = 0 and τ(1, N − 1) = 0. A stable coalition can form on the
strategy profiles s(n2+1) or s(n1), where n2+1 (respectively n1) agents always report 1 and the others
always report 0 regardless of their observation. This equilibrium, however, does not Pareto-dominate
the truthful one: the agents that report 0 do not get any reward, whereas they do get rewarded in the
honest equilibrium.
The payment mechanism can be further improved by setting τ(0, n1−1) = τ(1, n2+1) = ε, where ε
is some small positive value. This modification eliminates the equilibria s(n2+1) and s(n1) and instead
introduces the equilibria s(n2+2) and s(n1−1). Both these equilibria are extremely unattractive (some
agents get paid ε, while others don’t get paid at all) and are dominated by the honest equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6.7 Given the set of types Θ, the conditional probabilities Pr[1|θ], the prior belief over
types Pr[θ], and N = 4 agents, the following payment scheme has honest reporting as the Pareto-optimal
Nash equilibrium:
τ(·, ·) 0 1 2 3
0 ε x > 0 0 0
1 0 0 y > 0 ε
The values x and y depend on the probabilities Pr[1|θ] and Pr[θ], and ε has a small positive value.
Proof. The payments here are similar to those of Proposition 3.6.4 except that consensus is rewarded
with some small amount ε instead of being discouraged. In this way the mechanism has only three NE:
honest reporting, always reporting 1 or always reporting 0. Both lying equilibria, however, generate
much lower revenues (assuming, of course, that ε is small enough); therefore, honest reporting is the
Pareto-optimal equilibrium. The proof that the mechanism has only 3 NE is based on brute force: for
x and y taking the values specified in Proposition 3.6.4, we verify that no other strategy profile is a NE.
The details are presented in Appendix 3.F. ¥
For general reward mechanisms based on N > 4 reports, honest reporting can become the Pareto-
optimal NE by considering all lying strategy profiles, s, and adding to the design problem either of the
following linear constraints:
V (si, s−i|oi) < V (s∗i , s−i|oi) for some i, oi and s∗i ;
E
[
V (si, s−i)
]
< E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
for some i;
(3.24)
The first constraint ensures that the strategy profile s is not a NE, and consists of a disjunction of
at most 8 linear inequalities: for each reporting strategy si = (si(0), si(1)) ∈ S, the agent reporting
according to si has the incentive to deviate either when observing 0, or when observing 1. There are
four strategies in S and only one possible deviation for each observed signal, hence the 8 inequalities.
The second constraint ensures that s does not Pareto-dominate the honest equilibrium, and consists
of a similar disjunction of at most 4 inequalities. Note that any two strategy profiles that represent
different permutations of the same set of N reporting strategies will generate the same constraints.
Therefore, there are
( N + 3
3
)
different constraints imposing honesty as a Pareto-optimal NE, each
consisting of a disjunction of at most 12 linear inequations. The resulting optimization problem is a
disjunctive linear program which can be transformed into a mixed integer linear program (Sherali and
Shetty, 1980).
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Unfortunately, the complexity of the resulting optimization problem is exponential in the number
N of reporters considered by the payment mechanism. Since the payment mechanism depends on the
current belief over the types θ, the reputation mechanism might be required to frequently update the
payments in order to reflect the changing beliefs. For large values of N this is clearly infeasible.
I therefore consider a special family of payment mechanisms that can be designed efficiently to make
honest reporting the Pareto-optimal NE. The basic idea is to consider payments similar to those from
Proposition 3.6.7, that reward a report only when all but one of the reference reports agree. Consensus
on the positive or negative feedback is also rewarded by a small amount ε, but all other payments are
zero:
τ(·, ·) 0 1 2. . . N-3 N-2 N-1
0 ε x > 0 0. . . 0 0 0
1 0 0 0. . . 0 y > 0 ε
Figure 3.9: Payment mechanism for N > 4 agents.
The payment mechanism now depends on only 2 parameters, x and y that must be scaled to prevent
any other lying strategy profile to become a NE Pareto-dominating the honest equilibrium. Note that
no strategy profile where more than one agent reports according to spos or sneg can become a successful
collusion strategy. If at least two agents always report 1, none of the other agents will ever want to
report 0 (as τ(0, n) = 0 for any n ≥ 2). Similarly if at least two agents always report 0, none of the
other agents will ever want to report 1. Nevertheless, both consensus equilibria yield very small payoffs,
significantly lower than the payoff of the honest reporting equilibrium.
Following the intuition from the proof of Proposition 3.6.7, many of the remaining lying strategy
profiles cannot be a NE regardless of the values of x and y. Let us consider the set of potential lying
equilibrium strategy profiles:
S˜ = {(n0 × sneg, n1 × spos, n¯× s¯, nl × slie)| n0 + n1 + n¯+ nl = N}; (3.25)
where n0 ∈ {0, 1} agents always report 0, n1 ∈ {0, 1} agents always report 1, n¯ /∈ {N − 1, N} agents
report honestly and nl agents always lie. The cardinality of S˜ is 4(N − 1). The profile s ∈ S˜ is a NE if
and only if for any strategy si ∈ s, the agent reporting according to si does not have the incentive to
deviate to another reporting strategy given that all other agents keep reporting according to s−i. Let
oi ∈ Q2 be the signal observed by agent i. The report prescribed by strategy si is ri = si(oi) ∈ Q2, and
given that ε is small enough to be ignored, the expected payoff to agent i is:
Pr[1|oi, s−i] · x if ri = 0
Pr[N − 2|oi, s−i] · y if ri = 1
where Pr[1|oi, s−i] and Pr[N − 2|oi, s−i] are the probabilities that exactly 1, respectively N − 2 of the
other N − 1 agents will report positively given the observation oi and the strategy profile s−i.
The deviation to reporting 1− ri is not profitable for some observation oi if and only if:
Pr[1|oi, s−i] · x− Pr[N − 2|oi, s−i] · y > 0 if ri = 0
Pr[N − 2|oi, s−i] · y − Pr[1|oi, s−i] · x > 0 if ri = 1
The conditions that make s a NE can therefore be expressed as a set of at most 8 inequalities with
the following structure:
ajx− bjy > 0; aj , bj > 0
−akx+ bky > 0; ak, bk > 0
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If maxj
bj
aj
> mink bkak the above system of inequations is infeasible, so that for any positive values of x
and y the corresponding strategy profile s can not be a NE. However, when maxj
bj
aj
< mink bkak , there
are values of x and y which can make s a NE, and therefore, in the design problem we must specify a
constraint that prevents s from Pareto-dominating the honest NE. The corresponding constraint will
be a disjunction of inequalities: 2 for restricting x and y to values that do not make s a NE, at most 3
that limit the expected payments of colluders below the expected payment of the honest equilibrium.
Since there are 4(N − 1) potential lying strategy profiles, the optimization problem defining x and
y can have up to 4N − 2 constraints: 2 linear incentive-compatible constraints and up to 4(N − 1)
disjunctive linear constraints. The transformation to a mixed integer linear program involves adding up
to 4(N − 1) integer variables, which in the worst case, can result in exponential-time (in N) complexity
of the design problem.
Fortunately, most of the strategy profiles in S˜ can be eliminated analytically. It turns out that the
payment mechanism from Figure 3.9 does not accept as a Nash Equilibrium any strategy profile where
at lest one agent reports truthfully and another agent reports according to slie:
Proposition 3.6.8 Let s = (n0 × sneg, n1 × spos, n¯ × s¯, nl × slie) ∈ S˜ be a strategy profile where n0
agents always report 0, n1 agents always report 1, n¯ agents report honestly and nl agents always lie.
If (n¯ 6= 0 ∧ nl 6= 0) or (n0 = 1 ∧ n1 = 1), s cannot be a Nash equilibrium of the payment mechanism
described in Figure 3.9.
Proof. For the reasons explained above, the number of agents always reporting 0 or 1 can be restricted
to the following cases: (i) n0 = 0, n1 = 0, (ii) n0 = 1, n1 = 0, (iii) n0 = 0, n1 = 1 and (iv) n0 = 1, n1 = 1.
For all cases, consider the strategy profiles where n¯ ≥ 1 agents are honest, and the remaining agents
lie according to slie. For each such profile I will show that no values of x and y can simultaneously
satisfy the equilibrium constraints of both an honest and a lying agent. Moreover, when n0 = n1 = 1
the strategy profiles where all other agents are honest or all other agents lie, cannot be Nash equilibria.
The technical details of the proof are given in Appendix 3.G. ¥
The remaining lying strategy profiles to be considered for computing the values of x and y are the
following:
• s1 = (N × slie) when all agents lie; the constraints to prevent this equilibrium are also considered
in LP 3.6.2;
• s2 =
(
sneg, (N − 1)× slie) when one agent always reports 0, and all other agents lie;
• s3 =
(
spos, (N − 1)× slie) when one agent always reports 1, and all other agents lie;
A solution for x and y can therefore be found in constant time.
3.6.5 Partial Coalitions on Symmetric Strategies, Non-Transferable Utilities
For most practical applications it is reasonable to assume that only a fraction of the agents will be
able to collude. The non-colluders are assumed to report honestly, and their reports can be used by
the mechanism to deter any “partial” lying coalition. Note, however, that honest reports cannot be
identified and selectively used by the reputation mechanism.
I start as in Section 3.6.3, by assuming only symmetric collusion strategies and no side-payments
available among colluders. The number of colluders is Ncol < N , and the remaining N¯ = N − Ncol
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report honestly. There are 3 symmetric pure lying strategies, and appropriate constraints can ensure
that none of them becomes a Nash equilibrium, or Pareto-dominates the honest equilibrium.
Concretely, let P¯ r[·|·] be the probability distribution of the reports submitted by non-colluders, such
that P¯ r[n|oi] is the probability that n out of N¯ agents report positively given the observation oi ∈ Q2.
Likewise, let Pˆ r[·|·] be the probability distribution of the reports submitted by the other colluders: i.e.,
Pˆ r[n|oi] is the probability that n out of Ncol − 1 colluders report positively.
The payment scheme that makes honest reporting the unique Nash equilibrium for the colluders
and minimizes the expected payment to an honest reporter solves the following optimization problem:
min E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
;
s.t.
N∑
n=0
Pr[n|0](τ(0, n)− τ(1, n)) ≥ Λ;
N∑
n=0
Pr[n|1](τ(1, n)− τ(0, n)) ≥ Λ;
∨
oi∈Q2
( N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|oi]
(
τ(1, n+Ncol − 1)− τ(0, n+Ncol − 1)
)
< 0
)
∨
oi∈Q2
( N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|oi]
(
τ(0, n)− τ(1, n)) < 0)
∨
oi∈Q2
( N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|oi]
Ncol−1∑
x=0
Pˆ r[Ncol − 1− x|oi]
(
τ(1− oi, n+ x)− τ(oi, n+ x)
)
< 0
)
τ(0, n), τ(1, n) ≥ 0; ∀n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1};
where besides the first two incentive-compatibility constraints, the third, forth and fifth constraints
encourage deviations from the symmetric collusion on spos, sneg and slie respectively. The resulting
optimization problem is a disjunctive linear program.
Finally, honest reporting can be made the Pareto-optimal equilibrium by modifying the optimiza-
tion problem such that the disjunctive constraints preventing an equilibrium on the lying symmetric
strategies, also specify inequalities for limiting the payoff received by a colluder below the expected
payment of an honest reporter:
• colluders on spos gain less than in the honest equilibrium:
N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|oi]τ(1, n+Ncol − 1) < E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
;
• colluders on spos gain less than in the honest equilibrium:
N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|oi]τ(0, n) < E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
;
• colluders on slie expect to gain less than in the honest equilibrium:
∑
oi=0,1
Pr[oi]
N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|oi]
Ncol−1∑
x=0
Pˆ r[Ncol − 1− x|oi]τ(1− oi, n+ x) < E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
;
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3.6.6 Partial Coalitions on Asymmetric Strategies, Non-Transferable Utilities
A more practical scenario is to remove the restriction on symmetric collusion strategies, and consider
all strategy profiles s = (si), i = 1, . . . Ncol that colluders can use to misreport feedback. The remaining
N¯ = N − Ncol agents are assumed to report honestly, and side-payments are not available among
colluders.
The main difference from the previous scenarios is that here, we can use a stronger equilibrium
concept than Nash equilibrium. When the fraction of colluders is small enough, honest reporting can
be made a dominant strategy for the colluders, such that regardless of what the other Ncol − 1 agents
report, truth-telling is rewarded more than lying by at least some margin Λ.
If P¯ r[·|·] describes the probability distribution of the N¯ honest reports, and c is the number of
positive reports submitted by the other Ncol − 1 colluders, the payments τ(·, ·) that make honest
reporting the dominant strategy, and minimize the payment to an honest reporter, are defined by the
following optimization problem:
LP 3.6.3
min E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
= Pr[1]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|1]τ(1, n) + Pr[0]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|0]τ(0, n);
s.t.
N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|0](τ(0, n+ c)− τ(1, n+ c)) ≥ Λ;
N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|1](τ(1, n+ c)− τ(0, n+ c)) ≥ Λ;
∀c ∈ {0, . . . Ncol − 1},
τ(0, n), τ(1, n) ≥ 0; ∀n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1};
The remaining question is how large may the colluding fraction be, such that collusion-resistant,
incentive-compatible mechanisms exist.
Proposition 3.6.9 When more than half of the agents collude, (i.e., Ncol > N/2), no incentive-
compatible payment mechanism can make truth-telling the dominant strategy for the colluders.
Proof. The intuition behind the proof is the following: When Ncol > N/2, the Ncol − 1 colluders
submit at least as many reports as the remaining N −Ncol honest reporters. Therefore, any sequence
of honest reports, can be ‘corrected’ by a carefully chosen sequence of colluding reports, such that lying
is profitable.
Formally, let us extract from the system of inequalities defined in LP 3.6.3, the subset corresponding
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to c = {0, . . . , N¯}. This subset exists since N¯ < Ncol−1. Let us form the following optimization problem:
min Pr[1]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|1]τ(1, n) + Pr[0]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|0]τ(0, n);
s.t.
N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|0](τ(0, n+ c)− τ(1, n+ c)) ≥ Λ; ∀c = 0 . . . N¯
N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|1](τ(1, n+ c)− τ(0, n+ c)) ≥ Λ; ∀c = 0 . . . N¯
τ(0, n), τ(1, n) ≥ 0; ∀n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1};
Let y0c and y
1
c be the dual variables corresponding to the constraints where the colluding agents
report c positive signals, and the agent observes 0, respectively 1. The dual problem becomes:
max Λ
Ncol−1∑
c=0
(y
0
c + y
1
c);
s.t.
n∑
c=0
P¯ r[n− c|0]y0c − P¯ r[n− c|1]y1c ≤ Pr[0]Pr[n|0]; ∀n = 0 . . . N¯
n∑
c=0
P¯ r[n− c|1]y1c − P¯ r[n− c|0]y0c ≤ Pr[1]Pr[n|1]; ∀n = 0 . . . N¯
N¯∑
c=n+1
P¯ r[N¯ + 1− c|0]y0c − P¯ r[N¯ + 1− c|1]y1c ≤ Pr[0]Pr[N¯ + n+ 1|0]; ∀n = 0 . . . N¯
N¯∑
c=n+1
P¯ r[N¯ + 1− c|1]y1c − P¯ r[N¯ + 1− c|0]y0c ≤ Pr[1]Pr[N¯ + n+ 1|1]; ∀n = 0 . . . N¯
One can easily verify that the dual problem accepts as solutions:
y1c = P¯ r[c|0] · const ,
y0c = P¯ r[c|1] · const ;
(3.26)
for any positive constants. The dual problem is therefore unbounded, which makes the primal infeasible.
¥
The bound from Proposition 3.6.9 is also tight. Consider the plumber example presented in Section
3.3.1, and assume the reputation mechanism has N = 4 reports. The following payments are resistant
to the collusion of Ncol = 2 agents:
τ(·, ·) 0 1 2 3
0 1.575 3.575 0 0
1 0 0 2.203 0.943
For example, if Alice observes 1, reporting 1 is better than reporting 0 for any report of the other
colluder:
P¯ r[0|1]τ(1, 0) + P¯ r[1|1]τ(1, 1) + P¯ r[2|1]τ(1, 2) = 1.715;
P¯ r[0|1]τ(0, 0) + P¯ r[1|1]τ(0, 1) + P¯ r[2|1]τ(0, 2) = 0.715;
P¯ r[0|1]τ(1, 1) + P¯ r[1|1]τ(1, 2) + P¯ r[2|1]τ(1, 3) = 1.138;
P¯ r[0|1]τ(0, 1) + P¯ r[1|1]τ(0, 2) + P¯ r[2|1]τ(0, 3) = 0.138;
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where P¯ r[0|1] = 0.0385, P¯ r[1|1] = 0.1830 and P¯ r[2|1] = 0.7785 are the probabilities that 0, 1, or 2 out
of the N¯ = 2 non-colluders report positively, given that Alice observed high quality.
In the general case, the design problem has 2Ncol different constraints, and therefore, we should
expect the budget required by the reputation mechanism to grow with Ncol. I resort to numerical simu-
lations and study the average cost of an incentive-compatible, collusion-resistant reputation mechanism
as the fraction of colluders increases. I randomly generated 5000 problems as described in Appendix 3.E,
and considered reward mechanisms for 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 agents. For each problem and every number
of agents the number of colluders was varied from 1 to N/2. Figure 3.10 plots the average normalized12
cost of the collusion-resistant mechanism as a function of the colluding fraction, Ncol/N . One can see
that collusion resistance comes almost for free as long as less than one third of the population colludes.
Above this bound the cost increases exponentially, which makes most such mechanisms impractical.
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Figure 3.10: The average cost of the mechanism as we increase the colluding fraction.
I used the same numerical simulations to investigate the tightness of the bound set by Proposition
3.6.9. Table 3.6 presents the distribution of the maximum collusion threshold for the randomly generated
problems. For more than 95% of the problems we were actually able to compute payment mechanisms
that resist the maximum coalition size Nmaxcol = bN/2c described by Proposition 3.6.9.
Table 3.6: Distribution of the maximum coalition bound. Nmaxcol = bN/2c.
Distribution of max coalition size (in %) over
[Nmaxcol , N
max
col − 1, . . . , 1]
N = 5, Nmaxcol = 2 [99.98, 0.02]
N = 10, Nmaxcol = 5 [99.5, 0.36, 0.1, 0.04, 0]
N = 15, Nmaxcol = 7 [98.88, 0.54, 0.38, 0.08, 0.1, 0.02, 0]
N = 20, Nmaxcol = 10 [97.1, 0.86, 0.78, 0.56, 0.34, 0.2, 0.1, 0.04, 0.02, 0]
N = 25, Nmaxcol = 12 [96.3, 0.98, 0.76, 0.58, 0.48, 0.4, 0.24, 0.1, 0.1, 0.04, 0.02, 0]
The one-half collusion threshold set by Proposition 3.6.9 can be overcome by making honest re-
porting a Nash equilibrium, rather than a dominant strategy, for colluders. Consider the payment
mechanism described by Proposition 3.6.7 where the reputation mechanism considers N = 4 reports,
12The cost is normalized to the cost of the corresponding incentive-compatible mechanism that is not collusion-resistant.
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rewards consensus with a small positive payment ε, and otherwise pays a report if and only if all but
one of the other agents submit the same report. As proven above, this payment scheme accepts three
Nash equilibria, where: (i) all agents report honestly, (ii) all agents always reports 0, and (iii) all agents
always report 1. The fact that one agent cannot become part of a coalition and hence reports the truth,
restricts the set of equilibria to only one, namely the honest reporting equilibrium. Even when the
remaining three agents collude, their only NE under this payment mechanism is to report the truth.
General payment mechanisms based onN > 4 agents can be designed similarly to those from Section
3.6.4: for all strategy profiles the colluders can use, constraints must be added to the design problem
such that (i) no lying strategy profile is a NE, or (ii) no NE lying strategy profile Pareto-dominates the
honest reporting NE.
Concretely, let SNcol be the set of strategy profiles the colluders can use:
SNcol = {(n0 × sneg, n1 × spos, n¯× s¯, nl × slie)|n0 + n1 + n¯+ nl = Ncol}
where s = (n0 × sneg, n1 × spos, n¯ × s¯, nl × slie) ∈ SNcol is the strategy profile where n0 out of Ncol
colluders always report 0, n1 colluders always report 1, n¯ colluders report honestly, and nl colluders
always lie. When colluders report according to the strategy profile s, let (s, s¯) = (n0 × sneg, n1 ×
spos, (n¯ + N¯) × s¯, nl × slie) be the strategy profile used by the N agents, where the N¯ = N − Ncol
non-colluders report honestly.
Honest reporting is the unique Nash equilibrium for colluders if and only if:
V
(
si, (s−i, s¯)|oi
)
< V
(
s∗i , (s−i, s¯)|oi
)
; (3.27)
for some colluder i and observation oi. Similarly, s does not Pareto-dominate the honest reporting
equilibrium if:
E
[
V
(
si, (s−i, s¯)
)]
< E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
(3.28)
for some colluder i.
When compared to the similar constraints (3.24) of Section 3.6.4, there are two important differ-
ences. First, the inequalities apply only to the Ncol colluders, not to the entire set of agents, so that a
strategy profile that is not a NE for the N agents, might still be a Nash equilibrium for colluders. Take,
for example, the case where all colluders lie: i.e., s = (Ncol × slie). The strategy profile of all agents is
therefore (s, s¯) = (Ncol × slie, N¯ × s¯). It may well be possible that:
• a lying colluder finds it optimal to report according to slie given that N¯ agents report honestly
and Ncol − 1 agents report lies;
• an honest reporter would rather file a negative report after a positive experience, given that N¯−1
agents report honestly and Ncol agents lie.
So (s, s¯) is not a NE when considering all agents, but it is an equilibrium for the subset of colluders.
Similarly, it is possible that colluders gain better under (s, s¯) and honest reporters gain less, such that
(s, s¯) Pareto-dominates the honest equilibrium for the colluders, but not for all agents. The constraints
(3.27) and (3.28) are therefore stricter than their counterparts (3.24), as non-colluders are assumed to
unconditionally report the truth without taking into account the actions of a lying coalition.
Second, we can separately consider the constraint (3.27), when honest reporting is to be enforced
as the unique NEQ for colluders, or both constraints (3.27) and (3.28), when honest reporting is to be
enforced as the Pareto-optimal NEQ for colluders. The presence of honest reports makes it possible to
design payment mechanisms where honesty is the unique NE, an alternative that was not available under
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Figure 3.11: Average normalized cost of collusion-resistant payment mechanism. Different
equilibrium concepts.
the assumptions of Section 3.6.4. In both cases, the constraints preventing lying equilibria (or preventing
lying equilibria from dominating the honest equilibrium) can be represented by a disjunction of linear
inequalities, and consequently, by a conjunction of mixed integer linear constraints. The resulting
design problem is a MILP, and, as discussed in Section 3.6.4, has a worst-time complexity that grows
exponentially with the number N of agents.
Figure 3.11 compares the average normalized cost of a collusion-resistant payment mechanism when
honest reporting is: (i) the dominant strategy, (ii) the unique NE, or (iii) the Pareto-optimal NE.
The plots were generated by solving 100 randomly generated problems, for N = 10 and N = 15
agents. Computing the payment mechanism which satisfies the constraints (3.27) and (3.28) requires
significantly more time, hence the lower number of generated problems. Moreover, the capabilities of our
solver were exceeded for payments using more than 15 agents. Nevertheless, the loss in computational
efficiency is clearly rewarded by both lower cost of the mechanism, and coverage of greater coalitions.
As in Section 3.6.4, the payment mechanism from Figure 3.9 can be used to reduce the complexity
of the design problem when honest reporting is the unique or the Pareto-optimal NE. From Proposition
3.6.8, it is known that:
• in any NE, at most one colluder reports according to sneg or spos;
• an honest reporter and a liar cannot both regard their strategies as optimal given that at most
one of the other agents reports according to sneg or spos
Therefore, the remaining colluding strategy profiles that must be considered when designing the
payments x and y are the following:
• (Ncol × slie) when all colluders lie;
• (sneg, (Ncol − 1)× slie) when one colluder always reports 0 and the others always lie;
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• (spos, (Ncol − 1)× slie) when one colluder always reports 1 and the others always lie;
3.6.7 Partial Coalitions on Asymmetric Strategies, Transferable Utilities
As a last scenario I assume that one strategic agent controls a number of fake online identities, or sybils.
From the agent’s perspective, the individual revenues obtained by each sybil is irrelevant; the objective
of the agent is to maximize the cumulated revenue obtained by all sybils.
The fact that utilities are transferable makes the problem of the mechanism designer signifi-
cantly harder. In all previous scenarios, the constraints that made an incentive-compatible mechanism
collusion-resistant ensured that lying coalitions are either unstable or unprofitable. However, transfer-
able utilities allow some colluders to subsidize others, such that non-equilibrium colluding strategies
can still exist. Therefore, the necessary (and sufficient) condition for collusion resistance in this context
requires that the cumulated revenue of the coalition is maximized when reporting the truth.
Another difference from the settings in Sections 3.6.4 and 3.6.6 is that colluders coordinate their re-
porting strategy after observing the quality signals. This assumption is supported by the interpretation
that one strategic entity controls several fake online identities.
Concretely, the payment mechanism must have the following property: whenever Ncol colluding
agents observe c high quality signals, their cumulated revenue is maximized when reporting c positive
reports. An underlying assumption is that non-colluders (the other N¯ = N −Ncol agents) are reporting
honestly. The revenue of the coalition that reports r (out of Ncol) can be computed as follows. The r
colluders that report positively are rewarded τ(1, r − 1 + n), while the Ncol − r colluders that report
negatively are rewarded τ(0, r + n); n is the number of positive reports submitted by the (honest)
non-colluders. The expected revenue of the coalition is therefore:
V (r|c) =
N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|c]
(
r · τ(1, r − 1 + n) + (Ncol − r) · τ(0, r + n)
)
; (3.29)
where P¯ r[n|c] is the probability that n out of N¯ honest agents report positively, given that c out of
Ncol colluders observed high quality signals.
Honest reporting is the best strategy for the coalition, when for all c ∈ {0, . . . Ncol}, argmaxr V (r|c) =
c:
N¯∑
n=0
P¯ r[n|c]
(
c · τ(1, c− 1 + n) + (Ncol − c) · τ(0, c+ n)− r · τ(1, r − 1 + n)
− (Ncol − r) · τ(0, r + n)
)
≥ Λ; ∀r 6= c ∈ {0, . . . Ncol}
(3.30)
The cheapest incentive-compatible, collusion-resistant payment mechanism minimizes the objective
function (3.19) under the linear constraints (3.30):
LP 3.6.4
min E
[
V (s¯i, s¯−i)
]
= Pr[1]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|1]τ(1, n) + Pr[0]
N−1∑
n=0
Pr[n|0]τ(0, n);
s.t. (3.30) is true, ∀c, r ∈ {0, . . . Ncol}, c 6= r
τ(0, n), τ(1, n) ≥ 0; ∀n = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1};
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For the plumber example from Section 3.3.1, assuming that Alice controls Ncol = 3 different online
identities that may submit feedback about Bob, the following payments based on N = 6 reports deter
Alice from lying:
τ(·, ·) 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 20.85 0 0 0 4.40 9.98
1 45.54 28.78 0 0 0 4.31
Even if Alice controlled Ncol = 5 out of the N = 6 reports, there still are payments that make
honest reporting rational. These payments, however, are significantly higher:
τ(·, ·) 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 3455 0 1378 615 0 1125
1 1530 5569 4674 3736 0 2585
It turns out that for the general case, one honest report is enough to allow the design of incentive-
compatible payments that also deter sybil attacks of size N − 1. An example of such payments are
presented in the proposition below:
Proposition 3.6.10 Given the set of types Θ, the conditional probabilities Pr[1|θ], the prior belief
over types Pr[θ] and a number N of reports, the following payments encourage honest reporting from a
strategic agent who controls N − 1 different reports:
τ(0, 0) =
ScR(0, 0)
Ncol
; τ(0, 1) =
ScR(1, 0)
Ncol
; τ(1, N) =
ScR(1, N − 1)
Ncol
;
τ(0, x+ 1) =
(x+ 1)ScR(1, x)− xScR(0, x+ 1)
Ncol
; x = 1 . . . N − 1
τ(1, x) =
(N − 1− x)ScR(0, x+ 1)− (N − 2− x)ScR(1, x)
Ncol
; x = 1 . . . N − 1
where ScR(i, j), i ∈ {0, 1}, j = {0, . . . , N − 1} is a proper scoring rule: e.g., the logarithmic proper
scoring rule from Eq. (3.3), the quadratical proper scoring rule from Eq. (3.5) or the spherical proper
scoring rule from Eq. (3.4).
Proof. The expected payment of an agent who controls N − 1 different identities, observes c out of
N − 1 positive signals and reports r positive reports to the reputation mechanism can be computed as
in Eq. (3.29):
V (r|c) = Pr[0|c]
(
r · τ(1, r − 1) + (N − 1− r) · τ(0, r)
)
+
Pr[1|c]
(
r · τ(1, r) + (N − 1− r) · τ(0, r + 1)
)
= . . . = Pr[0|c]ScR(0, r) + Pr[1|c]ScR(1, r);
which by the definition of a proper scoring rule is strictly maximized when r = c: i.e. V (c|c)−V (r|c) > 0
for all r 6= c. By scaling the scoring rule appropriately (i.e., multiplication and addition with a constant),
honest reporting can be made better by lying with at least the margin Λ. ¥
Proposition 3.6.10 proves the existence of incentive-compatible collusion resistant rewards when all
but one report are controlled by the same strategic agent. However, as we have seen for the example in
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Section 3.3.1, such payments can be very expensive, and hence impractical. Numerical simulations can
be used to evaluate the marginal cost of increasing collusion resistance as the number of colluders (i.e.,
reports controlled by the same agent) increases. As in Section 3.6.6, I generated 5000 random problems
and computed the optimal payments for N = 5,10,15,20 and 25 reports. For each case, the coalition
size (i.e., Ncol) is increased from 1 to N − 1.
Figure 3.12 plots the average normalized13 cost of the collusion-resistant mechanism as a function of
the coalition fraction. The cost grows linearly for coalitions that span up to one half of the population;
for larger coalitions, the cost grows exponentially. Nevertheless, by comparing Figures 3.12 and 3.10,
one can see that for the same coalition size, the collusion-resistant payments are cheaper if assuming a
setting with non-transferable utilities.
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Figure 3.12: The average cost of the mechanism as we increase the colluding fraction (setting
with transferable utilities).
3.7 Related Work
One interesting alternative to payment schemes that encourage honest feedback is to develop mech-
anisms that make it in the best interest of the providers to truthfully reveal their hidden quality
attributes. The truthful declaration of quality eliminates the need for reputation mechanisms and
significantly reduces the cost of trust management.
Braynov and Sandholm (2002), for example, consider exchanges of goods for money and prove that
a market in which agents are trusted to the degree they deserve to be trusted is equally efficient as a
market with complete trustworthiness. By scaling the amount of the traded product, the authors prove
that it is possible to make it rational for sellers to truthfully declare their trustworthiness. However, the
assumptions made about the trading environment (i.e. the form of the cost function and the selling price
which is supposed to be smaller than the marginal cost) are not common in most electronic markets.
Another interesting work that addresses the trustworthiness of reputation information is the Good-
will Hunting mechanism of Dellarocas (2002). The mechanism works for eBay-like markets and provides
a way to make sellers indifferent between lying or truthfully declaring the quality of the good offered
for sale. The particularity of this work is that the goods are advertised to the buyers through the
13The cost is normalized to the cost of the corresponding incentive-compatible mechanism that is not collusion resistant.
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reputation mechanism, which can modify the asking price initially set by the seller. The reputation
mechanism thus compensates the momentary gains or losses made by the seller from misstating the
quality of the good, and creates an equilibrium where all sellers find it rational to truthfully announce
the quality. A major advantage of the mechanism is that it works even when the sellers offer various
goods with different values.
Mechanisms for encouraging honest reporting are also present in a number of commercial applica-
tions. The most famous is perhaps the ESP Game (von Ahn and Dabbish, 2004), designed to encourage
human users to label web images. The game14 pairs two users at random, and shows them the same
image. Each player must individually write tags about the image, without being able to see the tags
written by the partner. As soon as the two player write the same tag, they gain points and can pass to
the next picture. The goal is to get as many points as possible in a fixed amount of time. Intuitively,
this game has a very simple strategy: players must write as many correct tags as possible, since the
image they see is the only synchronization device that allows them to reach agreement on a tag. The
game is very successful, and the authors claim that in this way, all images on the web can be tagged in
several months.
The incentive mechanism behind the ESP game has, however, several problems. First, it is vulnera-
ble to cheating strategies where a group of players agree to reach agreement on a very simple tag like “a”
or “the”. This strategy could be posted to a popular blog and exposed rapidly to the ESP players. As
discussed in Section 3.6.1, these simple collusion strategies will give colluders a significant competitive
advantage, at the detriment of the game designers who collect only garbage tags. The problem can be
partly addressed by “taboo” lists containing all confirmed tags which were already submitted about the
picture.
The second problem is that rewards are equal for all possible tags. For a Picasso, the players
that match on the tag “painting” are equally rewarded as the players who correctly identify that the
painting is a Picasso. This gives incentives to the players to concentrate on the simplest possible tags
like “person”, “man”, “woman”, etc, without spending effort to provide more informative tags. This
problem has been partly corrected by the Google Image Labeler15, a franchise of the ESP Game, which
rewards players inversely proportional to the frequency of the tag they agree on. However, the exact
algorithm for computing the rewards is not public. Yahoo! is also known to use a version of the ESP
Game to tag their collection of images.
The ESP game can directly profit from the results of this chapter. The rewards used right now
are very simple payment mechanisms that specify positive amounts on matching tags. However, the
payments awarded to the players can be scaled according to the design constraints mentioned in Section
3.3.
Another example of a commercial application using payment mechanisms to encourage honest re-
porting is Amazon’s Mechanical Turk16. The role of the system is to provide a marketplace in which
human users can solve tasks that are very difficult for machines, but easy for people (i.e., short trans-
lations, tagging, face recognition, natural language search, etc). Task owners can pay the workers for
answering their tasks, and can also specify payment rules: e.g., a worker gets paid (or receives a bonus)
only if the answer is confirmed by a different worker solving the same task. Here again, the amounts
and the rules for paying the workers can be the object of incentive-compatible design.
A number of feedback forums reward raters independently based on the impact of their reviews
on the other users. ePinion.com, for example, has professional reviewers who get paid depending on
the votes expressed by normal users, and on the purchases made after reading the reviews. Another
14http://www.espgame.org
15http://images.google.com/imagelabeler/
16http://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
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example is the startup Friend2Friend.com17 who allows users to gain commissions by recommending
products to their friends.
Central to the results of this chapter is the principle of automated mechanism design (AMD). The
mechanism is created automatically (using optimization algorithms) for the specific problem instance,
given the specific information available to the mechanism designer. The idea has important advantages
since (a) it can be used to address classes of problems for which there are no known manually designed
mechanisms, (b) it can circumvent impossibility results by restricting the mechanism to one particular
setting, (c) it can generate better mechanisms by capitalizing on the specific information available in
the present setting, and (d) it shifts the effort of mechanism design to a machine.
Since first introduced by Conitzer and Sandholm (2002), AMD was used to generate several im-
pressive results. Conitzer and Sandholm (2003a) (a) reinvented the Mayerson auction which maximizes
the seller’s expected revenue in a single-object auction, (b) created expected revenue maximizing com-
binatorial auctions, and (c) created optimal mechanisms for a public good problem. Guo and Conitzer
(2007) use AMD to optimally redistribute the payments generated by the VCG mechanism, Conitzer
and Sandholm (2007) incrementally design incentive compatible mechanisms, while Hajiaghayi et al.
(2007) focus on AMD for online settings. Conitzer and Sandholm (2003b) show that the AMD can
potentially be exponentially faster for settings with structured preferences that allow a concise repre-
sentation of the input. Conitzer and Sandholm (2004) describe an efficient algorithm for AMD when the
mechanism is deterministic, does not allow payments and there is only one type-reporting agent. AMD
can also be used to design multi-stage mechanisms that reduce the burden of information elicitation by
querying the agents only for relevant information (Sandholm et al., 2007). The results of Sections 3.3
and 3.6 add to this already long list of results obtained through AMD.
The results of Section 3.6 are mostly related to the literature on implementation theory and in-
centive contracts for principle-(multi)agent settings. The main goal of implementation theory is to
characterize the space of social choice rules that are implementable by some mechanism given a game-
theoretic equilibrium concept. For complete information settings, well established results characterize
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice rule (SCR) to be implementable in dominant
strategy or in Nash equilibrium. For example, SCRs can be implemented in dominant strategies only if
they are strategy-proof (Gibbard, 1973), while the SCRs that can be Nash-implemented must satisfy the
property of monotonicity and no veto power (Maskin, 1999). Unfortunately, SCRs of practical interest
do not satisfy the monotonicity requirement. Fortunately, non-monotonic SCRs can be implemented
in undominated Nash equilibria (Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991), or in subgame perfect equilibria by
multi-stage mechanisms. Another relaxation that extends the set of implementable SCRs is to consider
virtual implementation, where the socially optimal outcome is required to occur only with probability
close to one (Matsushima, 1988; Abreu and Sen, 1991).
In environments with incomplete information agents have private information that is not shared by
other agents. The truthful revelation of the private information can only be ensured by social choice
rules that are Bayesian incentive-compatible. Moreover, a Bayesian monotonicity condition is necessary
for Bayesian implementation (Jackson, 1991). Moore and Repullo (2005) characterize SCRs that can
be virtually Bayesian implemented in pure strategies, and derive the necessary and sufficient conditions
of incentive compatibility and virtual monotonicity.
However, applying the implementation theory to the feedback reporting setting (an environment
with incomplete information) provides nothing more than the constraints on the payment function such
that honest reporting is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In implementation theory terms, the set
of possible world states consists of all combinations of N privately perceived quality signal (one signal
for each agent). The outcome space contains all possible sets of N feedback reports and all possible
combinations ofN positive payments made to theN agents. The desirable SCR contains all social choice
17http://www.friend2friend.com/
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functions that map the possible states of the world (i.e., the set of privately perceived signals) to the
outcomes where the reported feedback correspond to the privately perceived signals). Implementation
theory tells that the SCR must be incentive compatible (i.e., the social choice functions prescribe
outcomes where the payments to the agents make them truthfully reveal their private information) and
Bayesian monotone (i.e., the social choice functions prescribe outcomes where the payments received
by the agents make honest reporting the unique equilibrium). The results of Section 3.6 translate these
requirements into practical constraints that allow the computation of payment functions (and therefore
social choice functions) that are Bayesian Nash implementable.
A number of papers discuss incentive contracts that a principal should offer to several agents
whose effort levels are private. The reward received by each agent depends on the output observed
by the principal, and on the declarations of other agents. Holmstro¨m (1982), Ma (1988), and Li and
Balachandran (2000) show that efficient contracts exist that are also incentive-compatible and collusion-
proof. While the feedback reporting problem is similar, it differs in one major aspect: the reputation
mechanism designer (i.e., the principal) does not observe a direct signal which is correlated to the
reporters’ (i.e., agents’) private information.
3.8 Summary of Results
Two problems commonly associated with online feedback mechanisms are (i) the low proportion of
users that leave feedback, and (ii) the temptation to provide false or biased information. Both can
be addressed by reward schemes which (i) cover the cost of obtaining and reporting feedback, and (ii)
maximize the expected reward of a rational agent who reports truthfully. I address in this chapter the
design of such “truthful” rewards for signaling reputation mechanisms. Here, the correlation between
the private signal of an agent and her belief regarding the reports of other agents can be exploited to
make honest reporting a Nash equilibrium.
Section 3.2.1 reviews the work of Miller et al. (2005) and explains how incentive-compatible payment
mechanisms can be computed based on proper scoring rules. Section 3.3 uses the idea of automated
mechanism design to construct payment schemes that minimize the expected cost to the reputation
mechanism, while offsetting both the cost of reporting and the external gains an agent could obtain
from lying. The payments can be computed effectively by solving a linear optimization problem, and
reduce approximately three times the expected budget required by the reputation mechanism.
Section 3.4 investigates two methods that can further decrease incentive-compatible feedback pay-
ments. The first requires the use of several reference reports. I prove that higher numbers of reference
reports lead to lower costs; however, experiments show that little benefit can be obtained by using more
than 4 reference reports. The second method involves probabilistic filtering mechanisms that discard
some feedback reports. The key idea is to design the payment and the filtering mechanism together, by
considering both the information available to the agents, and the similarity between peer reports. The
resulting mechanism has much lower cost (expected payments are up to an order of magnitude lower)
without affecting the quality of reputation information.
Section 3.5 extends the design of inventive-compatible payments to settings with uncertain informa-
tion. If buyers have private information about the true type of a product or seller, the default payments
computed by the reputation mechanism are not always incentive-compatible. One solution is to ask
the buyers to reveal their private information, and have the reputation mechanism compute customized
payments for each reporter. Besides the cost of the added communication, this method is also vulnera-
ble to false declaration of private information. As an alternative, I consider payment mechanisms that
are incentive-compatible for a range of private beliefs.
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Incentive-compatible payments can easily be adapted to address the collusion between buyers and
sellers. The collusion can happen when the benefit obtained by the seller from a false report offsets the
payment returned to the client in exchange for lying. The feedback payments presented in Sections 3.3
and 3.4 make sure that no seller can afford to buy false reports from rational buyers.
The collusion between reporters, on the other hand, is addressed in Section 3.6. First, I show that
general incentive-compatible payments have several equilibria besides the truthful one. Some of the ly-
ing equilibria generate higher payoffs than the honest equilibrium, which might motivate selfish agents
to coordinate their reports and game the mechanism. Fortunately, supplementary constraints can be
added to the design problem such that honest reporting becomes the unique, or the pareto-optimal equi-
librium. For different collusion scenarios, I describe algorithms for computing such incentive-compatible,
collusion-resistant payments.
One remaining problem, however, is that the seller could create fake buyer identities, (or “bribe”
real buyers that never purchased the product) in order to bias the reputation information. The problem
can be addressed by security mechanisms that connect feedback reports to real transaction IDs. For
example, a site like Expedia.com can make sure that no client leaves feedback about a hotel without
actually paying for a room. Hotels could, of course, create fake bookings, but the repeated payment of
Expedia commission fees makes the manipulation of information very expensive. On the other hand,
social norms and legislation (i.e., providers that try to bribe clients risk being excluded from the market)
could further avoid provider side manipulation.
One hidden assumption behind the results of this chapter is that all agents are risk-neutral. Honest
reporting is rational because, in expectation, it brings higher revenues. However, risk-averse buyers
prefer the ”sure” benefit from lying to the probabilistic feedback payment, and thus misreport. Fortu-
nately, all mechanisms described above can be adapted to any risk-model of the buyers. Nevertheless,
(i) risk-averse buyers require significantly higher payments from the mechanism, and (ii) non-linear risk
models may lead to non-linear design problems.
The motivation to minimize feedback payments might not be clear when the budget of the mech-
anism is covered by buyer subscription fees. Higher fees will be matched (in expectation) by higher
feedback payments. However, this holds only for risk-neutral buyers. Real users (probably risk-averse)
will regard the fixed fees as more expensive than the revenue expected from honest reporting; and higher
subscription fees are increasingly more expensive. Moreover, no real-world system implemented today
charges users for reputation information. Introducing reputation information fees could seriously deter
participation.
An interesting question is what happens as more and more reports are recorded by the reputation
mechanism. When the type of the product does not change, the beliefs of the buyers rapidly converge
towards the true type (Figure 3.6). As more information becomes available to buyers, the private qual-
ity signal they observe triggers smaller and smaller changes of the prior belief. As a consequence, the
probability distributions for the reference reports conditional on the private observation (i.e., Pr[qk|·])
become closer, and the payments needed to guarantee a minimal expected loss from lying increase.
Fortunately, external benefits from lying also decrease: the effect of a false report on reputation infor-
mation tends to 0. Depending on the particular context, lying incentives decrease faster, respectively
slower than the distance between the conditional probability distributions for the reference reports, and
thus, truth-telling becomes easier respectively harder to guarantee. Whatever the case, it makes sense
to stop collecting feedback when the beliefs of the buyers are sufficiently precise.
In real settings, however, the true type of a product or service does actually change in time: e.g.,
initial bugs get eliminated, the technology improves, etc. Existing incentive compatible payment scheme
rely on the fact that future buyers obtain exactly the same thing as the present ones. Fortunately,
changes of type are unlikely to be frequent, so that by dividing the time into “rounds” (the exact length
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of a round will be an application dependent parameter) we can safely assume that changes of type may
only occur between rounds.
There are several directions for extending the results of this chapter in the future. First, to make
the mechanisms more practical, one might need to introduce further constraints in the design problem.
For example, a designer might wish to limit the highest payment to an agent, or require all payments to
take integer values so that they can be mapped to application dependent “points”. Understanding the
full repercussions on the resulting mechanism requires further study. Second, the robustness guarantees
of Section 3.5 could be extended to other models of private information.
Third, the extension of Section 3.6 to general settings with n-ary feedback is an interesting endeavor.
While conceptually straight-forward, the resulting design problem becomes exponentially more complex
as we increase the number of possible feedback values. The problem becomes to find efficient algorithms
that are able to quickly compute incentive-compatible collusion-resistant payment mechanisms for non-
binary feedback mechanisms.
Finally, another direction for future research is to design payment mechanisms that are resistant
against a mixed collusion scenario, where, for example, several strategic agents, each controlling several
fake identities, try to manipulate the reporting mechanism.
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Appendix 3.A Summary of Notation
Symbol Meaning
Θ, θ Θ is the set of possible types; θ ∈ Θ is one type;
Θ2 = {θG, θB} = {1, 0} in binary settings, the good, respectively the bad type;
Pr[θ] the prior probability of the type θ;
Pr[qj |θ] the probability of observing the signal qj given the type θ;
Oi the random signal denoting the observation of the buyer i;
oi ∈ Q the signal observed by the buyer i;
ri ∈ Q the signal reported by the buyer i;
Cr the cost of reporting;
Λ(qj , qh) the benefit from misreporting qh instead of the truth qj ;
Λˆ(qj , qh) the benefit from misreporting, discounted by using filtering;
B the maximum budget of the reputation mechanism;
si = (si(0), . . . si(M − 1)) reporting strategy of buyer i; si(j) ∈ Q is the report submitted when Oi = qj ;
s¯ = (q0, q1, . . . , qM−1) honest reporting strategy;
s∗ 6= s¯ some lying strategy;
ref (i) the reference report(s) of agent i
τ(ri, rref (i)) the payment received by agent i when she report ri and the reference reporters
report rref (i);
V (si, sref (i)|oi) the expected payment of an agent who observes the signal Oi = oi, re-
ports according to the strategy si, and the reference reporters report accord-
ing to the strategy sref (i): V (si, sref (i)|oi) =
∑
qk∈Q Pr[Oref (i) = qk|Oi =
oi]τ(si(oi), sref (i)(qk))
ScR(·) a scoring rule;
ScRlog(·) the logarithmic scoring rule;
ScRsph(·) the spherical scoring rule;
ScRquad(·) the quadratic scoring rule;
Nref the number of reference reporters;
Q(Nref ) the set containing all unordered sequences of Nref reference reports;
q¯k ∈ Q(Nref ) a set of signals observed or reported by Nref reference reporters;
Nftr the number of filtering reports;
Q(Nftr ) the set containing all unordered sequences of Nftr filtering reports;
qˆk ∈ Q(Nftr ) a set of signals observed or reported by Nftr filtering reporters;
pi(ri, rftr(i)) the probability of accepting the report submitted by agent i;
γinfLoss threshold probability of dropping useful information;
const some constant;
ε some small, positive number;
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Symbol Meaning
Pr∗[θ] = Pr[θ] + εθ private belief;
|εθ| < γmaxPI bound on the amount of variation;
Pr′[·] some lying probability distribution;
S set of binary reporting strategies: S = {(s(0), s(1))|s(0), s(1) ∈ ∆(Q2)};
s¯ = (0, 1) honest reporting strategy;
slie, spos, sneg lying strategies;
s = (si, s−i) a strategy profile, one strategy for each agent;
(s¯i, s¯−i) honest reporting strategy profile;
ri, r−i the report of agent i, the reports of all the other agents except i;
N (Nref = N − 1) the number of agents available to the reputation mechanism;
n the number of positive reports in the reference reports;
µ[n, s−i] belief given n positive observations and reporting strategy s−i;
Ncol number of colluding agents;
Appendix 3.B Generating Random Settings
We consider settings where M possible product types are each characterized by one quality signal: i.e.,
the sets Q and Θ have the same number of elements, and every type θj ∈ Θ is characterized by one
quality signal qj ∈ Q. The conditional probability distribution for the signals observed by the buyers is
computed as:
Pr[qk|θj ] =
{
1− ε if k = j;
ε/(M − 1) if k 6= j;
where ² is the probability that a buyer misinterprets the true quality of the product (all mistakes are
equally likely). We take ε = 10%.
The prior belief is randomly generated in the following way: for every θj ∈ Θ, p(θj) is a ran-
dom number, uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The probability distribution over types is then
computed by normalizing these random numbers:
Pr[θj ] =
p(θj)∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)
;
The external benefits from lying are randomly uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
Appendix 3.C Cardinality of Q(Nref )
The set of all possible values for Nref reference reports can be described as:
Q(Nref ) =
{
(n1, . . . , nM ) ∈ NM |
M∑
j=1
nj = Nref
}
;
The elements of Q(Nref ) can be determined by first setting n1 and then recursively finding the
vectors (n2, . . . , nM ) such that
∑M
j=2 nj = Nref − n1. |Q(Nref )| can therefore be computed by the
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recursive function:
|Q(Nref )| = g(N,M)
g(N,M) =
N∑
j=0
g(N − j,M − 1);
g(0,M) = 1; g(N, 1) = 1; ∀N,M ∈ N;
By induction over M , we show that g(N,M) = {M−1N+M−1 for all N ≥ 0. True for M = 1; assuming
g(N,M − 1) = {M−2N+M−2 for all N ≥ 0, we have:
g(N,M) =
N∑
j=0
{M−2j+M−2 = {M−2M−2 + {M−21+M−2 +
N∑
j=2
{M−2j+M−2
= {M−1M + {M−2M +
N∑
j=3
{M−2j+M−2
= {M−1M+1 + {M−2M+1 +
N∑
j=4
{M−2j+M−2 = . . . = {M−1M+N−1
Appendix 3.D Proof of Lemma 3.6.1
Pr[n|1]Pr[n+ 1|0]− Pr[n|0]Pr[n+ 1|1] =
(∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]
Pr[1|θ]
Pr[1]
Pr[n|θ]
)(∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]
Pr[0|θ]
Pr[0]
Pr[n+ 1|θ]
)
−
(∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]
Pr[0|θ]
Pr[0]
Pr[n|θ]
)(∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]
Pr[1|θ]
Pr[1]
Pr[n+ 1|θ]
)
=
(∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]
Pr[1|θ]
Pr[1]
Pr[n|θ]
)(∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]
Pr[0|θ]
Pr[0]
Pr[n|θ] (N − 1− n)Pr[1|θ]
(n+ 1)Pr[0|θ]
)
−
(∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]
Pr[0|θ]
Pr[0]
Pr[n|θ]
)(∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]
Pr[1|θ]
Pr[1]
Pr[n|θ] (N − 1− n)Pr[1|θ]
(n+ 1)Pr[0|θ]
)
=
(N − 1− n)
(n+ 1)Pr[1]Pr[0]
((∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]Pr[1|θ]Pr[n|θ]
)2−
(∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]Pr[0|θ]Pr[n|θ]
)(∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ]
Pr[1|θ]2
Pr[0|θ] Pr[n|θ]
))
< 0;
by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality applied to the vectors (
√
Pr[θ]Pr[0|θ]Pr[n|θ])θ∈Θ and (Pr[1|θ]
√
Pr[θ]Pr[n|θ]√
Pr[0|θ] )θ∈Θ.
Appendix 3.E Generating Random Binary Settings
Numerical simulations used to evaluate the average performance of the mechanisms described in Section
3.6 are based on random problems generated in the following way:
• the set of possible types is randomly chosen between 2 and 20;
• for each type, θ, the probability, Pr[1|θ], that the buyers observe high quality is randomly chosen
between 0 and 1;
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• unless otherwise specified, the number of agents is chosen randomly between 2 and 30.
Appendix 3.F Proof of Proposition 3.6.7
The idea of the proof is to show that we can find the positive values x and y such that the payment
scheme defined in Proposition 3.6.7 has only three NEQ: honest reporting, everybody reporting 0 or
everybody reporting 1.
No NEQ where n agents report according to slie and 4−n agents report honestly. From Proposition
3.6.4 we know that x and y can be found to prevent an equilibrium where all agents lie. Similarly, the
incentive-compatible constraints ensure that a strategy profile where one agent always lies and three
agents always report the truth cannot be a NEQ. Let us show that the profile s = (3 × slie, s¯) where
three agents lie and one agent reports the truth. The honest reporter observing a low quality signal
will report honestly if and only if:
Pr[2|0]x− Pr[1|0]y > 0;
The same honest agent reports a positive report after observing high quality if and only if:
−Pr[2|1]x+ Pr[1|1]y > 0;
However, by Lemma 3.6.1 we have Pr[1|0]Pr[2|0] >
Pr[1|1]
Pr[2|1] , so the two inequalities can never be simultaneously
satisfied.
Consider the profile s = (2× slie, 2× s¯) where two agents lie and two agents report the truth is not
NEQ. One honest reporter reports the truth if and only if:
(3Pr[3|0] + 2Pr[1|0])x− (3Pr[0|0] + 2Pr[2|0])y > 0;
−(3Pr[3|1] + 2Pr[1|1])x+ (3Pr[0|1] + 2Pr[2|1])y > 0;
A liar, on the other hand, reports according to slie if and only if:
(3Pr[0|1] + 2Pr[2|1])x− (3Pr[3|1] + 2Pr[1|1])y > 0;
−(3Pr[0|0] + 2Pr[2|0])x+ (3Pr[3|0] + 2Pr[1|0])y > 0;
All 4 inequalities are satisfied if and only if
3Pr[3|1] + 2Pr[1|1] < 3Pr[0|1] + 2Pr[2|1];
3Pr[0|0] + 2Pr[2|0] < 3Pr[3|0] + 2Pr[1|0];
which is impossible.
No NEQ where one agent always reports 1, n agents report according to slie and 3−n agents report
honestly. Clearly, when all 3 agents report honestly, the agent always reporting 1 has the incentive to
deviate and report 0 after observing low quality. Consider the strategy profile s = (spos, 2 × s¯, slie)
where one agent reports according to spos, two agents report honestly and one agent reports according
to slie. For the liar, slie is an equilibrium iff:
−Pˆ r[0|0]x+ Pˆ r[1|0]y > 0;
Pˆ r[0|1]x− Pˆ r[1|1]y > 0;
where Pˆ r[n|oi] is the probability that n out of the 2 honest reporters will observe 1, given the ob-
servation oi ∈ Q2. By Lemma 3.6.1, we have Pˆ r[1|1]Pˆ r[0|1] >
Pˆ r[1|0]
Pˆ r[0|0] , so the above inequations cannot hold
simultaneously.
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Consider the strategy profile s = (spos, s¯, 2 × slie) where one agent reports according to spos, one
agent reports honestly and two agents report according to slie. The agent reporting honestly, does so
iff:
Pˆ r[2|0]x− Pˆ r[0|0]y > 0;
−Pˆ r[2|1]x+ Pˆ r[0|1]y > 0;
where Pˆ r[n|oi] is the probability that n out of the 2 liars observe 1, given the observation oi ∈ Q2. This
is impossible since by Lemma 3.6.1 Pˆ r[0|0]
Pˆ r[2|0] >
Pˆ r[0|1]
Pˆ r[2|1] .
Similar techniques can be used to prove that no strategy profile
(
sneg, n × slie, (3 − n) × s¯) or(
sneg, spos, n × slie, (2 − n) × s¯) can be NEQ. Therefore, the only constraint (besides the incentive-
compatibility constraints) acting on the payments x and y is intended to prevent the all lying equilib-
rium. x and y take exactly the values described by Proposition 3.6.4.
Appendix 3.G Proof of Proposition 3.6.8
Consider the strategy profile s =
(
n¯× s¯, (N− n¯)×slie) ∈ S˜ where n¯ ≥ 1 agents report honestly, and the
others always lie. If s were a NEQ, an honest reporter must expect a higher payment by reporting the
truth, while a liar must expect a higher payment by lying. Consider an honest reporter observing 0. She
will report a negative signal if and only if Pr[r−i = 1|0]x > Pr[r−i = N − 2|0]y, where Pr[r−i = 1|0]
and Pr[r−i = N − 2|0] are the probabilities that exactly 1, respectively N − 2 of the remaining N − 1
agents report positive signals. Exactly one of the other agents reports a positive signal when:
• all but one of the other honest reporters observes low quality, and all liars observe high quality,
or
• all honest reporters observe low quality, and all but one of the liars observe high quality.
Pr[r−i = 1|0] =
∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ|0]
( n¯− 1
1
)
Pr[1|θ]Pr[0|θ]n¯−2
( N − n¯
N − n¯
)
Pr[1|θ]N−n¯+
∑
θ∈Θ
Pr[θ|0]
( n¯− 1
0
)
Pr[0|θ]n¯−1
( N − n¯
N − n¯− 1
)
Pr[1|θ]N−n¯−1Pr[0|θ]
=
(n¯− 1)!(N − n¯+ 1)!
(N − 1)! Pr[N − n¯+ 1|0] +
(n¯)!(N − n¯)!
(N − 1)! Pr[N − n¯− 1|0]
=
(n¯− 1)!(N − n¯)!
(N − 1)!
(
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯+ 1|0] + n¯Pr[N − n¯− 1|0]
)
;
Similarly,
Pr[r−i = N − 2|0] =
(n¯− 1)!(N − n¯)!
(N − 1)!
(
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯− 2|0] + n¯Pr[n¯|0]
)
;
Hence the honest reporter has the incentive to truthfully submit a negative report if and only if:
(N − n¯+ 1)
(
Pr[N − n¯+ 1|0]x− Pr[n¯− 2|0]y
)
+ n¯
(
Pr[N − n¯− 1|0]x− Pr[n¯|0]y
)
> 0;
On the other hand, the honest reporter will submit a positive report after observing a high quality
signal if and only if:
(N − n¯+ 1)
(
Pr[n¯− 2|1]y − Pr[N − n¯+ 1|1]x
)
+ n¯
(
Pr[n¯|1]y − Pr[N − n¯− 1|1]x
)
> 0;
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Exactly the same reasoning leads to the following two inequations for the liar:
(N − n¯)
(
Pr[n¯− 1|0]y − Pr[N − n¯|0]x
)
+ (n¯+ 1)
(
Pr[n¯+ 1|0]y − Pr[N − n¯− 2|0]x
)
> 0;
(N − n¯)
(
Pr[N − n¯|1]x− Pr[n¯− 1|1]y
)
+ (n¯+ 1)
(
Pr[N − n¯− 2|1]x− Pr[n¯+ 1|1]y
)
> 0;
There exist x and y such that the four inequalities are satisfied in the same time only if:
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯− 2|0] + n¯Pr[n¯|0]
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯+ 1|0] + n¯Pr[N − n¯− 1|0] <
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯− 2|1] + n¯Pr[n¯|1]
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯+ 1|1] + n¯Pr[N − n¯− 1|1]
(N − n¯)Pr[n¯− 1|1] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯+ 1|1]
(N − n¯)Pr[N − n¯|1] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯− 2|1] <
(N − n¯)Pr[n¯− 1|0] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯+ 1|0]
(N − n¯)Pr[N − n¯|0] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯− 2|0]
or equivalently:
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯− 2|0] + n¯Pr[n¯|0]
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯− 2|1] + n¯Pr[n¯|1] <
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯+ 1|0] + n¯Pr[N − n¯− 1|0]
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯+ 1|1] + n¯Pr[N − n¯− 1|1]
(N − n¯)Pr[n¯− 1|1] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯+ 1|1]
(N − n¯)Pr[n¯− 1|0] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯+ 1|0] <
(N − n¯)Pr[N − n¯|1] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯− 2|1]
(N − n¯)Pr[N − n¯|0] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯− 2|0]
However, one can show that:
(N − n¯)Pr[N − n¯|1] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯− 2|1]
(N − n¯)Pr[N − n¯|0] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯− 2|0] <
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯− 2|0] + n¯Pr[n¯|0]
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯− 2|1] + n¯Pr[n¯|1]
and
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯+ 1|0] + n¯Pr[N − n¯− 1|0]
(N − n¯+ 1)Pr[N − n¯+ 1|1] + n¯Pr[N − n¯− 1|1] <
(N − n¯)Pr[n¯− 1|1] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯+ 1|1]
(N − n¯)Pr[n¯− 1|0] + (n¯+ 1)Pr[n¯+ 1|0]
which means that the honest reporter and the liar cannot both believe that their strategies are optimal
(given the strategies of the other agents).
Consider the strategy profile s = (sneg, n¯× s¯, N − n¯− 1× slie) ∈ S˜ where one agent always reports
0, n¯ ≥ 1 agents report honestly, and N − n¯ − 1 ≥ 1 agents always lie. An honest reporter and a liar
both believe that s is a NEQ if and only if:(
n¯P¯ r[N − n¯− 2|0] + (N − n¯)P¯ r[N − n¯|0]
)
x− P¯ r[n¯− 1|0]y > 0
−
(
n¯P¯ r[N − n¯− 2|1] + (N − n¯)P¯ r[N − n¯|1]
)
x+ P¯ r[n¯− 1|1]y > 0
−
(
(n¯+ 1)P¯ r[N − n¯− 3|0] + (N − n¯− 1)P¯ r[N − n¯− 1|0]
)
x+ P¯ r[n¯|0]y > 0(
(n¯+ 1)P¯ r[N − n¯− 3|1] + (N − n¯− 1)P¯ r[N − n¯− 1|1]
)
x− P¯ r[n¯|1]y > 0
(3.31)
where P¯ r[j|oi] is the probability that j out of N − 2 agents observe high quality signals, given the
observation oi.
Nevertheless,
P¯ r[n¯|0]
P¯ r[n¯|1] <
P¯r[n¯− 1|0]
P¯ r[n¯− 1|1]
and
n¯P¯ r[N − n¯− 2|0] + (N − n¯)P¯ r[N − n¯|0]
n¯P¯ r[N − n¯− 2|1] + (N − n¯)P¯ r[N − n¯|1] <
(n¯+ 1)P¯ r[N − n¯− 3|0] + (N − n¯− 1)P¯ r[N − n¯− 1|0]
(n¯+ 1)P¯ r[N − n¯− 3|1] + (N − n¯− 1)P¯ r[N − n¯− 1|1]
which means that the inequalities in (3.31) can never be simultaneously satisfied.
Using exactly the same technique one can show that:
• s = (spos, n¯ × s¯, (N − n¯ − 1) × slie) ∈ S˜ where one agent always reports 0, n¯ ≥ 1 agents report
honestly, and N − n¯− 1 ≥ 1 agents always lie is not a NEQ;
• s = (sneg, spos, n¯× s¯, (N − n¯− 2)× slie) ∈ S˜ where one agent always reports 0, one agent always
reports 1, n¯ ≥ 0 agents report honestly, and N − n¯− 1 ≥ 0 agents always lie is not a NEQ.
Chapter 4
Novel Applications of Signaling
Reputation Mechanisms - QoS
Monitoring
An increasing fraction of a modern economy consists of services. Services are generally provided under
a contract that fixes the type and quality of the service to be provided as well as penalties if these are
not met. We call such a contract a Service Level Agreement or SLA. For example, an airline provides
as a service the transportation of a passenger within certain time constraints and has to pay certain
penalties if this service is not delivered. Another example is providing a communication service where
a certain availability and capacity is guaranteed and penalties must be paid if these are not reached.
An essential requirement for such service provisioning is to be able to monitor the quality of service
(or QoS) that was actually delivered. As the monetary value of individual services decreases, the cost of
providing accurate monitoring takes up an increasing share of the cost of providing the service itself. For
example, with current technology, reliably monitoring the quality of a communication service requires
constant communication with a neutral third party and would be almost as costly as providing the
service itself. The cost of this monitoring remains a major obstacle to wider adoption of a service-
oriented economy.
There is a large body of research addressing infrastructural facilities for SLA monitoring (Sahai
et al., 2002; Ludwig et al., 2004; Dan et al., 2004; Barbon et al., 2006). Existing solutions rely on one
of the following three techniques (see Figure 4.1):
• a trusted monitor intercepts the messages exchanged between the client and the provider and
outputs an estimate of the delivered QoS.
• a trusted party periodically probes the service and outputs performance metrics.
• monitoring code runs on the provider side, as part of the service middleware. The monitoring layer
intercepts the messages addressed to/originating from the provider, and estimates the delivered
QoS.
The problem with the first technique is scalability. When the monitor intercepts all service invo-
cations, it acts as a central proxy and soon becomes a performance bottleneck. Bottlenecks may of
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Figure 4.1: Traditional QoS Monitoring Approaches.
course be avoided by only monitoring a sample of the service invocations, but the monitoring will be
less precise.
The second technique is expensive and probably inaccurate. Special clients must be set up only
to probe and evaluate the service. They generate supplementary service requests which unnecessarily
overload service providers. Moreover, trusted clients monitor only a small sample of the total number
of requests, and therefore the output results are prone to noise and errors.
The problem with the third technique is trustworthiness. The providers have obvious strategic
incentives to modify the monitoring results. Unless strongly secured (which comes at a non-negligible
cost), the monitoring code may be tampered with, and rendered unreliable.
This chapter has the objective of describing an alternative system and method for accurately mon-
itoring the quality of service that has actually been delivered by a service provider. The basic principle
is to have each user of the service report the quality of service she observed to a reputation mechanism.
The reputation mechanism can estimate the QoS that was actually delivered by a service provider by
aggregating the reports from all clients that have interacted with that provider. The QoS estimate out-
put by the reputation mechanism can be used to check whether the provider complied with the SLA it
advertised; if violations are detected, the provider may be charged penalties that are later redistributed
to the community of users.
While this system can be used for a wide range of services, it is particularly suitable for monitoring
services that are provided to a large group of users that are treated equally by the service provider.
Different clients in the same group may receive different QoS, nevertheless, their observations can be
modeled by a random signal that only depends on the overall quality delivered by the provider. From this
perspective, the quality delivered by the provider within a certain time interval, to a certain client group
defines the provider’s fixed, unknown type. The reputation mechanism that uses the client feedback
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to estimate the QoS delivered by the provider is a signaling reputation mechanism, as described in
Chapter 3.
The key ingredient of the QoS monitoring system is to ensure that clients report honestly their QoS
observations. As shown in the previous chapter, honest reporting incentives can be guaranteed by a
payment mechanism where clients are paid for reporting their observed quality of service. To balance
the incentive of clients to report bad quality of service, the payments are scaled so that truthful reports
incur higher payments. These payments can be scaled to offset whatever benefit a client can obtain
from misreporting. With these payments, truthful reporting becomes optimal for clients, and does not
need to be further enforced. Thus, the system requires little or no direct interaction with a central
monitoring authority, and can be implemented at much lower cost than previously known methods.
Related Work
Reputation Mechanisms have emerged as efficient tools for service discovery and selection (Singh and
Huhns, 2005). When electronic contracts cannot be enforced, users can protect themselves against
cheating providers by looking at past behavior (i.e., the provider’s reputation). Liu et al. (2004)
present a QoS-based selection model that takes into account the feedback from users as well as other
business related criteria. The model is extensible and dynamic. In the same spirit, Kalepu et al. (2003)
proposes verity, a QoS measure that takes into account both reputation and the terms of the SLA. An
interesting approach is proposed by Deora et al. (2003), who argue that the expectations of a client
greatly influence the submitted feedback, and therefore should be used when assessing the QoS of a
provider. Both Maximilien and Singh (2004) and Alunkal et al. (2003) propose concrete frameworks for
service selection based on the reputation of the service provider. However, reputation-based selection
gives only indirect incentives, as clients learn to avoid deceitful providers.
As opposed to the above solutions, we mainly use the feedback reported by the clients to substitute
QoS monitoring. We believe that the information contained in the reports should be used directly
and immediately to assess the honesty of the advertisement made by the provider. Moreover, this
information should have direct repercussions on the gains of the provider through contractual penalties.
In this way, providers get immediate incentives to exert effort.
This chapter also relates to the large body of research on monitoring and enforcing of electronic con-
tracts. Mahbub and Spanoudakis (2004) and Robinson (2003) address the monitoring of requirements
(i.e., behavioral properties), as derived from the specification of a service in a particular context. Pis-
tore et al. (2004) propose a framework for planning the composition, and for monitoring the execution
of BPEL web services. Planning techniques are exploited to synthesize a monitor of a BPEL process,
which detects and signals whether the external partners behave inconsistently with the specified pro-
tocols. Barbon et al. (2006) check temporal, boolean, time-related, and statistic properties of BPEL
composition, using a framework supporting RTML, the Run-time Monitoring Specification Language.
Bianculli and Ghezzi (2007) address the monitoring of conversational services where the state depends
on the interaction between the client and the provider. Keller and Ludwig (2002) propose WSLA and
focus on monitoring QoS properties such as performance and costs. Xu and Jeusfeld (2003) and Milo-
sevic and Dromey (2002) address the formalization and automated monitoring of contracts expressed
in natural language.
Reliable information regarding the QoS of advertised services is also essential for service selec-
tion and composition. Zeng et al. (2003) and Zeng et al. (2004) present AgFlow, a middleware for
quality-driven service composition. In AgFlow, the QoS of web services is evaluated using an extensible
multidimensional QoS model, and the selection of individual services aims at optimizing the QoS of the
composite service. Wang et al. (2006) introduces QoS-based selection of semantic web services, i.e., web
services that provide well-defined, computer-interpretable semantics (McIlraith and Martin, 2003).
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Figure 4.2: A market of web services.
4.1 Formal Model and Assumptions
Let us consider an online market of services pictured in Figure 4.2 where different clients interact
with different service providers in a decentralized manner. There is no trusted authority or proxy
intermediating the transactions between clients and providers, except that discovery is facilitated by
service directories. Both clients and providers have digital identities based on public key infrastructure.
The complete upper level interaction protocol is described in Section 4.2.
Services are characterized by binding SLAs specifying both functional and non-functional (quality)
attributes expressed in a language such as WSDL (Dan et al., 2004) or WS-agreement (Andrieux et al.,
2005). Time is divided into equal periods, and assume that the same SLA is shared by a large group
of clients in any given period of time. The same service provider can have several customer groups,
but all clients within the same group are treated equally (within the same period of time). The length
of the time period is an application-dependent parameter, set to meet the two constraints above (i.e.,
large number of client requests per period, but the same SLA and service parameters).
The Quality of Service (QoS) is specified according to a common ontology. I consider objective qual-
ity attributes that take discrete values, and can be observed by clients for single service invocations.
ServiceIsAlive or InvocationFailure are examples of such quality attributes: they are understood by all
agents in the same way, can be measured for each interaction, and take Boolean values. ResponseTime
and Bandwidth are both objective and observable, but usually take continuous values. For most ap-
plications, however, clients are indifferent between values that fall within some range, and therefore,
they can be discretized: e.g., Bandwidth ∈ { DialUp, DSL, T1}. On the other hand, Availability or
Reliability do not meet our restriction since they are not observable for single interactions.
Second, I assume that quality properties are specified in the SLA as probability distributions over
possible values for each of the quality attributes. Availability can therefore be indirectly expressed as a
probability distribution over the boolean values of the quality attribute ServiceIsAlive.
Finally, the values of different quality attributes are assumed independent, with the only exception
that certain values of certain quality attributes render the observation of other quality attributes im-
possible: e.g., if for the present invocation the ServiceIsAlive attribute has the value FALSE, the value
of the ResponseTime attribute cannot be observed.
Formally, let A = {a1, a2, . . . , aNa} be the set of all (i.e., Na) quality attributes defined by our
ontology, and let Dj be the domain of values of the quality attribute aj . Generally, the dependence
between quality attributes is expressed through a (linear) correlation factor between the values of those
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attributes. In our model, however, dependencies can be expressed as a relation:
R = {(aj , vh, ak)|aj , ak ∈ A, vh ∈ Dj};
specifying all tuples (aj , vh, ak) such that when the quality attribute aj takes the value vh ∈ Dj , the
quality attribute ak cannot be observed. For example, the response time attribute cannot have a value
when the service is not alive, and therefore, the tuple (ServiceIsAlive, FALSE, ResponseTime) will be
a member of this set.
A description of the quality attribute aj ∈ A is a probability distribution µj : Dj → (0, 1) over all
possible values of the attribute aj . For example, a description of the quality attribute ResponseTime
could be the following: “the response time is: less than 0.1s with probability 30%, less than 0.5s with
probability 70%, and less than 1s with probability 100%”. A quality advertisement (as published by a
SLA) describes a subset A¯ ⊆ A of quality attributes. Let QS denote the set of all possible quality
advertisements, and let qs denote a member of this set (i.e., qs uniquely characterizes a SLA).
After every interaction, the client observes a value for some (possibly all) of the quality attributes
specified in the SLA. A quality observation, o = (vj), vj ∈ Dj ∪ {null}, aj ∈ A¯, is a vector containing
a value for each of the quality attributes specified in the SLA. Since not all combinations of values
can occur simultaneously (because of the constraints defined by the relation R), the quality attribute
ak will have the value vk = null if and only if some other quality attribute aj has the value vh, and
(aj , vh, ak) ∈ R. As quality observations give signals to the clients about the QoS delivered by the
provider, we will interchangeably use the terms signal and quality observation. The set of all possible
signals is denoted as in Chapter 3 by Q = {q0, q1, . . . qM−1}, where, of course, every signal is actually a
vector of values, one for each attribute in the subset A¯. A summary of the formal notation is given in
the Appendix 3.A.
A trusted reputation mechanism (RM) is responsible for gathering and aggregating the feedback
from the clients. The feedback is used to compute the delivered QoS and to update (in an application-
dependent manner) the reputation information about the service provider. Feedback consists of a set of
quality reports about the interactions between a client and a service provider. We assume that quality
observations can be derived automatically from the messages exchanged between the client and the
provider. To facilitate the reporting, the RM makes available the monitoring and reporting code that
allows the clients to automatically submit feedback.
The feedback messages submitted by the clients consist of a set of quality reports about the inter-
actions between the client and service providers. One message can thus compress information about
the several transactions with several service providers. We assume that quality observations can be
derived automatically from the messages exchanged between the client and the provider. To facilitate
the reporting, the RM makes available the monitoring and reporting code that allows the clients to
automatically submit feedback.
Although feedback is by default reported honestly, clients can tamper with the reporting code when
they increase their utility by doing so. Let Λ > 0 be an upper bound on the utility increase an agent
can obtain by lying, as, for example,
• falsely reporting low quality decreases the reputation of the provider, who may be forced, in the
future, to decrease the price of service;
• the decreases in reputation due to a false report may also drive away other clients, leaving the
service provider more available to the requests of the lying agent;
• falsely reporting high quality could attract rewards or preferential treatment from the provider.
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Figure 4.3: Interaction protocol involving a RM.
Tampering with the reporting code is costly, and we denote this cost by C. The same modified code
can be used repeatedly or shared by several clients, and therefore, the marginal cost of one false report
is often smaller than Λ. The potential advantage a client can obtain by lying motivates the need for
measures to ensure honesty.
Unlike the traditional techniques, our approach is to make lying uninteresting, rather than impos-
sible. We use a minimum of cryptographic tools, and propose a payment mechanism that rewards
honesty. The RM will pay something for every submitted feedback, and the payments will be scaled
such that, in expectation, the reward from telling the truth is better than the reward when lying by
at least Λ. This property guarantees that no agent (or small coalition of agents) has the incentive to
tamper with the reporting code.
4.2 Interaction Protocol
The participants in our environment are the following: service providers advertise SLAs and offer
the corresponding services; clients choose SLAs and invoke the respective services; service directories
facilitate the matching between clients and providers; RMs collect and aggregate feedback from the
clients; a bank handles payments. The RMs and the bank are trusted parties. A RM can be integrated
into a service directory in order to enable efficient, reputation-aware SLA selection. In this case, the
service directory integrating a RM is assumed to be trusted.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the interactions between the aforementioned participants:
1. Providers advertise SLAs to a service directory (1a). Each SLA uniquely identifies the service
provider (Provider-ID) and the service functionality, (Serv-ID) for example by referring to a WSDL
service description, and defines the price and QoS for service invocation. The service directory assigns
a suitable RM (RM-ID) for each SLA advertisement, which shall be used for feedback reporting. The
instantiation of a RM for a new SLA (1b) requires solving a linear optimization problem, which will be
discussed in Section 4.5. Advertised SLAs remain valid for a period of time specified by the provider.
After expiration, they are removed from the directory. Service directories may support leases, allowing
service providers to refresh SLA advertisements. Each SLA receives a unique SLA-ID, computed as a
secure hashcode of the SLA.
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2. Clients search for advertised SLAs according to functional and non-functional criteria, as well
as according to reputation information. To this end, clients access a directory and a RM. If the RM
is integrated within the directory, reputation-based filtering constraints can be directly included in the
directory query. Clients may inspect reputation information specific to a SLA, or aggregated reputation
information for a service provider.
3. The client and the chosen provider establish a contract for a given SLA, for a given period of
time. The client sends a request message to the service provider, including Client-ID, SLA-ID, and
the number of requested service invocations, Nr-Invoc. The service provider may reject the request,
if it (temporarily) cannot meet the conditions of the SLA. The response message sent by the service
provider is a non-forgeable service invocation capability (SIC), valid for Nr-Invoc service invocations
according to the conditions advertised in the SLA SLA-ID. The SIC will also be used by the client to
report feedback.
4. The client pays for the agreed number of service invocations (i.e., Nr-Invoc times the price stated
within the SLA). The payment message includes the SIC, and the bank returns the signed SIC in order
to certify successful payment.
5. The client requests the service, and the provider responds. For each service invocation, the client
has to provide a valid SIC signed by the bank. Hence, the service provider can easily determine that
the client has payed for the SLA. The service provider keeps track of the number of service invocations
for each valid SIC in order to ensure that this number does not exceed the contracted Nr-Invoc value.
The client monitors the QoS parameters to be reported to the RM.
6. The client sends feedback to the RM. The feedback contains the SIC signed by the bank, and
a timestamped series of quality reports. For each SIC, the client may send between 1 and Nr-Invoc
reports. The quality reports need not necessarily be aggregated within a single message. I.e., for the
same SIC, the client may send several messages with a varying number of quality reports. The RM
does not verify whether a service was actually invoked by the client, but it ensures that the client paid
for the invocation. I.e., the RM rejects reports if the SIC has not been signed by the bank.
7. The RM aggregates received feedback at the end of each time period. From all valid quality
reports about a SLA, the RM estimates the actually delivered QoS by computing the distribution of
values (i.e., histogram) for every quality attribute described by the SLA. Feedback can also be used to
update the reputation of the service provider.
8. The RM pays valid reports as described in Section 4.5 (8a). Finally, the RM publishes the
monitored QoS value for the current period and notifies the providers about the penalties they must
pay (8b). Service providers who do not pay the agreed penalties may be put on a black list by the RM
and consequently will be avoided by clients upon service selection.
4.3 Implementation of a Prototype
To validate the model discussed in the previous sections, we implemented a prototype of the QoS
monitoring framework as a light-weight add-on on top of existing web-service middleware (Axis1). The
framework exposes three types of components: directory services, reputation mechanisms, and banks. It
also uses external certification authorities in order to setup a public key infrastructure (PKI). The users
of the framework (i.e., the clients and the service providers) are provided with appropriate libraries in
order to facilitate the deployment of applications.
1http://ws.apache.org/axis/
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As a general principle, all components expose two kind of interfaces:
• a web service exposing the functionality available to the users (providers and clients) of the
framework. We will refer to this web service as the public web service (respectively the public
interface).
• a web service exposing the functionality available to the other components within the framework.
For security reasons, providers and clients do not have access to this web service. By abusing the
terminology we will refer to this web service as the private web service (respectively the private
interface).
The certification authority (CA) must provide the standard functionality associated to this role:
creation and signing of digital X.509 certificates, validation of certificates, and revocation of expired or
compromised certificates. For testing purposes we implemented a demo CA in our framework, however,
any CA with a web service interface may be used. All parties (clients, providers, as well as directory
services, reputation mechanisms and banks) are required to have valid identity certificates; these will
be used to sign, encrypt, and authenticate exchanged messages. In our current version, we assume that
CAs enforce unique identities and unique names.
The directory service is implemented as a wrapper around one or several UDDI and WSLA repos-
itories. The public interface of the directory allows service providers to register, modify and delete
service descriptions and service level agreements. Service registrations are requests by providing stan-
dard WSDL documents, signed by the provider. The directory checks the validity of the signature, and
forwards the request to the UDDI repository (we used JUDDI2 as the implementation of UDDI). The
business key returned by the UDDI repository is returned to the provider, but is also stored by the direc-
tory next to the identity of the provider. Any subsequent modifications to existing service descriptions
are first validated by the directory in order to avoid malicious corruption of WSDL documents.
Service providers may announce several SLAs for the same service. The registration of one or several
SLAs is made by providing one, respectively several WSLA documents, describing the non-functional
characteristics of the service. The directory first checks the validity of the business key against the
identity of the provider, and then forwards the request to a proprietary WSLA repository3. The WSLA
document describes the quality attributes of the service, by providing a cumulative distribution function
on the values of each attribute. The quality attributes and possible values are described in an ontology.
Clients can search the directory for services that fulfill functional and non-functional requirements.
Non-functional requirements are specified as a list of constraints that must be simultaneously met.
Every constraint specifies a tuple (aj , vh, pk), meaning that the client expects for the quality attribute
aj a value higher than vh with probability greater than pk. Efficient queries of the WSLA repository
can be implemented by indexing the WSLA documents according to all possible tuples (aj , vh).
The private interface of the directory is used by the Bank to signal the service providers that pay
(or do not pay) the required penalties. Service providers that refuse to pay the penalties are eventually
placed on a black list, and are excluded from the result set returned to the clients.
Among the modules provided by our framework, the bank is the simplest one. The public interface
of the bank includes the traditional operations (i.e., account creation, deposits, balance checks and
withdrawals) as well as two functions required to support the interaction protocol in Figure 4.3. The
first, paySIC(SIC, signatureOfClient) is used by clients to pay for a service invocation capability
(SIC) in step 4 of the interaction protocol. The bank signs the SIC as a proof of payment, and returns
2http://ws.apache.org/juddi/
3Our current implementation uses a MySQL database to implement the WSDL repository, with appropriate indexes
to facilitate the search of services with the desired quality levels
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it the client. The second, payPenalty(bill, signatureOfProvider) is used by providers to pay the
penalties resulting from delivering lower than advertised QoS (step 8). The bills are created periodically
by the reputation mechanism, and reflect the difference between the advertised and delivered quality
levels. Providers can instruct the bank to automatically pay the penalty bills.
The private interface of the bank allows the reputation mechanism to announce the penalties that
should be paid by a provider for not respecting the terms of the SLA. In response to such announce-
ments the bank notifies the provider about the pending payment, or automatically pays the penalty if
instructed so by the service provider.
Clients submit feedback reports by using the public interface of the reputation mechanism. One
message may contain a set of reports, made up of:
• quality observations (as defined in Section 4.1) for one or several SLAs
• the corresponding SICs, signed by the bank
• the signature of the client.
The RM checks the validity of the client’s signature, and verifies the signature of the bank on the SIC.
All reports about a SLA beyond the number specified in the SIC are discarded.
The private interface of the reputation mechanism is used by the directory in order to query the
reputation of certain service providers.
All components of the framework also include code for house-keeping operations like maintenance
of databases, purging expired records, revoking expired certificates, etc. This code can run either as a
separate demon process when the middleware allows it, or as part of the calls to the public or private
web services.
4.4 Incentive-compatible Service Level Agreements
In order to deter providers from advertising higher QoS, the SLA specifies a monetary penalty that
must be paid by the provider to each client at the end of a given period of time. The penalty is
directly proportional to the difference between the promised QoS and the quality that has actually
been delivered to the clients in a certain period of time. The SLA is incentive-compatible when the
total revenue of a provider advertising a higher QoS (i.e. the price obtained by overstating the QoS
minus the penalty incurred for lying) is lower than the revenue obtained by truthfully advertising the
intended QoS.
Definition 4.4.1 A reputation-based Service Level Agreement states the following terms:
• per_validity: the period of validity. Time is indexed according to a discrete variable t;
• cust_group: the intended customer group (e.g. silver/gold/platinium customers);
• QoS (denoted as qst ∈ QS): the advertised quality of service;
• price (denoted as pt) : the price of service valid for the current period;
102 Novel Applications of Signaling Reputation Mechanisms - QoS Monitoring
0 500 1000 1500 2000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
number of requests
Qo
S
Figure 4.4: The QoS as a function of the number of requests accepted by a provider. (Ex-
perimentally determined)
• penalty: the feedback-based penalty to be paid by the provider to the client for deviating from the
terms of the SLA. The penalty λt : QS×QS→ R+ is a function of advertised QoS (i.e. qst) and
delivered QoS (i.e. the monitored QoS, q̂st). λt(qst, q̂st) = 0 for all q̂st ≥ qst and strictly positive
otherwise.
The penalties are generally domain specific and depend on the revenues obtained and costs incurred
by the provider for offering service of different qualities. For a concrete example, consider the case below
4.4.1 Example of Incentive-compatible SLAs
A web service provides closing stock quotes. The web service advertises a SLA every morning and
specifies the price and the quality of the service. The price is any real value, while the quality is
advertised as a probability that the information (i.e., the closing quote) will be delivered before the
deadline (e.g., 5 minutes after the closing time). Interested clients request the service, and then wait
the answers from the service provider. They experience high quality if the answer is received before the
deadline (i.e. 5 minutes after the closing time) or low quality if the answer is late or not received.
The probability of successfully answering the clients’ requests depends on the infrastructure available
to the provider, but also on the number of requests it must address in a given day. The infrastructure of
the provider is assumed fixed; the number of requests, on the other hand, can be freely decided by the
service provider every day, by declining requests once a certain threshold has been achieved. Assume
that for our provider, Figure 4.4 plots the relation (experimentally determined) between the probability
of successfully satisfying a request and the number of accepted requests. Let φ : N→ [0, 1] denote this
function.
If n is the number of requests accepted in a given day, the provider will successfully satisfy, on the
average, n · φ(n) of them. More precisely, the actually delivered QoS is assumed normally distributed
around φ(n) with a fixed variance σ2.
Closing stock quotes represent mission-critical information for the clients; therefore, late or absent
information attracts supplementary planning costs and lost opportunities. The price clients are willing
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to pay for the service depends on the quality they expect from the provider, and is described by the
function u : [0, 1] → R+. u(qs) is the market price for a QoS equal to qs; moreover, to reflect the
aversion of clients to risk and failures, the price function is assumed convex.
The cost of the provider is assumed fixed, and equal to C. This value reflects the cost of maintaining
the software and hardware infrastructure, and does not depend on the number of clients the provider
serves. Therefore, in the day t when the provider serves nt clients and advertises the quality qst, the
expected revenue of the provider is:
Vt(nt, qst) = Eq̂st
[
nt ·
(
u(qst)− λ(qst, q̂st)
)− C];
where q̂st ∈ [0, 1] is the quality monitored by the reputation mechanism, and λ(qst, q̂st) is the penalty
the provider is supposed to pay to every client if the monitored quality is smaller than advertised. If
clients report truthfully, the reputation mechanism will estimate the QoS delivered by the provider as:
q̂st = φ(nt)+η where η is the noise introduced by the environment, normally distributed around 0 with
the variance σ2.
Proposition 4.4.1 The penalty function λ : QS×QS→ R+ satisfying the property:
∂λ(qs1, qs2)
∂qs1
≥ 2u′(qs1); ∀qs1, qs2 ∈ [0, 1];
makes the SLA incentive compatible.
Proof. Let (n∗, qs∗) = argmax(nt,qs) Vt(nt, qst) be the optimal number of client requests accepted by
the provider, and the optimal QoS advertised to the clients. Assuming the provider charges the market
price, the first order optimality condition on qs∗ becomes:
1
nt
∂Vt
∂qst
(n∗, qs∗) = u′(qs∗)− E
[ ∂λ
∂qst
(qs∗, φ(n∗) + η)
]
= u′(qs∗)−
∫
qs<qs∗
normpdf(qs|φ(n∗), σ) ∂λ
∂qst
(qs∗, q)dq
= 0;
where normpdf(q|φ(n∗), σ) is the normal probability distribution function with the mean φ(n∗) and the
variance σ2.
By replacing the condition on λ from the proposition, we have:∫
qs<qs∗
normpdf(qs|φ(n∗), σ) ∂λ
∂qst
(qs∗, q)dq ≤ 0.5;
or in other words, the normal cumulative probability distribution Pr[qs < qs∗|φ(n∗), σ] < 0.5. This is
only true when qs∗ ≤ φ(n∗) , so that the provider does not accept more client requests than he can
successfully satisfy with the advertised QoS, qs∗. The penalty function λ therefore encourages service
providers to truthfully advertise the quality they intend to deliver. ¥
For a price function u(qs) = qs2, the fixed cost C = 100, the standard deviations σ = 5%, and a
penalty function λ(qs, q̂s) = 2
(
u(qs)− u(q̂s)), Figure 4.5 shows the optimal revenue of the provider as
a function of n. The optimal value of the payoff function is reached for n∗ = 681, when qs∗ = 0.858 =
φ(681), and the provider indeed delivers the QoS he declared.
For the general case, clients can check the constraint on the penalty function by analyzing the
previous transactions concluded in the market. For every previously negotiated SLA (qst, pt, λt), clients
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Figure 4.5: The revenue function of the provider depending on the number of accepted
requests.
infer that the market price corresponding to qst must be higher than pt: i.e. u(qst) ≥ pt. Previous
interactions thus establish a lower bound on the real market price that can be used to safe-check the
validity of the penalty function. Note that the proof above does not make any assumptions about the
market price or the cost function of the providers. Therefore, such incentive-compatible SLAs can be
used for a variety of settings.
All service providers have the incentive to minimize the penalty function specified by the SLA.
This happens when the constraint in Proposition 4.4.1 is satisfied up to equality. As an immediate
consequence, all service providers advertise exactly the intended QoS, and will only pay minimum
penalties due to noise introduced by the environment.
4.5 Reliable QoS Monitoring
The reliability of the monitoring mechanism relies on three assumptions:
• clients submit honest feedback;
• clients are able to submit feedback only after having interacted with the provider;
• clients submit only one feedback per interaction.
The second and third assumptions can be implemented through cryptographic mechanisms based on
a public key infrastructure. As part of the interaction, providers can deliver secure certificates that can
later be used by clients to provide feedback. A concrete implementation of such a security mechanism
for reputation mechanisms is described by Jurca and Faltings (2003).
The first assumption, however, can be integrated into the broader context of truthful feedback
elicitation. The problem can be solved by side-payments (i.e. clients get paid by the reputation
mechanism for submitting feedback) which make it optimal for rational agents to report the truth.
Chapter 3 described the general theory behind building truthful reward mechanisms. In this section,
however, I will also present a simplified payment mechanism that is more suited for the current setting.
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Such payments can be constructed by comparing every report with some other report (called the
reference report) submitted by a different client about the same SLA. As the two reports refer to the
same service, there is a link between them; this link will be exploited such that whenever the reference
report is true, it also becomes in the reporter’s best interest to report the truth. Honest reporting thus
becomes a Nash equilibrium in our environment (see Section 3.3).
The simplest payment rule pays a report only if it matches (i.e., has the same value as) the reference
report. For example, a negative report about the SLA that describes only the attribute ServiceIsAlive
is paid only if the reference report is negative as well. However, the payments depend on the actual
value of report, and a negative report is paid differently from a positive report.
The reason why such payment rules encourage truthful reporting can be explained by the subtle
changes in beliefs triggered by the private experience of a client with a given service provider. Although
clients know that the service provider has all the incentives to deliver the promised QoS, they also
realize that the delivered QoS will only in expectation equal the advertised one. Environmental noise
and other unpredictable events will perturb the delivered QoS, making it higher in some rounds, and
smaller in others. This is why the current experience of a client also conveys information about the
immediately future interactions of other clients with the same provider.
It is therefore an acknowledged empirical fact (Prelec, 2004) (also in full accordance with Bayesian
theory) that an agent’s posterior belief about the observation of another client (that receives the service
in the same conditions) depends on the private experience of the agent.
For example, a client that has just had a negative experience believes that the clients in the same
round will probably experience similar problems. Thus, she expects that the reference report used to
compute her payment from the RM will correspond to a QoS that is slightly lower than advertised.
On the contrary, a satisfied client is more likely to believe that other clients will be satisfied as well;
therefore, she expects a reference report corresponding to slightly higher QoS than advertised.
The payments are designed such that a negative report maximizes the expected return only when
clients expect a negative reference report with probability higher than advertised. And vice-versa
for a positive report. Given that the reference report is true, the client maximizes her returns by
reporting honestly, which makes truth-telling a Nash equilibrium. This means that no agent can gain
an advantage by deviating from the protocol. Miller et al. (2005) and Jurca and Faltings (2006) present
a game theoretic analysis of such reporting scenarios and show that it is always possible to choose
payments that make truth-telling optimal.
Concretely, the RM computes the payment made to every client in the following way. At the end
of every period, all quality reports about the same SLA are grouped in a single set. Remember that
each report corresponds to a quality observation, and therefore consists of an array of values, each
corresponding to a quality attribute advertised by the provider.
For each report, r = (vrj ), the RM randomly chooses a reference report, ref = (v
ref
j ), coming from
a different client. Every pair of matching non-null values for the attribute aj (i.e., vrj = v
ref
j 6= null)
contributes with τj(vrj ) to the payment for the report r.
If ri =
(
ri(1), . . . ri(Ni)
)
are all the reports submitted by client i, and ref i denotes the set of
corresponding reference reports chosen by the reputation mechanism to compute the payment due to
client i, the total payment received by i is:
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Pay(i) =
Ni∑
h=1
Pay
(
ri(h), ref i(h)
)
; Pay(r , rr) =
∑
j
τj (v
r
j , v
ref
j );
where: τj(v
r
j , v
ref
j ) =
{
0 if vrj 6= vrefj or vrj = null
τj(v
r
j ) if v
r
j = v
ref
j
The payment mechanism is fully specified by announcing the amounts τj(vj), paid for a report matching
the reference report on the value vj of the quality attribute aj .
We compute the payment mechanism through automated mechanism design (Conitzer and Sand-
holm, 2002). Instead of a closed form specification, we define the mechanism through a set of constraints
that act on the decision variables (i.e., the payments τ(·) in our case). By adding an objective function,
we get an optimization problem that solves for the best possible payment mechanism in a given context.
The optimal payment mechanism minimizes the total cost of the RM, while guaranteeing that
honesty is better than lying by at least the desired margin. The cost of the RM will depend on the
SLA, so the payment mechanism must be instantiated for every SLA.
The expected cost for an honest report equals the weighted sum of all amounts τj(vh). The proba-
bility that payment τj(vh) is made equals the probability that both the report and the reference report
have the value vh for the quality attribute aj . Since each probability equals µj(vh) (described by the
SLA) and the two events are assumed independent, we have:
E[Cost] =
∑
aj∈A¯
∑
vh∈Dj
τj(vh)µj(vh)
2; (4.1)
To compute the expected revenue obtained by a client when lying or telling the truth, we must
first describe the belief of a client regarding the reference report chosen by the reputation mechanism.
Given the real quality observation o = (vj), we assume that the belief regarding the reference report
changes slightly in the direction of o. If µj(vh) is the advertised probability that the attribute aj takes
the value vh ∈ Dj , the belief of the client assigns:
• at least the probability µj(vh) +
(
1− µj(vh)
)
γmax to the event that the reference report also has
the value vh for the attribute aj , and,
• at most the probability µj(vk)(1 − γmin) to the event that the reference report has some other
value vk 6= vh for the attribute aj .
If vh = null (no observation was possible for the attribute aj), we assume that the beliefs regarding the
reference report remain unchanged. Both γmax and γmin take values between 0 and 1, and depend on
the specific applications.
Honest reporting can be guaranteed when:
• for any quality attribute aj , truthfully reporting maximizes the expected payment by at least Λ:[
µj(vh) +
(
1− µj(vh)
)
γmax
]
τj(vh) > [µj(vk)(1− γmin)] τj(vk) + Λ; (4.2)
for all quality attributes aj ∈ A¯ and all values vh 6= vk ∈ Dj ,
• dependencies between quality attributes do not break the honest reporting incentives (i.e., since
matching null values do not contribute to the payment, the payments for the values that cause
the null reports must be large enough):
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[µj(vh) + (1− µj(vh))γmax] τj(vh) > [µj(vk)(1− γmin)] τj(vk) + µl(vm)τl(vm) + Λ; (4.3)
for all aj , al ∈ A¯, vh 6= vk ∈ Dj , vm ∈ Dl such that the value vh of the attribute aj makes
impossible the observation of the attribute al: i.e., (aj , vh, al) ∈ R.
The margin Λ must offset the worst case incentive for lying. This value is very conservative and
can be relaxed in real applications by considering that not all lies can simultaneously attract the worst
case incentives.
The objective function in (4.1) together with the constraints defined by (4.2) and (4.3) define a linear
optimization problem that accepts as a solution the cheapest incentive-compatible payment mechanism
for a given SLA. The number of variables is equal to the overall number of values in all domains Dj ,
i.e.,
∑
aj∈A¯ card(Dj). The number of constraints is on the order of
∑
aj∈A¯ card(Dj)
2.
Compared to the general payments described in Chapter 3 (Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6) the payments
presented above implement several simplifications. First, they reward a reporter only for matching
values between the report and the reference report. This decision was taken to reduce the complexity
of the payment scheme. The number of possible “quality signals” observed by the clients may be huge.
For example, if clients observe 5 quality attributes, each having 3 values, the set of possible observations
contains 35 elements (every possible combination of values for the 5 attributes). In this case, general
payments that consider all possible combinations of even 2 reports must be described by 35
2
values.
The simplification to pay only matching reports eliminates a quadratic factor in the design process.
Second, the payments are based on comparing a report with a single reference report. In Sections
3.4 and 3.6 we have seen that the use of several reference reports both decreases the budget required
by the RM, and helps to prevent lying coalitions. Nevertheless, the increased complexity of the design
process forces us to limit the payments to using only one reference report.
Extending this framework to include other types of dependencies or correlations between quality
attributes does not pose theoretical challenges. Optimal payments that ensure truthful reporting can
still be computed by extending the optimization problem with constraints like (4.3) that limit the gains
of lying on pairs of values for correlated quality attributes. Intuitively, the additional constraints isolate
independent groups of attributes, and guarantee truth-telling incentives. However, the notation that
allows the definition of such payments is complicated, and outside the scope of this thesis.
The payments naturally decrease with the margins, Λ, required for truth-telling. Therefore, the
expected cost of the RM can be decreased either by decreasing the benefits clients may obtain by
manipulating their reports, or, by increasing the cost of tampering the reporting code. While the latter
direction is outside the scope of this thesis, the following two ideas can be used to address the former.
First, we can make sure that the penalties paid back by the provider do not give incentives to
underrate the quality of the service. For that, we impose that the penalty paid to client i depends only
on the QoS delivered to all other clients, except i. Given a large enough number of agents, the penalties
paid by the provider are expected to be the same, but the feedback reported by i has no influence on
the penalties paid to i.
A second interesting direction is to filter out the reports that are very far from the common distri-
bution (see Section 3.4). Intuitively, these reports are either erroneous, or intentionally try to introduce
significant perturbations towards desired values.
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4.5.1 Example
Let us modify the example from Section 4.4 in the following way. The QoS described in the SLA now
addresses two attributes: availability, (i.e., the probability that a request is answered before a deadline
td) and correctness the probability of returning the correct). From a practical point of view it makes
perfect sense to have both criteria used together, since otherwise a service can achieve almost perfect
availability by always returning the same information.
Assume the SLA advertises the value p1 ∈ [0, 1] for availability and the value p2 for correctness.
Formally, this SLA is expressed as the probability distribution µ1 = {p1, 1−p1} for the quality attribute:
a1 = ResponseBeforeDeadline ∈ D1 = {0(false), 1(true)};
and the probability distribution µ2 = {p2, 1− p2} for the quality attribute:
a2 = InformationIsCorrect ∈ D2 = {0(false), 1(true)};
Naturally, the relation R defining the dependency between quality attributes contains only the tuple
(a1, 0, a2): if no response is received, checking for correct information is meaningless.
A quality observation (and therefore a quality report) is a vector o = (v1, v2) where v1 ∈ {0, 1}
and v2 ∈ {0, 1, null}. The payment scheme used by the RM is defined by the four positive amounts
τ1(1), τ1(0), τ2(1) and τ2(0), paid when the non-null value of the attribute a1 or a2 matches the corre-
sponding value of the reference report. The maximum benefit a client can obtain by misreporting one
observation is Λ = 0.01 (all values hereafter are normalized to the price of service, assumed 1), and the
cost of tampering with the default monitoring code is C = 10. A client is assumed to generate at most
N = 1000 service requests within the same period of time, so the worst case truth-telling margin that
must be enforced by the RM is Λ¯ = Λ− C/N/2 = 0.5%.
The belief of one client regarding the value of the reference report changes by at least γmax = γmin =
20% in the direction of the actual observation. The probability that the reference report contains 1 for
a1 is: Pr1[1|1] = p1+(1−p1)γmax if the client also received a response, or Pr1[1|0] = p1− (1−p1)γmin
if the client did not receive a response. Similar equations can be written for the probabilities Pr2[1|1]
and Pr2[1|0] defining the beliefs regarding the value of the attribute a2 in the reference report. From
(4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), Figure 4.6 presents the linear optimization problem that defines the minimum
payments guaranteeing the truth-telling equilibrium. When p1 = p2 = 90%, we obtain the payments:
τ1(1) = 0.064, τ1(0) = 0.680, τ2(1) = 0.025, τ2(0) = 0.225, and an expected cost of 0.081. These rather
high payments can be further decreased by an order of magnitude using a filtering mechanism as in
Section 3.4: (i.e., the RM probabilistically selects the reports that will contribute towards estimating
delivered quality). The expected payments can thus be brought down to below 1% of the price of
service, which is a practical value.
4.6 Deterring Malicious Coalitions
The payments defined in the previous section do not have truthful reporting as the unique equilibrium.
Always reporting the same values is also an equilibrium strategy, since reports will surely match the
corresponding reference reports. Moreover, it is easy to see that such constant reporting strategies yield
higher payments than the truthful reporting. Fortunately, such coalitions on lying strategies can be
rendered unprofitable when a fraction of reports are guaranteed to be honest.
We believe it is reasonable to rely on some fraction of truthful reports for several reasons. First,
empirical studies show that a non-negligible fraction of users are altruists who always report the truth.
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min E[Cost] = p21τ1(1) + (1− p1)2τ1(0) + p22τ2(1) + (1− p2)2τ2(0);
s.t. Pr1[1|1]τ1(1) > Pr1[0|1]τ1(0) + Λ¯;
Pr1[0|0]τ1(0) > Pr1[1|0]τ1(1) + Λ¯;
Pr2[1|1]τ2(1) > Pr2[0|1]τ2(0) + Λ¯;
Pr2[0|0]τ2(0) > Pr2[1|0]τ2(1) + Λ¯;
Pr1[0|0]τ1(0) > Pr1[1|0]τ1(1) + p2τ2(1) + Λ¯;
Pr1[0|0]τ1(0) > Pr1[1|0]τ1(1) + (1− p2)τ2(0) + Λ¯;
τ1(1), τ1(0), τ2(1), τ2(0) ≥ 0;
Figure 4.6: Linear optimization problem defining the payment mechanism.
Second, given that the framework already provides the default (honest reporting) code, some clients
won’t have the knowledge to temper with the reporting code even if they want to.
The idea behind fighting lying coalition is to make them unstable. We start from the assumption
that at most ηcol ∈ (0, 1) percent of the clients can collude on a lying strategy. Then we compute a
payment scheme that makes it individually better for a colluder to shift to the honest reporting strategy,
knowing that 1−ηcol percent of the reports are honest. Since the other coalition members cannot detect
(and punish) deviators, all rational colluders will break the coalition and report honestly. The coalition
is unstable in the sense that it is not profitable for coalition members to keep their commitment to the
coalition.
Let us analyze the additional constraints on the optimization problem defining the payments. An
honest reporter now expects that the reference report will be part of a coalition with probability at
most ηcol. To make sure that the client still has the incentive to truthfully report the observed value
vh instead of the collusion value vk, the constraint in (4.2) becomes:
(1− ηcol) [µj(vh) + (1− µj(vh))γmax] τj(vh) >
(1− ηcol) [µj(vk)(1− γmin)] τj(vk) + ηcolτj(vk) + Λ;
(4.4)
for all quality attributes aj ∈ A¯ and all values vh 6= vk ∈ Dj . Similarly, the constraint (4.3) becomes:
(1− ηcol)
[
µj(vh) + (1− µj(vh))γmax
]
τj(vh) >
(1− ηcol)
[[
µj(vk)(1− γmin)
]
τj(vk) + µl(vm)τl(vm)
]
+ ηcol
(
µj(vk) + µl(vm)
)
+ Λ;
(4.5)
for all quality attributes aj , al ∈ A¯, values vh 6= vk ∈ Dj , vm ∈ Dl, and tuples (aj , vh, al) ∈ R.
The linear problem that minimizes (4.1) under the set of constraints (4.4) and (4.5) defines the
incentive-compatible payments that are also ηcol-collusion proof.
For the example in Section 4.6, we can obtain a payment mechanism that is also robust against
coalitions that cover at most a fraction ηcol of the reports. The dependence of the expected cost on ηcol
is plotted in Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Expected cost of a payment mechanism that is robust against collusion.
4.6.1 Using Trusted Monitoring Infrastructure
Another way of ensuring the reliability of feedback information is to use trusted reports as reference
reports when computing the payments due to the clients. The RM can use the trusted monitoring
infrastructure that already exists in markets of services and can probatively get honest reports about a
certain provider.
Without giving all the technical details, a trusted monitoring system works in two ways:
• it acts as a proxy between the client and the provider, and intercepts all messages before relaying
them to the intended destination. From the conversation, the monitor can deduce the QoS the
provider delivered to the client;
• the monitor itself becomes a normal client of the provider and requests the service with the sole
purpose of rating it. The monitor, however, must maintain its anonymity so that service providers
cannot preferentially treat the monitor.
Both methods generate truthful, trusted feedback that can be used by the RM to encourage normal
clients to report honestly. Nevertheless, trusted reports come at a cost, so it is important to use as few
as possible.
From a game theoretic point of view, one trusted report for every round is enough to enforce
honest reporting. If all other reports are compared (and paid) against the trusted one, the incentive-
compatibility constraints ensure that honest reporting is the unique optimal strategy of rational clients.
However, this procedure creates strong misbehavior incentives for the reputation mechanism itself. By
faking the value of the trusted report, or by strategically choosing one of several available reports, the
RM can significantly reduce the payments to the buyers. The misbehavior of the mechanism cannot be
detected unless some party is able to verify all trusted reports received by the mechanism.
Dealing with selfish reputation mechanisms is a complex problem in itself, beyond the scope of
this chapter. However, we believe that any trustworthy implementation of a RM must ensure three
properties:
• integrity of submitted reports;
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• traceable rules for assigning reference reports;
• upper limits on the number of times a reference report can be used.
The first can be addressed by digital signatures, and prevents the mechanism (or anybody else)
to modify the content of submitted information. Agents use their private keys to digitally encrypt
submitted feedback messages (Jurca and Faltings, 2003); all agents can thus read the feedback, but no
one can modify the content without being detected.
The second property prevents the RM to manipulate the choice of reference reports, without being
eventually disclosed. Technical solutions can be envisaged based on secure multi-party computation
protocols (Goldreich, 1998).
Finally, the third property ensures that the RM does not have the incentive to keep acquiring
trusted reports until it gets one that minimizes the total payments returned to the clients. Assume, for
example, that the cost of a trusted report is CT , that the RM already has one trusted report, and that
a trusted report can be used as a reference report at most NR times. The RM can choose to use the
available report and “score” NR other reports, or can choose to spend CT and acquire another trusted
report which will hopefully lead to smaller payments to the NR clients that will be scored against the
new trusted report. By choosing to buy another trusted report, the RM can hope to obtain a decrease
in payments of at most NR · τ¯ , where τ¯ is the maximum payment that can be made to a reporter. By
setting:
NR ≤ bCT
τ¯
c;
the most optimistic payment saving obtained from purchasing a fresh trusted report is always smaller
than the cost of the report, and the RM does not have the incentive to cheat.
The question now becomes how many trusted reports should the reputation mechanism purchase
in every round to ensure that rational clients report honestly. Clearly, if there are N feedback reports
in one round, N/NR trusted reports will allow the RM to score every feedback against a trusted report.
However, the number of trusted reports can be decreased even further by observing that ηcol-collusion
proof incentive compatible payments need a trusted report as a reference report only with probability
ηcol (see the constraints (4.4) and (4.5)).
If all N feedback reports obtained in a round are coming from self-interested clients, the problem of
the mechanism designed becomes how to choose ηcol and the corresponding ηcol-collusion proof payment
mechanism such that its total cost is minimized. The total expected cost to the RM is given by:
• N times the expected payment to one client (under the ηcol-collusion proof payment mechanism);
• dN ·ηcolNR e times CT , the cost for acquiring the trusted reports;
The design problem is therefore defined by the following optimization problem:
min E[Cost] + CT dN · ηcol
NR
e;
s.t. E[Cost] is defined by Eq. (4.1);
payments τ satisfy the constraints (4.4) and (4.5);
NR = bCT
τ¯
c where τ¯ is the maximum payment to one reporter;
the payments τ are positive, ηcol ∈ [0, 1);
(4.6)
112 Novel Applications of Signaling Reputation Mechanisms - QoS Monitoring
Another interesting observation is that a ηcol-collusion proof payment mechanism requires at least
a ηcol colluding fraction to change the equilibrium in the market from honest reporting to some other
lying strategy. This opens new opportunities for the efficient operation of reputation mechanisms. A
group of clients synchronized on the honest reporting strategy tend to keep reporting the truth as long
as no significant group of colluders wishes to shift the equilibrium. This property can be exploited by
mechanism operators to reduce the running cost of the mechanism. Trusted reports should be used
whenever new services enter the market. After several rounds, the mechanism can stop purchasing
trusted reports, knowing that the clients continue to report honestly. Active enforcement should be
resumed only when the mechanism has strong reasons to believe that a significant coalition tries to shift
the equilibrium.
The asynchronous involvement of the reputation mechanism is also advantageous from a practical
perspective. When entering the market, service providers typically have less clients; the mechanism
therefore needs few trusted reports to install the honest equilibrium. As the customer base of the
provider increases, new commeres will adopt the norms already existing in the market, and report the
truth.
4.7 Summary of Results
A service market based on SLAs between service providers and clients can only function effectively if
advertised SLAs are credible. However, service providers may deviate from their advertised QoS in order
to reduce the costs of service provisioning. Hence, QoS monitoring is essential, but neither service-side
nor client-side monitoring can be trusted.
In this chapter we presented a novel approach to achieve objective QoS monitoring by aggregating
quality ratings from clients within a RM, which provides incentives for the clients to report honestly.
The RM pays clients for submitting quality ratings, and the payments are designed such that lying
generates expected losses that offset the potential benefits from misreporting.
The mechanism we present can also resist collusion. As long as a small enough fraction of agents
collude, no lying strategy can give colluders a better payoff than honest reporting. Moreover, the
reputation mechanism can also buy trusted reports from a traditional, centralized monitoring system.
Few such trusted reports can help the RM synchronize all clients in the market on reporting the truth.
Once honest reporting is the equilibrium in the market, it takes a significant fraction of colluders to
shift the reporting equilibrium; therefore, the RM can stop purchasing honest reports, and resort to a
passive monitoring of the system.
The QoS monitoring system described in this chapter is cheaper, more accurate, and more secure
than existing solutions. First, the cumulated payments the RM has to pay to the clients for their
feedback can be made low enough such that the total cost of the monitoring framework can be made
several times cheaper when compared to traditional monitoring. Second, the RM will get information
about most transactions, without placing important communication burdens on the network (clients
can wrap several feedback reports in the same message, and do not have real-time constraints on the
communication process, so that feedback messages can be transmitted whenever there is free capacity
in the network). Central monitors, on the other hand, usually do not afford to monitor every interaction
because of the high cost associated to proxying every transaction. Last but not least, the system is
safe, since economical measures make dishonest reporting irrational.
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Appendix 4.A Summary of Notation
A = {a1, ..aNa} quality attributes defined by an ontology;
Na total number of quality attributes;
Dj domain of values of attribute aj ;
vh ∈ Dj values belonging to the domain of attribute aj ;
R R = {(aj , vh, ak)|aj , ak ∈ A, vh ∈ Dj} is a relation describing infeasible
combinations of (attribute, value) pairs. (aj , vh, ak) ∈ R iff the quality
attribute ak cannot be observed when the quality attribute aj takes the
value vh ∈ Dj , ;
µj ∈ ∆(Dj) a description of the attribute aj ;
A¯ a subset of A;
qs = (µ1, ..., µN¯a) quality of service;
QS the set of possible QoSs;
o = (vj), vj ∈ Dj ∪ {null} a quality observation, expressed as a vector of values, one for each at-
tribute aj ∈ A¯;
Q = {q0, q1, . . . qM−1} the set of all quality observations;
Λ upper bound on the utility an agent can obtain by lying;
C the cost of modifying the default monitoring software;
λ(qs1, qs2) the penalty paid by the provider he advertises QoS qs1 but delivers
qs2 < qs1;
ri = (ri(1), ..., ri(Ni)) all Ni reports submitted by agent i;
ref i = (ref i(1 ), ..., ref i(Ni)) the corresponding reference reports;
τj(vh) the contribution to the payment when the reference report has the match-
ing value vh ∈ Dj for the quality attribute aj ;
E[Cost] the expected payment to an honest reporter;
γmax, γmin thresholds for modified beliefs;
ηcol = NcolN the fraction of colluders;
CT the cost of obtaining a trusted report;
N the total number of reports received by the RM in one round;
NR ≤ bCTτ¯ c the maximum number of times a trusted report can be used as a reference
report;
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Chapter 5
Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms
As opposed to signaling reputation mechanisms that bridge the asymmetry of information that usually
exists in online trading situations, the role of sanctioning reputation mechanisms is to encourage coop-
erative behavior by inflicting indirect punishments on the users who cheat. We have seen that signaling
reputation mechanisms are mainly useful in markets where the same product or service is experienced
by a set of clients. The essential idea is the buyers do not know the real quality of the product, however,
they do expect to be treated equally: i.e., they buy exactly the same product, or they receive a service
provisioned with the same resources and effort.
This is the case, for example, in a market of web-services. Different providers possess different
hardware resources and employ different algorithms; this makes certain web-services better than others.
Nevertheless, all requests issued to the same web-service are treated by the same program. Some clients
might experience worse service than others, but these differences are random, and not determined by
the provider. This assumption of uniform quality (up to some random noise) allows future buyers to
learn from the feedback of past users, and estimate with better precision the unknown quality of the
service.
There are, however, online markets where different clients are not treated equally by the same seller.
Think of a barber, who must skillfully shave every client that walks in his shop. The problem here is
that providers must exert care (and costly effort) for satisfying every service request. Good quality can
result only when enough effort was exerted, but the provider is better off by exerting less effort: e.g.,
clients will anyway pay for the shave, so the barber can profit by doing a sloppy job as fast as possible
in order to have time for more customers.
The same situation arises in markets such as eBay or eLance.com1, where the seller (respectively
the service provider) can individually decide for each buyer how much effort to invest in satisfying the
request. The seller can decide to deliver the product (respectively the service) as advertised, can decide
to deliver a product of significantly lower quality, but can also decide not to deliver the product at
all. This is a common problem in electronic markets, as buyers pay first and thus expose themselves
to cheating behavior. Dellarocas and Wood (2006) estimate that only 80% of the buyers on eBay are
satisfied with the outcome of the transaction. Moreover, 46% of all consumer fraud-reports received by
the Federal Trade Commission in 2005 were related to the Internet, with Internet Auctions (12%) as a
top category2.
One cause behind the high fraud rates is that sellers are not motivated to fulfill their promises.
1eLance.com is a marketplace for professional services.
2The report is available at http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/Top10Fraud2005.pdf
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Providing high quality requires expensive effort, while breaking the contractual agreements usually
remains unpunished: contract enforcing institutions are weak in online environments, and the expected
revenue from trading again with the same buyer is too small to cover the present cost of effort. Sellers
thus face a moral hazard situation where cheating (i.e., providing low quality) is the optimal strategy.
Anticipating this behavior, rational buyer naturally chose not to transact at all.
Sanctioning reputation mechanisms can effectively restore trust in such markets by revealing infor-
mation about the sellers’ past behavior. The cheating of a seller is announced to the whole community
of buyers, and reduces the future opportunities of that seller to engage in profitable trade. The mo-
mentary gain obtained from cheating is smaller than the future losses due to a bad reputation, which
motivates the seller to deliver the promised quality. The market can thus function efficiently.
While similar principles have regulated impersonal trade activities ever since the Medieval period
(Greif, 1989), we now have a unique opportunity to engineer reputation mechanisms by controlling
(i) the kind of feedback requested from the participants, (ii) the definition of reputation, and (iii) the
flow of information in the system (Dellarocas, 2005). On eBay, for example, feedback can be positive,
negative or neutral, followed by a short textual comment. Reputation information is displayed as a
summary of reports (received in the last month, received in the last 6 months, received in the last year,
or ever received) followed by a list of textual comments. However, one can also imagine reputation
mechanisms where feedback is only binary, or drawn from a finite set. Likewise, reputation information
could be computed based on other statistics applied to the set of reports.
It therefore becomes important to understand the impact of these design decisions on the overall
performance of the reputation mechanism. This chapter addresses a simplified setting with pure moral
hazard, meaning that all sellers (or service providers) are assumed equally capable of providing high
quality, given that they invest the necessary (costly) effort. This assumption does not exactly match
the real markets, where, some sellers are natively more capable than others. For example, a more skilled
seller A could deliver some quality that seller B cannot, or even more commonly, seller A can deliver
some quality much cheaper than seller B. Unfortunately, the theoretical analysis of such environments
that combine moral hazard and asymmetric information (i.e., to the buyer it is not known that seller
A is more skilled than seller B) is very complex, and still open to further research. However, there are
settings where the moral hazard problem is predominant; for example on eBay, all seller can be assumed
equally capable of mailing the product to the winning bidder.
Dellarocas (2005) provides an extensive analysis of binary reputation mechanisms where sellers may
choose between two effort levels (e.g., an eBay seller that chooses to deliver or not the item) and buyers
privately perceive an imperfect binary signal about the action of the seller (e.g., the eBay buyer that
receives or not the item). He describes several reputation mechanisms that maximize the overall welfare
of the society and attain the theoretical efficiency bound. He also concludes that efficient reputation
mechanisms may depend only on the last submitted feedback report, and that the granularity of feedback
is important only up to the point it allows a more precise monitoring of the seller’s action3.
This chapter generalizes the results of Dellarocas to settings where sellers may choose between an
arbitrary number of effort levels, and feedback from buyers can have an arbitrary number of values.
From a practical perspective this generalization is important as it allows a more precise modeling of real
interactions. On eBay, for example, a binary model restricts the seller to a binary choice: ship or not the
item. In reality, however, the seller may also decide regarding the accuracy of the item description, the
promptness of the delivery, or the care exerted when packaging the item. Studies conducted by Pavlou
and Dimoka (2006) show that eBay textual comments often refer to these other strategic decisions of the
seller, and have an impact on the future trade of the seller. The design of better reputation mechanisms
3A larger feedback value set can be compacted into classes of positive signals and negative signals, where positive
signals are more likely to be observed following high effort, and negative signals are more likely to be observed following
low effort
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must therefore make use of both extended strategy spaces, and finer-grained feedback values.
The analysis will be based on a simplified model of a market where the same seller transacts with
a sequence of short run buyers. Prior to the interaction, buyers are assumed to query the reputation
mechanism, and check the reputation of the seller. Depending on the current reputation, every buyer
decides how much to pay for the good (by paying nothing the buyer refuses to trade), and the seller
than decides how much effort to put into delivering the good. Following the transaction, the reputation
mechanism records the feedback from the client, and updates the reputation of the seller accordingly.
Ideally, a practical reputation mechanism should have the following properties:
• reputation information is easy to understand, and has some intuitive representation;
• buyers are able to easily infer what is the best behavior they should adopt for a given reputation
value of the seller. The reputation mechanism may eventually recommend the best course of
action given the current reputation;
• clear rules specify how reputation changes when new feedback is submitted to the reputation
mechanism;
• the mechanism encourages efficient trade.
Given the definition of reputation, the reputation updating rules and the behavior recommendations
to the buyer, a rational seller will adopt a strategy that maximizes his life-time revenue. On the other
hand, given the optimal strategy of the seller, rational buyers will respond optimally, and may disregard
the recommendations of the reputation mechanism. From a game theoretic perspective, the market
interactions can be modeled by a repeated game between a long-run player (the seller) and a sequence
of short-run buyers that have access to a public history of play, as kept by the reputation mechanism.
Therefore, the information displayed by the reputation mechanism, and the recommendations to the
players must reflect an equilibrium strategy profile where rational buyers have the incentive to follow the
recommendations, and rational sellers find it optimal to behave as the reputation mechanism predicted.
Previous results show that equilibria of repeated games can be represented by (finite) state automata
(Osborne and Rubinstein, 1997; Mailath and Samuelson, 2006). We build on these results and construct
reputation mechanisms that mirror the automaton of the underlying equilibrium. Thus, every state of
the automaton is a possible value the reputation of the seller may take (see Figure 5.1). The outgoing
transitions from a state are labeled with the possible feedback values a buyer can submit, and reflect
the reputation updating rules defined by the mechanism. A behavior recommendation is associated to
every state, and corresponds to the next round equilibrium strategy for the current reputation value.
When the underlying automaton corresponds to an efficient equilibrium, the reputation mechanism has
all of the ideal properties mentioned above.
Concretely, this chapter presents the following results. First, the two-state (i.e., good and bad)
reputation mechanism of Dellarocas (2005) can be generalized to any number of effort levels and feedback
values. Efficient mechanisms can be constructed using a randomization device that switches good
reputation into bad with a probability that depends on the feedback submitted by the buyers. Bad
reputation, however, may never become good again. In equilibrium, sellers with good reputation exert
the required effort, while sellers with bad reputation do not exert any effort at all. For this reason,
buyers interact only with good sellers.
Second, efficient reputation mechanisms can consider only the most recent N feedback reports, for
any value of N . Every possible sequence of N reports becomes a distinct reputation value the seller may
have; the price paid by the buyers depends on the current reputation of the seller, and corresponds to the
expected utility obtained from the transaction with the seller. One characteristic of such mechanisms
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Figure 5.1: The reputation mechanism defines four reputation values (R1,R2,R3 and R4)
and two feedback values (0 or 1). The current reputation of the seller is R1; the reputation in
the next round will be R2.
is that reputation information can be compressed to a statistic (i.e., a histogram) of the N reports.
Nevertheless, the reputation mechanism must internally keep the entire sequence in order to correctly
update the reputation.
Third, we show that there are reputation mechanisms where the equilibrium strategies are always
pure strategies. The previous results rely on public randomization devices or mixed strategies. When
practical reasons prevent the use of either, it is helpful to be able to design reputation mechanisms with
pure equilibrium strategies.
Forth, we generalize the result of Dellarocas regarding the granularity of requested feedback. Given
L effort levels, we show that a feedback set containing more that L+1 values helps improve the efficiency
of the reputation mechanism only to the extent it allows a better clustering of the L+1 most significant
feedback signals.
Last but not the least, we address the problem of honest reporting. As discussed in the previous
chapters, empirical evidence suggests that benefits can be plundered by lying, and that some users
do misreport feedback (White, 1999; Harmon, 2004). We describe an alternative to the side-payment
schemes from Chapter 3 that explicitly reward truthful reports, by showing that honesty can emerge
as a rational behavior when clients have a repeated presence in the market. To this end we describe
a mechanism that supports an equilibrium where truthful feedback is obtained. Then we characterize
the set of pareto-optimal equilibria of the mechanism, and derive an upper bound on the percentage of
false reports that can be recorded by the mechanism. An important role in the existence of this bound
is played by the fact that rational clients can establish a reputation for reporting honestly.
5.1 Related Work
The results of this chapter build on the extensive literature on repeated games with one long-run player
and a sequence of short-run opponents. Fudenberg and Levine (1994) characterize the set of perfect
public equilibria (PPE) of such games, and conclude that imperfect monitoring (i.e., buyers indirectly
perceive the effort exerted by the seller through the quality of the product) impacts the efficiency of the
market. Sellers are kept away from the first best payoff by an amount that is directly proportional to
the chance of receiving unfair ratings. Moreover, Fudenberg and Levine show that for games describing
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settings similar to ours, the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs is the same as the set of PPE payoffs.
The concept of perfect public equilibrium (Fudenberg et al., 1994) conveniently allows the analysis
of infinitely repeated games using dynamic programming techniques (Abreu et al., 1990; Fudenberg
et al., 1994). The game that starts in the second period is strategically equivalent to the original
game, and therefore, strategies can be recursively expressed through the action of the first round, and
a continuation strategy for the game starting in the second round. Equilibrium conditions require that
any deviation from the strategy of the first round attracts lower continuation payoffs that make the
deviation unprofitable (a direct application of the one-shot deviation principle).
Osborne and Rubinstein (1997) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006) express PPE equilibrium strate-
gies by (finite) state automata. As agents play the game, the automaton moves from one state to the
other depending on the history of previous rounds. Every state prescribes a strategy for the following
round, and a transition table as a function of received feedback. We will be using this representation
to describe efficient strategies for several reasons. First, every state of the automaton can be intuitively
associated to a reputation value. Second, the transition function of the automaton nicely captures the
rules for updating reputation information. Third, the one-round strategies associated to every state
give an intuitive mapping between reputation values and equilibrium behavior.
Cooperative equilibria exist only when trading margins are high enough, and sellers discount future
revenues sufficiently low (Dellarocas, 2005; Shapiro, 1983). The potential loss suffered by a seller who
is not allowed to trade is thus high enough to offset the momentary gain from cheating. This restriction
applies to our results as well.
5.2 The Setting
In our setting, a monopolist long-run seller (or provider) repeatedly sells the same good or service to
a sequence of one-time buyers (or clients). Following the conventions, we will refer to a seller by ’he’
and to a buyer by ’she’. In every round t, the tth buyer first pays for the good, and than expects the
seller to deliver the promised quality. Following payment, the seller must decide what effort to exert
for producing the good. The set E = {e0, e1, . . . , eL−1} of effort levels is known and does not change in
time.
Exerting effort is expensive for the seller. Let c : E → R be the cost function of the seller, where
c(ei) is the cost of exerting effort ei ∈ E. The cost function is assumed known. For simplicity, we order
effort levels according to their cost. For any i < j, ei is less effort than ej , and therefore, c(ei) < c(ej).
The continuous function obtained by the piecewise linearization of c is assumed convex, and without
loss of generality, we take c(e0) = 0; e0 corresponds to exerting no effort.
The buyers privately perceive the quality of the delivered good as a signal taking values from the
finite set Q = {q0, q1, . . . , qM−1}. The perception of the buyers is influenced by the effort exerted by
the seller, but also by uncontrollable environmental factors. We model the perception of buyers by an
independent random signal, with an identical distribution that depends on the effort level exerted by the
seller. In every round t, the signal q(t) observed by the tth buyer follows the distribution Pr[·|e(t)], where
Pr
[
qj |e(t)
]
is the probability of observing the signal qj ∈ Q, given that the seller exerts effort e(t) ∈ E.
To avoid the confusion with the power operator, round indexes will always be placed as superscripts
between round brackets. The distributions Pr[·|·] are assumed known, and have full support: i.e.,
Pr[qj |ei] 6= 0 for all ei ∈ E and all qj ∈ Q.
The buyer from the tth round is assumed to be the winner of a second price auction where every
bidder bids her expected utility of the good. Let vi : Q→ R be the valuation function of bidder i, such
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that vi(qk) is the value to bidder i of a good with perceived quality qk ∈ Q. In round t, bidder i bids
an amount equal to her expected utility of the good:
bid
(t)
i =
∑
qk∈Q
Pr
[
qk|e(t)
]
vi(qk);
and therefore, the price paid by the tth buyer is:
p(t) =
∑
qk∈Q
Pr
[
qk|e(t)
]
v˜(qk);
where v˜(·) is the valuation function of the second highest bidder. We assume that sufficiently many
bidders bid in every round, and that their private valuation functions are drawn from a common
distribution; v˜(qk) can therefore be expected to take the same value in every round, and can be intuitively
regarded as the market value of quality qk.
Since the price in round t equals the expected utility of the second highest bidder, it can also be
expressed as a function of exerted effort: p(ei) =
∑
qk∈Q Pr[qk|ei]v˜(qk) is the expected price the seller
would get for a good provisioned with effort ei. We assume that p(e0) = 0, as the market value of a
good provided with no effort is 0.
The seller discounts future revenues with the factor δ < 1, and is interested in maximizing the
present-time value of the payoffs obtained over his entire life-time. If (p(t))t=0,...,∞ and (e(t))t=0,...,∞
are the sequences of prices, respectively effort levels, the lifetime revenue of the seller is:
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
p(t) − c(e(t))
)
;
which normalized to the one-round payoffs becomes:
U = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
p(t) − c(e(t))
)
; (5.1)
A central reputation mechanism asks buyers to submit feedback about the quality delivered by the
seller. In a first instance, we assume buyers report honestly the quality signal they observe. We do not
exclude the possibility of reporting mistakes, however, these mistakes are assumed unintentional, and
already factored in the distributions Pr[·|·]. Then, in Section 5.4 we will extend the analysis to address
honest feedback reporting incentives.
The reputation mechanism is trusted by all participants; however, it cannot monitor the effort
exerted by the seller, or the true quality signal observed by the buyer. After every round, the reputation
mechanisms publishes the set of feedback signals reported so far, or any other statistics based on that
set. A summary of the formal notation is given in the Appendix 5.A.
5.2.1 Example
As an example, consider an online CD retailer who auctions music CD’s (of similar value) to interested
buyers. All CDs are described as new, however, the seller has the choice to ship a cheaper, second-hand
CD instead of a new one. The cost to the seller of a new CD is $8, while a second hand CD costs only
$5. We assume that a second-hand CD is always available, and that shipping costs are $1. Therefore,
the three actions the seller can take at the end of ever auction are: (i) not to ship the CD, denoted as
q0 and costing c(q0) = 0, (ii) ship a second hand CD, denoted as q1 and costing c(q1) = 5 + 1 = 6, and
(iii) ship a new CD, denoted as q2, and costing c(q2) = 8 + 1 = 9.
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Every buyer cares about getting a CD that plays well in her CD player; the market value of such a
CD is $13. CDs, however, may have scratches or other defects that may cause jitters with some devices.
As these problems are clearly annoying for somebody listening to their favorite song, a CD with jitters
is worth only $2 to the owner. Naturally, the fact of not receiving any CD is worth $0. Second hand
CDs are more likely to cause jitters than new ones. We assume that a second hand CD plays well in
60% of the devices, while a new CD plays well in 95% of the devices. Moreover, the probability that
a package gets lost during transportation is 1% (CDs lost during transportation are never recuperated,
nor replaced by the seller).
The quality signal observed by the buyers has three possible values: (i) q0, i.e., the CD was not
received, (ii) q1, i.e., the CD jitters, or (iii) q2, i.e., the CD plays well. The conditional probability
distribution of the quality signal observed by the buyers is presented in Figure 5.2(a). Here, for example,
the probability Pr∗[q1|e1] = 0.396 was computed as follows: given that the seller shipped a second hand
CD, the buyer receives a CD that jitters with probability 99% · 40% (the probability that the CD was
not lost during transportation, times the probability that a second-hand CD provokes jitters).
Given the above probabilities, we can now compute the price expected by the seller as a function
of exerted effort (Figure 5.2(c)):
• p(e0) = 0 when the seller does not ship the CD;
• p(e1) = 0 ·Pr∗[q0|e1] + 2 ·Pr∗[q1|e1] + 13 ·Pr∗[q2|e1] = 8.514 when the seller ships a second hand
CD;
• p(e2) = 0 · Pr∗[q0|e2] + 2 · Pr∗[q1|e2] + 13 · Pr∗[q2|e2] = 12.325 when the seller ships a new CD;
Buyers report honestly the quality signal they observed, but can make involuntary reporting mis-
takes. With probability 1% they report the signal qj instead of qi, for all qj 6= qi. The probability
distribution of feedback signals recorded by the reputation mechanism is presented in Figure 5.2(b).
Here, for example, the probability Pr[q1|e1] = 0.3941 is computed as 98% · 0.396 + (1 − 0.396) · 1%:
the probability that the buyer observes q1 (given e1) and doesn’t make a reporting mistake, plus the
probability that the buyer doesn’t observe q1 but makes a reporting mistake. The discount factor of
the seller is assumed δ = 0.9.
5.2.2 Strategies and Equilibria
The interaction between the seller and the buyers can be modeled by an infinitely repeated game
between the long-run seller and a sequence of one-round buyers that win the corresponding second-
price auctions. The stage game is a sequential game G, where the bidders first decide what price to
pay, and the seller second decides what effort to exert. A strategy of the bidder in the stage game is a
positive real value p ∈ R+ specifying the price to pay. Second price auctions are incentive compatible,
therefore rational bidders bid exactly their expected utility of the good.
A pure strategy of the seller in the game G is a mapping e : R+ → E specifying the effort exerted
as a function of the price paid by the buyer. Let ∆(E) denote the set of all probability distributions
over the elements of E. A mixed strategy of the seller, ²(p) ∈ ∆(E), specifies a probability distribution
over the effort exerted by the seller. If ²(p) =
∑
ei∈E αi(p) ·ei, the seller exerts effort ei with probability
αi(p). The sum
∑
ei∈E αi(p) equals 1.
The only equilibrium of the stage game is inefficient: the seller exerts no effort (i.e., ² = e0) and
anticipating this, bidders do not bid anything for the good (p = p(e0) = 0). This result is trivial, since
e0 is the dominant strategy for the seller, regardless of the price paid by the buyer.
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Pr∗[·|·] e0 e1 e2
q0 1 0.01 0.01
q1 0 0.396 0.0495
q2 0 0.594 0.9405
(a) Observation of buyers - con-
ditional distribution of signals.
Pr[·|·] e0 e1 e2
q0 0.98 0.0197 0.0197
q1 0.01 0.3941 0.058
q2 0.01 0.5862 0.9223
(b) Feedback reports - conditional
distribution of signals.
Cost:
e0 e1 e2
0 6 9
Price:
e0 e1 e2
0 8.5140 12.3255
(c) Cost and expected
price of effort.
e0 - does not ship CD
e1 - ships second-hand CD
e2 - ships new CD
q0 - does not receive CD
q1 - receives jittering CD
q2 - receives good CD
(d) Legend
Figure 5.2: Numerical example. Conditional probability distribution of signals given effort
levels, the cost of effort, and the expected price depending on effort.
The repeated game may have other equilibria when the seller cares enough about future revenues,
i.e., the discount factor, δ is large enough (Fudenberg and Levine, 1994). Intuitively, the feedback
transmitted through the reputation mechanism makes it rational for the seller to exert effort. When
previous feedback is positive, future buyers trust the seller and bid more for the good. The cooperative
equilibrium is thus sustained by the fact that the future revenues made accessible by positive feedback,
offset the momentary gain the seller would obtain by exerting no effort.
Formally, the feedback left by previous buyers creates a public history of the seller’s behavior. Let
h(t) ∈ (×Q)t−1 be the sequence of signals reported by the buyers up to (excluding) round t. The
initial history is the empty set (i.e., h(0) = ∅), and the set of all possible histories up to round t is
H(t) = (×Q)t−1.
In the repeated game, a strategy of the seller is a sequence σ = (²(t))t=0,...,∞ of mappings ²(t) :
H(t) → ∆(E) specifying the (possibly mixed) effort level exerted in round t, as a function of the history
of the previous rounds. σ is a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) if for any round t and any history h(t),
the seller cannot improve his payoff by a one-shot deviation from σ: i.e., there is no round t and history
h(t) so that the seller prefers to exert effort e′ ∈ E instead of the equilibrium effort, ²(t).
Let σ|h(t) be the truncation of the strategy σ to the infinitely repeated game that starts in period t,
given the history h(t); let h(t+1) = h(t)q(t) be the history resulting from appending the feedback q(t) ∈ Q
from round t to the history h(t).
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The revenue of the seller for following σ|h(t), as perceived just before round t is:
U(σ|h(t)) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t′=t
δt
′−t
(
p(t
′) − c(²(t′))
)
;
and can further be expressed as the sum between the revenue obtained in round t, and the revenue
obtained from the round t+ 1 onward. However, the strategy in the game that starts from round t+ 1
depends on the history h(t+1) = h(t)q(t), and therefore, the continuation payoff for the rest of the game
is a function of the feedback q(t) resulting from round t:
U(σ|h(t)) = (1− δ)
(
p(t) − c(²(t)) +
∞∑
t′=t+1
δt
′−t
(
p(t
′) − c(²(t′))
))
= (1− δ)
(
p(t) − c(²(t))
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|²(t)]U(σ|h(t)qk);
(5.2)
Therefore, the PPE condition for the strategy of the seller becomes:
U(σ|h(t)) ≥ (1− δ)
(
p(t) − c(e′)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e′]U(σ|h(t)qk); (5.3)
for all rounds t, histories h(t) and effort levels e′ ∈ E, e′ 6= ²(t).
An equivalent, but practically more convenient representation of a strategy is given by an automaton
(Osborne and Rubinstein, 1997). By definition, a strategy σ defines the action to be taken by the seller
after any possible history. Since the set of all possible histories of the repeated game, H =
⋃∞
t=0H
(t),
is infinite, the standard representation may prove cumbersome.
The automaton representation is based on two important observations. The first is that any strategy
can also de represented recursively by specifying the action of the first round, and the different con-
tinuation strategies for the infinitely repeated game that starts in the second round. The continuation
strategies depend on the feedback from the first round: σ = (²(0), σ|q0, . . . , σ|qM−1) where ²(0) ∈ ∆(E)
is played in the first round, and the continuation strategy is σ|qj when the feedback of the first round
is qj . Therefore, σ can be visually described by an infinite tree of continuation strategies. Each path in
this tree is a specific play that might occur in the infinitely repeated game.
The second observation is that there may be continuation strategies, following different histories,
that are the same. When recursively expanding σ, equal continuation strategies can be grouped together,
and the tree is condensed to a (possibly infinite) directed graph. Every node of the graph corresponds to
a (distinct) continuation strategy, and has a number of outgoing edges equal to the number of distinct
feedback values that can be received after the first round of that continuation strategy. This graph
visually pictures the automaton describing σ.
Formally, we partition the set H of histories into classes of histories that induce identical continua-
tions. The histories h and h′ from H belong to the same class if and only if the continuation strategies
σ|h and σ|h′ are identical. Classes are denoted by z, and the resulting partition is Z. Any strategy σ
can be represented by the automaton (Z, zs, ², trn) where:
• Z is the set of states of the automaton;
• zs ∈ Z is the starting state. zs contains the initial history, h(0) = ∅;
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• ² : Z → ∆(E) is the output function of the automaton that associates the one-round strategy
²(z) ∈ ∆(E) to every state z ∈ Z. To simplify the notation will also use ²i = ²(zi);
• The transition function trn : Z × Q → Z identifies the next state of the automaton, given the
current state and the feedback received from the buyer. trn(z, qk) = z′ if and only if h(t) ∈ z
and h(t+1) = (h(t)qk) ∈ z′ (i.e., the automaton transits to the state containing the history h(t)
concatenated with qk).
In most cases the partition Z is finite, and the strategy is represented by a finite state automaton.
Verifying the equilibrium conditions on a strategy represented by an automaton is straight-forward.
Every state of the automaton can be associated with a payoff given by the continuation strategy that
‘starts’ in that state. If U(zi) is the payoff associated to the state zi ∈ Z, we have the following system
of equations defining the payoffs:
U(zi) = (1− δ)
(
p(²i)− c(²i)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|²i]U
(
trn(zi, qk)
)
; ∀zi ∈ Z;
As a direct application of the one-shot deviation principle, the strategy σ is an equilibrium if and
only if for all states zi ∈ Z, the seller cannot profitably deviate to some other effort e′:
U(zi) ≥ (1− δ)
(
p(²i)− c(e′)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e′]U
(
trn(zi, qk)
)
;
In the infinitely repeated game, the seller generally has many PPE strategies. Nevertheless, online
markets have the advantage that they can be designed to encourage a certain equilibrium. By controlling
what information is made public, the reputation mechanism can recommend a certain strategy. Players
are free, of course, to choose another equilibrium; however, the coordination on a new strategy profile
may be difficult, and therefore, unlikely.
From the perspective of the reputation mechanism designer, it is important to know which equilib-
rium strategy to select, and how to construct the reputation mechanism that recommends that strategy.
As the most important criterion, the reputation mechanism should select an efficient equilibrium
strategy that maximizes the cumulated revenue of the market participants. Since buyers pay exactly the
market price, their equilibrium expected revenue is constant. Social efficiency is therefore maximized
by the equilibrium strategy that gives the seller the highest possible revenue.
Among the equilibria that are socially efficient, the designer should choose the one that generates
the simplest possible reputation mechanism.
It is straightforward to see that the reputation mechanism designer can implement the equilibrium
strategy σ by revealing to the buyers only the automaton describing σ (i.e., set of states, the response
function and transition function) and the current state of the automaton. Intuitively, the states of the
automaton are the reputation values the seller can have. The current state of the automaton is the
current reputation of the seller, the transition function defines how reputation changes as a function of
submitted feedback, and the response function of the automaton prescribes the equilibrium behavior of
the seller (and therefore of the buyers), given the current reputation.
A second criterion is simplicity. The reputation mechanism should be simple and intuitive to
understand. Acknowledging that the perception of simplicity also depends on subjective factors like
user interface and documentation, we consider two objective measures of simplicity. The first is the size
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(number or states) of the automaton representing the equilibrium strategy. Fewer states lead to fewer
possible values of reputation, and therefore, to a short description of the mechanism. The second is
the use of randomization devices. Probabilistic decisions are assumed more complex than deterministic
ones since they require the existence of trusted randomization devices.
5.2.3 Efficient Equilibrium Strategies
Fudenberg and Levine (1994) offer a general methodology for computing the maximum PPE payoff
obtained by the seller. Let U be the set of PPE payoffs the seller may obtain, and let U¯ be the
maximum value in this set. By definition, there must be an equilibrium strategy σ¯ that generates the
payoff U¯ . As we have seen in the previous section, σ¯ can be described by a first round strategy ²¯ and by
k different continuation strategies σ¯|qk, one for each possible feedback generated after the first round.
Since the continuation strategies are by definition PPE strategies, the payoffs Uk generated by σ¯|qk
must also belong to the set U .
As a consequence, there must be the one round strategy ²¯ ∈ ∆(E), and the PPE continuation
payoffs (Uk)k=0,...,M−1 ∈ U that enforce U¯ , so that:
• U¯ is the payoff obtained by playing ²¯ in the first round, and a PPE strategy that gives Uk in the
subsequent rounds, depending on the feedback qk from the first round;
U¯ = (1− δ)(p(²¯)− c(²¯))+ δ ∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|²¯]Uk; (5.4)
• there is no profitable deviation from ²¯ in the first round;
U¯ ≥ (1− δ)(p(²¯)− c(e′))+ δ ∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e′]Uk; ∀e′ ∈ E (5.5)
• all continuation payoffs are smaller or equal to U¯ .
U¯ ≥ Uk, ∀k = 1, . . . ,M ; (5.6)
If ²¯ were given, the payoff U¯ would be the solution of the following linear optimization problem:
LP 5.2.1 Maximize U¯ as a function of (Uk), such that (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6) hold.
However, we know from Fudenberg and Levine (1994) that ²¯ is a pure strategy (i.e., ²¯ ∈ E), and
therefore we can find U¯ by solving LP 5.2.1 L times, once for each element of E, and taking the maximum
solution. Since linear optimization problems can be solved efficiently, the algorithm for finding U¯ is
polynomial in the size of the sets Q and E.
Let us now compute the maximum PPE payoff the seller can obtain in the example presented in
Section 5.2.1. Assuming that ²¯ = e0 (the seller does not ship the CD), the only solution to LP 5.2.1
is U¯ = 0 = U0 = U1 = U2. Intuitively, the seller does not gain anything in the first round (because
p(e0)− c(e0) = 0), and therefore, the set of constraints expressed by (5.6) force all equilibrium payoffs
to 0.4
If ²¯ = e1, the optimization problem has the following solution: U¯ = 2.39 and U0 = 1.7, U1 = U2 = U¯ .
If the efficient strategy required the seller to ship a second-hand CD, the fact that the buyer received a
4Assume some Uk is greater than 0. The expected continuation payoff
∑
qk∈Q Pr[qk|e0]Uk is both smaller than Uk
and greater than U¯ . Therefore U¯ < Uk which violates the constraints
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CD (good or bad) is good enough to entitle the seller to the maximum PPE continuation payoff. Only
when buyers report not having received the CD (signal q0) the seller is punished by a lower continuation
payoff. These continuation payoffs make action e1 optimal for the seller: Not shipping the CD would
cause an expected loss equal to δ(U¯ − U0)(Pr[q0|e0]− Pr[q0|e1])/(1− δ) = 6, just enough to cover the
cost of shipping a second-hand CD.
The efficient strategy is however ²¯ = e2. The optimization problem LP 5.2.1 solves for: U¯ = 2.61,
U0 = 1.52, U1 = 1.62 and U2 = U¯ . The fact that the buyer reports not having received a CD is
punished by the worst continuation payoff, U0. The report about a jittering CD is slightly better, but
still reduces the continuation payoff of the seller. Only the feedback q2 (the CD plays well) entitles the
seller to an efficient continuation payoff. Note that the maximum PPE payoff is quite far from the first
best equilibrium payoff of the seller. If the seller were able to credibly commit to always ship a new
CD, his expected payoff would be p(e2) − c(e2) = 3.32. The efficiency loss is a direct consequence of
the imprecise monitoring process: honest sellers that always ship a new CD sometimes get punished for
losses occurred during transportation or for manufacturing defects. These punishments are nonetheless
necessary to deter the seller from shipping a second-hand CD, or not shipping at all.
Several properties of this example are worth mentioning. First, the feedback value q2 entitles the
seller to the maximum continuation payoff. Second, the future loss suffered by the seller from exerting
less effort than e2 is sometimes just enough to cover the momentary reduction of cost. For example, by
shipping a second hand CD the seller would save $3, and would expect a future loss that is currently
worth:
δ
(
U2
(
Pr[q2|e2]− Pr[q2|e1]
)
+ U1
(
Pr[q1|e2]− Pr[q1|e1]
)
+ U0
(
Pr[q0|e2]− Pr[q0|e1]
))
1− δ = 3;
Therefore, the seller is actually indifferent between shipping a new or a second-hand CD, even though
the equilibrium strategy requires him to ship the new CD. It turns out that both these properties can
hold for our general setting.
First, we will consider the continuation payoffs (Uk)k=0,...,M−1 that enforce the efficient payoff U¯ .
As proven by the proposition below, at least one of these payoffs is equal to U¯ ; the corresponding
feedback value qk¯ ∈ Q entitles the seller to continue receiving U¯ in the rest of the game.
Proposition 5.2.1 Given the maximum PPE payoff U¯ enforced by the one round strategy ²¯ and the
continuation PPE payoffs (Uk)k=0,...,M−1, there is k¯ such that Uk¯ = U¯ .
Proof. see Appendix 5.B. ¥
Second, we prove that the first round strategy ²¯ that enforces U¯ , is not strictly better than all other
strategies the seller may play. Given the continuation payoffs (Uk), there is at least another effort level
e∗ 6= ²¯ the seller could exert in the first round, and still expect the payoff U¯ .
Proposition 5.2.2 Given the maximum PPE payoff U¯ enforced by the one round strategy ²¯ and the
continuation PPE payoffs (Uk)k=0,...,M−1, there is at least another effort level e∗ ∈ E, e∗ 6= ²¯ such that
the seller is indifferent between exerting ²¯ or e∗ in the first round.
Proof. see Appendix 5.C. ¥
One last remark addresses the conditions when the seller’s maximum PPE payoff is greater than
0. Intuitively, the seller exerts effort in the first round only when future revenues made accessible by
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positive feedback offset the cost of effort. Naturally, this can happen only when future transactions
generate sufficient revenue, and the discount factor δ is high enough. The exact dependence can be
computed analytically for the binary case (Dellarocas, 2005), and determined numerically for the general
case addressed in this chapter.
5.3 Designing Efficient Reputation Mechanisms
Efficient reputation mechanisms should allow the market participants to coordinate on a PPE strategy
that gives the seller the maximum revenue, U¯ (the surplus of the buyers is constant). Therefore, the
first problem of the mechanism designer is to (i) find an efficient PPE strategy, and (ii) to choose what
information to display to the agents in order to coordinate their play on the desired equilibrium strategy.
One obvious way of constructing an efficient PPE strategy is to recursively specify a strategy for
the next round, and the different continuation payoffs (one for every possible feedback received after
the first round) given by the equilibrium that start after the next round. U¯ is thus obtained when the
seller plays ²¯ in the first round, and receives one of the continuation payoffs (Uk) for the game that
starts in the second round. Every one of the payoffs Uk can be further obtained when the seller plays
²
(1)
k ∈ ∆(E) in the second round, and receives one of the continuation payoffs (Uj)j=0,...,M−1 from the
third round onward5. Following the same procedure, the efficient PPE strategy can be fully determined.
However, a reputation mechanism based on a recursive description of the equilibrium has several
practical disadvantages. First, as the game is repeated infinitely, the equilibrium cannot be fully
expanded. Any description of the equilibrium will inform the agents that after some finite number
of rounds (whose strategy is specified), the continuation strategy will be an equilibrium giving some
known amount. The agents will have to trust the reputation mechanism that it will correctly choose
future continuation strategies that enforce the promised payoffs.
Second, the reputation mechanism must actively compute the equilibrium in every round. Similarly,
an auditor of the reputation mechanism must constantly verify that the next round strategy and the
continuation payoffs follow the equilibrium conditions.
Third, there is no intuitive connection between the equilibrium strategy and the reputation of the
seller. Buyers are being told that previous feedback entitles the seller to a continuation payoff that is
worth a particular value. It may well happen that a sequence of apparently bad feedback entitles the
seller to a high continuation payoff6, and therefore the intuition that bad feedback should correspond
to low payoffs is lost.
Finally, the space of continuation payoffs is continuous between 0 and U¯ . Every practical compu-
tation system will make rounding errors that could affect the equilibrium conditions.
A more practical approach is to describe efficient PPE strategies through a finite state automaton,
as mentioned in Section 5.2.2. Take for example the automaton (Z, zs, ², trn) where the Z is the set of
states, zs is the starting state, ²(z) describes the one-round strategy for each state z ∈ Z, and trn is the
transition function. There is an immediate mapping to a reputation mechanism that encourages the
agents to play the strategy described by (Z, zs, ², trn): Z can be considered the set of reputation values
(every state can be given an intuitive label corresponding to the value of the state), zs is the initial
5The continuation payoffs (Uj) may of course be different for every Uk; moreover, we must have Uk = (1− δ)(p(²(1)k )−
c(²
(1)
k )) + δ
∑
qj∈Q Pr[qj |²
(1)
k ]Uj , and Uk ≥ (1− δ)(p(²
(1)
k )− c(e′)) + δ
∑
qj∈Q Pr[qj |e′]Uj for all e′ ∈ E, in order to make
one shot deviation unprofitable.
6This may happen, for example, when the seller just comes out of a sequence of rounds where he was punished by low
prices
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reputation of the seller, the function ² prescribes the next round action for every reputation value, and
the function trn defines how the reputation gets updated depending on the feedback of the last round.
Reputation mechanisms described in this way do not require active computation in every round,
can be easily verified, and have an intuitive description. In the rest of this section we will describe
different automata that correspond to efficient strategies and have, in some sense, a convenient form.
We take as the main criterion for convenience, the simplicity of the corresponding reputation mech-
anism. First, we would like the automaton to be as small as possible (in terms of number of states).
Second, we would like the reputation mechanism to rely as little as possible on random (respectively)
mixed strategies. It turns out there is a clear tradeoff between the two criteria. A summary of results
presented in this section is the following:
• efficient PPE strategies can be described by a 2-state probabilistic automaton. The two states of
the automaton correspond to the extreme values of the PPE payoff set, U : 0 corresponds to the
bad state and U¯ corresponds to the good state. The automaton is probabilistic in the sense that
the transition function randomly chooses the next state. The transition probabilities, however, are
a function of the feedback submitted by the buyer. Probabilistic automata can be implemented
only if the reputation mechanism can take random decisions (i.e., has a random device that is
trusted by the participants)
• when the reputation mechanism cannot use a randomization device, efficient PPE strategies can
be described by deterministic automata of size MN for any integer N greater or equal to 1. Such
automata require the sellers to use mixed one-round strategies.
• when the reputation mechanism cannot use a randomization device, and sellers can use only
pure strategies, a reputation mechanism can be designed by solving an optimization problem.
Depending on the size of the resulting automaton, the reputation mechanism may not be fully
efficient.
5.3.1 Probabilistic Reputation Mechanisms
Given the efficient payoff U¯ enforced by the effort level ²¯ and the continuation payoffs (Uk), k =
0, . . . ,M − 1, consider the following automaton Ap = (Z, zs, ², trn) where:
• the set of states contains 2 states: Z = {zG, zB}, where zG is the good state and zB is the bad
state.
• the automaton starts in the good state: zs = zG
• ²(zG) = ²¯ and ²(zB) = e0; the automaton prescribes the effort level ²¯ in the good state, and no
effort (i.e., e0) in the bad state.
• trn(zB , ·) = zB , so that once in the bad state, the automaton stays forever in the bad state
regardless of the feedback provided by the buyers. The transition from the state zG is probabilistic:
trn(zG, qk) =
{
zG with probability
Uk
U¯
zB with probability
U¯−Uk
U¯
The reputation mechanism that implements Ap corresponds to the randomization device mechanism
described by Dellarocas (2005) for binary reputation mechanisms. The seller has either good or bad
reputation. Only sellers with good reputation are allowed to trade in the market; sellers with bad
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Good Badq2
q1
q0 42%
38%
62%
58%
Figure 5.3: Two state probabilistic reputation mechanism.
reputation are isolated and excluded for ever from the market. A seller with good reputation is always
expected to exert the effort ²¯. Depending on the feedback submitted by the client, the reputation
mechanism changes the good reputation into bad reputation with a certain probability. The probability
is computed such that a deviation from the effort ²¯ cannot bring the seller higher revenues.
Before proving that the resulting reputation mechanism is efficient, let us draw in Figure 5.3 the
automaton Ap corresponding to the example in Section 5.2.1. As explained, from the state zB , the only
possible transition is to zB . From the state zG, the transitions are as follows:
• if the buyer submits the feedback q2, the automaton stays in zG;
• if the buyer submits the feedback q1, the automaton transits to zB with probability 38%;
• if the buyer submits the feedback q0, the automaton transits to zB with probability 42%;
Proposition 5.3.1 Ap defines an efficient PPE strategy.
Proof. First, let us computed the payoff expected by the seller associated to each state z ∈ Z of Ap.
Let UG and UB be the payoffs associated to the states zG and zB respectively. When in zB the seller
obtains p(e0) − c(e0) = 0 in the first round, and stays in zB for the game that starts in the second
round. Therefore:
UB = (1− δ)
(
p(e0)− c(e0)
)
+ δUB = 0;
When in zG, the seller obtains p(²¯) − c(²¯) in the first round, and continues in the state zG with
probability Uk
U¯
. Therefore:
UG = (1− δ)
(
p(²¯)− c(²¯))+ δ ∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|²¯]
(Uk
U¯
UG +
U¯ − Uk
U¯
UB
)
= U¯ ;
Clearly, the strategy described by Ap gives the seller the maximum PPE payoff, U¯ .
Second, let us verify that the strategy defined by Ap is an equilibrium. When in the state zB , any
deviation to more effort brings supplementary costs, and no benefits. When in state zG, assume there
is a profitable deviation to the effort level e′ 6= ²¯. This happens only if:
UG < (1− δ)(p(²¯)− c(e′)) + δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e′]Uk
This however contradicts the assumption that U¯ is a PPE payoff enforced by e¯ and (Uk). ¥
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The reputation mechanism described by Ap uses extreme punishments to enforce the cooperation
of the seller. Any feedback value that is different from qk¯ (the feedback that entitles the seller to
a continuation payoff equal to U¯ , see Proposition 5.2.1) triggers the exclusion of the seller from the
market with non-zero probability. Effort levels other than ²¯ generate a higher risk of punishment, hence
the equilibrium. Unfortunately, even good faith sellers that always exert the expected effort ²¯ face a
non-zero probability of being punished, and will eventually be excluded from the market. In practice,
excluded buyers should be given the option to buy back their way into the market, and start fresh with
good reputation. The entrance fee in this case should by equal to UG.
A reputation mechanism based on Ap can always be constructed given U¯ , ²¯ and the continuation
payoffs (Uk). Therefore, the condition mentioned in Section 5.2.3 regarding the magnitude of future
revenues is also sufficient for the existence of probabilistic reputation mechanisms that induce some
level of cooperation in the market.
5.3.2 Deterministic Reputation Mechanisms using Mixed Strategies
The random decisions taken by the reputation mechanism, coupled with the severity of the punish-
ments that are based on those random decisions may undermine the trustworthiness of the reputation
mechanism. Sellers that unfairly get punished, or buyers that do not see the consequence of their neg-
ative feedback may raise legitimate questions regarding the honesty of the reputation mechanism. The
dependance on a public randomization device whose output is uncontestable can be unpractical; this
justifies the need to design deterministic reputation mechanisms where every feedback triggers a precise
effect in the equilibrium strategy.
One immediate observation is that a deterministic automaton must have a number of different
states at least equal to the number of different continuation payoffs that enforce the desired equilibrium
outcome. For simplicity, we assume in this section that all M continuation payoffs are different. If
this is not the case (details in Section 5.3.4) some states will be duplicated, and can be easily grouped
together.
In this section we show that we can describe efficient PPE strategies through automata with exactly
M states. Consequently, there are efficient reputation mechanisms with exactlyM values of reputation.
Moreover, we prove that for any integer N > 0, there is at least one automaton with MN states that
corresponds to an efficient PPE strategy. All proofs are constructive and give straightforward algorithms
for designing the corresponding reputation mechanism.
Intuitively, such mechanisms define the reputation of the seller based on the last N submitted
feedback reports. The continuation payoffs Uk allow a ranking of the feedback signals, such that the
feedback corresponding to the highest continuation payoff is considered as the best, and the feedback
corresponding to the lowest continuation payoff is regarded as the worst possible feedback.
Starting from the effort ²¯ and continuation payoffs (Uk) enforcing U¯ , we will first describe the
deterministic automaton with M states. The automaton Ad = (Z, zs, ², trn) is defined as follows:
• the set of states Z = {z0, z1, . . . zM−1} contains M states, one corresponding to each distinct
continuation payoff Uk;
• the starting state zs = zk¯ corresponds to the maximum continuation payoff Uk¯ = U¯ (this state
exists, as shown in Proposition 5.2.1)
• for each state zi, ²i = ²(zi) is a mixed strategy over a subset of effort levels E ⊆ E defined as
follows:
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E = {e ∈ E| U¯ = (1− δ)(p(e¯)− c(e))+ δ ∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e]Uk} (5.7)
E contains ²¯ and all other effort levels e, such that the seller is indifferent between exerting ²¯
or e in the first round of the equilibrium that gives him the maximum payoff U¯ . As shown in
Proposition 5.2.2, E contains at least another element besides ²¯.
Moreover, if ²i =
∑
e∈E αi(e) · e, where αi(e) is the probability assigned by ²i to the effort level e
from E, we have:
Ui = (1− δ)
(
p(²i)− c(²i)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|²i]Uk; (5.8)
• the transition function is trn(·, qk) = zk. i.e., regardless of the current state, the feedback qk
transits the automaton in the state zk.
For the example in Section 5.2.1, the reputation mechanism corresponding to the automaton Ad
is graphically presented in Figure 5.4. The seller starts in the state z2, and expects a payoff equal to
U¯ . In the first round the seller ships a new CD, and depending on the feedback qj of the buyer, his
reputation at the beginning of the second round will be zj . The equilibrium strategy of the seller for
the next round depends on his current reputation, and on the set E. For the numerical values we have
chosen, the set E = {e0, e1, e2}, as shipping a second-hand CD, or not shipping at all, causes to the
seller an expected future loss that is exactly equal to the cost saved by cheating. One example of an
equilibrium strategy is the following:
• the seller ships a new CD if the feedback from the last transaction was q2;
• if the feedback from the last transaction was q1, the seller randomizes between shipping a new
CD (with probability 20%) and not shipping anything (with probability 80%);
• if the feedback from the last transaction was q0, the seller randomizes between shipping a new
CD (with probability 11%) and not shipping anything (with probability 89%);
Proposition 5.3.2 if Ad exists, it defines an efficient PPE strategy.
Proof. By definition of Ad, the continuation payoff associated to any state zi is Ui. Naturally, the
starting state zs gives the seller the efficient payoff U¯ .
The remaining problem is to verify that the strategy described by Ad is a PPE. For that we must
prove that there is no state zi where the seller can find a profitable deviation from ²i. We do that in
two steps. First, we show that for all states zi, the seller is indifferent between exerting any effort level
e′ ∈ E. Second we show that for all states zi, any deviation to the effort e∗ ∈ E \ E causes a loss to
the seller.
For any e′ ∈ E we have:
δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e′]Uk = U¯ − (1− δ)
(
p(e¯)− c(e′));
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Figure 5.4: A Reputation mechanism using only the last feedback.
Given the state zi, the revenue obtained by the seller for playing e′ ∈ E instead of ²i is:
U ′i = (1− δ)
(
p(²i)− c(e′)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e′]Uk
= (1− δ)(p(²i)− c(e′))+ U¯ − (1− δ)(p(e¯)− c(e′))
= U¯ − (1− δ)(p(²¯)− p(²i));
(5.9)
and does not depend on e′. Since ²i is a mixed strategy with support in E, Ui = U ′i , and no deviation
to e′ ∈ E is profitable.
On the other hand, for any e∗ ∈ E \ E we know from (5.5) that:
δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e∗]Uk < U¯ − (1− δ)
(
p(e¯)− c(e∗));
and as a consequence, the payoff obtained by the seller for deviating in state zi from ²i to e∗ is strictly
lower than Ui:
V ∗i = (1− δ)
(
p(²i)− c(e∗)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e∗]Uk
< (1− δ)(p(²i)− c(e∗))+ U¯ − (1− δ)(p(e¯)− c(e∗))
< U¯ − (1− δ)(p(²¯)− p(²i)) = Ui;
Therefore, the strategy defined by Ad is an efficient PPE. ¥
Ad exists only when we can find the mixed one-round strategy ²i that satisfies Equation (5.8) for
each state zi. As an immediate consequence of Equation (5.9), a necessary and sufficient existence
condition of Ad is that all continuation payoffs that enforce U¯ satisfy:
Uk ≥ U¯ − (1− δ)
(
p(²¯)−min
e∈E
p(e)
)
; (5.10)
This supplementary condition introduces further constraints on the optimization problem that de-
fines U¯ . There will be situations where a positive payoff can theoretically be guaranteed to the seller,
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but not by a reputation mechanism characterized by Ad. Unlike probabilistic reputation mechanisms
characterized by Ap, deterministic reputation mechanisms based on Ad require stricter conditions on
the magnitude of future revenues than the ones mentioned in Section 5.2.3.
A reputation mechanism that remembers the last n > 1 feedback reports can be constructed using
the same intuition. Depending on the feedback received in the preceding round, the price obtained by
the seller in the immediately next round is different: the worse the last feedback, the lower the next
round payment. When the reputation mechanism remembers the last N reports, the punishment for
bad feedback can be spread over N rounds; however, the cumulated punishment for every feedback
is the same as if the reputation mechanism remembered only the last report. Let the automaton
Ad(N) = (Z, zs, ², trn) be defined as follows:
• the set Z = {zr|r = (r1, r2, . . . , rN )} contains MN states, one corresponding to every sequence r
of N feedback signals. rk ∈ Q is the feedback report submitted k rounds ago.
• the starting state zs = zr¯ where r¯ = (qk¯, . . . , qk¯). qk¯ ∈ Q is the perfect feedback corresponding to
the maximum continuation payoff Uk¯ = U¯ (this state exists, as shown in Proposition 5.2.1)
• for each state zr, ²r = ²(zr) is a mixed strategy over a subset of effort levels E ⊆ E defined in
(5.7). ²r =
∑
e∈E αr(e) · e, where αr(e) is the probability assigned by the strategy ²r to the effort
level e from E. Moreover,
αr(e) =
∑N
j=1 αrj (e)∑N−1
k=0 δ
k
; (5.11)
for all e ∈ E \ {²¯}, and αr(²¯) = 1−
∑
e∈E\{²¯} αr(e). αrj (e) is the probability of effort e assigned
by the strategy ²rj , rj ∈ Q, and is defined by Equation (5.8).
• the transition function is trn(·, zr) = zr⊕qk , where r ⊕ qk is the sequence of N − 1 most recent
reports plus the feedback qk: i.e., if r = (r1, r2, . . . , rN ), then r ⊕ qk = (qk, r1, . . . , rN−1).
Proposition 5.3.3 if Ad(N) exists, it defines an efficient PPE strategy.
Proof. First, we will show that the value of each state zr of the automaton Ad(N) is:
U(zr) = U¯ − (1− δ)
N∑
j=1
(
p(²¯)− p(²rj )
)∑N−j
k=0 δ
k∑N−1
k=0 δ
k
; (5.12)
We must verify that:
U(zr) = (1− δ)
(
p(²r)− c(²r)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|²r]U(zr⊕qk );
for all states zr ∈ Z. We denote as φ =
∑N−1
k=0 δ
k, and derive the following preliminary results:
p(²r) =
∑N
j=1 p(²rj )− (N − φ)p(²¯)
φ
;
c(²r) =
∑N
j=1 c(²rj )− (N − φ)c(²¯)
φ
;
Pr[·|²r] =
∑N
j=1 Pr[·|²rj ]− (N − φ)Pr[·|²¯]
φ
;
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Therefore:
U ′ = (1− δ)(p(²r)− c(²r))+ δ ∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|²r]U(zr⊕qk )
=
1− δ
φ
( N∑
j=1
(
p(²rj )− c(²rj )
)− (N − φ)(p(²¯)− c(²¯))
+
δ
φ
∑
qk∈Q
( N∑
j=1
Pr[qk|²rj ]− (N − φ)Pr[qk|²¯]
)(
U¯ − (1− δ)(p(²¯)− p(²qk ))
− (1− δ)
N−1∑
j=1
(
p(²¯)− p(²rj )
)∑N−1−j
k=0 δ
i
φ
)
However,
Urj = (1− δ)
(
p(²rj )− c(²rj )
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|²rj ]Uk = U¯ − (1− δ)
(
p(²¯)− (p(²rj )
)
;
therefore:
U ′ =
1− δ
φ
( N∑
j=1
(
p(²rj )− c(²rj )
)− (N − φ)(p(²¯)− c(²¯)))
+
δ
φ
∑
qk∈Q
( N∑
j=1
Pr[qk|²rj ]− (N − φ)Pr[qk|²¯]
)
Uk
− δ(1− δ)
φ
N−1∑
j=1
(
p(²¯)− p(²rj )
)N−1−j∑
i=0
δi
=
1
φ
N∑
j=1
(Urj − U¯) + U¯ −
δ(1− δ)
φ
N−1∑
j=1
(
p(²¯)− p(²rj )
)N−1−j∑
i=0
δi
= U¯ − (1− δ)
φ
N∑
j=1
(
p(²¯)− p(²rj )
)(
1 + δ
N−1−j∑
i=0
δi
)
= U¯ − (1− δ)
φ
N∑
j=1
(
p(²¯)− p(²rj )
)N−j∑
i=0
δi = U(zr)
Next, let us show that the strategy defined by Ad(N) is an equilibrium. Assume that in state zr,
the seller deviates to the strategy e′ ∈ E. The payoff he obtains is thus:
U ′(zr) = (1− δ)
(
p(²r)− c(e′)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e′]U(zr⊕qk )
=
1− δ
φ
( N∑
j=1
p(²rj )− (N − φ)p(²¯)− φ · c(e′)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e′]
(
Uk − (1− δ)
∑N−1
j=1
(
p(²¯)− p(²rj )
)∑N−j
i=1 δ
i
φ
)
=
1− δ
φ
( N∑
j=1
p(²rj )− (N − φ)p(²¯)− φ · c(e′)
)
+ U¯ − (1− δ)(p(²¯)− c(e′))
− (1− δ)
∑N−1
j=1
(
p(²¯)− p(²rj )
)∑N−j
i=1 δ
i
φ
)
= U¯ − (1− δ)
φ
N∑
j=1
(
p(²¯)− p(²rj )
)N−j∑
i=0
δi = U(zr)
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On the other hand, all deviations to the effort e∗ ∈ E \E will give the seller a payoff strictly smaller
than U(zr) since by definition, δ
∑
qk∈Q Pr[qk|e′]Uk < U¯ − (1− δ)
(
p(²¯)− c(e′)). Hence Ad(N) describes
an efficient PPE strategy. ¥
One property of Ad(N) is that the single-round strategies prescribed by it do not depend on the
sequence of feedback reports. The mixed strategies ²r are computed only from the distribution of
feedback reports in the sequence r.
Automaton Ad(N) exists only if we can find the strategies ²r that satisfy the conditions mentioned in
the definition. One immediate consequence of Equation (5.11) is that
∑
e∈E\{²¯} αk(e) ≤
∑N−1
k=0 δ
k
N < 1.
Therefore, the continuation payoffs Uk must satisfy stricter constraints:
Uk = U¯ − (1− δ)
(
p(²¯)− p(²k)
)
≥ U¯ − (1− δ)min
e∈E
(
p(²¯)− p(e))∑N−1k=0 δk
N
;
The greater the value of N , the harder are the constraints on the continuation payoffs that enforce
U¯ . Therefore, reputation mechanisms that remember more reports from the past do not increase the
efficiency of the mechanism, but limit the settings where efficient mechanisms can be constructed. This
conclusion agrees with the results of Dellarocas (2005) for the binary case.
5.3.3 Deterministic Reputation Mechanisms with Pure Strategies
One assumption we made in Section 5.2 is that buyers bid their expected utility of the good offered by
the seller. The equilibrium described by Ad(N) prescribes a mixed strategy for the seller for most of
the rounds: unless the feedback from the last N rounds is equal to r¯ = (qk¯, . . . , qk¯), the continuation
payoff expected by the seller is smaller than U¯ , and requires the seller to randomize his action in the
next round. Although the seller is indifferent between any effort level in the support of the mixed
equilibrium strategy, the buyers must believe that the seller will choose randomly the exerted effort,
following exactly the probabilities prescribed by the equilibrium.
Real buyers might have problems adopting such beliefs. Take for example the buyer before a round
where the equilibrium prescribes the mixed strategy α²¯ + (1 − α)e0, with α close to 1. The seller is
indifferent between exerting high effort, ²¯, or exerting no effort at all; in equilibrium, however, he is
expected to exert high effort almost all the time. The buyer should therefore pay a price which is very
close to p(²¯), the expected utility of a good provisioned with high effort. Nevertheless, any aversion
to risk will determine the buyer to pay significantly less than p(²¯). As most people are risk-averse, a
reputation mechanism that uses mixed strategies may have a serious impact on efficiency.
It therefore becomes important to find reputation mechanisms that support pure perfect public
equilibrium strategies. Given a finite integer N , the problem we are addressing in this section is to
find the finite state automaton Apr(N) with N states, describing a pure strategy PPE. Assuming that
several automata exist, we would like to find the one that maximizes the revenue of the seller. The design
parameter N can be intuitively seen as the maximum amount of memory available to the reputation
mechanism.
Formally, given the set of N states Z = {z0, z1, . . . zN−1}, we must find a starting state zs ∈ Z, a
pure strategy response function ² : Z → E, and a deterministic transition function trn : Z × Q → Z
such that the automaton Apr(N) = (Z, zs, ², trn) corresponds to a PPE strategy and maximizes the
revenue of the seller.
This design problem can be captured in an optimization problem, where the objective is to maximize
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Figure 5.5: The reputation mechanism supporting a pure strategy equilibrium.
the continuation payoff of the starting state zs, given that Apr(N) satisfies the equilibrium constraints:
i.e., the seller cannot benefit by deviating from the strategy ²(zi) = ²i in any state zi ∈ Z. Let Ui be
the continuation payoff given by Apr(N) in state zi. By symmetry we can assume that zs = zN−1 and
therefore the optimization problem becomes:
min UN−1
s.t. Ui = (1− δ)
(
p(²i)− c(²i)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|²i]Utrn(zi,qk); ∀zi ∈ Z;
Ui ≥ (1− δ)
(
p(²i)− c(e)
)
+ δ
∑
qk∈Q
Pr[qk|e]Utrn(zi,qk); ∀zi, ∀e 6= ²i ∈ E;
Ui ≤ Ui+1 ∀i = {0, 1, . . . , N − 2};
(5.13)
where Utrn(zi,qk) is the continuation payoff of the state trn(zi, qk). The first constraint makes sure that
the continuation payoffs are generated by the automaton Apr(N), the second constraint expresses the
equilibrium conditions, and the third constraint breaks the symmetry. The variables of the optimization
problem are the strategies ²i and the transitions trn(zi, qk).
For the example described in Section 5.2.1, Figure 5.5 graphically presents the best pure strategy
reputation mechanism with N = 5 states. The maximum payoff obtained by the seller is U0 = 2.60,
which is close to the efficient payoff U¯ = 2.61. The other continuation payoffs are: U1 = 2.317,
U2 = 1.608, U3 = 1.432 and U4 = 0.
This reputation mechanism has, however, several counterintuitive properties. Take for example the
transitions from the state z1. If the feedback of the buyer is q0 (the buyer did not receive the CD) or
q2 (the buyer received a working CD) the automaton transits to the state z0. If on the other hand the
feedback is q1 (the CD is not working) the automaton transits to the state z4. The state z0 corresponds
to the maximum reputation value, while the state z4 corresponds to the lowest possible reputation
value. The seller is therefore rewarded when the buyer does not receive the CD, and strongly punished
when the buyer receives a defective CD. The same observations apply to the transitions from the state
z3.
These anomalies can be eliminated by imposing further constraints on the optimization problem
(5.13). For example, one can request that the continuation payoffs following the signals q0, q1, respec-
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tively q2 should be increasing. As another example, one might want a reputation mechanism where in
equilibrium, the sellers with better reputation exert higher effort (this again, is not the case for the
mechanism presented in Figure 5.5: in state z2 the seller ships a second-hand CD, while in the state
z1 the seller does not ship a CD). A number of other “practical” constraints can be added to make
the reputation mechanism more intuitive, and optimal in the same time. The augmented optimization
problem defines an automated algorithm for designing the best possible reputation mechanism given
the desired constraints.
5.3.4 Feedback Granularity
We have assumed so far that the set of possible feedback values is fixed, and contains M elements. An
interesting question is if the granularity of the requested feed influences the efficiency of the reputation
mechanism. The answer is negative; we show that a mechanism where the buyer can submit L + 1
different feedback values can be equally efficient as another mechanism where feedback can be infinitely
diverse. However, having less than L + 1 distinct feedback values can decrease the efficiency of the
mechanism.
The main reason behind this fact is that among theM continuation payoffs that enforce the efficient
payoff U¯ , at most L + 1 take different values. If M > L + 1 several continuations will give the seller
either the maximum payoff, U¯ , or the minimum payoff 0.
Proposition 5.3.4 There are at most L + 1 different continuation payoffs that enforce the socially
efficient payoff, U¯ .
Proof. As seen in Proposition 5.2.2, the continuation payoffs (Uk)k=0,...,M−1 solve the linear problem
(5.24). As a first step in this proof, note that the problem has a unique solution: for δ 6= 0, the vector
C defining the coefficients of the objective function is not parallel to any of the vectors defining the
constraints.
The optimal solution therefore corresponds to one vertex of the polytope bounding the feasible
region. This polytope is defined by 2M +L− 1 hyperplanes, where M +L− 1 hyperplanes are defined
by the equations A · x = B, and the remaining M hyperplanes are defined by the equations. Uk = 0.
Consequently, the optimal solution will satisfy M out of the 2M +L− 1 inequalities up to equality.
When M > L, it follows that at least M − L+ 1 out of the 2M bounding constraints 0 ≤ Uk ≤ U¯ will
be satisfied to equality. This means that M −L+1 continuation payoffs will be either equal to 0, or to
U¯ . Hence, there are at most L+ 1 different continuation payoffs that enforce U¯ . ¥
When different feedback signals generate the same continuation payoffs, the equilibrium strategy
fails to make a distinction between them. Any of the first round feedback signals that trigger the
maximum continuation payoff, U¯ , are equally good, while any of the signals that trigger the minimum
continuation payoff equal to 0 are equally bad. Therefore, signals that trigger the same continuations can
be grouped together, without loss of efficiency. A mechanism with more than L+ 1 different feedback
signals is more efficient only up to the extent it allows a better grouping of signals that are very good
or very bad. This result agrees with the conclusion of Dellarocas (2005) for the binary case.
The bound defined by Proposition 5.3.4 is also tight. There are settings where further compressing
the feedback set reduces the maximum payoff the seller can get, and hence the efficiency of the market.
To see this, let us extend the example from Section 5.2.1, and assume that buyers who experience jitters
now examine the surface of the CD, and guess whether jitters are caused by manufacturing defects,
or by scratches made by previous owners. A CD that plays well is not inspected. The buyer can now
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Pr∗[·|·] e0 e1 e2
q0 1 0.01 0.01
q1s 0 0.277 0.005
q1n 0 0.119 0.0445
q2 0 0.594 0.9405
(a) Observation of buyers - con-
ditional distribution of signals.
Pr[·|·] e0 e1 e2
q0 0.97 0.0196 0.0196
q1s 0.01 0.2761 0.0148
q1n 0.01 0.1240 0.0528
q2 0.01 0.5802 0.9129
(b) Feedback reports - conditional
distribution of signals.
Figure 5.6: The buyer observes whether CD’s have manufacturing defects or are scratched
by ware.
report 4 quality signals, as a CD with jitters can be reported new (q1n), when the buyer believes the
problems are coming from manufacturing defects, or second hand (q1s), when the buyer believes jitters
are caused by scratches. On a second hand (jittering) CD, the buyer is likely to detect scratches in
70% of the cases. A new jittering CD, on the other hand, has observable scratches with much lower
probability, i.e., 10%. The conditional probability distribution of the signals observed by the buyer
depending on the action of the seller are displayed in Figure 5.6(a). The probability distribution of the
signals recorded by the reputation mechanism (considering reporting mistakes) is given in Figure 5.6(b).
The maximum PPE payoff of the seller in this new context is U¯ = 2.97 and is enforced by the first
round strategy ²¯ = e2 and the continuation payoffs: U0 = 1.91, U1s = 1.69, U1n = U2 = U¯ . Note that
the maximum PPE payoff the seller can now obtain is higher than in the previous case (2.97 instead of
2.61). This, however, is not the consequences of a fourth quality signal – a reputation mechanism where
the feedback signals q1n and q2 are indistinguishable would be equally efficient. The increased efficiency
is rather due to a change in the monitoring technology. By requiring additional feedback from buyers
regarding the appearance of a defective CD, the reputation mechanism can more effectively punish the
sellers for deviating from the equilibrium strategy, and hence increases the efficiency of the system.
Nevertheless, 4 quality signals are strictly necessary for smaller discount factors. When δ = 0.79, the
maximum PPE payoff is U¯ = 2.79, enforced by the effort ²¯ = e2 and the continuation payoffs U0 = 0.22,
U1s = 0, U1n = 1.84 and U2 = U¯ . Any further reduction of the feedback set (i.e., by compressing two
signals into one) strictly decreases the maximum PPE payoff the seller can obtain.
In general, when M > L + 1, the automata describing efficient equilibrium strategies will have
duplicate states. All signals that trigger identical continuation payoffs can be grouped together into
one signal, and therefore, the corresponding states in the automata can be collapsed into one state.
5.4 A Mechanism for Obtaining Reliable Feedback Reports
Signaling reputation mechanisms also face the important challenge of providing incentives to rational
users to report honest feedback. Rational users can regard the private information they have observed
as a valuable asset, not to be freely shared. Worse even, agents can have external incentives to misreport
and thus manipulate the reputation information available to other agents. Without proper measures,
the reputation mechanism will obtain unreliable information, biased by the strategic interests of the
reporters.
5.4. A Mechanism for Obtaining Reliable Feedback Reports 139
There are well known solutions for providing honest reporting incentives for signaling reputation
mechanisms (see Chapter 3). Since all clients interacting with a service receive the same quality (in a
statistical sense), a client’s private observation influences her belief regarding the experience of other
clients. For example, if one client has a bad experience with a certain service, she is more likely to
believe that other clients will also encounter problems when interacting with the same service. This
correlation between the client’s private belief and the feedback reported by other clients can be used to
design feedback payments that make honesty a Nash equilibrium (see Section 3.3). When submitting
feedback, clients get paid an amount that depends both on the the value they reported and on the
reports submitted by other clients. As long as others report truthfully, the expected payment of every
client is maximized by the honest report – thus the equilibrium. Miller et al. (2005) and Jurca and
Faltings (2006) show that incentive-compatible payments can be designed to offset both reporting costs
and lying incentives.
For sanctioning reputation mechanisms the same payment schemes are not guaranteed to be
incentive-compatible. Different clients may experience different service quality because the provider
decided to exert different effort levels. The private beliefs of the reporter may no longer be correlated
to the feedback of other clients, and therefore, the statistical properties exploited to obtain a truthful
Nash equilibrium are no longer present.
As an alternative, we propose different incentives to motivate honest reporting based on the repeated
presence of the client in the market. Game theoretic results (i.e., the folk theorems) show that repeated
interactions support new equilibria where present deviations are made unattractive by future penalties.
Even without a reputation mechanism, a client can guide her future play depending on the experience
of previous interactions. As a first result of this chapter, we describe a mechanism that indeed supports
a cooperative equilibrium where providers exert effort all the time. The reputation mechanism correctly
records when the client received low quality.
There are certainly some applications where clients repeatedly interact with the same seller with
a potential moral hazard problem. The barber shop mentioned in the beginning of this chapter is one
example, as most people prefer going to the same barber (or hairdresser). Another example is a market
of delivery services. Every package must be scheduled for timely delivery, and this involves a cost for
the provider. Some of this cost may be saved by occasionally dropping a package, hence the moral
hazard. Moreover, business clients typically rely on the same carrier to dispatch their documents or
merchandise. As their own business depends on the quality and timeliness of the delivery, they do have
the incentive to form a lasting relationship and get good service. Yet another example is that of a
business person who repeatedly travels to an offshore client. The business person has a direct interest
to repeatedly obtain good service from the hotel which is closest to the client’s offices.
We assume that the quality observed by the clients is also influenced by environmental factors
outside the control of, however observable by, the provider. Despite the barber’s best effort, a sud-
den movement of the client can always generate an accidental cut that will make the client unhappy.
Likewise, the delivery company may occasionally lose or damage some packages due to transportation
accidents. Nevertheless, the delivery company (like the barber) eventually learns with certainty about
any delays, damages or losses that entitle clients to complain about unsatisfactory service.
The mechanism we will develop in this section is quite simple. Before asking feedback from the
client, the mechanism gives the provider the opportunity to acknowledge failure, and reimburse the
client. Only when the provider claims good service does the reputation mechanism record the feedback
of the client. Contradictory reports (the provider claims good service, but the client submits negative
feedback) may only appear when one of the parties is lying, and therefore, both the client and the
provider are sanctioned: the provider suffers a loss as a consequence of the negative report, while the
client is given a small fine.
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One equilibrium of the mechanism is when providers always do their best to deliver the promised
quality, and truthfully acknowledge the failures caused by the environmental factors. Their “honest”
behavior is motivated by the threat that any mistake will drive the unsatisfied client away from the
market. When future transactions generate sufficient revenue, the provider does not afford to risk losing
a client, hence the equilibrium.
Unfortunately, this socially desired equilibrium is not unique. Clients can occasionally accept bad
service and keep returning to the same provider because they don’t have better alternatives. Moreover,
since complaining for bad service is sanctioned by the reputation mechanism, clients might be reluctant
to report negative feedback. Penalties for negative reports and the clients’ lack of choice drives the
provider to occasionally cheat in order to increase his revenue.
As a second result, we characterize the set of pareto-optimal equilibria of our mechanism and prove
that the amount of unreported cheating that can occur is limited by two factors. The first factor limits
the amount of cheating in general, and is given by the quality of the alternatives available to the clients.
Better alternatives increase the expectations of the clients, therefore the provider must cheat less in
order to keep his customers.
The second factor limits the amount of unreported cheating, and represents the cost incurred by
clients to establish a reputation for reporting the truth. By stubbornly exposing bad service when it
happens, despite the fine imposed by the reputation mechanism, the client signals to the provider that
she is committed to always report the truth. Such signals will eventually change the strategy of the
provider to full cooperation, who will avoid the punishment for negative feedback. Having a reputation
for reporting truthfully is of course, valuable to the client; therefore, a rational client accepts to lie (and
give up the reputation) only when the cost of building a reputation for reporting honestly is greater
than the occasional loss created by tolerated cheating. This cost is given by the ease with which the
provider switches to cooperative play, and by the magnitude of the fine imposed for negative feedback.
Our mechanism is similar to the one used by Papaioannou and Stamoulis (2005a,b, 2006) for peer-
to-peer applications. The authors require both transacting peers to submit feedback on their mutual
performance. If reports disagree, both parties are punished, however the severity of their punishment
depends on each agent’s non-credibility factor. This factor is maintained and evolved by the reputation
mechanism. Papaioannou and Stamoulis experimentally investigate a variety of peer-to-peer situations,
and show that a class of common lying strategies are successfully deterred by their scheme. The
main difference from their work, however, is that we consider all possible pareto-optimal equilibrium
strategies, and set upper bounds on the amount of untruthful information recorded by the reputation
mechanism.
Concretely, we will proceed by describing in more detail our mechanism (Section 5.4.1), and by
analyzing it from a game theoretic point of view (Section 5.4.2). We also establish the existence of the
cooperative equilibrium, and derive un upper bound on the amount of cheating that can occur in any
pareto-optimal equilibrium.
Then, we establish the cost of building a reputation for reporting honestly (Section 5.4.5), and hence
compute an upper bound on the percentage of false reports recorded by the reputation mechanism in
any equilibrium. Finally, Section 5.4.6 analyzes the impact of malicious buyers that explicitly try to
destroy the reputation of the provider, and gives initial approximations on the worst case damage such
buyers can cause to providers.
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5.4.1 The CONFESS Mechanism
We limit the model described in Section 5.2 to a binary setting where the effort exerted by the provider
can be high or low, and the quality observed by the clients is likewise, high or low. Formally, the set
of effort levels is E2 = {e0, e1} and the set of quality signals is Q2 = {q0, q1}. Moreover, we assume
that every client repeatedly interacts with the service provider, however, successive requests from the
same client are always interleaved with enough requests generated by other clients. Transactions are
assumed sequential, the provider does not have capacity constraints, and accepts all requests.
The price of service is p monetary units, but only high quality is valuable to the clients; the utility
of high quality is u. Low quality has utility 0, and can be precisely distinguished from high quality.
Before each round, the client can decide to request the service from the provider, or quit the market
and resort to an outside provider that is completely trustworthy. The outside provider always delivers
high quality service, but for a higher price p(1 + ρ).
If the client decides to interact with the online provider, she issues a request to the provider, and
pays for the service. The provider can now decide to exert low (e0) or high (e1) effort when treating
the request. Low effort has a normalized cost of 0, but generates only low quality. High effort is
expensive (normalized cost equals c(e1) = c) and generates high quality with probability α < 1. α is
fixed, and depends on the environmental factors outside the control of the provider. αp > c, so that it
is individually rational for providers to exert effort.
After exerting effort, the provider can observe the quality of the resulting service. He can then
decide to deliver the service as it is, or to acknowledge failure and roll back the transaction by fully
reimbursing7 the client. We assume perfect delivery channels, such that the client perceives exactly the
same quality as the provider. After delivery, the client inspects the quality of service, and can accuse
low quality by submitting a negative report to the reputation mechanism.
The reputation mechanism (RM) can oversee monetary transactions (i.e., payments made between
clients and the provider) and can impose fines on all parties; however, the RM does not observe the
effort level exerted by the provider, nor does it know the quality of the delivered service. The RM
asks feedback from the client only if she chose to transact with the provider in the current round (i.e.,
paid the price of service to the provider) and the provider delivered the service (i.e., provider did not
reimburse the client). When the client submits negative feedback, the RM punishes both the client and
the provider: the client must pay a fine ε, and the provider accumulates a negative reputation report.
Examples
A delivery service for perishable goods (goods that lose value past a certain deadline) is one example
where our mechanism can apply. Pizza, for example, must be delivered within 30 minutes, otherwise
it gets cold and loses its taste. Hungry clients can order at home, or drive to a more expensive local
restaurant, where they’re sure to get a hot pizza. The price of a home delivered pizza is p = 1, while at
the restaurant, the same pizza would cost p(1 + ρ) = 1.2. In both cases, the utility of a warm meal is
u = 2.
The pizza delivery provider must exert costly effort to deliver orders within the deadline. A courier
must be dispatched immediately (high effort), for an estimated cost of c = 0.8. While such action
usually results in good service (the probability of a timely delivery is α = 99%), traffic conditions and
unexpected accidents (e.g., the address is not easily found) may still delay some deliveries past the
7In reality, the provider might also pay a penalty for rolling back the transaction. As long as this penalty is small, the
qualitative results of this section remain valid.
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deadline.
Once at the destination, the delivery person, as well as the client, know if the delivery was late
or not. As it is common practice, the provider can acknowledge being late, and reimburse the client.
Clients may provide feedback to a reputation mechanism, but their feedback counts only if they were
not reimbursed. The client’s fine for submitting a negative report can be set for example at ε = 0.01.
The future loss to the provider caused by the negative report (and quantified through ε¯) depends on
the reputation mechanism.
A simplified market of car garagists or plumbers could fit the same model. The provider is commis-
sioned to repair a car (respectively the plumbing) and the quality of the work depends on the exerted
effort. High effort is more costly but ensures a lasting result with high probability. Low effort is cheap,
but the resulting fix is only temporary. In both cases, however, the warranty convention may spec-
ify the right of the client to ask for a reimbursement if problems reoccur within the warranty period.
Reputation feedback may be submitted at the end of the warranty period, and is accepted only if
reimbursements didn’t occur.
An interesting emerging application comes with a new generation of web services that can optimally
decide how to treat every request. For some service types, a high quality response requires the exclusive
use of costly resources. For example, computation jobs require CPU time, storage requests need disk
space, information requests need queries to databases. Sufficient resources, is a prerequisite, but not
a guarantee for good service. Software and hardware failures may occur, however, these failures are
properly signaled to the provider. Once monetary incentives become sufficiently important in such
markets, intelligent providers will identify the moral hazard problem, and may act strategically as
identified in our model.
5.4.2 Behavior and Reporting Incentives
From game theoretic point of view, one interaction between the client and the provider can be modeled
by the extensive-form game (G) with imperfect public information, shown in Figure 5.7. The client
moves first and decides (at node 1) whether to play in and interact with the provider, or to play out
and resort to the trusted outside option.
Once the client plays in, the provider can chose at node 2 whether to exert high or low effort
(i.e., plays e1 or e0 respectively). When the provider plays e0 the generated quality is low. When the
provider plays e1, nature chooses between high quality (q1) with probability α, and low quality (q0)
with probability 1− α. The constant α is assumed common knowledge in the market. Having seen the
resulting quality, the provider delivers (i.e., plays d) the service, or acknowledges low quality and rolls
back the transaction (i.e., plays l) by fully reimbursing the client. If the service is delivered, the client
can report positive (1) or negative (0) feedback.
A pure strategy is a deterministic mapping describing an action for each of the player’s information
sets. The client has three information sets in the game G. The first information set is singleton and
contains the node 1 at the beginning of game when the client must decide between playing in or out.
The second information set contains the nodes 7 and 8 (the dotted oval in Figure 5.7) where the client
must decide between reporting 0 or 1, given that she has received low quality, q0. The third information
set is singleton and contains the node 9 where the client must decide between reporting 0 or 1, given
that she received high quality, q1. The strategy in0q01q1 , for example, is the honest reporting strategy,
specifying that the client enters the game, reports 0 when she receives low quality, and reports 1 when
she receives high quality. The set of pure strategies of the client is:
AC = {out1q01q1 , out1q00q1 , out0q01q1 , out0q00q1 , in1q01q1 , in1q00q1 , in0q01q1 , in1q01q1};
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Figure 5.7: The game representing one interaction. Empty circles represent decision nodes,
edge labels represent actions, full circles represent terminal nodes and the dotted oval rep-
resents an information set. Payoffs are represented in rectangles, the top row describes the
payoff of the client, the second row describes the payoff of the provider.
Similarly, the set of pure strategies of the provider is:
AP = {e0l, e0d, e1lq0 lq1 , e1lq0dq1 , e1dq0 lq1 , e1dq0dq1};
where e1lq0dq1 , for example, is the socially desired strategy: the provider exerts effort at node 2,
acknowledges low quality at node 5, and delivers high quality at node 6. A pure strategy profile s is a
pair (sC , sP ) where sC ∈ AC and sP ∈ AP . If ∆(A) denotes the set of probability distributions over
the elements of A, σC ∈ ∆(AC) and σP ∈ ∆(AP ) are mixed strategies for the client, respectively the
provider, and σ = (σC , σP ) is a mixed strategy profile.
The payoffs to the players depend on the chosen strategy profile, and on the move of nature. Let
g(σ) =
(
gC(σ), gP (σ)
)
denote the pair of expected payoffs received by the client, respectively by the
provider when playing strategy profile σ. The function g : ∆(AC) × ∆(AP ) → R2 is characterized in
Table 5.1 and also describes the normal form transformation of G. Besides the corresponding payments
made between the client and the provider, Table 5.1 also reflects the influence of the reputation mech-
anism, as further explained in Section 5.4.3. The four strategies of the client that involve playing out
at node 1 generate the same outcomes, and therefore, have been collapsed for simplicity into a single
row of Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Normal transformation of the extensive form game, G
5.4.3 Implementation in the Reputation Mechanism
For every interaction, the reputation mechanism records one of the three different signals it may receive:
positive feedback when the client reports 1, negative feedback when the client reports 0, and neutral
feedback when the provider rolls back the transaction and reimburses the client. In Figure 5.7 (and
Table 5.1) positive and neutral feedback do not influence the payoff of the provider, while negative
feedback imposes a punishment equivalent to ε¯.
Two considerations made us choose this representation. First, we associate neutral and positive
feedback with the same reward (0 in this case) because intuitively, the acknowledgement of failure may
also be regarded as “honest” behavior on behalf of the provider. Failures occur despite best effort, and
by acknowledging them, the provider shouldn’t suffer.
However, neutral feedback may also result because the provider did not exert effort. The lack of
punishment for these instances contradicts the goal of the reputation mechanism to encourage exertion
of effort. Fortunately, the action e0l can be the result of rational behavior only in two circumstances,
both excusable: one, when the provider defends himself against a malicious client that is expected to
falsely report negative feedback (details in Section 5.4.6), and two, when the environmental noise is too
big (α is too small) to justify exertion of effort. Neutral feedback can be used to estimate the parameter
α, or to detect coalitions of malicious clients, and indirectly, may influence the revenue of the provider.
However, for the simplified model presented above, positive and neutral feedback are considered the
same in terms of generated payoffs.
The second argument relates to the role of the RM to constrain the revenue of the provider depending
on the feedback of the client. There are several ways of doing that. In Section 5.3.1 we have seen that
one way to punish the provider when the clients submit negative reports is by exclusion. After each
negative report the reputation mechanism randomly decides to bans the provider from the market. The
probability distribution for the random decision can be tuned such that the provider has the incentive
to cooperate almost all the time, and the market stays efficient. The second method for punishing
providers was presented in Section 5.3.2, where every negative report triggers the decrease of the price
the next N clients will pay for the service. For lower values of N the price decrease is higher, nonetheless,
N can take any value in an efficient market.
Both mechanisms work because the future losses offset the momentary gain the provider would
have had by intentionally cheating on the client. Note that these penalties are given endogenously by
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lost future opportunities, and require some minimum premiums for trusted providers. When margins
are not high enough, providers do not care enough about future transactions, and will use the present
opportunity of cheating.
Another option is to use exogenous penalties for cheating. For example, the provider may be
required to buy a licence for operating in the market8. The licence is partially destroyed by every
negative feedback. Totaly destroyed licences must be restored through a new payment, and remaining
parts can be sold if the provider quits the market. The price of the licence and the amount that
is destroyed by a negative feedback can be scaled such that rational providers have the incentive to
cooperate. Unlike the previous solutions, this mechanism does not require minimum transaction margins
as punishments for negative feedback are directly subtracted from the upfront deposit.
One way or another, all reputation mechanisms foster cooperation because the provider associates
value to client feedback. Let V (R+) and V (R−) be the value of a positive, respectively a negative
report. In the game in Figure 5.7, V (R+) is normalized to 0, and V (R−) is ε¯. V (R−) can also be
seen as the difference between the equilibrium continuation payoff expected by the provider following a
negative, instead of a positive report (see Section 5.2.3). By using this notation, we abstract away the
details of the reputation mechanism, and retain only the essential punishment associated with negative
feedback. Any reputation mechanism can be plugged in our scheme, as long as the particular constraints
(e.g., minimum margins for transactions) are satisfied.
One last aspect to be considered is the influence of the reputation mechanism on the future transac-
tions of the client. If negative reports attract lower prices, rational long-run clients might be tempted to
falsely report in order to purchase cheaper services in the future. Fortunately, some of the mechanisms
designed for single-run clients, do not influence the reporting strategy of long-run clients. The repu-
tation mechanism that only keeps the last N reports (Section 5.3.2) is one of them. A false negative
report only influences the next N transactions of the provider; given that more than N other requests
are interleaved between any two successive requests of the same client, a dishonest reporter cannot
decrease the price for her future transactions.
The licence-based mechanism we have described above is another example. The price of service
remains unchanged, therefore reporting incentives are unaffected. On the other hand, when negative
feedback is punished by exclusion, clients may be more reluctant to report negatively, since they also
lose a trading partner.
5.4.4 Analysis of Equilibria
The one-time game presented in Figure 5.7 has only one subgame equilibrium where the client opts out.
When asked to report feedback, the client always prefers to report 1 (reporting 0 attracts the penalty ε).
Knowing this, the best strategy for the provider is to exert low effort and deliver the service. Knowing
the provider will play e0d, it is strictly better for the client to play out.
The repeated game between the same client and provider may, however, have other equilibria. Before
analyzing the repeated game, let us note that every interaction between a provider and a particular
client can be strategically isolated and considered independently. As the provider accepts all clients and
views them identically, he will maximize his expected revenue in each of the isolated repeated games.
From now on, we will only consider the repeated interaction between the provider and one client.
This can be modeled by a T -fold repetition of the stage game G, denoted GT , where T is finite or
infinite. We will deal here with the infinite horizon case, however, the results obtained can also be
applied with minor modifications to finitely repeated games where T is large enough.
8The reputation mechanism can buy and sell market licences
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If δˆ is the per period discount factor reflecting the probability that the market ceases to exist after
each round, (or the present value of future revenues), let us denote by δ the expected discount factor
in the game GT . If our client interacts with the provider on the average every N rounds, δ = δˆN .
The life-time expected payoff of the players is computed as:
T∑
τ=0
δτgτi ;
where i ∈ {C,P} is the client, respectively the provider, gτi is the expected payoff obtained by player i
in the τ th interaction, and δτ is the discount applied to compute the present day value of gτi .
We will consider normalized life-time expected payoffs, so that payoffs in G and GT can be expressed
using the same measure:
Vi = (1− δ)
T∑
τ=0
δτgτi ; (5.14)
We define the average continuation payoff for player i from period t onward (and including period
t) as:
V ti = (1− δ)
T∑
τ=t
δτ−tgτi ; (5.15)
The set of outcomes publicly perceived by both players after each round is:
Y = {out, l, q01, q00, q11, q10}
where:
• out is observed when the client opts out,
• l is observed when the provider acknowledges low quality and rolls back the transaction,
• qi j is observed when the provider delivers quality qi ∈ {q0, q1} and the client reports j ∈ {0, 1}.
We denote by ht a specific public history of the repeated game out of the set Ht = (×Y )t of all possible
histories up to and including period t. In the repeated game, a public strategy σi of player i is a sequence
of maps (σti), where σ
t
i : H
t−1 → ∆(Ai) prescribes the (mixed) strategy to be played in round t, after
the public history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1. A perfect public equilibrium (PPE) is a profile of public strategies
σ = (σC , σP ) that, beginning at any time t and given any public history ht−1, form a Nash equilibrium
from that point on (Fudenberg et al., 1994). V ti (σ) is the continuation payoff to player i given by the
strategy profile σ.
G is a game with product structure since any public outcome can be expressed as a vector of two
components (yC , yP ) such that the distribution of yi depends only on the actions of player i ∈ {C,P},
the client, respectively the provider. For such games, Fudenberg et al. (1994) establish a Folk Theorem
proving that any feasible, individually rational payoff profile is achievable as a PPE of G∞ when
the discount factor is close enough to 1. The set of feasible, individually rational payoff profiles is
characterized by:
• the minimax payoff to the client, obtained by the option out: VC = u− p(1 + ρ);
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Figure 5.8: The pareto-optimal frontier of the set of feasible, individually rational payoff
profiles of G.
• the minimax payoff to the provider, obtained when the provider plays e0l: VP = 0;
• the pareto optimal frontier (graphically presented in Figure 5.8) delimited by the payoffs given
by (linear combination of) the strategy profiles (in1q01q1 , e1lq0dq1), (in1q01q1 , e1dq0dq1) and
(in1q01q1 , e0d).
and contains more than one point (i.e., the payoff when the client plays out) when α(u−p) > u−p(1+ρ)
and αp−c > 0. Both conditions impose restrictions on the minimum margin generated by a transaction
such that the interaction is profitable. The PPE payoff profile that gives the provider the maximum
payoff is (VC , VP ) where:
VP =
{
α ∗ u− c− u+ p(1 + ρ) if ρ ≤ u(1−α)
p
p+ c(pρ−u)
αu
if ρ > u(1−α)
p
and VC is defined above.
While completely characterizing the set of PPE payoffs for discount factors strictly smaller than 1
is outside the scope of this section, let us note the following results:
First, if the discount factor is high enough (but strictly less than 1) with respect to the profit margin
obtained by the provider from one interaction, there is at least one PPE such that the reputation
mechanism records only honest reports. Moreover, this equilibrium is pareto-optimal.
Proposition 5.4.1 When δ > pp(1+α)−c , the strategy profile:
• the provider always exerts high effort, and delivers only high quality; if the client deviates from
the equilibrium , the provider switches to e0d for the rest of the rounds;
• the client always reports 1 when asked to submit feedback; if the provider deviates, (i.e., she receives
low quality), the client switches to out for the rest of the rounds.
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is a pareto-optimal PPE.
Proof. It is not profitable for the client to deviate from the equilibrium path. Reporting 0 attracts the
penalty ε in the present round, and the termination of the interaction with the provider (the provider
stops exerting effort from that round onwards).
The provider, on the other hand, can momentarily gain by deviating to e1dq0dq1 or e0d. A deviation
to e1dq0dq1 gives an expected momentary gain of p(1 − α) and an expected continuation loss of (1 −
α)(αp − c). A deviation to e0d brings an expected momentary gain equal to (1 − α)p + c and an
expected continuation loss of αp− c. For the discount factor satisfying our hypothesis, both deviations
are not profitable. The discount factor is low enough with respect to profit margins, such that the
future revenues given by the equilibrium strategy offset the momentary gains obtained by deviating.
The equilibrium payoff profile is (VC , VP ) = (α(u− p), αp− c), which is pareto-optimal and socially
efficient. ¥
Second, we can prove that the client never reports negative feedback in any pareto-optimal PPE,
regardless the value of the discount factor. The restriction to pareto-optimal is justifiable by practical
reasons: assuming that the client and the provider can somehow negotiate the equilibrium they are
going to play, it makes most sense to choose one of the pareto-optimal equilibria.
Proposition 5.4.2 The probability that the client reports negative feedback on the equilibrium path of
any pareto-optimal PPE strategy is zero.
Proof. The full proof presented in Appendix 5.D follows the following steps. Step 1, all equilibrium
payoffs can be expressed by adding the present round payoff to the discounted continuation payoff from
the next round onward. Step 2, take the PPE payoff profile V = (VC , VP ), such that there is no other
PPE payoff profile V ′ = (V ′C , VP ) with VC < V
′
C . The client never reports negative feedback in the
first round of the equilibrium that gives V . Step 3, the equilibrium continuation payoff after the first
round also satisfies the conditions set for V . Hence, the probability that the client reports negative
feedback on the equilibrium path that gives V is 0. Pareto-optimal PPE payoff profiles clearly satisfy
the definition of V , hence the result of the proposition. ¥
The third result we want to mention here, is that there is an upper bound on the percentage of
false reports recorded by the reputation mechanism in any of the pareto-optimal equilibria.
Proposition 5.4.3 The upper bound on the percentage of false reports recorded by the reputation mech-
anism in any PPE equilibrium is:
γ ≤
{
(1−α)(p−u)+pρ
p
if pρ ≤ u(1− α);
pρ
u
if pρ > u(1− α) (5.16)
Proof. The full proof presented in Appendix 5.E builds directly on the result of Proposition 5.4.2. Since
clients never report negative feedback along pareto-optimal equilibria, the only false reports recorded by
the reputation mechanism appear when the provider delivers low quality, and the client reports positive
feedback. However, any PPE profile must give the client at least VC = u − p(1 + ρ), otherwise the
client is better off by resorting to the outside option. Every round in which the provider deliberatively
delivers low quality gives the client a payoff strictly smaller than u − p(1 + ρ). An equilibrium payoff
greater than VC is therefore possible only when the percentage of rounds where the provider delivers low
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quality is bounded. The same bound limits the percentage of false reports recorded by the reputation
mechanism. ¥
For a more intuitive understanding of the results presented in this section, let us refer to the pizza
delivery example detailed in Section 5.4.1. The price of a home delivered pizza is p = 1, while at the
local restaurant the same pizza would cost p(1 + ρ) = 1.2. The utility of a warm pizza to the client is
u = 2, the cost of delivery is c = 0.8 and the probability that unexpected traffic conditions delay the
delivery beyond the 30 minutes deadline (despite the best effort of the provider) is 1− α = 0.01.
The client can secure a minimax payoff of VC = u − p(1 + ρ) = 0.8 by always going out to the
restaurant. However, the socially desired equilibrium happens when the client orders pizza at home,
and the pizza service exerts effort to deliver pizza in time: in this case the payoff of the client is
VC = α(u− p) = 0.99, while the payoff of the provider is VP = αp− c = 0.19.
Proposition 5.4.1 gives a lower bound on the discount factor of the pizza delivery service such
that repeated clients can expect the socially desired equilibrium. This bound is δ = pp(1+α)−c = 0.84;
assuming that the daily discount factor of the pizza service is δˆ = 0.996, the same client must order
pizza at home at least once every 6 weeks. The values of the discount factors can also be interpreted
in terms of the minimum number of rounds the client (and the provider) will likely play the game. For
example, the discount factor can be viewed as the probability that the client (respectively the provider)
will “live” for another interaction in the market. It follows that the average lifetime of the provider is
at least 1/(1− δˆ) = 250 interactions (with all clients), while the average lifetime of the client is at least
1/(1− δ) = 7 interactions (with the same pizza delivery service). These are clearly realistic numbers.
Proposition 5.4.3 gives an upper bound on the percentage of false reports that our mechanism may
record in equilibrium from the clients. As u(1− α) = 0.02 < 0.2 = pρ, this limit is:
γ =
pρ
u
= 0.1;
It follows that at least 90% of the reports recorded by our mechanism (in any equilibrium) are correct.
The false reports (false positive reports) result from rare cases where the pizza delivery is intentionally
delayed to save some cost but clients do not complain. The false report can be justified, for example,
by the provider’s threat to refuse future orders from clients that complain. Given that late deliveries
are still rare enough, clients are better off with the home delivery than with the restaurant, hence they
accept the threat. As other options become available to the clients (e.g., competing delivery services)
the bound γ will decrease.
Please note that the upper bound defined by Proposition 5.4.3 only depends on the outside alterna-
tive available to the provider, and is not influenced by the punishment ε¯ introduced by the reputation
mechanism. This happens because the revenue of a client is independent of the interactions of other
clients, and therefore, on the reputation information as reported by other clients. Equilibrium strategies
are exclusively based on the direct experience of the client. In the following section, however, we will
refine this bound by considering that clients can build a reputation for reporting honestly. There, the
punishment ε¯ plays an important role.
5.4.5 Building a Reputation for Truthful Reporting
An immediate consequence of Propositions 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 is that the provider can extract all of the
surplus created by the transactions by occasionally delivering low quality, and convincing the clients
not to report negative feedback (providers can do so by promising sufficiently high continuation payoffs
that prevent the client to resort to the outside provider). Assuming that the provider has more “power”
in the market, he could influence the choice of the equilibrium strategy to one that gives him the most
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revenue, and holds the clients close to the minimax payoff VC = u − p(1 + ρ) given by the outside
option.9
However, a client who could commit to report honestly, (i.e., commit to play the strategy s∗C =
in0q01q1) would benefit from cooperative trade. The provider’s best response against s∗C is to play
e1l
q0dq1 repeatedly, which leads the game to the socially efficient outcome. Unfortunately the com-
mitment to s∗C is not credible in the complete information game, for the reasons explained in Section
5.4.4.
Following the results of Kreps et al. (1982), Fudenberg and Levine (1989) and Schmidt (1993)
we know that such honest reporting commitments may become credible in a game with incomplete
information. Suppose that the provider has incomplete information in G∞, and believes with non-
negative probability that he is facing a committed client that always reports the truth. A rational
client can then “fake” the committed client, and “build a reputation” for reporting honestly. When the
reputation becomes credible, the provider will play e1lq0dq1 (the best response against s∗C), which is
better for the client than the payoff she would obtain if the provider knew she was the “rational” type.
As an effect of reputation building, the set of equilibrium points is reduced to a set where the
payoff to the client is higher than the payoff obtained by a client committed to report honestly. As
anticipated from Proposition 5.4.3, a smaller set of equilibrium points also reduces the bound of false
reports recorded by the reputation mechanism. In certain cases, this bound can be reduced to almost
zero.
Formally, incomplete information can be modeled by a perturbation of the complete information
repeated game G∞ such that in period 0 (before the first round of the game is played) the “type” of
the client is drawn by nature out of a countable set Θ according to the probability measure µ. The
client’s payoff now additionally depends on her type. We say that in the perturbed game G∞(µ) the
provider has incomplete information because he is not sure about the true type of the client.
Two types from Θ have particular importance:
• The “normal” type of the client, denoted by θ0, is the rational client who has the payoffs presented
in Figure 5.7.
• The “commitment” type of the client, denoted by θ∗, always prefers to play the commitment
strategy s∗C . From a rational perspective, the commitment type client obtains an arbitrarily high
supplementary reward for reporting the truth. This external reward makes the strategy s∗C the
dominant strategy, and therefore, no commitment type client will play anything else than s∗C .
In Theorem 5.4.1 we give an upper bound kP on the number of times the provider delivers low
quality in G∞(µ), given that he always observes the client reporting honestly.
The intuition behind this result is the following. The provider’s best response to a honest reporter is
e1l
q0dq1 : always exert high effort, and deliver only when the quality is high. This gives the commitment
type client her maximum attainable payoff in G∞(µ), corresponding to the socially efficient outcome.
The provider, however, would be better off by playing against the normal type client, against whom he
can obtain an expected payoff greater than αp− c.
The normal type client may be distinguished from a commitment type client only in the rounds
when the provider delivers low quality: the commitment type always reports negative feedback, while
9All pareto-optimal PPE payoff profiles are also renegotiation-proof (Bernheim and Ray, 1989; Farrell and Maskin,
1989). This follows from the proof of Proposition 5.16: the continuation payoffs enforcing a pareto-optimal PPE payoff
profile are also pareto-optimal. Therefore, clients falsely report positive feedback even under the more restrictive notion
of negotiation-proof equilibrium.
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the normal type might decide to report positive feedback in order to avoid the penalty ε. The provider
can therefore decide to deliver low quality to the client in order to test her real type. The question is,
how many times should the provider test the true type of the client.
Every failed test (i.e., the provider delivers low quality and the client reports negative feedback)
generates a loss of −ε¯ to the provider, and slightly enforces the belief that the client reports honestly.
Since the provider cannot wait infinitely for future payoffs, there must be a time when the provider will
stop testing the type of the provider, and accepts to play the socially efficient strategy, e1lq0dq1 .
The switch to the socially efficient strategy is not triggered by a revelation of the client’s type. The
provider believes that the client behaves as if she were a commitment type, not that the client is a
commitment type. The client may very well be a normal type who chooses to mimic the commitment
type, in the hope that she will obtain better service from the provider. However, further trying to
determine the true type of the client is too costly for the provider. Therefore, the provider chooses to
play e1lq0dq1 , which is the best response to the commitment strategy s∗C .
Theorem 5.4.1 If the provider has incomplete information in G∞, and assigns positive probability to
the normal and commitment type of the client (µ(θ0) > 0, µ∗0 = µ(θ
∗) > 0), there is a finite upper
bound, kP , on the number of times the provider delivers low quality in any equilibrium of G∞(µ). This
upper bound is:
kP =
 ln(µ∗0)
ln
(
δ(VP−αp+c)+(1−δ)p
δ(VP−αp+c)+(1−δ)ε¯
)
 (5.17)
Proof. First, we use an important result obtained by Fudenberg and Levine (1989) about statistical
inference (Lemma 1): If every previously delivered low quality service was sanctioned by a negative
report, the provider must expect with increasing probability that his next low quality delivery will also
be sanctioned by negative feedback. Technically, for any pi < 1, the provider can deliver at most n(pi)
low quality services (sanctioned by negative feedback) before expecting that the n(pi) + 1 low quality
delivery will also be sanctioned by negative feedback with probability greater then pi. This number
equals to:
n(pi) =
⌊
lnµ∗
lnpi
⌋
;
As stated earlier, this lemma does not prove that the provider will become convinced that he is
facing a commitment type client. It simply proves that after a finite number of rounds the provider
becomes convinced that the client is playing as if she were a commitment type.
Second, if pi > δVP
δVP+(1−δ)ε¯ but is strictly smaller than 1, the rational provider does not deliver low
quality (it is easy to verify that the maximum discounted future gain does not compensate for the risk
of getting a negative feedback in the present round). By the previously mentioned lemma, it must be
that in any equilibrium, the provider delivers low quality a finite number of times.
Third, let us analyze the round, t¯, when the provider is about to deliver a low quality service (play
dq0) for the last time. If pi is the belief of the provider that the client reports honestly in round t¯, his
expected payoff (just before deciding to deliver the low quality service) can be computed as follows:
• with probability pi the client reports 0. Her reputation for reporting honestly becomes credible,
so the provider plays e1lq0dq1 in all subsequent rounds. The provider gains p − ε¯ in the current
round, and expects αp− c for the subsequent rounds;
152 Sanctioning Reputation Mechanisms
• with probability 1 − pi, the client reports 1 and deviates from the commitment strategy, the
provider knows he is facing a rational client, and can choose a continuation PPE strategy from
the complete information game. He gains p in the current round, and expects at most VP in the
subsequent rounds;
VP ≤ (1− δ)(p− piε¯) + δ(pi(αp− c) + (1− pi)VP )
On the other hand, had the provider acknowledged the low quality and rolled back the transaction
(i.e., play lq0), his expected payoff would have been at least:
V ′P ≥ (1− δ)0 + δ(αp− c)
Since the provider chooses nonetheless to play dq0 it must be that VP ≥ V ′P which is equivalent to:
pi ≤ pi = δ(VP − αp+ c) + (1− δ)p
δ(VP − αp+ c) + (1− δ)ε¯
(5.18)
Finally, by replacing Eq. (5.18) in the definition of n(pi) we obtain the upper bound on the number
of times the provider delivers low quality service to a client committed to report honestly. ¥
The existence of kP further reduces the possible equilibrium payoffs a client can get in G∞(µ).
Consider a rational client who receives for the first time low quality. She has the following options:
• report negative feedback and attempt to build a reputation for reporting honestly. Her payoff for
the current round is −p− ε. Moreover, her worst case expectation for the future is that the next
kP − 1 rounds will also give her −p− ε, followed by the commitment payoff equal to α(u− p):
VC |0 = (1− δ)(−p− ε) + δ(1− δkP−1)(−p− ε) + δkP α(u− p); (5.19)
• on the other hand, by reporting positive feedback she reveals to be a normal type, loses only p in
the current round, and expects a continuation payoff equal to VˆC given by a PPE strategy profile
of the complete information game G∞:
VC |1 = (1− δ)(−p) + δVˆC ; (5.20)
The reputation mechanism records false reports only when clients do not have the incentive to build
a reputation for reporting honestly, and VC |1 > VC |0; this is true for:
VˆC > δ
kP−1α(u− p)− (1− δkP−1)(p+ ε)− 1− δ
δ
ε;
Following the argument of Proposition 5.4.3 we can obtain a bound on the percentage of false reports
recorded by the reputation mechanism in a pareto-optimal PPE that gives the client at least VˆC :
γˆ =
{
α(u−p)−VˆC
p
if VˆC ≥ αu− p;
u−p−VˆC
u
if VˆC < αu− p
(5.21)
Of particular importance is the case when kP = 1. VˆC and γˆ become:
VˆC = α(u− p)− 1− δ
δ
ε; γˆ =
(1− δ)ε
δp
; (5.22)
5.4. A Mechanism for Obtaining Reliable Feedback Reports 153
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
µ∗
0
k
P
Figure 5.9: The upper bound kP as a function of the prior belief µ∗0.
so the probability of recording a false report (after the first one) can be arbitrarily close to 0 as ε→ 0.
For the pizza delivery example introduced in Section 5.4.1, Figure 5.9 plots the bound, kP , defined
in Theorem 5.4.1, as a function of the prior belief (µ∗0) of the provider that the client is an honest
reporter. We have used a value of the discount factor equal to δ = 0.95, such that on average, every
client interacts 1/(1 − δ) = 20 times with the same provider. The penalty for negative feedback was
taken ε¯ = 2.5. When the provider believes that 20% of the clients always report honestly, he will deliver
at most 3 times low quality. When the belief goes up to µ∗0 = 40% no rational provider will deliver low
quality more than once.
In Figure 5.10 we plot the values of the bounds γ from Eq. (5.16) and γˆ from Eq. (5.21) as a
function of the prior belief µ∗0. The bounds simultaneously hold, therefore the maximum percentage of
false reports recorded by the reputation mechanism is the minimum of the two. When µ∗0 is less 0.25,
kP ≥ 2, γ ≤ γˆ, and the reputation effect does not significantly reduce the worst case percentage of false
reports recorded by the mechanism. However, when µ∗0 ∈ (0.25, 0.4) the reputation mechanism records
(in the worst case) only half as many false reports, and as µ∗0 > 0.4, the percentage of false reports
drops to 0.005. This probability can be further decreased by decreasing the penalty ε. In the limit, as
ε approaches 0, the reputation mechanism will register a false report with vanishing probability.
The result of Theorem 5.4.1 has to be interpreted as a worst case scenario. In real markets, providers
that already have a small predisposition to cooperate will defect fewer times. Moreover, the mechanism
is self enforcing, in the sense that the more clients act as commitment types, the higher will be the prior
beliefs of the providers that new, unknown clients will report truthfully, and therefore the easier it will
be for the new clients to act as truthful reporters.
As mentioned at the end of Section 5.4.4, the bound γˆ strongly depends on the punishment ε¯
imposed by the reputation mechanism for a negative feedback. The higher ε¯, the easier it is for clients
to build a reputation, and therefore, the lower the amount of false information recorded by the reputation
mechanism.
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Figure 5.10: The maximum probability of recording a false report as a function of the prior
belief µ∗0.
5.4.6 The Threat of Malicious Clients
The mechanism described so far encourages service providers to do their best and deliver good service.
The clients were assumed rational, or committed to report honestly, and in either case, they never
report negative feedback unfairly. In this section, we investigate what happens when clients explicitly
try to “hurt” the providers by submitting fake negative ratings to the reputation mechanism.
An immediate consequence of fake negative reports is that clients lose money. However, the costs ε
of a negative report would probably be too small to deter clients with separate agendas from hurting the
provider. Fortunately, the mechanism we propose naturally protects service providers from consistent
attacks initiated by malicious clients.
Formally, a malicious type client, θβ ∈ Θ, obtains a supplementary (external) payoff β for reporting
negative feedback. Obviously, β has to be greater than the penalty ε, otherwise the results of Proposition
5.4.2 would apply. In the incomplete information game G∞(µ), the provider now assigns non-zero initial
probability to the belief that the client is malicious.
When only the normal type, θ0, the honest reporter type θ∗ and the malicious type θβ have non-zero
initial probability, the mechanism we describe is robust against unfair negative reports. The first false
negative report exposes the client as being malicious, since neither the normal, nor the commitment
type report 0 after receiving high quality. By Bayes’ Law, the provider’s updated belief following a false
negative report must assign probability 1 to the malicious type. Although providers are not allowed to
refuse service requests, they can protect themselves against malicious clients by playing e0l: i.e., exert
low effort and reimburse the client afterwards. The RM records neutral feedback in this case, and does
not sanction the provider. Against e0l, malicious clients are better off by quitting the market (opt out),
thus stopping the attack. The RM records at most one false negative report for every malicious client,
and assuming that identity changes are difficult, providers are not vulnerable to unfair punishments.
When other types (besides θ0, θ∗ and θβ) have non-zero initial probability, malicious clients are
harder to detect. They could masquerade client types that are normal, but accidentally misreport.
It is not rational for the provider to immediately exclude (by playing e0l) normal clients that rarely
misreport: the majority of the cooperative transactions rewarded by positive feedback still generate
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positive payoffs. Let us now consider the client type θ0(ν) ∈ Θ that behaves exactly like the normal
type, but misreports 0 instead of 1 independently with probability ν. When interacting with the client
type θ0(ν), the provider receives the maximum number of unfair negative reports when playing the
efficient equilibrium: i.e., e1lq0dq1 . In this case, the provider’s expected payoff is:
VP = αp− c− νε¯;
Since VP has to be positive (the minimax payoff of the provider is 0, given by e0l), it must be that
ν ≤ αp−cε¯ .
The maximum value of ν is also a good approximation for the maximum percentage of false negative
reports the malicious type can submit to the reputation mechanism. Any significantly higher number
of harmful reports exposes the malicious type and allows the provider to defend himself.
Note, however, that the malicious type can submit a fraction ν of false reports only when the
type θ0(ν) has positive prior probability. When the provider does not believe that a normal client can
make so many mistakes (even if the percentage of false reports is still low enough to generate positive
revenues) he attributes the false reports to a malicious type, and disengages from cooperative behavior.
Therefore, one method to reduce the impact of malicious clients is to make sure that normal clients
make few or no mistakes. Technical means (for example by providing automated tools for formatting
and submitting feedback), or improved user interfaces (that make it easier for human users to spot
reporting mistakes) will greatly limit the percentage of mistakes made by normal clients, and therefore,
also reduce the amount of harm done by malicious clients.
One concrete method for reducing mistakes is to solicit only negative feedback from the clients (the
principle that no news is good news, also applied by Dellarocas (2005)). As reporting involves some
conscious decision, mistakes will be less frequent. On the other hand, the reporting effort will add to
the penalty for a negative report, and makes it harder for normal clients to establish a reputation for
honest reporters. Alternative methods for reducing the harm done by malicious clients (like filtering
mechanisms, etc., ) as well as tighter bounds on the percentage of false reports introduced by such
clients will be further addressed in future work.
5.4.7 Remarks
Further benefits can be obtained if the clients’ reputation for reporting honestly is shared within the
market. The reports submitted by a client while interacting with other providers will change the initial
beliefs of a new provider. As we have seen in Section 5.4.5, providers cheat less if they a priory expect
with higher probability to encounter honest reporting clients. A client that has once built a reputation
for truthfully reporting the provider’s behavior will benefit from cooperative trade during her entire
lifetime, without having to convince each provider separately. Therefore the upper bound on the loss
a client has to withstand in order to convince a provider that she is a commitment type, becomes an
upper bound on the total loss a client has to withstand during her entire lifetime in the market. How
to effectively share the reputation of clients within the market remains an open issue.
Correlated with this idea is the observation that clients that use our mechanism are motivated to
keep their identity. In generalized markets where agents are encouraged to play both roles (e.g. a
peer-2-peer file sharing market where the fact that an agent acts only as “provider” can be interpreted
as a strong indication of “double identity” with the intention of cheating) our mechanism also solves
the problem signaled by Friedman and Resnick (2001) related to cheap online pseudonyms. The price
to pay for the new identity is the loss due to building a reputation as truthful reporter when acting as
a client.
Unlike incentive-compatible mechanism that pay reporters depending on the feedback provided by
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peers, the mechanism described here is less vulnerable to collusion. The only reason individual clients
would collude is to badmouth (i.e., artificially decrease the reputation of) a provider. However, as long
as the punishment for negative feedback is not super-linear in the number of reports (this is usually the
case), coordinating within a coalition brings no benefits for the colluders: individual actions are just
as effective as the actions when part of a coalition. The collusion between the provider and client can
only accelerate the synchronization of strategies on one of the PPE profiles (collusion on a non-PPE
strategy profile is not stable), which is rather desirable. The only profitable collusion can happen when
competitor providers incentivize normal clients to unfairly downrate their current provider. Colluding
clients become malicious in this case, and the limits on the harm they can do are presented in Section
5.4.6.
The CONFESS mechanism is not a general solution for all online markets. In general retail e-
commerce, clients don’t usually interact with the same service provider more than once, which violates
a crucial assumption behind our results. Nevertheless, we believe there are several scenarios of practical
importance that do meet our requirements (e.g., interactions that are part of a supply chain). For
these, our mechanism can be used in conjunction with other reputation mechanisms to guarantee
reliable feedback and improve the overall efficiency of the market.
Although we present a setting where the service always costs the same amount, the results can
be extended to scenarios where the provider may deliver different kinds of services, having different
prices. As long as the provider believes that requests are randomly drawn from some distribution, the
bounds presented above can be computed using the average values of u, p and c. The constraint on
the provider’s belief is necessary in order to exclude some unlikely situations where the provider cheats
on a one time high value transaction, knowing that the following interactions carry little revenue, and
therefore, cannot impose effective punishments.
We also systematically overestimate the bounds on the worst case percentage of false reports
recorded by the mechanism. The computation of tight bounds requires a precise quantitative de-
scription of the actual set of PPE payoffs the client and the provider can have in G∞. Fudenberg et al.
(1994) and Abreu et al. (1990) pose the theoretical grounds for computing the set of PPE payoffs in
an infinitely repeated game with discount factors strictly smaller than 1. However, efficient algorithms
that allow us to find this set are still an open question. As research in this domain progresses, we expect
to be able to significantly lower the upper bounds described in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.5.
One direction of future research is to study the behavior of the above mechanism when there is
two-sided incomplete information: i.e. the client is also uncertain about the type of the provider. A
provider type of particular importance is the “greedy” type who always likes to keep the client to a
continuation payoff arbitrarily close to the minimal one. In this situation we expect to be able to find
an upper bound kC on the number of rounds in which a rational client would be willing to test the true
type of the provider. The condition kP < kC describes the constraints on the parameters of the system
for which the reputation effect will work in the favor of the client: i.e. the provider will give up first
the “psychological” war and revert to a cooperative equilibrium.
The problem of involuntary reporting mistakes briefly mentioned in Section 5.4.6 needs further
addressing. Besides false negative mistakes (reporting 0 instead of 1), normal clients can also make
false positive mistakes (report 1 instead of the intended 0). In our present framework, one such mistake
is enough ro ruin the reputation of a normal type client to report honestly. This is one of the reasons why
we chose a sequential model where the feedback of the client is not required if the provider acknowledges
low quality. Once the reputation of the client becomes credible, the provider always rolls back the
transactions that generate (accidentally or not) low quality, so the client is not required to continuously
defend her reputation. Nevertheless, the consequences of reporting mistakes in the reputation building
phase must be considered in more detail. Similarly, mistakes made by the provider, monitoring and
communication errors will also influence the results presented here.
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Last, but not the least, practical implementations of the mechanism we propose must address the
problem of persistent online identities. One possible attack created by easy identity changes has been
mentioned in Section 5.4.6: malicious buyers can continuously change identity in order to discredit
the provider. In another attack, the provider can use fake identities to increase his revenue. When
punishments for negative feedback are generated endogenously by decreased prices in a fixed number of
future transactions (Dellarocas, 2005), the provider can adopt the following strategy: he cheats on all
real customers, but generates a sufficient number of fake transactions in between two real transactions,
such that the effect created by the real negative report disappears. An easy fix to this latter attack is
to charge transaction or entrance fees. However, these measures also affect the overall efficiency of the
market, and therefore, different applications will most likely need individual solutions.
5.5 Summary of Results
This chapter addresses the design of sanctioning reputation mechanisms for settings with moral hazard.
They allow sellers to credibly commit that they will deliver the promised quality after having been paid
by the buyers, by enforcing punishments on cheating sellers: negative feedback decreases the reputation,
and hence the future opportunities and revenues available to the seller. The future loss is greater than
the momentary gain obtained by cheating, and therefore cooperation becomes an optimal strategy for
the sellers.
As opposed to signaling reputation mechanisms, sanctioning mechanisms can be designed in different
ways. For example, the designer can choose the granularity of the solicited feedback, the reputation
aggregation algorithm, and the amount of detail published to the other users. A deep understanding of
these design parameters is essential for encouraging efficient trading in the market.
Dellarocas (2005) was the first to address the optimal design of binary reputation mechanisms
where sellers can exert two effort levels, and buyers can observe two quality signals. In this chapter we
extend the results of Dellarocas to general sanctioning mechanisms where sellers can exert any number
of effort levels, and buyers can perceive any number of quality signals. First, we find that a reputation
mechanism with two values of reputation (i.e., good or bad) can be efficient. Depending on the feedback
provided by the last buyer, the reputation mechanism randomly decides to exclude the seller from the
market. The probabilities governing the decision of the mechanism are scaled thus that the seller always
finds it optimal to exert the equilibrium effort level.
Second, we show that a reputation mechanism that considers only the last N reports can be efficient,
for any value of N . Such a mechanism has an equilibrium where the price paid by future buyers depends
on the feedback submitted by the last N clients. Bad feedback decreases the prices the seller can obtain
in the future N transactions, and encourages the seller to exert the expected (i.e., equilibrium) effort
level.
Third, we present an algorithm for computing deterministic reputation mechanisms that only have
pure equilibria. Such mechanisms can be desired, when, for example, buyers are risk averse, and mixed
strategies cause significant efficiency losses to the sellers. Unfortunately, pure strategy sanctioning
reputation mechanisms are hard to compute, and may generate payoffs that are strictly smaller than
the optimal one (however, potentially greater than the payoffs that consider the risk aversion of buyers).
Forth, we investigate the efficiency of the reputation mechanism as a function of feedback granularity.
Intuitively, as buyers are allowed to express finer grained feedback, the reputation mechanism should
have more precise information which should lead to increased efficiency of the market. Surprisingly,
however, a mechanism which accepts only L + 1 different feedback (where L is the number of effort
levels the seller can exert) can be just as efficient as a mechanism who allows infinitely fine-grained
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feedback. More detailed feedback can increase the efficiency of the mechanism only to the extent it
allows a better grouping of signals into a most L+ 1 classes.
Finally, we describe the CONFESS mechanism that can be coupled to any sanctioning reputation
mechanism to encourage the submission of honest feedback. CONFESS works by comparing the feed-
back submitted by the buyer to the feedback implicitly submitted by the seller. After every transaction,
the seller is allowed to acknowledge failures and reimburse the buyer, if the latter received bad quality.
If, however, the seller does not reimburse the buyer, and the buyer submits negatived feedback, the
reputation mechanism can conclude that (i) either the buyer is lying, or (ii) the seller cheated on the
buyer. Therefore, it punishes both the seller and the buyer: the seller’s reputation is decrease, and the
buyer must pay a small fine. When future transactions generate sufficient profit, we prove that there is
an equilibrium where the provider behaves as socially desired: he always exerts effort, and reimburses
clients that occasionally receive bad service due to uncontrollable factors. Moreover, we analyze the
set of pareto-optimal equilibria of the mechanism, and establish a limit on the maximum amount of
false information recorded by the mechanism. The bound depends both on the external alternatives
available to clients and on the ease with which they can commit to reporting the truth.
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Appendix 5.A Summary of Notation
Symbol Meaning
E = {e0, e1, ..., eL−1} the set of L effort levels;
E2 = {e0, e1} for binary settings, e0 is no effort, e1 is high effort;
Q = {q0, q1, ..., qM−1} the set of M observable quality signals;
Q2 = {q0, q1} = {0, 1} for binary settings, the negative and the positive signals
c(ei) the cost of effort ei;
vi(qk) the value of quality signal qk to buyer i;
v˜(·) the valuation function of the second highest bidder;
Pr[qj |ei] the probability that a buyer perceives the quality signal qj when the seller
exerts effort ei;
t time index;
p(t), p(ei) the price paid by the t
th buyer, equals the expected utility of the second highest
bidder; the expected price obtained for exerting effort ei;
δ the discount factor;
U , U ′, U¯ , U˜ , Uk the expected (normalized) lifetime revenue of the seller;
U , Uˆ the set of PPE payoffs of the seller; Uˆ is a discrete set;
G a game;
² ∈ ∆(E) a (mixed) strategy of the seller;
h(t) ∈ Qt−1 the sequence of feedback reported by the buyers up to (excluding) round t;
H(t) = Qt−1, H =
⋃∞
t=0H
(t) the set of all possible histories up to round t; H is the set of all possible
histories;
σS = (²
(t))t=0,...,∞ a strategy of the seller in the infinitely repeated game of G;
σB = (p
(t))t=0,...,∞ a strategy of the buyers in the infinitely repeated game of G;
σ = (σB , σS), σ|h(t) a strategy profile; the truncation of σ to the game that starts in period t;
A = (Z, z, ², trn) a finite state automaton;
N number of reports considered by the reputation mechanism;
r = (r1, . . . , rN ) a sequence of N reports, rj ∈ Q2;
n0(r) the number of negative reports in the sequence r;
qj ⊕ r the signal qj precedes the sequence r;
r ⊕ qj the signal qj is appended to the sequence r;
Pr[r] the probability of sequence r;
ε some small positive amount;
φ, γ used to substitute complex expressions;
Appendix 5.B Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5.2.1
Given the maximum PPE payoff U¯ enforced by the one round strategy ²¯ and the continuation PPE
payoffs (Uk)k=0,...,M−1, there is k¯ such that Uk¯ = U¯ .
Proof. Consider the constraints (5.5) of the linear optimization problem LP 5.2.1. These constraints
make it rational for the seller to exert effort ²¯ in the first round, rather than any other effort e′ 6= ²¯.
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Expanding U¯ according to (5.4) we get:
δ
∑
qk∈Q
(
Pr[qk|²¯]− Pr[qk|e′]
)
Uk ≥ (1− δ)
(
c(e′)− c(²¯)
)
; ∀e′ 6= ²¯ (5.23)
Assume that all Uk are strictly smaller than U¯ , such that U¯ −Uk > γ > 0, for all k = 0, . . . ,M − 1.
The continuation payoffs Uk+γ are all smaller than U¯ , and therefore, they can be PPE payoffs obtained
by the seller.
Since
∑
qk∈Q Pr[qk|²¯] =
∑
qk∈Q Pr[qk|e′] = 1, the continuation payoffs Uk + γ also satisfy the
inequalities (5.23). Moreover, the payoff enforced by ²¯ and (Uk + γ) is U ′ = U¯ + γ and meets all
necessary constraints to be a PPE payoff. This is however impossible, since U¯ is the maximum PPE
payoff the seller can get. It follows that γ = 0 and therefore, there must be k¯ such that Uk¯ = U¯ . ¥
Appendix 5.C Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5.2.2
Given the maximum PPE payoff U¯ enforced by the one round strategy ²¯ and the continuation PPE
payoffs (Uk)k=0,...,M−1, there is at least another effort level e∗ ∈ E, e∗ 6= ²¯ such that the seller is
indifferent between exerting ²¯ or e∗ in the first round.
Proof. Given ²¯, the continuation payoffs that enforce the maximum PPE payoff U¯ solve the linear
problem (in standard matrix notation):
max. CTx
s.t. Ax ≤ B, x ≥ 0 (5.24)
where xT = (Uk)k=0,...,M−1 are the variables, the coefficients of the objective function are CT =
(δPr[qk|²¯])k=0,...,M−1, and the constraints are given by the (M+L−1)×M , (respectively (M+L−1)×1)
matrices:
A =

1− δPr[q0|²¯] −δPr[q1|²¯] . . . −δPr[qM−1|²¯]
−δPr[q0|²¯] 1− δPr[q1|²¯] . . . −δPr[qM−1|²¯]
.
.
.
.
.
.
−δPr[q0|²¯] −δPr[q1|²¯] . . . 1− δPr[qM−1|²¯]
Pr[q0|e0]− Pr[q0|²¯] Pr[q1|e0]− Pr[q1|²¯] . . . Pr[qM−1|e0]− Pr[qM−1|²¯]
Pr[q0|e1]− Pr[q0|²¯] Pr[q1|e1]− Pr[q1|²¯] . . . Pr[qM−1|e1]− Pr[qM−1|²¯]
.
.
.
.
.
.
Pr[q0|eL−1]− Pr[q0|²¯] Pr[q1|eL−1]− Pr[q1|²¯] . . . Pr[qM−1|eL−1]− Pr[qM−1|²¯]

;
B = (1− δ)

(
p(²¯)− c(²¯))(
p(²¯)− c(²¯))
.
.
.(
p(²¯)− c(²¯))(
c(e0)− c(²¯)
)
/δ(
c(e1)− c(²¯)
)
/δ
.
.
.(
c(eL−1)− c(²¯)
)
/δ

;
(5.25)
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The dual problem corresponding to this linear program is
min. BT y
s.t. AT y ≥ C, y ≥ 0
where for every constraint in the primal, there is a variable in the dual, and for every variable in the
primal, there is a constraint in the dual. We will index dual variables in the following way: yT =(
(yk)k=0,...,M−1, (yi)i=0,...,L−1,ei 6=²¯
)
, where yk, respectively yi, are dual variables corresponding to the
primal constraints:
(− δPr[q0|²¯], . . . , 1− δPr[qk|²¯], . . . ,−δPr[qM−1|²¯])x ≤ (1− δ)(p(²¯)− c(²¯));
respectively,
(
Pr[q0|ei]− Pr[q0|²¯], . . . , Pr[qM−1|ei]− Pr[qM−1|²¯]
)
x ≤ (1− δ)
δ
(
c(ei)− c(²¯)
)
;
If the primal problem is feasible, the dual must be feasible as well. Moreover, the optimal solution
of the primal corresponds to the optimal solution of the dual, and vice versa. Assume that the optimal
dual solution has yi = 0 for all i = 0, . . . , L − 1, ei 6= ²¯. By simplifying the constraints in the dual
problem, we get:
yj − δPr[qj |²¯]
M−1∑
k=0
yk ≥ δPr[qj |²¯]; ∀j = 0, . . . ,M − 1;
As
∑M−1
k=0 yk ≥ 0 and Pr[qj |²¯] > 0, yj is strictly greater than 0 for all j = 0, . . . ,M − 1. Therefore the
corresponding primal constraints are satisfied to equality, which gives Uk = U¯ for all k = 0, . . . ,M − 1.
Unless U¯ = 0 this is impossible.
As a consequence, at least one of the dual variables yi has an optimal solution strictly greater than
0. Let i∗ be such that yi
∗
> 0 and e∗ = ei
∗
. The corresponding primal constraint is satisfied to equality
by the optimal solution and therefore:
δ
∑
qk∈Q
(
Pr[qk|²¯]− Pr[qk|e∗]
)
Uk = (1− δ)
(
c(e∗)− c(²¯)
)
;
Consequently, the seller is indifferent between exerting effort e∗ or ²¯ in the first round of the PPE
strategy that gives him U¯ . ¥
Appendix 5.D Proof of Proposition 5.4.2
The probability that the client reports negative feedback on the equilibrium path of any pareto-optimal
PPE strategy is zero.
Proof.
Step 1. Following the principle of dynamic programming (Abreu et al., 1990), the payoff profile
V = (VC , VP ) is a PPE of G∞, if and only if there is a strategy profile σ in G, and the continuation
PPE payoffs profiles {W (y)|y ∈ Y } of G∞, such that:
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• V is obtained by playing σ in the current round, and a PPE strategy that gives W (y) as a
continuation payoff, where y is the public outcome of the current round, and Pr[y|σ] is the
probability of observing y after playing σ:
VC = (1− δ)gC(σ) + δ
(∑
y∈Y
Pr[y|σ] ·WC(y)
)
;
VP = (1− δ)gP (σ) + δ
(∑
y∈Y
Pr[y|σ] ·WP (y)
)
;
• no player finds it profitable to deviate from σ:
VC ≥ (1− δ)gC
(
(σ′C , σP )
)
+ δ
(∑
y∈Y
Pr
[
y|(σ′C , σP )
] ·WC(y)); ∀σ′C 6= σC
VP ≥ (1− δ)gP
(
(σC , σ
′
P )
)
+ δ
(∑
y∈Y
Pr
[
y|(σC , σ′P )
] ·WP (y)); ∀σ′P 6= σP
The strategy σ and the payoff profiles {W (y)|y ∈ Y } are said to enforce V .
Step 2. Take the PPE payoff profile V = (VC , VP ), such that there is no other PPE payoff profile
V ′ = (V ′C , VP ) with VC < V
′
C . Let σ and {W (y)|y ∈ Y } enforce V , and assume that σ assigns positive
probability β0 = Pr[q00|σ] > 0 to the outcome q00. If β1 = Pr[q01|σ] (possibly equal to 0), let us
consider:
• the strategy profile σ′ = (σ′C , σP ) where σ′C is obtained from σC by asking the client to report 1
instead of 0 when she receives low quality (i.e., q0);
• the continuation payoffs {W ′(y)|y ∈ Y } such that W ′i (q01) = β0Wi(q00)+β1Wi(q01) and W ′i (y 6=
q01) = Wi(y) for i ∈ {C,P}. Since, the set of correlated PPE payoff profiles of G∞ is convex, if
W (y) are PPE payoff profiles, so are W ′(y).
The payoff profile (V ′C , VP ), V
′
C = VC + (1 − δ)β0ε is a PPE equilibrium profile because it can
be enforced by σ′ and {W ′(y)|y ∈ Y }. However, this contradicts our assumption that V ′C < VC , so
Pr[q00|σ] must be 0. Following exactly the same argument, we can prove that Pr[q10|σ] = 0.
Step 3. Taking V , σ and {W (y)|y ∈ Y } from step 2, we have:
VC = (1− δ)gC(σ) + δ
(∑
y∈Y
Pr[y|σ] ·WC(y)
)
; (5.26)
If no other PPE payoff profile V ′ = (V ′C , VP ) can have V
′
C > VC , it must be that the continuation
payoffs W (y) satisfy the same property. (Assume otherwise that there is a PPE (W ′C(y),WP (y)) with
W ′C(y) > WC(y). Replacing W
′
C(y) in (5.26) we obtain V
′ that contradicts the hypothesis).
By continuing the recursion, we obtain that the client never reports 0 on the equilibrium path that
enforces a payoff profile as defined in Step 2. Pareto-optimal payoff profiles clearly enter this category,
hence the result of the proposition.
¥
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Appendix 5.E Proof of Proposition 5.4.3
The upper bound on the percentage of false reports recorded by the reputation mechanism in any PPE
equilibrium is:
γ ≤
{
(1−α)(p−u)+pρ
p
if pρ ≤ u(1− α);
pρ
u
if pρ > u(1− α)
Proof. Since clients never report negative feedback along pareto-optimal equilibria, the only false
reports recorded by the reputation mechanism appear when the provider delivers low quality, and the
client reports positive feedback. Let σ = (σC , σP ) be a pareto-optimal PPE strategy profile. σ induces
a probability distribution over public histories and, therefore, over expected outcomes in each of the
following transactions. Let µt be the probability distribution induced by σ over the outcomes in round
t. µt(q00) = µt(q10) = 0 as proven by Proposition 5.4.2. The payoff received by the client when playing
σ is therefore:
VC(σ) ≤ (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
µt(q01)(−p) + µt(q11)(u− p) + µt(l)0 + µt(out)(u− p− pρ)
)
;
where µt(q01) + µt(q11) + µt(l) + µt(out) = 1 and µt(q01) + µt(l) ≥ (1 − α)µt(q11)/α, because the
probability of q0 is at least (1− α)/α times the probability of q1.
When the discount factor, δ, is the probability that the repeated interaction will stop after each
transaction, the expected probability of the outcome q01 is:
γ = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtµt(q01);
Since any PPE profile must give the client at least VC = u− p(1+ ρ), (otherwise the client is better
off by resorting to the outside option), VC(σ) ≥ VC . By replacing the expression of VC(σ), and taking
into account the constraints on the probability of q1 we obtain:
γ(−p) + (u− p) ·min (1− γ, α) ≤ VC ;
γ ≤
{
(1−α)(p−u)+pρ
p
if pρ ≤ u(1− α);
pρ
u
if pρ > u(1− α)
¥
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Chapter 6
Understanding Existing Online
Feedback
The previous chapters have presented several results that can be used to design better online repu-
tation mechanisms. Chapter 3 addressed signaling reputation mechanisms and discussed methods for
providing honest reporting incentives to rational users. Chapter 4 described a concrete application of
signaling reputation mechanism for building better quality of service monitoring system for markets of
(web-)services. Chapter 5, on the other hand, addressed sanctioning reputation mechanisms, and pre-
sented methods and algorithms for designing reputation mechanisms that (i) encourage the cooperative
behavior and (ii) make honest reporting rational.
While new systems could greatly benefit from these and similar research results, we will still see a
great number of plain online reputation mechanisms that (i) provide little or no reporting incentives, and
(ii) aggregate feedback into reputation information in trivial ways. Nevertheless, such naive mechanisms
will continue to be important channel for Word-of-mouth regarding products, services or other types of
commercial interactions, and users will most likely continue using them for taking purchasing decisions
(Houser and Wooders, 2006; Melnik and Alm, 2002; Kalyanam and McIntyre, 2001; Dellarocas et al.,
2006).
Recent analysis, however, raises important questions regarding the ability of existing forums to
reflect the real quality of a product. In the absence of clear incentives, users with a moderate outlook
will not bother to voice their opinions, which leads to an unrepresentative sample of reviews. For
example, Hu et al. (2006) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) show that Amazon1 ratings of books or
CDs follow with great probability bi-modal, U-shaped distributions where most of the ratings are either
very good, or very bad. Controlled experiments, on the other hand, reveal opinions on the same items
that are normally distributed. Under these circumstances, using the arithmetic mean to predict quality
(as most forums actually do) gives the typical user an estimator with high variance that is often false.
It is important, therefore, to better understand the interactions that take place in existing online
reputation mechanisms, and come up with better ways of using the existing information. One such
step has been made by Hu et al. (2006), who explain when users submit online feedback. They propose
the “Brag-and-Moan Model” where users rate only if their utility of the product (drawn from a normal
distribution) falls outside a median interval. The authors conclude that the model explains the empirical
distribution of reports, and offers insights into smarter ways of estimating the true quality of the product.
1http://www.amazon.com
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In this chapter we extend this line of research, and explain further facts about the behavior of users
when reporting online feedback. Using actual hotel reviews from the TripAdvisor2 website, we consider
two additional sources of information besides the basic numerical ratings submitted by users. The first
is simple linguistic evidence from the textual review that usually accompanies the numerical ratings.
We use text-mining techniques similar to Ghose et al. (2005) and Cui et al. (2006), however, we are
only interested in identifying what aspects of the service the user is discussing, without computing the
semantic orientation of the text. We find that users who comment more on the same feature are more
likely to agree on a common numerical rating for that particular feature. Intuitively, lengthy comments
reveal the importance of the feature to the user. Since people tend to be more knowledgeable in the
aspects they consider important, users who discuss a given feature in more details might be assumed
to have more authority in evaluating that feature.
Second we investigate the relationship between a review and the reviews that preceded it. A perusal
of online reviews shows that ratings are often part of discussion threads, where one post is not necessarily
independent of other posts. One may see, for example, users who make an effort to contradict, or
vehemently agree with, the remarks of previous users. By analyzing the time sequence of reports, we
conclude that past reviews influence the future reports, as they create some prior expectation regarding
the quality of service. The subjective perception of the user is influenced by the gap between the prior
expectation and the actual performance of the service (Parasuraman et al., 1985, 1988; Olshavsky and
Miller, 1972; Teas, 1993) which will later reflect in the user’s rating. We propose a model that captures
the dependence of ratings on prior expectations, and validate it using the empirical data we collected.
Both results can be used to improve the way reputation mechanisms aggregate the information from
individual reviews. Our first result can be used to determine a feature-by-feature estimate of quality,
where for each feature, a different subset of reviews (i.e., those with lengthy comments of that feature)
is considered. The second leads to an algorithm that outputs a more precise estimate of the real quality.
6.1 The Data Set
We consider real hotel reviews collected from the popular travel site TripAdvisor. TripAdvisor indexes
hotels from cities across the world, along with reviews written by travelers. Users can search the site
by giving the hotel’s name and location (optional). The reviews for a given hotel are displayed as a list
(ordered from the most recent to the oldest), with 5 reviews per page. The reviews contain:
• information about the author of the review (e.g., dates of stay, username of the reviewer, location
of the reviewer);
• the overall rating (from 1, lowest, to 5, highest);
• a textual review containing a title for the review, free comments, and the main things the reviewer
liked and disliked;
• numerical ratings (from 1, lowest, to 5, highest) for different features (e.g., cleanliness, service,
location, etc.)
Below the name of the hotel, TripAdvisor displays the address of the hotel, general information
(number of rooms, number of stars, short description, etc), the average overall rating, the TripAdvisor
ranking, and an average rating for each feature. Figure 6.1 shows the page for a popular Boston hotel
whose name (along with advertisements) was explicitly erased.
2http://www.tripadvisor.com/
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Figure 6.1: The TripAdvisor page displaying reviews for a popular Boston hotel. Name of
hotel and advertisements were deliberatively erased.
We selected three cities for this study: Boston, Sydney and Las Vegas. For each city we considered
all hotels that had at least 10 reviews, and recorded all reviews. Table 6.1 presents the number of hotels
considered in each city, the total number of reviews recorded for each city, and the distribution of hotels
with respect to the star-rating (as available on the TripAdvisor site). Note that not all hotels have a
star-rating.
For each review we recorded the overall rating, the textual review (title and body of the review)
and the numerical rating on 7 features: Rooms(R), Service(S), Cleanliness(C), Value(V), Food(F),
Location(L) and Noise(N). TripAdvisor does not require users to submit anything other than the
overall rating, hence a typical review rates few additional features, regardless of the discussion in the
textual comment. Only the features Rooms(R), Service(S), Cleanliness(C) and Value(V) are rated by a
significant number of users. However, we also selected the features Food(F), Location(L) and Noise(N)
because they are referred to in a significant number of textual comments. For each feature we record
the numerical rating given by the user, or 0 when the rating is missing. The typical length of the textual
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Table 6.1: A summary of the data set.
City # Reviews # Hotels # of Hotels with
1,2,3,4 & 5 stars
Boston 3993 58 1+3+17+15+2
Sydney 1371 47 0+0+9+13+10
Las Vegas 5593 40 0+3+10+9+6
comment amounts to approximately 200 words. All data was collected by crawling the TripAdvisor site
in September 2006.
6.1.1 Formal notation
We will formally refer to a review by a tuple (r, T ) where:
• r = (rf ) is a vector containing the ratings rf ∈ {0, 1, . . . 5} for the features f ∈ F = {O,R, S,C, V, F, L,N};
note that the overall rating, rO, is abusively recorded as the rating for the feature Overall(O);
• T is the textual comment that accompanies the review.
Reviews are indexed according to the variable i, such that (ri, T i) is the ith review in our database.
Since we don’t record the username of the reviewer, we will also say that the ith review in our data set
was submitted by user i. When we need to consider only the reviews of a given hotel, h, we will use
(ri(h), T i(h)) to denote the ith review about the hotel h.
6.2 Evidence from Textual Comments
The free textual comments associated to online reviews are a valuable source of information for under-
standing the reasons behind the numerical ratings left by the reviewers. The text may, for example,
reveal concrete examples of aspects that the user liked or disliked, thus justifying some of the high,
respectively low ratings for certain features. The text may also offer guidelines for understanding the
preferences of the reviewer, and the weights of different features when computing an overall rating.
The problem, however, is that free textual comments are difficult to read. Users are required to
scroll through many reviews and read mostly repetitive information. Significant improvements would
be obtained if the reviews were automatically interpreted and aggregated. Unfortunately, this seems a
difficult task for computers since human users often use witty language, abbreviations, cultural specific
phrases, and the figurative style.
Nevertheless, several important results use the textual comments of online reviews in an automated
way. Using well established natural language techniques, reviews or parts of reviews can be classified
as having a positive or negative semantic orientation. B. et al. (2002) classify movie reviews into
positive/negative by training three different classifiers (Naive Bayes, Maximum Entropy and SVM)
using classification features based on unigrams, bigrams or part-of-speech tags.
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Dave et al. (2003) analyze reviews from CNet and Amazon, and surprisingly show that classification
features based on unigrams or bigrams perform better than higher-order n-grams. This result is chal-
lenged by Cui et al. (2006) who look at large collections of reviews crawled from the web. They show
that the size of the data set is important, and that bigger training sets allow classifiers to successfully
use more complex classification features based on n-grams.
Hu and Liu (2004) also crawl the web for product reviews and automatically identify product
attributes that have been discussed by reviewers. They use Wordnet to compute the semantic orientation
of product evaluations and summarize user reviews by extracting positive and negative evaluations of
different product features. Popescu and Etzioni (2005) analyze a similar setting, but use search engine
hit-counts to identify product attributes; the semantic orientation is assigned through the relaxation
labeling technique.
Ghose et al. (2005, 2006) analyze seller reviews from the Amazon secondary market to identify the
different dimensions (e.g., delivery, packaging, customer support, etc.) of reputation. They parse the
text, and tag the part-of-speech for each word. Frequent nouns, noun phrases and verbal phrases are
identified as dimensions of reputation, while the corresponding modifiers (i.e., adjectives and adverbs)
are used to derive numerical scores for each dimension. The enhanced reputation measure correlates
better with the pricing information observed in the market. Pavlou and Dimoka (2006) analyze eBay
reviews and find that textual comments have an important impact on reputation premiums.
Our approach is similar to the previously mentioned works, in the sense that we identify the aspects
(i.e., hotel features) discussed by the users in the textual reviews. However, we do not compute the
semantic orientation of the text, nor attempt to infer missing ratings.
We define the weight, wif , of feature f ∈ F \ {O} in the text T i associated with the review (ri, T i),
as the fraction of T i dedicated to discussing aspects (both positive and negative) related to feature
f . We propose an elementary method to approximate the values of these weights. For each feature
we manually construct the word list Lf containing approximately 50 words that are most commonly
associated to the feature f . The initial words were selected from reading some of the reviews, and
seeing what words coincide with discussion of which features. The list was then extended by adding
all thesaurus entries that were related to the initial words. Finally, we brainstormed for missing words
that would normally be associated with each of the features.
Let Lf ∩T i be the list of terms common to both Lf and Ti. Each term of Lf is counted the number
of times it appears in T i, with two exceptions:
• in cases where the user submits a title to the review, we account for the title text by appending
it three times to the review text T i. The intuitive assumption is that the user’s opinion is more
strongly reflected in the title, rather than in the body of the review. For example, many reviews
are accurately summarized by titles such as ”Excellent service, terrible location” or ”Bad value
for money”;
• certain words that occur only once in the text are counted multiple times if their relevance to that
feature is particularly strong. These were ’root’ words for each feature (e.g., ’staff’ is a root word
for the feature Service), and were weighted either 2 or 3. Each feature was assigned up to 3 such
root words, so almost all words are counted only once.
The list of words for the feature Rooms is given for reference in the Appendix 6.A.
The weight wif is computed as:
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wif =
|Lf ∩ T i|∑
f∈F\{O} |Lf ∩ T i|
(6.1)
where |Lf ∩ T i| is the number of terms common to Lf and T i. To keep a uniform notation, we also
define the weight for the feature Overall(O) as the normalized length of the entire textual comment
associated to a review:
wiO =
|T i|
maxi |T i| ;
where |T i| is the number of character in the textual comment T i.
The following is a TripAdvisor review for a Boston hotel (the name of the hotel is omitted): ”I’ll
start by saying that I’m more of a Holiday Inn person than a *** type. So I get frustrated when I pay
double the room rate and get half the amenities that I’d get at a Hampton Inn or Holiday Inn. The
location was definitely the main asset of this place. It was only a few blocks from the Hynes Center
subway stop and it was easy to walk to some good restaurants in the Back Bay area. Boylston isn’t far
off at all. So I had no trouble with foregoing a rental car and taking the subway from the airport to
the hotel and using the subway for any other travel. Otherwise, they make you pay for anything and
everything. And when you’ve already dropped $215/night on the room, that gets frustrating.The room
itself was decent, about what I would expect. Staff was also average, not bad and not excellent. Again,
I think you’re paying for location and the ability to walk to a lot of good stuff. But I think next time I’ll
stay in Brookline, get more amenities, and use the subway a bit more.
This numerical ratings associated to this review are rO = 3, rR = 3, rS = 3, rC = 4, rV = 2 for
features Overall(O), Rooms(R), Service(S), Cleanliness(C) and Value(V) respectively. The ratings for
the features Food(F), Location(L) and Noise(N) are absent (i.e., rF = rL = rN = 0).
The weights wf are computed from the following lists of common terms:
LR ∩ T ={room}; wR = 0.066
LS ∩ T ={3 * Staff, amenities}; wS = 0.267
LC ∩ T = ∅; wC = 0
LV ∩ T ={$, rate}; wV = 0.133
LF ∩ T ={restaurant}; wF = 0.067
LL ∩ T ={2 * center, 2 * walk, 2 * location, area}; wL = 0.467
LN ∩ T = ∅; wN = 0
The root words ’Staff’ and ’Center’ were tripled and doubled respectively. The overall weight of the
textual review (i.e., its normalized length) is wO = 0.197. These values account reasonably well for the
weights of different features in the discussion of the reviewer.
One point to note is that some terms in the lists Lf possess an inherent semantic orientation. For
example the word ’grime’ (belonging to the list LC) would be used most often to assert the presence,
and not the absence of grime. This is unavoidable, but care was taken to ensure words from both sides
of the spectrum were used. For this reason, some lists such as LR contain only nouns of objects that
one would typically describe in a room (see Appendix 6.A).
The goal of this section is to analyze the influence of the weights wif on the numerical ratings r
i
f .
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Intuitively, users who spent a lot of their time discussing a feature f (i.e., wif is high) had something
to say about their experience with regard to this feature. Obviously, feature f is important for user
i. Since people tend to be more knowledgeable in the aspects they consider important, our hypothesis
is that the ratings rif (corresponding to high weights w
i
f ) constitute a subset of “expert” ratings for
feature f .
Figure 6.2 plots the distribution of the rates ri(h)C with respect to the weights w
i(h)
C for the cleanliness
of a Las Vegas hotel, h. Here, the high ratings are restricted to the reviews that discuss little the
cleanliness. Whenever cleanliness appears in the discussion, the ratings are low. Many hotels exhibit
similar rating patterns for various features. Ratings corresponding to low weights span the whole
spectrum from 1 to 5, while the ratings corresponding to high weights are more grouped together.
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Figure 6.2: The distribution of ratings against the weight of the cleanliness feature.
We therefore make the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6.2.1 The ratings rif corresponding to the reviews where w
i
f is high, are more similar to
each other than to the overall collection of ratings.
To test the hypothesis, we take the entire set of reviews, and feature by feature, we compute the
standard deviation of the ratings with high weights, and the standard deviation of the entire set of
ratings. High weights were defined as those belonging to the upper 20% of the weight range for the
corresponding feature. If Hypothesis 6.2.1 were true, the standard deviation of all ratings should be
higher than the standard deviation of the ratings with high weights.
We use a standard T-test to measure the significance of the results. City by city and feature by
feature, Table 6.2 presents the average standard deviation of all ratings, and the average standard
deviation of ratings with high weights. Indeed, the ratings with high weights have lower standard
deviation, and the results are significant at the standard 0.05 significance threshold (although for certain
cities taken independently there doesn’t seem to be a significant difference, the results are significant
for the entire data set). Please note that only the features O,R,S,C and V were considered, since for
the others (F, L, and N) we didn’t have enough ratings.
Hypothesis 6.2.1 not only provides some basic understanding regarding the rating behavior of online
users, it also suggests some ways of computing better quality estimates. We can, for example, construct
a feature-by-feature quality estimate with much lower variance: for each feature we take the subset of
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Table 6.2: Average standard deviation for all ratings, and average standard deviation for rat-
ings with high weights. In square brackets, the corresponding p-values for a positive difference
between the two.
City O R S C V
all 1.189 0.998 1.144 0.935 1.123
Boston high 0.948 0.778 0.954 0.767 0.891
p-val [0.000] [0.004] [0.045] [0.080] [0.009]
all 1.040 0.832 1.101 0.847 0.963
Sydney high 0.801 0.618 0.691 0.690 0.798
p-val [0.012] [0.023] [0.000] [0.377] [0.037]
all 1.272 1.142 1.184 1.119 1.242
Vegas high 1.072 0.752 1.169 0.907 1.003
p-val [0.0185] [0.001] [0.918] [0.120] [0.126]
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Figure 6.3: The distribution of hotels depending on the average overall rating (only reviews
corresponding to high weights).
reviews that amply discuss that feature, and output as a quality estimate the average rating for this
subset. Initial experiments suggest that the average feature-by-feature ratings computed in this way
are different from the average ratings computed on the whole data set.
The first objection one might raise against this method is that ratings corresponding to high weights
are likely to come from passionate users and are therefore likely to have extreme values. The distribution
plotted Figure 6.2 supports this claim, as users who write detailed comments about the cleanliness of
the hotel are mostly unhappy. Similarly, for other hotels one might expect to see the users who write
a lot about a certain feature to agree more, but only on extreme ratings (ratings of 1 or 5).
This, however, does not seem to be the case for the TripAdvisor data set. As another experiment,
we took all hotels from a given city, and for each hotel, h, we computed the average of all ratings ri(h)f
for the feature f , where the corresponding weight, wi(h)f , was high (i.e., belongs to the upper 20% of the
weight range for that feature). Figure 6.3 plot the distribution of hotels for the three cities, depending
on the average of the overall ratings corresponding to high weights. For Boston (the left-most graph
in Figure 6.3), the average overall rating from long reviews is almost normally distributed around 3.5,
with 2 peaks around 2.5 and 4. In Sydney, on the other hand (the middle graph in Figure 6.3) the
average overall rating of long reviews is almost uniformly distributed.
Similar patterns can be seen by analyzing the distribution of hotels depending on the average value
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Figure 6.4: The distribution of hotels depending on the average value rating (only reviews
corresponding to high weights).
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Figure 6.5: The distribution of hotels depending on the average service rating (only reviews
corresponding to high weights).
or service rating (where, again, the average was made only for those reviews discussing a lot the value,
respectively the service of the hotel. Figure 6.5 presents the distribution of hotels as a function of
the average rating for Service, Figure 6.4 presents the similar graphs for the value ratings. In both
cases, most of the hotels have an average rating between 2 and 4, which means that most of the users
discussing a lot a certain feature are not providing extreme ratings.
The second objection against building feature by feature estimators who average only the ratings
corresponding to high weights, is that users who comment in more detail on a certain feature are not
necessary experts of the domain. Consequently, their opinion should not count more than the opinion
of other users.
This objection can partly be refuted by the following experiment. Tripadvisor lets users vote for
the helpfulness of a review. By a simple click, a user can vote whether a particular review was useful
or not. The system tracks the total number of votes received by every review, and displays bellow the
review a footnote indicating how many of the total votes were positive.
Let the score of a review be the fraction of positive votes received by the review. This score can be
regarded as an accurate estimator of the review’s quality for the following two reasons. First, voting for
a review requires almost no effort. The mouse click expressing a vote does not require authentication,
and does not perturb the user when browsing for information (i.e., does not trigger a reload of the web
page). As opposed to users who write a full review, the users who vote do not need the internal benefits
(e.g., extreme satisfaction or dissatisfaction) to compensate the cost of reporting. Moreover, the same
user can easily vote for different reviews, expressing thus a relative order between reviews.
Second, the way the information is displayed (normal font size, below the main text of a review,
without any visual pointers) makes it unlikely that the score of the review has an important influence
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Figure 6.6: The score of reviews plotted against their total length.
on the final decision of a client. This also means that there probably are few incentives to falsely cast
votes, which together with the first point, lead to the conclusion that the score of a review probably
reflects a representative opinion regarding the helpfulness of the review.
Figure 6.6 plots the score of the reviews in our data set against their weight for the feature Overall
(which is actually proportional to the total length of the review). Every point in the figure represents
a review. One can see that the long reviews tend to have high scores, so whey were generally helpful to
the other users. However, the inverse is not true: more helpful reviews are not necessarily longer.
Testing the hypothesis that high weights are indicators of expert opinions, requires, however, further
experiments. There is no data available on TripAdvisor today which might reveal the correlation
between the weight and the quality of the rating for a certain feature. However, one should devise
controlled experiments where human users assess the quality of the ratings. This remains a direction
for future work.
6.2.1 Correlation between Reporting Effort and Transactional Risk
Another factor behind the feedback bias observed on Amazon, is the relative low value of the items
purchased in the market. Books and CD’s are generally seen as very cheap, so the risk associated
with buying a boring book or a bad CD is quite low. Feedback from previous clients decreases the
information asymmetry of future buyers, and therefore their risk of choosing the wrong item. However,
if the transaction poses little risk in the first place, the contribution of a feedback report to the further
decrease of risk is so small, that it does not compensate the effort of reporting3.
Feedback reporting is not rational in such environments, since neither the reporter, nor the commu-
nity benefit from the costly action of reporting. Therefore, the feedback that gets submitted is probably
a consequence of the strong emotional response of some users who strongly like or disliked the product.
This internal emotional motivation can explain the bimodal, u-shaped distribution of ratings observed
on Amazon (Hu et al., 2006).
On Amazon, the correlation between reporting incentives and perceived risk is difficult to analyze,
3We thank Vincent Schickel-Zuber for suggesting this idea.
6.2. Evidence from Textual Comments 175
since most books and CDs have comparable prices, and involve comparable risks. On TripAdvisor,
on the other hand, some hotels can be an order of magnitude more expensive than others. Moreover,
an unappropriate hotel may ruin a vacation, a business meeting or a romantic weekend, so the risk of
choosing a bad hotel probably exceeds by far the amount paid for the room. The right feedback in this
context is very valuable to future users, as it can make the difference between a memorable trip and a
dreadful one. This added value to the future travelers should motivate more users to contribute with
feedback.
The data collected from TripAdvisor cannot reveal a positive correlation between the risk posed by
a hotel and the motivation to submit feedback, since there is no way of estimating the actual percentage
of users who left feedback for a particular hotel. However, the TripAdvisor data set can be used to
study the correlation between the risk associated to a hotel and the effort spent by previous users in
describing their experience with that hotel. Intuitively, we expect that the reviewers of high risk hotels
spend more effort in submitting their reviews, as a consequence of feeling stronger motivated to share
their experience.
Before presenting the results, let us explain our choices for measuring risk and effort. The effort
spent in writing a review is measured by the length of the textual comment accompanying a review,
and this choice is simpler to argument. The TripAdvisor feedback submission form is the same for
everybody, so the difference between a fast and a careful review is given by the level of detail given in
the textual comment. It is true that (i) some users can convey more information in shorter text, and
(ii) shorter, concise English is harder to write than a long, sloppy text. Nevertheless, we expect that
on the average a longer textual comment contains more information than a short one, and therefore
signals more effort.
We will use as a measure for risk the official star-rating of the hotels. The intuition behind this
choice is the following. A traveler who books a room in a one or two stars hotel probably expects
as little as a decent bed, a relatively clean room, and a minimum of assistance from the hotel’s staff.
Given the high competition and the strict hygiene legislation in Boston, Las Vegas or Sydney (the cities
chosen for our study) any hotel is likely to meet these basic requirements, keeping thus the traveler
happy. Therefore, the risk taken by the traveler in choosing a low-end hotel is minimum. A four or five
stars hotel, on the other hand, exposes a traveler to a much higher risk. The traveler chooses to pay
more because she seeks certain qualities and services that were not offered by the cheaper alternative
hotels. A business person, for example, might need reliable communication facilities, a concierge who
can recommend good restaurants and arrange local transportation, or a fitness center to relax after a
stressful day. These facilities are arguably essential to the success of the trip, and therefore, the business
person has a lot to lose if she doesn’t obtain them from the chosen hotel.
There are two important reasons for choosing the star-rating as a measure for risk, instead of the
more straight-forward information on price. First, the price information available on the TripAdvisor
is not reliable. TripAdvisor is not a booking agency, and the price they quote is only informative,
obtained by averaging prices quoted by their booking partners. The pricing structure of hotel rooms
is very complex today (prices depend on the season, on the type of room, but also on the occupancy
of the hotel), and is often subject to special offers and discounts. Therefore, the average displayed
by TripAdvisor is probably a very poor estimate of what the users really paid for the room. A quick
manual scan of some reviews suffices to reveal important differences between the price quoted by the
users in their textual comments, and the average price displayed by TripAdvisor.
Star rating, on the other hand, are fixed, and much easier to verify. Tourist offices, or Yellow Pages
directories have detailed lists of the hotels available in a certain city, together with their official star
ratings. Eventual errors in the TripAdvisor database are easy to spot by the users, and therefore, will
probably be corrected. Again, a manual crosschecking with the information published by booking sites
like Expedia or Travelocity will convince you that the star rating recorded by TripAdvisor is probably
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Figure 6.7: The average normalized length of all textual comments, as a function of the star
rating.
correct.
The second reason for choosing the star rating instead of the price for assessing risk, is that the risk
associated to choosing a hotel is relative to the other alternatives available to the traveler. Consider
Alice, who needs to travel to a remote location where there is only one available hotel. There is no
risk for Alice in choosing the wrong hotel, since there is no choice at all. On the other hand, when
Alice travels to a city like Boston where there is plenty of choice, she does incur a significant risk for
choosing a particular hotel since many other hotels could have offered her similar or better service for
lower price.
Therefore, assessing the risk of a hotel based on its prices requires a normalization of prices respective
to the other hotels available in a given location. Hotels in the center of Boston are significantly more
expensive than hotels in Las Vegas; paying 200 dollars for a hotel in Boston is by far less risky that paying
the same amount for a hotel in Las Vegas. Since we do not have neither accurate price information,
nor precise location information, the corresponding normalization is impossible to do.
The star rating, on the other hand, provides a better relative ranking of hotels, since the distribution
of hotels depending on the star rating tends to be the same for all locations. The risk of a four-star
hotel is probably the same, whether in Boston, or in Las Vegas, because both cities are assumed to offer
a comparable choice of lower-stars hotels.
To study the correlation between the effort spent for writing a review and the risk associated to a
hotel, we conducted the following experiment. For each hotel h, we computed the average normalized
length of the comments present in the reviews submitted about the hotel h. We then grouped all hotels
depending on their star rating, and computed the mean, respectively the standard deviation, of the
average review length. Figure 6.7 plots the two values as a function of the number of stars. Indeed,
higher-rated hotels receive, on the average, longer reviews, which supports our hypothesis that users
spend more effort in reviewing the ’riskier’ hotels. However, due to the large variance of the review
length, we cannot conclude statistically that reviews about x-star hotels are significantly4 longer than
the reviews submitted about x + 1-star hotels, where x can be one, two, three or four. Nevertheless,
when hotels are split into two risk groups:
4The T-tests were conducted at a 5% significance level
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• the low -risk hotels have one, two, or three stars;
• the high-risk hotels have four or five stars;
there is a significant increase in the length of reviews submitted about the high-risk hotels as compared
to the length of the reviews about low-risk hotels. The p-value for the corresponding T-test is 1.8 ·10−4.
Visually, the difference between the length of reviews received by high-risk and low-risk hotels can
be better seen in Figure 6.8. Here, we only considered the three-longest reviews submitted about every
hotel. The plot displays the average and the standard deviation of the 3 longest reviews about all hotels
in a certain star category. Clearly, the most detailed reviews of four and five star hotels are significantly
longer than the most detailed reviews submitted about the less-than-four-stars hotels.
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Figure 6.8: The average normalized length of the 3 longest textual comments, as a function
of the star rating.
It is also interesting to consider how the reviews address different aspects of quality depending on the
star rating of the hotels. Figure 6.9 plots the average weight of the features Cleanliness, Rooms, Value
and Service for hotels with different numbers of stars. The cleanliness, for example, is mostly discussed
for the low-end hotels. Four or five star hotels are expected to be impeccably clean, and probably are
very clean. The cleanliness is definitely not a risk factor for high-end hotel, hence reviewers spend little
time discussing it. For low-end hotels, on the other hand, the cleanliness can be a major decision factor,
and there is a significantly higher risk of choosing a dirty hotel. Hence the increased fraction of the
comments addresses the cleanliness.
The same trend is observable for the fraction of the text discussing the value of the hotel, although
overall, the value is discussed much more than the cleanliness. High-end hotels apparently have a very
well established tradeoff between price and quality, which makes this feature a low risk factor. For
low-end hotels, on the other side, there can be large variations between the value of different hotels,
hence the presence of this feature in the reviews. The service, on the other hand, becomes increasingly
important for high-end hotels. As argued previously, the travelers who chose fancier hotels do so because
they need or like certain services that are not available in the cheaper hotels. The main risk associated
to choosing four or five star hotels comes from not getting the services you want, hence naturally, the
reviews for these hotels go into more detail regarding the services offered by the hotel.
The quality of the room, on the other hand does not seem to vary a lot depending on the star rating
of the hotel. The rooms tend to be discussed more for one star hotels, however, the difference is not
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Figure 6.9: The fraction of the comment taken by different features, as a function of the star
rating.
statistically significant.
6.3 The Influence of Past Ratings
Two important assumptions are generally made about reviews submitted to online forums. The first
is that ratings truthfully reflect the quality observed by the users; the second is that reviews are
independent from one another. While anecdotal evidence (Harmon, 2004; White, 1999) challenges the
first assumption5, in this section, we address the second.
A perusal of online reviews shows that reviews are often part of discussion threads, where users
make an effort to contradict, or vehemently agree with the remarks of previous users. Consider, for
example, the following review:
”I don’t understand the negative reviews... the hotel was a little dark, but that was the style. It was
very artsy. Yes it was close to the freeway, but in my opinion the sound of an occasional loud car is
better than hearing the ”ding ding” of slot machines all night! The staff on-hand is FABULOUS. The
waitresses are great (and *** does not deserve the bad review she got, she was 100% attentive to us!),
the bartenders are friendly and professional at the same time...”
5Part of Amazon reviews were recognized as strategic posts by book authors or competitors
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Here, the user was disturbed by previous negative reports, addressed these concerns, and set about
trying to correct them. Not surprisingly, his ratings were considerably higher than the average ratings
up to this point.
It seems that TripAdvisor users regularly read the reports submitted by previous users before
booking a hotel, or before writing a review. Past reviews create some prior expectation regarding the
quality of service, and this expectation has an influence on the submitted review. We believe this
observation holds for most online forums. The subjective perception of quality is directly proportional
to how well the actual experience meets the prior expectation, a fact confirmed by an important line
of econometric and marketing research (Parasuraman et al., 1985, 1988; Olshavsky and Miller, 1972;
Teas, 1993).
The correlation between the reviews has also been confirmed by recent research on the dynamics of
online review forums (Forman et al., 2006).
6.3.1 Prior Expectations
We define the prior expectation of user i regarding the feature f , as the average of the previously
available ratings on the feature f6:
ef (i) =
∑
j<i,r
j
f
6=0
rjf
∑
j<i,r
j
f
6=0
1
As a first hypothesis, we assert that the rating rif is a function of the prior expectation ef (i):
Hypothesis 6.3.1 For a given hotel and feature, given the reviews i and j such that ef (i) is high and
ef (j) is low, the rating r
j
f exceeds the rating r
i
f .
We define high and low expectations as those that are above, respectively below a certain cutoff
value θ. The set of reviews preceded by high, respectively low expectations are defined as follows:
Rhighf = {rif |ef (i) > θ}
Rlowf = {rif |ef (i) < θ}
These sets are specific for each (hotel, feature) pair, and in our experiments we took θ = 4. This rather
high value is close to the average rating across all features across all hotels, and is justified by the fact
that our data set contains mostly high quality hotels.
For each city, we take all hotels and compute the average ratings in the sets Rhighf and R
low
f (see
Table 6.3). The average rating amongst reviews following low prior expectations is significantly higher
than the average rating following high expectations.
There are two ways to interpret the function ef (i):
6if no previous ratings were assigned for feature f , ef (i) is assigned a default value of 4.
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Table 6.3: Average ratings for reviews preceded by low (first value in the cell) and high
(second value in the cell) expectations. The P-values for a positive difference are given within
square brackets.
City O R S C V
3.953 4.045 3.985 4.252 3.946
Boston 3.364 3.590 3.485 3.641 3.242
[0.011] [0.028] [0.0086] [0.0168] [0.0034]
4.284 4.358 4.064 4.530 4.428
Sydney 3.756 3.537 3.436 3.918 3.495
[0.000] [0.000] [0.035] [0.009] [0.000]
3.494 3.674 3.713 3.689 3.580
Las Vegas 3.140 3.530 2.952 3.530 3.351
[0.190] [0.529] [0.007] [0.529] [0.253]
• The expected value for feature f obtained by user i before his experience with the service, acquired
by reading reports submitted by past users. In this case, an overly high value for ef (i) would
drive the user to submit a negative report (or vice versa), stemming from the difference between
the actual value of the service, and the inflated expectation of this value acquired before his
experience.
• The expected value of feature f for all subsequent visitors of the site, if user i were not to submit
a report. In this case, the motivation for a negative report following an overly high value of
ef is different: user i seeks to correct the expectation of future visitors to the site. Unlike the
interpretation above, this does not require the user to derive an a priori expectation for the value
of f .
Note that neither interpretation implies that the average up to report i is inversely related to the
rating at report i. There might exist a measure of influence exerted by past reports that pushes the
user behind report i to submit ratings which to some extent conforms with past reports: a low value
for ef (i) can influence user i to submit a low rating for feature f because, for example, he fears that
submitting a high rating will make him out to be a person with low standards7. This, at first, appears
to contradict Hypothesis 6.3.1. However, this conformity rating cannot continue indefinitely: once the
set of reports project a sufficiently deflated estimate for vf , future reviewers with comparatively positive
impressions will seek to correct this misconception.
6.3.2 Impact of Textual Comments on Quality Expectation
Further insight into the rating behavior of TripAdvisor users can be obtained by analyzing the relation-
ship between the weights wf and the values ef (i). In particular, we examine the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6.3.2 When a large proportion of the text of a review discusses a certain feature, the
difference between the rating for that feature and the average rating up to that point tends to be large.
7The idea that negative reports can encourage further negative reporting has been suggested before Khopkar and
Resnick (2005)
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The intuition behind this claim is that when the user is adamant about voicing his opinion regarding
a certain feature, his opinion differs from the collective opinion of previous postings. This relies on
the characteristic of reputation systems as feedback forums where a user is interested in projecting his
opinion, with particular strength if this opinion differs from what he perceives to be the general opinion.
To test Hypothesis 6.3.2 we measure the average absolute difference between the expectation ef (i)
and the rating rif when the weight w
i
f is high, respectively low. Weights are classified high or low by
comparing them with certain cutoff values: wif is low if smaller than 0.1, while w
i
f is high if greater
than θf . Different cutoff values were used for different features: θR = 0.4, θS = 0.4, θC = 0.2, and
θV = 0.7. Cleanliness has a lower cutoff since it is a feature rarely discussed; Value has a high cutoff
for the opposite reason. Results are presented in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Average of |rif − ef (i)| when weights are high (first value in the cell) and low
(second value in the cell) with P-values for the difference in sq. brackets.
City R S C V
1.058 1.208 1.728 1.356
Boston 0.701 0.838 0.760 0.917
[0.022] [0.063] [0.000] [0.218]
1.048 1.351 1.218 1.318
Sydney 0.752 0.759 0.767 0.908
[0.179] [0.009] [0.165] [0.495]
1.184 1.378 1.472 1.642
Las Vegas 0.772 0.834 0.808 1.043
[0.071] [0.020] [0.006] [0.076]
This demonstrates that when weights are unusually high, users tend to express an opinion that does
not conform to the net average of previous ratings. As we might expect, for a feature that rarely was
a high weight in the discussion, (e.g., cleanliness) the difference is particularly large. Even though the
difference in the feature Value is quite large for Sydney, the P-value is high. This is because only few
reviews discussed value heavily. The reason could be cultural or because there was less of a reason to
discuss this feature.
6.3.3 Reporting Incentives
Previous models suggest that users who are not highly opinionated will not choose to voice their opinions
(Hu et al., 2006). In this section, we extend this model to account for the influence of expectations.
The motivation for submitting feedback is not only due to extreme opinions, but also to the difference
between the current reputation (i.e., the prior expectation of the user) and the actual experience.
Such a rating model produces ratings that most of the time deviate from the current average rating.
The ratings that confirm the prior expectation will rarely be submitted. We test on our data set the
proportion of ratings that attempt to “correct” the current estimate. We define a deviant rating as one
that deviates from the current expectation by at least some threshold θ, i.e., |rif − ef (i)| ≥ θ. For each
of the three considered cities, the following tables, show the proportion of deviant ratings for θ = 0.5
and θ = 1.
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Table 6.5: Proportion of deviant ratings with θ = 0.5
City O R S C V
Boston 0.696 0.619 0.676 0.604 0.684
Sydney 0.645 0.615 0.672 0.614 0.675
Las Vegas 0.721 0.641 0.694 0.662 0.724
Table 6.6: Proportion of deviant ratings with θ = 1
City O R S C V
Boston 0.420 0.397 0.429 0.317 0.446
Sydney 0.360 0.367 0.442 0.336 0.489
Las Vegas 0.510 0.421 0.483 0.390 0.472
The above results suggest that a large proportion of users (close to one half, even for the high
threshold value θ = 1) deviate from the prior average. This reinforces the idea that users are more
likely to submit a report when they believe they have something distinctive to add to the current
stream of opinions for some feature. Such conclusions are in total agreement with prior evidence that
the distribution of reports often follows bi-modal, U-shaped distributions.
6.4 Modelling the Behavior of Raters
To account for the observations described in the previous sections, we propose a model for the behavior
of the users when submitting online reviews. For a given hotel, we make the assumption that the quality
experienced by the users is normally distributed around some value vf , which represents the “objective”
quality offered by the hotel on the feature f . The rating submitted by user i on feature f is:
rˆif = δfv
i
f + (1− δf ) · sign
(
vif − ef (i)
)[
c+ d(vif , ef (i)|wif )
]
(6.2)
where:
• vif is the (unknown) quality actually experienced by the user. vif is assumed normally distributed
around some value vf ;
• δf ∈ [0, 1] can be seen as a measure of the bias when reporting feedback. High values reflect the
fact that users rate objectively, without being influenced by prior expectations. The value of δf
may depend on various factors; we fix one value for each feature f ;
• c is a constant between 1 and 5;
• wif is the weight of feature f in the textual comment of review i, computed according to Eq. (6.1);
• d(vif , ef (i)|wif ) is a distance function between the expectation and the observation of user i. The
distance function satisfies the following properties:
– d(y, z|w) ≥ 0 for all y, z ∈ [0, 5], w ∈ [0, 1];
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– |d(y, z|w)| < |d(z, x|w)| if |y − z| < |z − x|;
– |d(y, z|w1)| < |d(y, z|w2)| if w1 < w2;
– c+ d(vf , ef (i)|wif ) ∈ [1, 5];
The second term of Eq. (6.2) encodes the bias of the rating. The higher the distance between the
true observation vif and the function ef , the higher the bias.
6.4.1 Model Validation
We use the data set of TripAdvisor reviews to validate the behavior model presented above. We split
for convenience the rating values in three ranges: bad (B = {1, 2}), indifferent (I = {3, 4}), and good
(G = {5}), and perform the following two tests:
• First, we will use our model to predict the ratings that have extremal values. For every hotel, we
take the sequence of reports, and whenever we encounter a rating that is either good or bad (but
not indifferent) we try to predict it using Eq. (6.2)
• Second, instead of predicting the value of extremal ratings, we try to classify them as either good
or bad. For every hotel we take the sequence of reports, and for each report (regardless of it value)
we classify it as being good or bad
However, to perform these tests, we need to estimate the objective value, vf , that is the average of
the true quality observations, vif . The algorithm we are using is based on the intuition that the amount
of conformity rating is minimized. In other words, the value vf should be such that as often as possible,
bad ratings follow expectations above vf and good ratings follow expectations below vf .
Formally, we define the sets:
Γ1 = {i|ef (i) < vf and rif ∈ B};
Γ2 = {i|ef (i) > vf and rif ∈ G};
that correspond to irregularities where even though the expectation at point i is lower than the delivered
value, the rating is poor, and vice versa. We define vf as the value that minimize these union of the
two sets:
vf = argmin
vf
|Γ1 ∪ Γ2| (6.3)
In Eq. (6.2) we replace vif by the value vf computed in Eq. (6.3), and use the following distance
function:
d(vf , ef (i)|wif ) = |vf − ef (i)|
vf − ef (i)
√
|vf 2 − ef (i)2| · (1 + 2wif );
The constant c ∈ I was set to min{max{ef (i), 3}}, 4}. The values for δf were fixed at {0.7, 0.7, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6}
for the features {Overall, Rooms, Service, Cleanliness, Value} respectively. The weights are computed
as described in Section 6.2.
As a first experiment, we take the sets of “extremal” ratings {rif |rif /∈ I} for each hotel and feature.
For every such rating, rif , we try to estimate it by computing rˆ
i
f using Eq. (6.2). We compare this
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estimator with the one obtained by simply averaging the ratings over all hotels and features: i.e.,
r¯f =
∑
j,r
j
f
6=0
rjf
∑
j,r
j
f
6=0
1
;
Table 6.7 presents the ratio between the root mean square error (RMSE) when using rˆif and r¯f to
estimate the actual ratings. In all cases the estimate produced by our model is better than the simple
average.
Table 6.7: Average of RMSE(rˆf )RMSE(r¯f )
City O R S C V
Boston 0.987 0.849 0.879 0.776 0.913
Sydney 0.927 0.817 0.826 0.720 0.681
Las Vegas 0.952 0.870 0.881 0.947 0.904
As a second experiment, we try to distinguish the sets Bf = {i|rif ∈ B} and Gf = {i|rif ∈ G} of
bad, respectively good ratings on the feature f . For example, we compute the set Bf using the following
classifier (called σ):
rif ∈ Bf (σf (i) = 1)⇔ rˆif ≤ 4;
Tables 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 present the Precision(p), Recall(r) and s = 2prp+r for classifier σ, and compares
it with a naive majority classifier, τ , τf (i) = 1⇔ |Bf | ≥ |Gf |:
Table 6.8: Precision(p), Recall(r), s= 2prp+r while spotting poor ratings for Boston
O R S C V
p 0.678 0.670 0.573 0.545 0.610
σ r 0.626 0.659 0.619 0.612 0.694
s 0.651 0.665 0.595 0.577 0.609
p 0.684 0.706 0.647 0.611 0.633
τ r 0.597 0.541 0.410 0.383 0.562
s 0.638 0.613 0.502 0.471 0.595
We see that recall is always higher for σ and precision is usually slightly worse. For the s metric
σ tends to add a 1-20% improvement over τ , much higher in some cases for hotels in Sydney. This is
likely because Sydney reviews are more positive than those of the American cities and cases where the
number of bad reviews exceeded the number of good ones are rare. Replacing the test algorithm with
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Table 6.9: Precision(p), Recall(r), s= 2prp+r while spotting poor ratings for Las Vegas
O R S C V
p 0.654 0.748 0.592 0.712 0.583
σ r 0.608 0.536 0.791 0.474 0.610
s 0.630 0.624 0.677 0.569 0.596
p 0.685 0.761 0.621 0.748 0.606
τ r 0.542 0.505 0.767 0.445 0.441
s 0.605 0.607 0.670 0.558 0.511
Table 6.10: Precision(p), Recall(r), s= 2prp+r while spotting poor ratings for Sydney
O R S C V
p 0.650 0.463 0.544 0.550 0.580
σ r 0.234 0.378 0.571 0.169 0.592
s 0.343 0.452 0.557 0.259 0.586
p 0.562 0.615 0.600 0.500 0.600
τ r 0.054 0.098 0.101 0.015 0.175
s 0.098 0.168 0.172 0.030 0.271
one that plays a 1 with probability equal to the proportion of bad reviews improves its results for this
city, but it is still outperformed by around 80%.
6.5 Summary of Results
The main goal of this chapter is push forward our understanding of the factors that (i) drive a user to
submit feedback, and (ii) bias a user in the rating she provides to the reputation mechanism. For that
we use two additional sources of information besides the vector of numerical ratings: first we look at
the textual comments that accompany the reviews, and second we consider the reports that have been
previously submitted by other users.
Using simple natural language processing algorithms, we were able to establish a correlation between
the weight of a certain feature in the textual comment accompanying the review, and the noise present
in the numerical rating. Specifically, it seems that users who discuss amply a certain feature are likely
to agree on a common rating. This observation allows the construction of feature-by-feature estimators
of quality that have a lower variance, and are hopefully less noisy. Initial experiments suggest that
longer reviews tend to be more helpful to the other users, backing up the argument that reputation
estimators should weigh more the corresponding ratings. Nevertheless, further evidence is required to
support the intuition that at a feature level, high weight ratings are also more accurate, and therefore
deserve higher priority when computing estimates of quality.
Using the same natural language processing of the textual comments associated to reviews, we were
able to establish a correlation between the risk associated to a hotel and the effort spent in submitting
the review. For the reasons detailed in Section 6.2.1 we assume that hotels with higher number of stars
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present a higher risk for the travelers, in terms of taking a bad decision. The average length of the
reviews submitted about high risk hotels is significantly bigger than the average length of low-end hotel
reviews, meaning that users are willing to spend more effort when they perceive a higher risk of taking
a bad decision. An immediate extension of this observation is that users will also be more motivated
to submit feedback about high-risk transactions, however, we did not have the proper data to validate
this assumption.
Second, we emphasize the dependence of ratings on previous reports. Previous reports create an
expectation of quality which affects the subjective perception of the user. We validate two facts about
the hotel reviews we collected from TripAdvisor: First, the ratings following low expectations (where
the expectation is computed as the average of the previous reports) are likely to be higher than the
ratings following high expectations. Intuitively, the perception of quality (and consequently the rating)
depends on how well the actual experience of the user meets her expectation. Second, we include
evidence from the textual comments, and find that when users devote a large fraction of the text to
discussing a certain feature, they are likely to motivate a divergent rating (i.e., a rating that does not
conform to the prior expectation). Intuitively, this supports the hypothesis that review forums act as
discussion groups where users are keen on presenting and motivating their own opinion.
We have captured the empirical evidence in a behavior model that predicts the ratings submitted
by the users. The final rating depends, as expected, on the true observation, and on the gap between
the observation and the prior expectation. The gap tends to have a bigger influence when an important
fraction of the textual comment is dedicated to discussing a certain feature. The proposed model was
validated on the empirical data and provides better estimates than the simple average.
One assumption that we make is about the existence of an objective quality value vf for the feature
f . This is rarely true, especially over large spans of time. Other explanations might account for the
correlation of ratings with past reports. For example, if ef (i) reflects the true value of f at a point in
time, the difference in the ratings following high and low expectations can be explained by hotel revenue
models that are maximized when the value is modified accordingly. However, the idea that variation
in ratings is not primarily a function of variation in value turns out to be a useful one. Our approach
to approximate this elusive ’objective value’ is by no means perfect, but conforms neatly to the idea
behind the model.
A natural direction for future work is to examine concrete applications of our results. Significant
improvements of quality estimates are likely to be obtained by incorporating all empirical evidence
about rating behavior. Exactly how different factors affect the decisions of the users is not clear. The
answer might depend on the particular application, context and culture.
Appendix 6.A List of words, LR, associated to the feature Rooms
All words serve as prefixes: room, space, interior, decor, ambiance, atmosphere, comfort, bath, toilet,
bed, building, wall, window, private, temperature, sheet, linen, pillow, hot, water, cold, water, shower,
lobby, furniture, carpet, air, condition, mattress, layout, design, mirror, ceiling, lighting, lamp, sofa,
chair, dresser, wardrobe, closet
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The internet is moving rapidly towards an interactive milieu where online communities and economies
gain importance over their traditional counterparts. While this shift creates opportunities and benefits
that have already improved our day-to-day life, it also brings a whole new set of problems. For example,
the lack of physical interaction that characterizes most electronic transactions, leaves the systems much
more susceptible to fraud and deception. According to the US Federal Trade Commission approximately
one half of all consumer fraud reports in 2005 were related to the Internet.
Reputation mechanisms offer a novel and effective way of ensuring the necessary level of trust
which is essential to the functioning of any market. They collect information about the history (i.e.,
past transactions) of market participants and make public their reputation. Prospective partners guide
their decisions by considering reputation information, and thus make more informative choices.
Online reputation mechanisms enjoy huge success. They are present in most e-commerce sites
available today, and are seriously taken into consideration by human users. Numerous empirical studies
prove the existence of reputation premiums which allow service providers with good reputation to charge
higher prices.
The economical value of online reputation raises questions regarding the trustworthiness of mecha-
nisms themselves. Existing systems were conceived with the assumption that users will share feedback
honestly. However, we have recently seen increasing evidence that some users strategically manipulate
their reports. For some sites, the extent of spam feedback called for immediate solutions to eliminate
suspicious reports. Known approaches include ad-hoc semi-manual, semi-automatic filters that provide
satisfactory results only temporarily.
This thesis presents a more systematic approach to making reputation mechanisms trustworthy.
Assuming that the agents participating in the market are rational (i.e., they are interested in maximizing
their utility) I investigate different methods for making the reputation mechanisms truthful, such that
users find in their best interest to report the truth.
The design of honest reporting incentives depends on the function and implementation of the rep-
utation mechanism, therefore I address separately the two important roles of reputation. The first role
of the reputation mechanism is to inform future users on the hidden quality attributes of the product
or service they intend to purchase. The mechanism acts as a signaling device which differentiates the
products or service providers depending on their innate attributes and capabilities. Chapter 3 formally
describes the signaling reputation mechanisms, and then proceeds to discussing reporting incentives.
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Previous work showed that explicit payments can encourage truthful reporting in signaling repu-
tation mechanisms. The basic idea is that every reporter gets reworded for submitting feedback, but
different reporters may receive different amounts. The payment received by a reporter depends on
the value of the submitted report, but also on the feedback submitted by some other user about the
same product or service. When carefully designed, these feedback payments support an honest Nash
equilibrium, where no agent can benefit by lying as long as all other reporters tell the truth.
I bring several novel results to the design of incentive compatible feedback payments for signaling
reputation mechanisms:
1. I use the idea of automated mechanism design (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002) to define the
incentive-compatible payments that are also optimal. The payments are defined by a linear
optimization problem which minimizes the expected payment to an honest reporter, and hence
the expected cost to the reputation mechanism. The use of automated mechanism design does not
pose unpractical computation burdens, and can decrease the budget required by the reputation
mechanism by up to 70%;
2. The payments can be further decreased by computing the payment received by a reporter based
on the feedback of several other agents. It has been formally proven that every supplementary
reference report considered by the payment scheme reduces the expected cost of the mechanism.
Fortunately, the biggest reductions in cost are obtained from the first few supplementary reference
reports, which means that the design problem can remain simple enough to be practical;
3. Further reductions in cost can be obtained by filtering out some reports. The reputation mecha-
nism will randomly throw away some feedback. However, the probability of discarding a report
depends on the reports of other agents. When designed together, a payment and a filtering
mechanism can be very efficient, and up to an order of magnitude cheaper;
4. I describe an algorithm for making the feedback payments robust to noise and private information.
When the agents detain private information about a product, the payments proposed by the
reputation mechanism are not necessarily incentive compatible. I give an example of how lying
becomes profitable, and I describe a method for correcting the incentives as long as the amount
of private information is bounded;
5. I address the problem of collusion, and show that general incentive compatible payments are
vulnerable to collusion. If several agents coordinate their reporting strategies they can manipulate
the reputation information without suffering payment losses. The vulnerability to collusion comes
from the fact that general payment schemes have several Nash equilibria, some of which being
more attractive than the honest equilibrium. I add to the design problem constraints to ensure
that honest reporting is the unique or the pareto-optimal equilibrium. I describe several positive
and negative results for different collusion scenarios.
Another direct contribution of this thesis is to identify novel applications for reputation mechanisms
where a reward scheme brings provable properties about the reliability of reputation information. One
such example is quality of service (QoS) monitoring in decentralized markets of (web-)services. By using
the feedback reported by the clients, the QoS monitoring process can be made more precise, reliable
and cheaper.
The second role of reputation mechanisms is to encourage cooperative behavior. In many markets
the seller must exert costly effort in order to satisfy the request of the buyer. However, the buyer
usually pays first and remains vulnerable to cheating; having received the payment, the seller no longer
exerts the required effort. The main idea is that present feedback determines the future reputation of
an agent, and implicitly affects the future revenues accessible to the agent. When carefully designed,
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reputation mechanisms can make it such that the momentary gain obtained by cheating is offset by the
future losses cased by a bad reputation. Hence cheating is appropriately sanctioned by the reputation
mechanism, and this encourages every participant in the market to behave cooperatively.
Sanctioning reputation mechanisms can be designed in many ways, depending (i) on the granularity
of feedback requested from the users, (ii) on the algorithms for aggregating feedback into reputation
information, or (iii) on the extent and form of reputation information dissemination. Dellarocas (2005)
discusses binary reputation mechanisms (where seller, for example, can cooperate or cheat, and buyers
can receive high or low quality) and investigates the effect these design decisions on the efficiency of
the mechanism.
The novel contribution of Chapter 5 is to extend Dellarocas’ results to general settings, where
the seller can choose between several effort levels, and buyers can observe several quality levels. The
following results are worth mentioning:
1. A reputation mechanism where the reputation has a binary value (i.e., can be either good or bad)
can be equally efficient to other mechanisms where the reputation is infinitely finer grained;
2. Efficient reputation mechanism may only consider a finite number of past reports, and should not
consider the entire history of feedback;
3. A mechanism which accepts a finite number of different feedback values can be just as efficient as
a mechanism who allows infinitely fine-grained feedback. More detailed feedback can increase the
efficiency of the mechanism only to the extent it allows a better grouping of signals into a finite
number of classes.
The second contribution of Chapter 5 is to discuss a mechanism for encouraging the submission of
honest feedback. CONFESS works by comparing the feedback submitted by the buyer to the feedback
implicitly submitted by the seller. After every transaction, the seller is allowed to acknowledge failures
and reimburse the affected buyer. If, however, the seller does not reimburse the buyer, and the buyer
submits negatived feedback, the reputation mechanism concludes that one of the agents is lying, and
punishes them both. This simple mechanism supports and equilibrium where all sellers cooperate, and
all buyers report the truth. Moreover, it allows the buyers to build a reputation for always reporting
the truth, which in the end, can be proven to limit the amount of false information received by the
reputation mechanism in any pareto-optimal equilibrium.
Last but not least, the thesis discusses methods for improving existing online reputation mechanisms.
Since we will most likely continue to have reputation mechanisms that do not address the reporting
incentives of the participants, it is important to understand what are the factors that drive users to
submit feedback and bias their ratings. Some recent works proposed several models for explaining why
and how human users provide feedback. In Chapter 6 I extend this line of research by experimentally
analyzing a database of hotel reviews from the TripAdvisor web site. The main results are:
1. The users who amply discuss a certain feature are more likely to agree on a common rating for
that feature. These users are not outliers, and their reviews are generally regarded as more helpful
by the other users.
2. The effort spent in writing a review is correlated to the risk (in terms of making a bad choice)
associated to a hotel. High-end hotels have more risk associate to them since travelers pay more
without knowing if they will get the desired service. Human raters apparently feel motivated to
decrease the decision risk of future users, hence they spend more effort rating the high-end hotels.
3. The rating expressed by a reviewer is strongly biased by the reviews submitted by previous users.
The information already available in the forum creates a prior expectation of quality, and changes
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the user’s subjective perception of quality. The gap between the expectation and the actual quality
is reflected in the rating submitted to the site.
4. A great proportion of users submit ratings that are significantly different from the average of
previous ratings. This leads to the conclusion that human users are more likely to voice their
opinion when they can bring something different to the discussion, and can contribute with new
information.
7.1 Directions for Future Work
The results of this thesis constitute an important theoretical foundation for a new generation of rep-
utation mechanisms that are more practical, and bound to function under realistic conditions. I see
several interesting directions that have a great potential to improve online reputation mechanisms.
7.1.1 From “lists of reviews” to designed reputation mechanisms
Current reputation mechanisms usually require users to submit feedback that (a) numerically rates
the quality of the service on several dimensions, and (b) comments further aspects of the service that
were not captured by numerical ratings. Reputation is then displayed as an average score of numerical
ratings, followed by a list of the textual comments submitted by individual users. I see several problems
with such systems.
First, the interpretation of reputation scores is difficult, and requires both an understanding of
the rating scale, and contextual information about the market. On eBay, for example, feedback can
be negative, neutral or positive, and the score of a user is displayed as the number (respectively the
percentage) of positive feedback reports. However, most sellers have many positive reports and very
few negative ones. To really assess the risk of being cheated, buyers must compare the profile of the
chosen seller with that of sellers who trade similar products.
Moreover, scores are inflated by time, as all sellers continuously accumulate feedback. The trustwor-
thiness of a seller that has one thousand positive ratings today, is not the same as the trustworthiness
of a seller that will have one thousand positive reports next month. The effort invested in assessing the
reputation today, is therefore not reusable the next time the same user transacts on eBay.
Second, the overall scores only contain partial information. Human users heavily use textual com-
ments to disclose important information about sellers or items. On Amazon’s secondary market, for
example, it is not uncommon to discover that a book seller with good ratings has really slow delivery.
For someone pressed to buy a birthday present, the overall rating is misleading. On the other hand,
scrolling through a list of repetitive textual comments is time consuming and prone to missing out
important information.
Third, reputation scores are sometimes aggregated in the wrong way. Available ratings are usually
submitted by biased users that were either very happy, or very unhappy with the product. Using the
arithmetic average to aggregate reports gives a poor estimator with high variance. Finally, available
feedback reports do not necessarily reflect the truth.
I believe that a new generation of reputation mechanisms must be carefully designed to be as effective
as possible. A reputation mechanism should clearly specify the semantics of reputation information (i.e.,
what is reputation information and how does it change with new feedback), and provide clear guidelines
for taking decisions based on reputation information. These aspects influence one another and should
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therefore be designed in equilibrium.
In a first phase, the transition to the new systems can be made by leveraging on natural language
techniques to automate the extraction of information from textual comments. Initial results suggest
that simple algorithms can output valuable data that improves the default aggregation of numerical
scores. One can carry on this track to obtain better methods for extracting reputation information from
available ratings.
Based on improved information, the mechanism can then compute and recommend optimal behavior
strategies that are contingent to reputation information. In equilibrium, the truster will find it optimal
to adopt the behavior recommended by the reputation mechanism, and the trustee will have incentives
to do as expected.
Finally, reputation mechanisms should be augmented with incentive schemes that elicit honest
feedback and prevent collusion. The schemes from Chapters 3 and 5 should be extended to more
practical contexts where ratings are multi-dimensional, quality observations are subjective, and rewards
can be based on something else than money (e.g., access to resources, social prestige, etc).
7.1.2 Signaling and sanctioning reputation mechanisms
In real markets both roles of reputation information are present in the same time: clients must choose
providers with different abilities, who can all cheat or cooperate to some extent. While pure signal-
ing, and pure sanctioning reputation mechanisms are well understood, the design of mechanisms that
concomitantly fulfill both roles remains a theoretical challenge. One reason for that is an apparent
conflict regarding the use of information: signaling reputation mechanisms become more efficient as
they dispose of more information, while sanctioning mechanisms, on the contrary, are more efficient
when they consider fewer reports (Dellarocas, 2005).
7.1.3 Factoring human behavior into reputation mechanism design
Pure theoretical analysis often leads to negative or impractical results. Take for example feedback
payment schemes that are incentive-compatible. They make honest reporting a Nash equilibrium, but
also create other lying equilibria which are sometimes more attractive than the honest one. The resulting
mechanism is vulnerable to collusion, as groups of agents can coordinate their behavior on the more
attractive lying equilibrium.
However, when a fraction of the reporters are assumed honest, it is possible to deter lying coalitions
by making them unstable. The assumption that some reporters will unconditionally report the truth is
justified by both empirical studies, and common-sense intuition. Some users are altruistic and obtain
comfort from being honest. Other users blindly follow the recommendations of the mechanism designer,
and do not have the skills to discover the higher paying lying strategies. Yet another category of users
cannot coordinate their actions with those of a coalition.
I believe there is a great potential to factor facts about human behavior into the game-theoretic
design of reputation mechanisms. Humans are not entirely rational; habit, social norms and moral
values constrain their behavior towards actions that are usually more altruistic and cooperative than
game-theory predicts. These new constraints should allow the design of better mechanisms.
The large literature of psychological, sociological and economical experimental research can provide
numerous insights about the behavior of humans in online feedback reporting settings. These insights
can then be transformed into real models by analyzing the statistical patterns of behavior extracted
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from existing databases. I expect significant improvements for factoring these assumptions in the design
of online reputation mechanisms.
7.1.4 Mechanisms for social networks and P2P systems
One important application of reputation mechanisms is in the context of social networks and P2P
systems, where no central entity can host the reputation mechanism. Feedback is distributed in the
network and reflects the direct interactions among peers.
The design of reputation mechanism is significantly harder in such environments due to the new
technological constraints. Communication channels are imperfect, and messages between two peers must
usually be relayed through several other peers. Peers continuously join and leave the system, which
often triggers reconfigurations in the network. Feedback reports are likely to get lost, the reputation of
a peer can be different in different parts of the network, and can fluctuate heavily with time.
Reputation mechanisms must therefore be robust and computationally efficient. Robustness implies
that peers should not be able to exploit temporary fluctuations of information. Efficiency is required
to reduce the total overhead of reputation management. I believe it is possible to design a reputation
mechanism with asymmetric feedback transmission. Negative feedback should be widely broadcasted so
that cheaters are effectively punished. Positive feedback, on the other hand, can be implicitly assumed
in order to reduce the communication overhead. Nevertheless, the problems associated with changing
or faking online identities (Cheng and Friedman, 2005) should be carefully considered.
7.1.5 Reputation mechanisms translated to other domains
The same design principles used for constructing better reputation mechanisms can be applied to other
domains and improve on current solutions. One example about Quality of Service monitoring systems
was described in Chapter 4.
A future generation of recommender systems can also be designed to account for the strategic
interests of the participants. Users can be incentivised to submit honest ratings by reward mechanisms
similar to those used for signaling reputation mechanisms. Moreover, providers can be effectively
deterred from manipulating the recommendations of the system by filtering techniques initially designed
for reputation mechanisms. I believe that merging recommender and reputation mechanisms will result
in more robust and precise systems which will improve the market efficiency.
Yet another example, novel advertising mechanisms can be constructed based on social networks
regulated by reputation mechanisms. Online advertisements are targeted today based on contextual
information about the user (e.g., keywords of interest, profile based on search and browsing activity).
However, people tend to rely more on friends for getting recommendations about the items they intend
to purchase. I believe there is a great potential for passing on advertisements through the social network
of a user. The role of the reputation mechanism in this context is to prevent abuse, and promote the
spread of responsible advertisements.
In general, any decentralized information system can employ a reputation mechanism to deter
cheating, improve the quality of information, and increase the participation of rational users. I believe
that IT systems which consider the incentives of individual users and make the desired behavior an
equilibrium have a great potential to improve the trust and security of online applications.
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